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Abstract 
This study examines in detail for the first time the emergence and development of a 
highly specialised sector of British manufacturing industry, charting its evolution and 
explaining its growth predominantly through scrutiny of original source material relating 
to the key actors in the story. It proposes that after 1888 Britain produced an optical 
munitions manufacturing structure which succeeded in dominating production of the 
most militarily important and commercially valuable instrument in the field, and which 
by 1914 had achieved an hegemonical position in the international marketplace. The 
study also overturns the conclusions of the previous brief scholarship on the topic, 
asserting that the industry responded well to the challenges of the Great War and going 
on to show that there was a difficult, but ultimately successful translation back to peace. 
This largely ignored branch of British technological manufacturing performed effectively 
and ran counter to notions of the relative decline or comparative failure of industries in 
the sector, and the narrative puts forward reasons to explain that success. To do this, the 
account employs a methodology embracing a combination of theories and models of 
historical explanation to demonstrate reasons for the industry's path and to test the 
interpretations put forward. 
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Introduction 
1 The nature of optical munitions and the importance of the industry. 
The British industry that made specialised optical instruments - `optical munitions' - for 
use in warfare has not previously been systematically examined. It is curious in having 
been almost entirely overlooked, particularly as it constituted an important component in 
the evolution of scientific and technological industries in Britain during the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Optical munitions were devices either specially 
designed or adapted for use in warfare, and used for observation, measuring target 
ranges, and controlling gunnery, torpedoes and aerial bomb aiming. They employed 
complex optical systems requiring great precision in manufacture and incorporation into 
mechanical mounting systems which were equally demanding in their construction, and 
represented highly specialised applications of optical technology that generally had no 
outlet into civil markets. Although optical devices such as telescopes had been used in 
warfare from the early seventeenth century, it was only during the last two decades of the 
nineteenth century that their development was accelerated by a combination of other 
advancing technologies that influenced and stimulated weapons design, a process that 
continued at an advancing pace and peaked during the Great War of 1914-1918, slowing 
with the return of peace and eventually being checked in 1923 through a combination of 
political will and financial constraint. 
Optical devices became essential components of the most complex and important 
weapons systems that evolved during the period of this study. Without them, for 
example, neither the capital ship nor the submarine could have functioned effectively and 
would have been compromised as effective strategic instruments. The optical munitions 
industry that furnished these key components became a vital part of the British 
armaments industry. 
2. Previous scholarship and conceptions. 
The optical munitions industry which emerged in the latter part of the nineteenth century 
and grew to strategic importance in the following thirty years, has been almost entirely 
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overlooked and never closely examined, a state of neglect for which reasons will be 
suggested later. This study closes that gap in knowledge, and shows a capable and 
effective industry whose performance runs counter to some frequent conceptions of 
shortcomings in British technological manufacturing in the early 20th century. It explains 
why this new industry emerged, charts its evolution, provides a chronology and a cast of 
players in the perspective of contemporary events, and describes and explains the 
relationship that developed between the industry, the State client, and the armed forces 
which used its products. The account demonstrates the growing importance of optical 
instrumentation in warfare and explores how the armed forces' attitudes to optical 
munitions were influenced not only by national and international politics but also by 
institutions and traditions within their own structures, which in turn affected both the pre- 
war development and post-war survival of the optical munitions industry. The story 
shows that an overlooked facet of British technological manufacturing had sufficient skill 
and commercial ability to compete so successfully for foreign business before the Great 
War that it reached a hegemonical position which was eroded only by the massive 
political and demographic changes caused by the reversion to peace in the early 1920s. 
Despite its importance, the optical munitions industry has not only been almost entirely 
overlooked, but what little that has been written about it has created a number of 
misconceptions. The nature of optical munitions themselves has not generally been 
understood by historians dealing with industry and individual businesses, who have 
accepted that military optical devices were either the same as those intended for civil use 
or little more than modifications of them. Nor have they recognised the growing 
importance and significance of optics in warfare after the 1890s and the consequent 
importance of the firms making them, and none have made the connection that places 
optical munitions manufacture within the field of the armaments rather than the scientific 
instruments industry. 
The first printed account dealing with the optical munitions manufacture was in the 
History of the Ministry of Munitions, prepared in 1922 as an official record of that body's 
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work during the Great War. ' Its relatively brief coverage of war-time optical 
manufacturing (just forty four pages in a twelve volume work) related to what it 
described as `The Optical and Scientific Instrument Trade'. Two principal problems have 
arisen from this account and misdirected later scholars. Firstly, it located the production 
of optical munitions within the commercial instruments industry, a position which has 
subsequently been accepted without question but which this account will show to be 
erroneous. And secondly, it maintained that the earlier production of optical munitions 
took place within the context of a backward and inefficient optical industry, an 
impression that has also been generally adopted. This study demonstrates the inaccuracy 
of those interpretations and illustrates how they have helped to generate misconceptions 
and errors in the recognition and understanding of optical munitions production in 
Britain. 
For example, Roy and Kay MacLeod's study of the British government's relationship 
with the optical instruments industry during the Great War drew on both the official 
History and some Ministry of Munitions files, reinforced by contemporary reports and 
published correspondence. They saw optical munitions production as part of the general 
optical instruments industry's activities rather than in a separately identifiable sector. 
Their concern was principally with the State's `mediations' in what they described as the 
`science-based industries' that included those making optical instruments, and they 
considered that the production of optical munitions took place `at the extreme end of the 
science-based industries'. Following the lead given by the Ministry's account, they 
emphasised the inadequacy of the pre-war optical industry and the transformation 
achieved during the war, whilst recognising that they had `been unable to look in detail at 
individual optical technologies ... or the business histories of individual fums' 
4 Had 
they been able to direct their examination down those routes, a very different picture 
would have emerged. 
Great Britain, Ministry of Munitions, History of the Ministry of Munitions. 12 vols. (London: HMSO, 
1922). 
2 R. and K. MacLeod, "Government and the Optical Industry in Britain 1914-1918. " In War and Economic 
Development, edited by J. M. Winter. (Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 1977) p. 165. 
3 MacLeod (1976) p. 191. 
4 MacLeod (1976) p. 166. 
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Man Williams touched on optical munitions production when she compared aspects of 
the British and French `precision industries' between 1870 and 1939, in the context of 
connections between precision engineering and the military sciences 5 She identified 
precision industries as those `at the forefront in scientific, technical and industrial 
research', 6 and although not dealing specifically with optical manufacture recognised 
there were links between such industries and the armed forces that had a catalysing effect 
on them. Williams cited the case the case of the Glasgow rangefinder makers Barr & 
Stroud as an instance of how such connections could encourage and shape the growth of 
a particular business.? Nevertheless, she saw Barr & Stroud as part of the instrument 
making community and, despite the company's total lack of either commercial products 
or civil clients, failed to recognise its close connection with the armaments industry. In 
her discussion of the Great War period, Williams took up the theme developed by Roy 
and Kay MacLeod, citing from their earlier work and archival material from surviving 
Ministry of Munitions' files, accepting that a weak pre-war industry had been in need of 
State intervention. 
A third reference to optical munitions manufacture is found in Anita McConnell's history 
of the York optical firm of Thomas Cooke Ltd. 8 She showed the firm's involvement in 
optical munitions production before the Great War, but because much of that was 
`instruments adapted to military needs', or derived from earlier types of survey 
instruments designed originally for the civil market, she regarded them as essentially no 
different from the fun's other commercial optical apparatus. 9 However, McConnell 
made it clear that by no means all of the optical munitions produced by Cooke had any 
likely civil sales; the Watkin depression rangefinder and Grenfell gunsights, for example, 
were designed specifically for use with artillery, and a marketing agreement with 
Grenfell and the arms producers Vickers was signed in 1896.10 Despite this separation 
s M. E. Williams. The Precision Makers; a History of the Instruments Industry in Britain and France 1870- 
1939. (London: Routledge, 1994). In particular, see chapters 2,3, and 4. 
6 Williams (1994) p. 1. 
Williams (1994) p. 34. 
8 A. McConnell. Instrument Makers to the World; a History of Cooke, Troughton & Simms. (York: 
William Sessions, 1992). 
9 McConnell (1992) p. 64, and pp. 72-78. 
10 McConnell (1992) p 65. 
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from civil marketing, like the MacLeods and Mari Williams, she still saw optical 
munitions manufacture as an adjunct to commercial instrument production rather than a 
separate enterprise. 
This failure to identify the importance of optical munitions in the context of industry and 
business has been paralleled in the study of military technology and warfare, where 
optical devices have been seen as subordinate elements of other more elaborate weapons 
systems, rather than as critically important artefacts in their own right. Jon T. Sumida's 
detailed study of the introduction of gunnery direction (fire-control) systems into the 
Royal Navy between 1889 and 1914 emphasised the primary importance of the 
mechanical computational elements that predicted the future position of a moving target, 
minimising the vital role played by the optical instruments that provided the initial target 
distance required to set the process in train. l l Norman Friedman's lengthy examination of 
the evolution of the U. S. submarine confined discussion of the periscope - the only 
means by which a submerged vessel could see what was happening above the surface and 
thus function as an underwater weapon - to an appendix, even then concentrating largely 
on the context of its installation and maintenance in the boat's hull. 12 Like Sumida, he 
relegated optical instrumentation to a secondary role within a larger technological 
system, and in his companion history of U. S. battleships gave even less attention to the 
question, mentioning optical fire-control on only seven of 450 pages without indicating 
its importance at all. 13 
British historians have followed similar paths. In their major history of the design of 
British capital ships after 1912, Alan Raven and John Roberts devoted only one 
paragraph specifically to rangefinders in the period between then and 1922, and Ian Hogg 
and John Bachelor allowed just one page to optical munitions in their comprehensive 
i J. T. Sumida. In Defence of Naval Supremacy; Finance, Technology and British Naval Policy 1889- 
1914. (London, Routledge, 1993). See chapters 3,5, and 6 for details on fire-control systems as a self- 
contained technological entity. 
12 Norman Friedman. U. S. Submarines through 1945; An Illustrated Design History. (Annapolis, MD: 
Naval Institute Press, 1995). p. 267 if. 
" Norman Friedman. U. S. Battleships; An Illustrated Design History (London, Arms and Armour Press, 
1986). See Index. 
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history of the naval gun and its employment. 14 John Brooks examined the location of fire 
control equipment aboard early twentieth century battleships in great depth without 
giving any attention to the nature of optical instruments themselves. 15 This characteristic 
passing-over of optical technology was partly explained by D. K. Brown, another 
historian of warship design, when he said that he took into account `the technology of ... 
fire control ... only [in 
its] impact on the overall design of the ships'. 16 Historians of 
naval armament technology have not been oblivious to optical munitions, but through a 
repeated subordination to other considerations have minimised their importance and so 
failed to introduce any significant body of knowledge into the literature of armaments 
and their application. 
The only published work dealing in any detail with optical munitions manufacture 
remains Michael Moss and lain Russell's history of the Glasgow rangefmder makers 
Barr & Stroud Ltd, commissioned by the firm to mark its centenary in 1988.17 Not 
intended to be either a critical or analytical account of the company, still less a survey of 
an entire industry, it is a straightforward record of the firm's inception and growth that 
provides a narrative account of its fortunes as a specialist maker of optical munitions. 
The authors had access to the company's large archive, and the book contains much 
useful basic factual content about the business, as well as some contextual information. 
However, its `broad brush' nature precluded any analysis of the company's development 
and inter-action with the State, so that the book is something of an aperitif to the whole 
subject of optical munitions production rather than being a meal in itself. 
3 Themes, theories and models. 
The history of the optical munitions industry cannot be encapsulated or fenced-off from 
other history. It existed not only within its own business world and the pursuit of its 
14 A. Raven and J. Roberts, British Battleships of World War II (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1976) 
79, and I. Hogg and J. Batchelor, Naval Gun (Poole, Dorset: Blandford Press, 1978) p. 108. 
s J. Brooks, "The Mast and Funnel Question: Fire-Control Positions in British Dreadnoughts 1905-1915. " 
In Warship 1995 (London: Conway Maritime Press, 1995) pp. 40-60. 
16 D. K. Brown, The Grand Fleet; Warship Design and Development 1906-1922. (London: Chatham 
Publishing, 1999) p. 7. 
" Michael Moss and lain Russell. Range and Vision; the First Hundred Years of Barr & Stroud. 
(Edinburgh: Mainstream Publishing, 1988). In particular, see chapters 1 to 3. 
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specific scientific research, but also in context of evolving military technology and the 
political will to employ and exploit such technologies within a framework of national 
security and foreign policies. As a result, its story embraces not only elements of 
entrepreneurship and invention, of business history and the growth of business structures 
- what may be called `internal' elements - but also has a content concerning the 
evolution of military technologies, of naval and military history, as well as domestic and 
international politics - the `external' elements. Although the principal theme is of an 
evolving industry responding to developments in military and naval technologies and 
growing eventually to become a strategically critical part of the national armaments 
industry, there are other themes which emerge from the external context, interweaving 
with and adding layers to the story, enriching the account but complicating its telling and 
explanation. These contributing themes include the nature of military and naval societies, 
the State's attitude to rights of inventors and the international proliferation of armaments, 
the economic factors influencing expenditure on arms, and the willingness of government 
to sustain vital elements of the defence industry in peacetime. The story of the industry is 
diverse and complicated, and it must look for the theoretical underpinnings of historical 
scholarship to guide and facilitate its interpretation and explanation. 
There is no shortage of theoretical underpinning to draw on; the problem is to decide if 
any one theory or model might possibly serve as a unifying thread to run through the 
study. Notions of technological determinism might seem highly appropriate to the 
understanding of the industry at a time when advances in military technology were acting 
`as a crucial agent of change' in how armies and navies saw the potential of new 
weaponry and acted to acquire it. '8 Advances in armaments technology between the late 
1880s and the early 1920s could be interpreted as having led the governments of the 
major (and some minor) powers into `a situation of inescapable necessity' where they 
had to acquire the latest and most sophisticated weapons systems, a seemingly clear-cut 
case of what Merritt Roe Smith and Leo Marx called `hard determinism' where 
technology itself is credited with `the power to effect change'. As the following account 
18M. R Smith and L. Manx, editors, Does Technology Drive History? The Dilemma of Technological 
Determinism (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1994) pp. ix, xii, xiii and xiv are the locations of the 
quotations in the rest of this section. 
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will show, this seems sufficiently convincing at the start of the story, when the 
technology of new explosives led to the development of weapons whose effective 
deployment demanded the creation of new instruments for their direction. However, 
subsequent changes through time indicate that the development of both instruments and 
industry was influenced as much by those involved with them as by the inexorable 
pressure of technological evolution. 
The accommodation of this trend could be more suitably reached through the alternative 
understanding, still in the area of determinism, that `the history of technology is a history 
of human actions', demanding comprehension of the social, political and economic 
circumstances surrounding those responsible for a particular advance in order to provide 
explanation for it. This `soft determinism' argues that the agency for change through 
technological development lies not in technology itself but in the structure of the society 
in which it is located. Comprehension of the nature of technological power requires 
understanding the `actors' who were at the heart of the process. 19 These approaches lend 
themselves to a process of fusion where, as Smith and Marx suggest, technological 
determinism maybe understood as being the human characteristic of producing societies, 
whether military or civil, that `invest technologies with enough power to drive history'. 
However, the industry's evolution will be seen to involve a great deal of influence from 
areas which were not themselves directly connected with the developing technology, 
raising the question of whether the `softly deterministic' approach can actually be 
adequate to explain the process of evolution that took place. 
The nature of those outside influences and forces will be seen frequently as other than 
technological in their nature, issuing from a variety of sources located outside the 
industry itself, all having their own particular interests and priorities which were by no 
means always similar. The industry's story is made up of a `seamless web of technology 
and society', where the overall context in which technological developments were 
located played a significant part in the identification and solution of problems in the 
19 Smith and Marx (1994), p. xiii. 
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development of optical munitions 2° Contextual factors frequently heavily influenced the 
nature of solutions to perceived problems. The `social construction of technology' 
method (SCOT) might be used to explain how non-technological factors, emanating from 
distinctly identifiable social groups whose interests or goals were by no means identical, 
shaped the evolution of instrument design (and the industry itself) and then influenced 
the recognition of a particular solution as being appropriate for its intended purpose. 
SCOT suggests that technology is socially constructed by groups of people involved in a 
process of innovation and who, individually and collectively, interact with each other in 
order to produce a particular artefact. In this study, the term artefact can be applied both 
to the instruments being made and to the industry which produced them. These groups, 
or `actors', may have differing views of the `proper' form of the artefact involved, but 
work towards a `stabilised' outcome to achieve `closure' of a process which is essentially 
social rather than technical in its nature. 
Although the social constructivist approach promises here to allow a better understanding 
of contextual factors than soft determinism might, it still leaves some difficulty in 
explaining certain aspects of the industry's evolution. This is particularly so in respect of 
events during the Great War, where attempts to overhaul the optical munitions industry 
were frustrated by a set of factors which were by no means covered by the social 
dimension, being inherently technical in their nature and suggesting a decidedly 
determinist nature. Taking into account the apparent appropriateness of some aspects of 
the industry's development for deterministic interpretation, it seems fitting to ask 
whether SCOT is, after all, the ideal model to adopt. 
The `systems' approach to the study of the history of technology adopted by Thomas 
Hughes, which stresses the importance of attention to `the different but interlocking 
elements of physical artefacts, institutions, and their environment', seems best suited to 
facilitate the assimilation of the variety of factors bearing on the development of the 
20 W. E Bijker, T. P. Hughes and T. J. Pinch, editors., The Social Construction of Technological Systems: 
New Directions in the Sociology and History and Technology (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 1989) p. 10 
supplies the quotation. 
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optical munitions industry. 21 Although recognising the essentiality of considering both 
non-technological and social factors, Hughes maintained it was not possible `to deal 
separately with the technological and the social' in considering the evolution of 
technology. 22 Unlike the SCOT approach, in Hughes' view social interests should not be 
seen as especially privileged. Furthermore, he argued that those involved in the 
development of technological industries had to consider how their artefacts related to the 
social, political, economic and scientific contexts that surrounded them, defining them as 
`system builders' who perforce had to manage a plethora of variables in order 
successfully to place their artefacts in `an enduring whole'. 23 Hughes went on to explain 
how these system builders evolved strategies to cope with problems that occurred in the 
growth of their particular areas, providing a `model-within-a-model' to understand their 
development. 
Of all the models considered, this approach promises to allow the most satisfactory 
understanding of the range of social and technological forces that bore directly and 
indirectly on this industry, Hughes' model may indeed be interpreted as `a kind of soft 
determinism 924 but he maintained that his emphasis on what he termed technological 
momentum permitted `a more flexible mode of interpretation', a condition which will be 
particularly useful here. In his view, the social constructivist approach was particularly 
applicable to the understanding of `young' technological systems, whereas determinism 
was better adapted to the comprehension of `mature' ones. In the case of the optical 
munitions industry, whose history here goes from embryonic to mature, this model has 
more to commend it than the others. 
Any of the `determinist', `constructivist' and `systems' approaches could therefore be 
employed successfully in considering the optical munitions industry, although one 
promises to be more successful than the others. But, because of the diversity of themes 
21 Bijker et al. (1989) p. 4 supplies the quotation. 22 D. Mackenzie, `Missile Accuracy: a Case Study in the Social Processes of Technological Change' in 
Bijker et al., p. 196. 
23 J. Law, `Technology and Heterogenous Engineering: The Case of Portuguese Expansion' in Bijker et al 
(1989) p. 112. 
24 David Hounshell, `Hughesian History of Technology and Chandlerian Business History: Parallels, 
Departures and Critics' in History and Technology, 1995, Vol. 12, p. 215. 
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that occur through the phases of its development, it seems appropriate to consider 
whether any single theory or model can in fact be applicable throughout. No matter how 
attractive may be the idea of a single one to bind together the story, the changing nature 
of the emphases revealed throughout the account (as in the Great War period mentioned 
above) suggests the need to consider the appropriateness of employing, or at least 
referring to, more than one type of theoretical underpinning. Although proponents of 
determinism and constructivism may argue that those approaches are frequently mutually 
exclusive, as the story unfolds it will suggest that at different stages in the industry's 
evolution one approach does better suit the case than another. Accordingly, even though 
Hughes' systems approach has much to commend it as the most suitable model which 
will be chiefly used as an aid to understanding the changes that took place during the 
period of this account, where necessary it will be supplemented by reference to the other 
models mentioned above. 
4 Strengths and weaknesses of resource bases. 
The scarcity of published material on the industry means that this study relies on archival 
sources for almost all its detail and also for much of its supporting background matter. So 
far as the industry itself is concerned, it is frustrating that so few records have survived 
for many of the individual companies, and in some cases almost nothing could be 
located. Details for two of the Royal Navy's largest suppliers of sighting instruments - 
W. Ottway & Co. Ltd. and the Ross Optical Company Ltd. - are virtually non-existent, 
apart from trade catalogues and advertisements. Little more than trade catalogues remain 
for R. & J. Beck Ltd., which became a very large munitions producer during the Great 
War. Happily, more details remain for other fines such as Adam Hilger & Co. Ltd, and 
Thomas Cooke & Sons Ltd, both of which had significant roles in the production of 
optical munitions. The Hilger material, although modest in quantity, provides details of 
the firm's size and its premises, and includes a memoir left by its Managing Director 
relating to his work with the firm before 1925. Cooke's records, although incomplete, 
include the indexes to its design office drawings for the period up to 1914, and the 
Directors' Minute Book up to the business being wound up in 1923. 
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Most importantly, a very large amount of material has been preserved by Barr & Stroud 
Ltd. which not only became by far the largest British optical munitions producer, but also 
made the single most important type of instrument, the rangefinder. The collection 
includes material relating to the firm's foundation, and its earliest correspondence with 
the War Office and Admiralty, as well as letters and memoranda passing between the 
firm's principals during its early years. The material increases substantially for the 
company's later years, and after 1900 there is an almost complete set of financial records, 
orders and contracts, as well as a wealth of correspondence with British and foreign State 
clients, foreign agents and domestic sub-contractors. It provides the `thick description 25 
that yields much detail not only about the company's day to day activities, but also its 
attitudes to its domestic and foreign customers. 
Company sources alone however, no matter how detailed, would not permit a balanced 
and reasoned assessment of the optical munitions industry's progress. Even the Barr & 
Stroud collection lacks the letters written to the business, only their replies having 
survived. Fortunately a large body of Admiralty, War Office, and Ministry of Munitions 
records provide both qualitative and quantitative information relating to the Services' and 
the State's attitudes to both the industry and the instruments themselves. The naval and 
military material provide much important and highly relevant context to allow 
explanations of how the industry evolved, particularly in the period up to the Russo- 
Japanese War. Other context, particularly relating to dealings with both the Royal Navy 
and foreign navies, is to be found in published works dealing with the technological and 
political background to the growth in armaments from 1905 to 1915. For the Great War, 
when the industry was placed under previously unimagined pressures, the surviving 
Ministry of Munitions records provide information that reveals a great deal more about 
the industry than the printed account even hints at, and allow an explanation of why the 
official history came to paint such a misleading picture of the pre-war optical industry as 
a whole. 
25 Bijker et al. (1989) p. 5. 
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5 Chapter outline. 
The opening chapter considers the underlying reasons that led to the War Office's public 
advertisement for a practical and effective distance measuring device in 1888, an event 
that conveniently marks the start of systematic optical munitions manufacture in Britain. 
In exploring how evolving late 19th century military technologies created a new demand 
for specific optical aids to gunnery, it introduces the notion that social forces within the 
Army itself had already begun to generate a specific understanding not only of what 
forms those aids should take, but also what was the relevant social group to design them 
and by what means they should be procured. It shows how those ideas became so firmly 
entrenched that they acquired a significance that would influence attitudes towards both 
instruments and industry until the upheaval of the Great War finally forced their 
wholesale revision. This combination of deterministic and constructivist factors develops 
to the start of the Boer War in 1899, when the emergence of a distinct specialised 
manufacturing structure for optical munitions becomes clear. At the same time, the 
growing importance of the Admiralty appeared, stressing the increasing significance of 
the rangefinder. In considering the emergence of the monopoly of Barr & Stroud in 
British rangefinder manufacture, the account shows how that firm was able to establish 
itself so successfully and quickly, and suggests why other established companies in the 
optical field failed to capture this business. 
The period from the Boer War to the end of the Russo-Japanese war in 1906, dealt with 
in the second chapter, marks an increasing use of optical devices on land and at sea, 
together with a growing complexity in the story. These were the first occasions when 
optical munitions were systematically used in battle and the chapter discusses the 
influence that both conflicts had on the progress of their subsequent development and 
incorporation into both British and foreign armies and navies. Questions of the 
relationship between specialised British industry and the State and the capacity for 
industrial mobilisation in time of war add layers to the account, emphasising the financial 
and organisational problems involved in optical munitions production besides the 
technical difficulties involved in the development of the instruments themselves. The 
continued growth of Barr & Stroud and its simultaneously deepening relationships with 
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both the Royal Navy and foreign powers opens up issues concerning conflicts of 
commercial interest, involving secrecy, patent protection and monopoly of supply. 
The succeeding chapter covers the stage from 1907 up the outbreak of the Great War, 
illustrating how optical munitions (and by extension their makers) became confirmed in 
their importance, especially through their incorporation in the most important 
contemporary strategic weapon system, the Dreadnought battleship. It emphasises how 
one firm and one instrument came to dominate the whole question of optical munitions 
production, and shows how far political and economic considerations rather than 
advancing technology were coming to affect the whole question of market potential. 
Scrutiny of the relationship between the British armed forces and the optical munitions 
suppliers emphasises the weakening of a case for a straightforwardly deterministic 
explanation of the industry's evolution and suggests that the growing complexity of 
relations between the key maker and the British government was influenced as much by 
technological as by social factors, emphasising the relevance of Hughes' systems 
approach in the interpretation of events. 
Because the Great War of 1914-1918 was by far the most important episode in which the 
industry was involved during the period of this study, three chapters are devoted to it. A 
number of new issues are introduced there, some of which seemingly shift the emphasis 
back to the appropriateness of a more determinist explanation for the industry's 
evolution, whilst others similarly appear to emphasise the validity of social explanations, 
reinforcing the better applicability of an analytical model that embraces both fields. The 
first war-time section analyses and assesses the performance of optical munitions making 
up to the summer of 1915 and suggests that, contrary to some previous accounts, the 
failures in delivery stemmed principally from the War Office's own organisational 
inadequacies rather than shortcomings in the structure of optical manufacturing. 
Nevertheless, the analysis identifies weaknesses in the trade, relates them to 
contemporary perceptions of the whole optical industry, and then explains how they 
influenced the State's subsequent efforts to mobilise and transform it. 
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The second chapter on the Great War period examines how the creation of the Ministry 
of Munitions resulted in what amounted to the conscription of the civil optical 
instruments trade into what became a hugely expanded but temporary `hostilities only' 
optical munitions military-industrial complex, and explains the agenda that was pursued 
by some Ministry officials in an effort to rejuvenate optical manufacturing capability and 
produce an efficient instruments industry that would compete successfully in the 
expected post-war market place. The account demonstrates that the relatively restricted 
success that was achieved was largely through the immediate pressure of technical issues 
resulting from the pressures created by the war itself, which were sufficiently powerful to 
negate the efforts of the social group attempting to further reorganisation. It also 
considers the massive scale on which the war-time industry was expected to operate, and 
the means by which the Ministry regulated and directed its daily activities. 
The third of the sections devoted to the war uses case studies to examine the performance 
of three distinctly different instances of optical munitions production, examining by what 
means and with what degree of success each one operated. It is in this stage that Hughes' 
model becomes particularly relevant to comprehending the complexity of the forces that 
were actually driving the social groups involved, a disparate grouping of military, 
technological, political and business `families' responding both collectively and 
individually to a frequently conflicting body of requirements. 
The following chapter deals with the problems of industrial demobilisation immediately 
following the end of the Great War, illustrating how the Ministry of Munitions' 
reformation plans for the optical industry were frustrated, this time by a range of factors 
that were more socially constructed than technologically determined. It details the extent 
of the problems facing both the `regular' and the `conscript' optical munitions industries, 
emphasising how different the two branches were and illustrating the differing strategies 
attempted in converting back to peace. The coverage of the industry once more becomes 
focussed on just one company, reflecting the increased importance that Barr & Stroud 
had acquired during the war and how the rapid and major cut-backs in both the Army and 
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Navy paradoxically accentuated its commitment to optical munitions rather than 
stimulating a determined effort to diversify into civil product lines. 
The closing chapter describes how, by 1923, the development of optical munitions had 
been checked not by a limitation of scholarship in military technology, but by political 
will driven by fiscal prudence allied to military and naval uncertainties about the likely 
nature of warfare in the light of maturing weapons technologies such as the aeroplane 
and submarine. The account shows how these factors effectively led to the beginning of a 
hibernation that lasted until the re-armament programmes of the late 1930s. At this point, 
the momentum of military technology might be seen to exert what could be termed a 
`reverse hard deterministic' effect on the industry, where the financial costs and political 
implications of armaments programmes led the principal powers once again into `a 
situation of inescapable necessity', but this time with the opposite effect of the same 
condition before 1914. Then, the condition had led to massive expenditures, but by 1923 
it was pressing governments to scale back spending drastically. At the close of this story, 
optical munitions production in Britain is shown to be reduced in scale to a level at 
which its continuation by those involved represented almost a gesture of faith and 
patriotism rather than sound business sense, a circumstance again best explained through 
a fusion of deterministic and constructivist theories on the lines suggested by Thomas 
Hughes. 
5 Summary 
This study continually shifts focus to bring into clear view the internal and external 
factors that governed the industry's evolution in response to unprecedented changes in 
the scale and scope of military technologies. As with an optical system, the closer the 
study gets to its subject, the harder it is to keep it all in focus, particularly where the 
shape of what is under examination is often ill-defined. Inadequacies and gaps in the 
source material used to build up an image of the industry mean that there are unavoidably 
parts of the larger picture that cannot be seen clearly, despite the best efforts to interpret 
and extrapolate meaning from established facts in order to re-construct events and 
provide explanation. The total elimination of aberrations that distorted the images 
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produced by the lenses of the optical instruments described in the following pages was 
indeed impossible, and their designers were obliged to settle not for perfection but for 
what was possible with the knowledge and materials available. This account is governed 
by similar constraints, and if at times the picture is less than crystal clear then (like the 
instruments themselves) it must rely on having enough clarity to show this particular 
portion of the past essentially as it was. 
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Chapter 1 
The emergence of the industry, 1888 to 1899 
1.1 Introduction 
In 1888 there was no recognisable optical munitions industry in Britain, principally 
because neither the Army nor the Royal Navy used specialised optical instruments on a 
scale large enough to support any business in their manufacture. Although both 
employed telescopes for observation and signalling, they were issued in small numbers 
and were little different to those sold commercially. Telescopic gun sights were rarely 
used and rudimentary rangefinders were found only in the Army. 1 This situation began to 
change after the late 1880s, not because of progress in optical science but because 
developments in armaments technologies created problems in maximising the potential 
of new weapons that were capable of solution only by the application of optical 
technologies. As the range and accuracy of guns increased, it became essential to know 
target distances in order to set elevations correctly, and to have some means to aim at 
targets so far distant as to be almost invisible to the eye. These needs were not entirely 
novel, and both services had experimented with rangefinding instruments and aiming 
telescopes in a haphazard manner since the 1860s, but only with the arrival of the new 
more powerful `nitro' or smokeless propellants did the conditions emerge where optical 
aids to gunnery became not just desirable but essential. As a result, the Army and Royal 
Navy began separately to seek new instruments and so created conditions which could 
nurture the growth of a distinctive optical munitions industry. By far the most important 
of these gunnery instruments was the rangefinder, and this first chapter examines its 
manufacture in the light of developing technology and the contextual influences affecting 
it, considering how innovation in armament technology came to drive specialised optical 
manufacturing into a completely new sector that sat between civil optical instrument 
production and the armaments industry. 
1 For descriptions of observation instruments, see W. Reid, "Binoculars in the Army, Part 1: 1856-1903" 
Army Museum (1981), and R J. Cheetham, Old Telescopes (Southport, Lancashire, 1997), and for 
descriptions of early rangefinding devices, see Great Britain, Army. Regulations for Musketry instruction 
1896 (London: HMSO, 1896). 
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1.2 The War Office and its Rangefinder Paradigms 
In May 1888, faced with the introduction of a new infantry rifle that could be used at 
ranges of a mile or more, 2 the War Office published an advertisement in the London 
journals Engineering and The Engineer inviting designs for a rangefinder suitable for use 
by the infantry, which marked a convenient point to start chronicling the emergence of 
specialised optical munitions production in Britain. 3 The Army already used small 
numbers of rudimentary range measuring devices based on surveying instruments using 
techniques that were well known to civil engineers. These used the principle of 
triangulation, setting out a base-line of known length perpendicular to the object whose 
range was required, and then measuring the angle subtended between the target and the 
extremity of the base in order to calculate the target's distance. They had all been devised 
by serving officers and manufactured by optical instrument makers who produced for the 
civil market. The only successful rangefinder then in service was a highly specialised 
device used by Coastal Artillery in fixed and elevated defensive positions and which was 
incapable of being used by mobile forces. 5 This `Depression Rangefinder' (so-called 
because it measured the angle of depression between itself and the target in order to 
produce a distance reading) had been devised by a Royal Artillery officer, Major H. S. 
Watkin, who had also produced another instrument for Infantry known as the `Field 
Rangefinder', based on the surveyor's box-sextant 6 Like earlier attempts to make 
military rangefinders by Captain Nolan and by Major Weldon in the 1860s and 1870s, 
2 For the background to the new rifle, see E. G. B. Reynolds, The Lee Enfield Rifle (London: Jenkins, 
1960) Chapter 1. 
3 M. Moss and I. Russell, Range and Puion: The First Hundred Years of Barr & Stroud (Edinburgh: 
Mainstream Publishing, 1988) p. 13. Their illustration is not the notice of 25.5.1888, for which see 
University of Glasgow Archives, Barr & Stroud, City of Glasgow, Optical Instrument Makers, collection, 
reference UGD 295 (subsequently UGD 295) 16/1/4, Letter Books and Correspondence, Archibald Barr, 
27.5.1888. 
See W. F. Stanley, Surveying and Levelling Instruments (London: Spon, 1901) chapters 1,2, and 6 for the 
history of survey techniques and descriptions of instruments relevant to rangefinding. 
S A. McConnell, Instrument Makers to the World: A History of Cooke, Troughton & Simms (York: William 
Sessions Ltd, 1992) pp. 64,65 and 78. 
6 For details of the box-sextant, its history and use, see W. F. Stanley, Surveying and Levelling Instruments 
(London: Spon, 1901) pp. 413-420, and for background to the development of earlier rangefinders see 
Minutes of the Proceedings of the Royal Artillery Institution, Vol. II, p. 332ff, Vol. IV, p. 1 ff, Vol. VIII, 
p. 161 f1 Vol. IX p. 47 ff and pp. 549-553, Vol. XI, p. 365. For descriptions of some of these devices, and 
comments on them, see Great Britain, Army, School of Musketry, Annual Report 1891. (London: HMSO, 
1891) p. 20, and Great Britain, Army, Regulations for Musketry Instruction 1896 (London: HMSO, 1896). 
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his portable device had been far from satisfactory and had attracted criticisms of 
inconvenience, fragility, and inaccuracy. 7 These were of relatively little consequence 
whilst combat distances for rifle-fire were usually short enough for sight-settings to be 
less than critical, but the advent of a new high-velocity cartridge and a magazine-fed 
repeating rifle presented the possibility of delivering high volumes of fire at ranges 
where, without knowing the range correctly, errors in sighting would mean missing even 
massed ranks of men-8 The decision was therefore taken to seek a new rangefmder, and a 
public request made for submissions. 9 The successful rangefinder had to be hardy enough 
for use on active service in all weathers, had to be portable by one fully equipped soldier 
and require no more than two men in use, and had to be able to measure ranges with an 
accuracy of 4per cent at 1,000 yards. The designs had to be received before August 1", 
1888, an interval of only eight weeks. 
Even if all the Army's previous rangefinding devices had originated from serving 
officers, there had been earlier commercial efforts to design instruments similar to what 
was now requested. In 1860, the Scottish instrument maker Patrick Adie had been 
granted British Patent 37/1860 for `improvements in means to measure angles', and he 
obtained a second one in 1863 (608/1863) for improvements to his first design. Adie's 
rangefinder differed from those tried by the Army; it was a self-contained type operated 
by one man, with a short measuring-base of three feet six inches rather than the 75 feet or 
more used with the `long-base' patterns in the Army. 10 Two other designs for short-base 
rangefinders had been patented in the mid-1880s by H. R. A. Mallock (British Patent 
8043/1885) and by the Astronomer Royal, W. H. M. Christie (British Patent 
12404/1886), but neither had been marketed. Adie had tried to sell his for survey use, 
and it had been included in trials held by the Royal Artillery in 1869, although it had 
' Great Britain, Army, School of Musketry, Annual Report (London: HMSO, 1893) p. 18. 
a E. G. B. Reynolds, The Lee Enfield Rifle (London: Jenkins, 1960) p. 21 describes the origins of the Lee 
Metford rifle, and Great Britain, Army, Regulations for Musketry Instruction, editions for 1887 and 1896 
(London: HMSO, 1887 and 1896) illustrate the differences in ranges between the old new rifles in Tables E 
and F (1887) and fig. 419 (1896). 
9 The following conditions are extracted from the advertisement itself preserved in UGD 295/16/1/4- 
'0 Moss and Russell (1988) describe and illustrate this and other patterns on pp. 18-21; L. C. Martin, 
Optical Measuring Instruments: Their Construction Theory and Use (London: Blackie, 1924) discusses the 
principles of the short-base rangefinder on pp. 104-107. 
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performed poorly and was dismissed as fundamentally unsuited for Army service. 
" 
These designs offered the advantages of being compact, convenient and quick to use, 
qualities that apparently made them well-adapted to the Army's newly published 
requirement. 
There was also a substantial British optical instruments industry that could consider the 
problem. At least 34 optical instrument makers existed in 1888 who were making, or had 
recently made, survey instruments, telescopes or microscopes, all of which had some of 
the characteristics of rangefinders in using precisely worked optical systems 
incorporating lenses, prisms and mirrors mounted in protective housings. 12 These firms 
made up an industry producing a wide range of precision-made artefacts which sold not 
only domestically and throughout the Empire, but also in Europe, the Far East, the 
United States of America, and South America. There were telescopes from small hand- 
held opera and field glasses up to complete astronomical observatories, surveying 
instruments from the simple box sextant up to the largest transits for primary surveys, 
laboratory microscope bodies and their eyepieces and objectives, as well as stereoscopes, 
spherometers, ophthalmoscopes, and lenses for photographic cameras and lantern-slide 
projectors. A panoply of contemporary optical instruments was being made in Britain 
and it might be expected that such a diverse industry would have produced ideas for a 
new military rangefinder. 
That did not happen. Despite this substantial manufacturing base, not one firm entered a 
design of its own in the trials of 1889, and the only civilian submission came from 
private inventors. 13 The apparent lack of interest may have been connected with the short 
time allowed for the submission of designs, eight weeks being perhaps considered 
insufficient to produce even draft plans for a device that was being considered ab initio. 
There was also the question of cost and likely return on such a project, particularly as the 
" Captain Nolan, "The Range-Finder. " Proceedings of the Royal Artillery Institution II (1874): 161-207. 
12 Extracted from R. G. W. Anderson, J. Burnett and B. Gee, Handlist of Scientific Instrument Makers' 
Trade Catalogues 1600-1914 (Edinburgh: National Museums of Scotland., 1990) and the unclassified 
collection of makers' catalogues held by the National Museum of Photography, Film and Television, 
Bradford, West Yorkshire. 
13 Moss and Russell (1988) pp. 22-23. 
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War Office had given no indication of how much business might result or the likely 
rewards. The only civilian design that reached the end of the trials came from two 
academics who took up the idea as an alternative to a moribund research project with 
which they had become disillusioned. 
In 1888, Archibald Barr (1855-1931) was Professor of Engineering at the Yorkshire 
College in Leeds, and William Stroud (1860-193 8) was Cavendish Professor of Physics 
there. 14 Neither had any connection with the armed forces or the optical industry, and 
Stroud's later description of their decision to enter the competition suggests it was rooted 
in little more than momentary caprice. The two men had met in Leeds during August 
1885 and in 1887 they began to design a camera to simplify the production of lantern- 
slides as teaching aids. Early in 1888 they decided to collaborate in a research project on 
the numerical value of the mechanical equivalent of heat but had made little progress by 
the time the War Office advertisement appeared on May 25th. Stroud subsequently 
recorded that 
On the morning of May 26th, Dr Barr came round to see me and proposed to drop 
the subject of the determination of the mechanical equivalent of heat and take up 
the invention of Rangefinders; so there and then we decided to enter for the 
competition for Rangefinders, about which neither of us knew anything. In 
blissful ignorance of what had already been done on the subject, we dashed off 
regardlessly. '5 
Stroud's account was written late in his life, possibly to be read by his family as an 
informal memoir, and it suggests a levity not mirrored in Archibald Barr's surviving 
correspondence. However, it indicates that they really did know nothing about 
rangefinders and only after their first and hastily constructed rudimentary prototype was 
a `ghastly failure' at the beginning of June did they begin to approach the problem in a 
deliberate and scientific manner. They began by obtaining Adie, Mallock and Christie's 
14 See Moss and Russell (1988) Chapter 1 for background material on Archibald Barr and William Stroud.. 
's William Stroud (n. d., but circa 1936) Early Reminiscences of the Barr and Stroud Rangefinders 
(privately printed) p. 6 
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patents and examining them in the light of their failure to produce a satisfactory model. 
Unlike earlier designers, the pair could employ simultaneously a combination of optical 
and mechanical skills that allowed them to integrate ideas first in analysis and then to 
work on the invention of solutions by scientific methodology. They were sure that the 
principal reason for the failure of earlier short-base rangefinders had been in the 
weakness of the mechanical engineering around one key part in the optical system. 
Previous attempts had all provided a distance reading by aligning a movable image of the 
target with one that was fixed to the operator's view. The displacement of the movable 
image was done by rotating either a lens or a mirror about its vertical axis, but the 
amount of rotational movement was so small that reading errors resulted through what 
Moss and Russell colourfully described as `drunken screws' and `deranged reflectors '. 16 
To Stroud, the solution was obvious and easily attained by the replacement of one type of 
optical component with another, coupled with a new mechanical arrangement to house it. 
Instead of rotating a lens or a mirror, the image displacement could be done by moving a 
wedge-shaped prism along the optical system's axis, converting a rotational movement 
of a few thousandths of an inch into a much longer lateral motion. Neither aspect of his 
proposal was novel but their application and combination were, and the `invention' could 
therefore be patented and protected. Moss and Russell noted that it was `the most 
important innovation' in the design, which perhaps under-stated its significance; the 
tracking-prism patent alone was enough to keep any other serious competitor out of 
rangefinder manufacture until it expired in 1903 and gave the professors a head start in 
making and selling them. '7 The realisation of such a simple solution to a serious 
difficulty must have prompted them to act quickly before anyone else considering the 
same question arrived at the same answer. A second force to urge them was the War 
Office's response to an enquiry made by Barr on June 13a'. 18 
Barr asked what would happen to the intellectual property in the design if it were taken 
up by the War Office. He enquired whether it would become the Government property, 
or would the inventor `be at liberty to treat with foreign governments' and if it would be 
16 Moss and Russell (1988) p. 21. 
" UGD 295 Unclassified material, J. M. Strang manuscript, p. 18. 
18 UGD 295/1611/4, Barr to War Office, 13.6.1888. 
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`necessary or advisable' to seek patent protection for the invention. The reply was 
dismissive, saying that arrangements about ownership and rights would be made only 
after the trials, without any indication as to how the questions of title and reward would 
be dealt with. As for patents, an inventor should decide for himself about the desirability 
of protection. What Barr made of all this is not recorded in the surviving records but a 
reasonable interpretation was that the War Office regarded itself as the sole arbiter of 
how inventors should be treated and would offer only the terms it thought fit. In that 
event, patent protection was clearly an advantage and the pair quickly drafted a 
provisional specification and lodged it at the Patent Office before the end of June. 19 
Moss and Russell's account of this emphasised the collaborative nature of Barr and 
Stroud's work, stressing that Barr's pragmatic approach, espousing sound engineering 
methodology that worked towards "the elimination, as far as possible, of the need for 
accurate and difficult craftsmanship", enabled Stroud's `inventive' solutions to be 
translated in to a practical form. 20 However, the authors placed less emphasis on Barr's 
entrepreneurial instinct that was vital in advancing the rangefinder through the processes 
of invention and development to introduce it successfully to a specialised market place in 
which he had neither personal experience nor prior training. Barr's ability to anticipate 
and manage business problems was evident throughout this first phase in the 
development of the industry, demonstrating his capacity for devising lateral strategies to 
deal with them. 
The first difficulty came after the War Office examined the design and requested a 
prototype for examination by its Trials Committee before the end of December 1888. The 
costs had to be met personally by the inventors as the War Office refused even to 
consider any claims for expenses until after the trials, and there was no guarantee that 
they would be met if the submission was unsuccessful 2' According to Stroud, both he 
and Barr suffered from `acute impecuniosity', so to minimise their cash outlay they used 
"British Patent 9520/1888 records the application date as 30.6.1888. 20 Extract from Barr's inaugural address to Glasgow University's Engineering Society, January 1892. Cited 
by Moss & Russell (1988) p. 22. 
21 UGD 295/16/1/4, Barr Personal papers, War Office to Barr, 16.6.1888, extract from War Office 
Memorandum for Inventors. 
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the College's Physics Department technician to do all the mechanical construction work, 
assembling mechanical components made by James White & Co, in Glasgow (where 
Barr had connections from his earlier work at the University there as assistant to Sir 
William Thomson). The pair, taking care not to broadcast what they were about, kept `a 
rigid account' of his time at Barr's suggestion, so that in the event of the rangefinder 
being successful they could pay for the man's services in order that the Yorkshire 
College `should have no claim to a share of the proceeds'. Barr, according to Stroud had 
`the wisdom of the serpent', 22 although when word of the clandestine construction work 
eventually came out after the rangefmder's adoption Stroud came in for considerable 
censure from the College, irrespective of his willingness to foot the bill for Departmental 
labour. 23 The authorities considered the institution should have an interest in the 
rangefinder, and pressed Stroud so severely on the matter that his position came under 
review before he eventually convinced them to settle for payment of the technician's 
wages. 
But long before then, while the first rangefinder was being built, Barr began lobbying to 
gain access to the Trials Committee to allow him to replace it with an improved model. 
In November or December, he obtained `letters of introduction' to Major General Clark 
(the senior reviewing officer) which led to Barr getting a meeting on January 18th 1889.24 
He and Stroud had refined the optics and their housing to produce a more easily used and 
durable instrument which they wished to build and substitute for the one recently 
delivered. 25 The Committee refused this because it contravened the terms of the 
competition, but Clark told Barr that if the original rangefmder passed, the improved 
version might possibly be entered in later trials. 26 The first prototype was tested in March 
and performed well, and immediately afterwards Barr persuaded the new senior 
u Stroud, Early Reminiscences p. 7. 
23 See Moss and Russell (1988) p. 23, and UGD 295 unclassified material ACC1539, 'Notes by Mrs Shaw 
Murray (Dr Stroud's daughter) in which she describes the effect the business had on Stroud's health. 
24 UGD 295/16/1/1, Barr to Ripon, 1.1.1889, and UGD 295/16/1/17, Barr to Ordnance Committee, 
18.3.1889. 
25 UGD 295/16/l/17,, Barr to Ordnance Committee, 18.3.1889, and Archibald Barr and William Stroud, 
Memorandum to the Ordnance Committee, Royal Arsenal Woolwich March 18th 1889. Copy in GUA, UGD 
295'Un-classified papers'. Subsequently'Memorandum'. 
26 UGD 295/16/14, Barr to Ordnance Committee acknowledging their decision, 21.1.1889. 
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reviewing officer, Major-General P. Smith, to follow the lead of his predecessor and 
allow the submission of detailed proposals for the modified design. Before the end of 
May it was agreed the new model could be entered for the second set of trials in August 
as the `Barr and Stroud Improved Rangefinder' and on the 19th Barr was told to have it 
delivered by the end of July. 27 
Barr wanted to enter the best instrument possible, and was prepared to employ 
sophistication in design to obtain the required accuracy. This did not conflict with his 
desire to eliminate `accurate and difficult craftsmanship', by which he meant hand-fitting 
individual components, but actually endorsed his methodological approach to appropriate 
engineering solutions where he was prepared to use whatever means were essential to 
attain an essential goal. Stroud's original design used right-angled prisms for its 'end- 
reflectors' in place of the mirrors in earlier rangefinders. Prisms, which had only started 
to become common in optical instruments during the 1880s, were more stable and 
resistant to the distortions that were almost impossible to avoid in glass mirrors and had 
affected the accuracy of earlier rangefinders. Stroud's proposed optical improvements 
used a novel 'objective prism' that had one face ground to a curve to let it also function as 
a lens and so improve the image's brightness besides providing an assembly that could 
be more rigidly mounted, improving the performance substantially. 28 However, they 
were a novel concept and both difficult to make and more expensive than the more usual 
plane-surfaced types, a combination of difficulties that was to prove disastrous. 
Sometime after the March trials, according to Moss and Russell, the inventors decided 
their rangefmder's high selling price `might prejudice its chances' and they looked to 
make `substantial savings' which subsequently had a catastrophic effect on the 
21 Archibald Barr and William Stroud, Memorandum, compares the two types in detail, and UGD 
295/16/1/4, Bar 's personal papers, Barr to Ordnance Committee acknowledging their decision, 3.6.1889. 
and Ordnance Committee to Barr, 19.6.1889. 
28 For information on prism designs see G. Smith and D. A. Atchison, The Eye and Visual Optical 
Instruments (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) Chapter 8. For other background information 
on optical systems, see L. C. Martin, Optical Measuring Instruments: Their Construction Theory and Use 
(London: Blackie, 1924) and D. F. Home, Optical Instruments and Their Applications (Bristol: Adam 
Hilger Ltd., 1980). 
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instrument's performance in the second set of trials. 29 The authors' sources for this were 
Stroud's later memoir and a letter from Barr to the Ordnance Committee on May 18th, 
whose contents were not given in detail and which is not in the now-surviving records. 
There are grounds to believe that matters were by no means as simple as this account 
suggests, raising questions about the ability of contemporary optical manufacturing 
technology to provide what was needed. 
Having justified the submission of a new instrument to the Ordnance Committee entirely 
on the grounds of significant optical and mechanical advantages obtained through using 
`objective prisms', the Professors' change from them to `plane-parallel silvered 
reflectors' (glass mirrors) is not easy to understand and difficult to reconcile with the 
later claims about economies alone being responsible for it. The problems with mirrors 
were well known to Barr and Stroud, and they had always recognised that their use had 
been partly to blame for the failures of earlier rangefinders. The relatively thin sheets of 
glass were virtually impossible to mount in a manner that let them respond to 
temperature changes without flexing and distorting to give false range readings. Even if 
the economies had been great enough to bring the price down to anything like the 
Mekometer's, the dangers of using them still remained. But reducing the rangefmder's 
cost so greatly was highly improbable, because even without any optics the complexity 
of its strain-resisting body inevitably meant a higher price greater than the simple sheet- 
metal box used by Watkin in conjunction with an optical system that was no more than 
two mirrors and three meniscus lenses similar to those used in spectacles. Despite 
Stroud's later abbreviated account of the trials, the change must have been driven by 
some other factor. 
The most likely explanation is a failure to obtain the complex prisms that were at the 
heart of the improved model. Although Moss and Russell said that Stroud had gone to 
the York instrument makers Thomas Cooke and Sons for his first lenses and prisms, it is 
unlikely that Cooke's actually did all the optical work. 30 By 1888, the London firm of 
29 Moss & Russell (1988) p. 23, and Stroud, Early Reminiscences, p. 8. 
30 Moss & Russell (1988) p. 22. 
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Adam Hilger & Co. had established itself as the country's leading maker of prisms, and 
Archibald Barr may already have been acquainted with its owners, Adam and Otto 
Hilger, through his earlier connections with Lord Kelvin in Glasgow. 31 The Hilgers had 
made optical parts for Sir Archibald Campbell, an associate of Kelvin, since 1875, and in 
1888 Otto Hilger had moved to Glasgow to work for Campbell in his laboratory. Barr 
had been Kelvin's assistant before he went to Leeds, and maintained contact with him 
during the time he and Stroud were developing the rangefinder, sending him details of 
the design and receiving comments on it. 32 Hilger's having made prisms for the 1889 
instrument is supported by a reference in the firm's surviving papers that although the 
first order from the partnership of `Barr & Stroud' came in 1891, there had been other 
earlier ones from the 'individuals'. 3 Hilger's prism expertise was considerable, but it 
was a small firm which, as will be seen in subsequent chapters, regularly had difficulty 
keeping its work on schedule, and in 1889 relied almost entirely on Adam Hilger himself 
for the most difficult and exacting work such as Stroud's objective prisms. If their 
unusual form caused problems and delayed completion, then the delivery deadline of 31 
July for the rangefinder would have demanded an urgent solution for which the use of 
mirrors must have been the only course open. 
Much of this is conjectural, but the behaviour of the rangefinder at its trial was 
indubitably a shock for which Moss and Russell advanced no explanation. When Stroud 
used it in the cool of the August morning it worked well, but as the day progressed the 
sun's heat `distorted the mirrors' and `to Dr Stroud's dismay' it produced `wildly 
inaccurate readings'. 34 That the failure clearly came as a surprise suggests either gross 
negligence in preparation or that there had been inadequate time to test it properly 
beforehand. The notion that the change to mirrors was solely on grounds of cost hardly 
31 For a summary of Hilger's history see D. F. Home (1980) Optical Instruments and their applications 
(Hilger, Bristol) p. 34, and for details of connections with Campbell see Science Museum Library, Hilger 
collection, HILG 3/1, History, `Notes from Mr Johnson in connection with his history of Adam Hilger', 
6.11.1952, and HILG 3/1, `Mr Twyman's Lecture, August 1944'. 
32 UGD 295/16/1/3, Barr, Personal Correspondence, William Thomson to Barr, 8.3.1889, commenting on 
the design. 
" HILG 3/1, Sales Manager, Hilger & Watts (successor company to Adam Hilger Ltd) to Barr & Stroud 
Ltd, 25.1.1952. 
"Moss and Russell (1988) p. 23. 
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stands in the context of what Barr and Stroud already knew about rangefinder design. 
Moss and Russell drew their account from Barr & Stroud archive material that apparently 
failed to survive the later removal of records from the factory, 35 and Stroud's own 
account of the trials makes no reference to the performance being different to previous 
experience. The authors noted that `the professors were left to agonise over their mistake 
in substituting a cheaper design' but the cause of the mistake may have been due to 
limitations in the level of contemporary optical manufacturing technology in Britain. 
An understanding of this may be reached through the ideas propounded by Thomas 
Hughes in his `systems approach' to understanding the evolution of technological 
systems. Stroud had encountered what Hughes categorised as a reverse salient, a situation 
where a component in a system has `fallen behind or gone out of phase with others' 
holding back progress on what he termed a `broader front' and which will, when solved 
correct the problem. 36 Hughes recognised that such situations may be by-passed, 
allowing progress to be resumed pending a solution, which appropriately describes 
Stroud's problem. Because satisfactory prisms were unobtainable - whether for technical 
or financial reasons - and time was pressing, Stroud had no option but to deal with the 
problem by substituting an inferior technology. Ironically, his success in devising the 
tracking-prism to overcome an earlier reverse salient that was a greater `critical problem' 
in rangefinder construction, was negated by the unexpected failure to deal with the 
second one of end-reflectors. There, the issue was not one of an appropriate solution, but 
the unanticipated problem of prism procurement. The production of large prisms was a 
reverse salient that would remain for several years but, as the narrative will show, a 
lateral solution was devised that enabled progress on the broader front of rangefinder 
development to continue in the meantime. 
After the trials, Barr and Stroud were told that their instrument had not been selected and 
the Watkin Mekometer had been chosen. However, it is by no means certain that the 
35 Moss and Russell (1988) p. 238, notes 32 and 34 state `Cash Book No. 1' referring to letters received. 
36 T. P. Hughes, "The Evolution of Large Technological Systems. " In The Social Construction of 
Technological Systems: New Directions in the Sociology and History of Technology, edited by W. E. 
Bijker, T. P. Hughes, and T. J. Pinch. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1989) pp. 73 and 74. 
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decision for the Watkin was made simply because it performed more accurately. The 
published specification of May 25th 1888 might have been written around the 
Mekometer, in fact it described exactly the kind of instrument the Mekometer was. All 
the Army's previous rangefinding devices had been, like the Mekometer, the 'two- 
observer long-base' type and the Army had become habituated to their use, largely 
because when used deliberately under test conditions they did indeed produce far more 
accurate readings than the single-observer designs. 37 In a lecture at the Royal Artillery 
Institute in 1881, reviewing every variation of rangefinder tried since 1861, the speaker 
emphasised that the only types proven as definitely unsuitable were the `yard telemeters', 
by which he meant the self-contained single observer types. 8 He emphasised that what 
was needed was refinement and simplification of the long-base type and that no other 
system was likely to perform satisfactorily. This pre-disposition had come to constitute a 
`rangefinding paradigm' that was reflected in the 1888 specification and which would 
continue to influence the Army for the next fifteen years. 
William McBride has considered the concept of both intellectual and technological 
paradigms in the context of what he designated military hierarchical structures. 39 He 
defined a military intellectual paradigm as an established philosophy within an army or 
navy, and suggested that the military technological paradigm differed from Edward 
Constant's earlier definition of `an exemplary artefact and a cultural framework devoted 
to sustaining it' in that the military one interacted not only with the surrounding culture 
but also with the intellectual paradigm of the related military profession. 4° This 
combination can be used as a model to explain the selection process which the War 
Office followed in 1889 and its later attitude towards rangefmding apparatus, particularly 
when applied in conjunction with McBride's other thesis that `military hierarchies seek 
stability' and when presented with a new technology which is perceived as challenging 
such stability, they can react adversely towards it. This sits within the broader framework 
" Captain Nolan, "The Range-Finder. " Proceedings of the Royal Artillery Institution II (1874): p. 162. 
38 E. G. Edwards, "Field Range-Finding. " Proceedings of the Royal Artillery Institution XI (1883): 202-14. 
39 W. McBride, Technological Change and the U. S. Navy 1865-1945 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2000) pp. 4-6. 
40 MacBride cites E. Constant II, The Origins of the Turbojet Revolution (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1980) as the basis of his modified definition. 
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of Thomas Hughes' understanding of the growth of technological systems (which here 
are represented by the rangefinder), in which he emphasised the interaction of both social 
and technical factors in shaping the evolution of artefacts. 
With the British Army and the rangefinder, the evolved intellectual paradigm was that 
only long-base rangefinders could provide sufficient accuracy, and the technological 
paradigm was manifested in the assorted instruments in use that all conformed to the 
principle of extended bases. The `exemplary artefact' was not one single device, but a 
family of similar devices that had in common inventors who were all drawn from the 
cultural framework of serving officers which supported the paradigm itself. From that, it 
can be adduced that the intellectual paradigm was extended to project the concept that 
only members of the military society could be expected to understand the Army's needs, 
and so be competent in evolving suitable designs for it. The War Office was pre- 
conditioned to frame its May 1888 specification in the way it did, because its 
rangefmding paradigm postulated that a successful instrument would have pre- 
determined characteristics that would favour, or even demand, a particular form of 
instrument. At the same time, according to Mc Bride, the hierarchical structure of the 
Trials Committee would tend to reject any anomalous artefact that challenged the 
existing (though still imperfect) stability. The outcome of the trials can be construed in 
exactly that manner. 
The Mekometer's operation was far more complicated than a single-observer 
instrument. 1 Two operators stood erect twenty five yards apart and aligned their separate 
instruments on a pre-determined target, and then manipulated one vis-a-vis the other until 
images reflected from the target and the other instrument were brought into alignment. 
With the single-observer type, all that was needed was to aim the instrument and align 
two images by means of an operating wheel. Its tactical advantages were acknowledged, 
but the previous failures to make a practical example had consistently reinforced the 
paradigm of the two-observer instrument. Despite Barr and Stroud's success in the 
41 Great Britain, Army, Handbook of the Mekometer (London: HMSO, 1911) pp. 9-13 describe the 
instrument's operation.. 
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March trials, the failure in August was, to the cultural framework of the Trials 
Committee, predictable on the basis of past experiences and the expected outcome 
reinforced the existing rangefmding paradigm, not only because it confirmed the notion 
that such designs were intrinsically unsuited but also because it originated outside the 
military society that defined expectations of it. What McBride described as `inherent 
paradigmatic inertia' then deflected attention away from the potential tactical advantages 
in Barr and Stroud's design and directed the selection process towards the Mekometer 
despite its operational drawbacks. 
1.3 The War Office and Thomas Cooke & Sons 
The Mekometer was `introduced into service' in October 1891.42 It was produced by 
Thomas Cooke & Sons who must have been given a contract slightly earlier, because by 
April 1891 they had already prepared the necessary drawings to commence 
manufacture. 3 Production, or at least its issue to troops, went ahead slowly, with the 
School of Musketry commenting in its Annual Report for 1892-1893 that the only 
rangefinders in service with the Infantry were still the older Watkin and Weldon types 
which the Mekometer was intended to supersede. 44 It was by no means the first optical 
device the firm had made for the Army, and Cooke's had an acquaintance with its 
designer that went back at least to the 1870s when as a Captain in the Royal Artillery 
Watkin had designed his Depression Rangefinder for coastal artillery. 45 Its selection had 
been protracted, with trials taking place between 1876 and June 1881 when it was finally 
adopted and ordered from Cooke's who produced it `under a cloak of great secrecy'. 46 
42 Great Britain, Army, School of Musketry. Annual Report (London: HMSO, 1893) p. 18. 
43 University of York, Borthwick Institute of Historical Research, Vickers Instruments Archive, Company 
Records of Cooke, Troughton & Sims (subsequently VIA), AJB 070/1.3/ Box 1, Drawings Index 1882- 
1921, drawings number 369 and 370. 
44 For instruments in service, see Great Britain, Army, School of Musketry. Annual Report (London: 
HMSO, 1893) p. 18, and for obsolescence of earlier types see Great Britain, Army, List of Changes in War 
Material (London: HMSO, 1891), entry 24.8.1891. 
45 For general background on Cooke's early involvement with optical munitions, see McConnell (1992) pp. 
64-65. For the Depression Rangefinder, PRO WO 32/8902 provides the source material for the following 
section, unless otherwise indicated. 
" McConnell (1992) p. 64 provides the quotations associated with Watkin in the rest of this section. 
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The Depression Rangefinder also fitted the Army's rangefmding paradigm, being a 
sophisticated derivation of the surveyor's level intended to be used in gun batteries which 
were sited well above sea level. It could only be used from a permanent mounting whose 
height above a mean sea level was precisely known and which formed the extended 
measuring base for the system. Its optical component was a high magnification telescope 
incorporating an aiming mark that was similar to those which Cooke's already produced 
for survey instruments; the device's sophistication came in a complex system of cams 
and gears that translated the depression angle into a range reading and target bearing for 
the guns. The combined `Depression Range-and-Position Finder' formed a key 
component in the network of coastal forts and batteries that had been set up since the 
1860s as a strategic defence system against attack and invasion and it was vital to the 
doctrine of engaging an enemy at long range before he could approach closely enough to 
deploy his own armament. 47 Watkin's device was considered important enough for the 
Crown to award him £25,000 in 1888, for `transferring his patents to the War Office. ' It 
is difficult to resist the idea that, given Watkin's personal standing at the time of the 1889 
trials, their outcome might have been a foregone conclusion. 
In 1891 Cooke's had become sole maker of Watkin's devices which, to the British Army, 
were state-of-the-art rangefinding instruments. Their commercial worth to Cooke's is not 
easy to determine accurately as no directly relevant material from the company has 
survived, but some idea can be formed from other sources. The Army's contemporary 
scales of issue for Infantry rangefinders meant that only 300 Mekometers were likely to 
have been ordered, plus a small number for spares, so that with a selling price of £7, its 
total value could scarcely have exceeded E2,500.48 The Depression Rangefinder is harder 
to assess without knowing how many were needed or its price, but some details 
preserved by Cooke's bankers give clues, as well as telling a good deal about the firm's 
financial condition in the early 1890s. 
47 M. J. Bastable, Arms and the State: Sir William Armstrong and the Remaking of British Naval Power, 
1854-1914 (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2004) pp. 68-69. 
41 The scale of issue and cost are supplied by National Archives, Kew, Records of the Treasury 
(subsequently PRO) TI /11223, Proceedings of the Ordnance Council, 12.6.1908, p. 4. 
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Anita McConnell's history of Cooke's makes clear that although the business had a large 
domestic and export trade it had a record of liquidity problems that ran from the late 
1860s into the 1890s, caused largely by losses from the mismanagement of large 
contracts for astronomical telescopes 49 By the early 1890s, despite an expanding market 
for survey apparatus, profits from general instrument making were inadequate to cover 
losses on the astronomy side and the firm saw optical munitions manufacture as a 
potential solution to its financial difficulties. In January 1891, when the Mekometer 
contract was obtained and the Depression Rangefinder was in production, Cooke's 
current account with the Yorkshire Banking Company was overdrawn by £1,914 against 
an agreed limit of £1,000.50 In September, the firm asked for its overdraft to be raised to 
£6,000 to cover current liabilities, and for a further £4,000 to purchase additional 
premises. Cooke's assured the bank that the money was required only until February 
1892 when `the account would be put in credit by moneys to come to them from the 
Government'. If Cooke's was truly expecting War Office business to rectify its financial 
difficulties then the Depression Rangefinder was worth approximately £7,500 over the 
next year. The bank turned down the application, and in June 1892 the firm was forced to 
ask for `a three month extension of credit to £5,000'. Either the War Office payments had 
failed to come in or trading had deteriorated markedly, but optical munitions work had 
not significantly changed the company's overall financial condition as expected. Cooke's 
may have been excessively optimistic about its prospects, anticipating orders that failed 
to materialise. The amount of business likely to result from optical munitions in the 
1890s was limited by the Army's very limited employment of them and although 
Cooke's had a monopoly of manufacture for the two Watkin rangefinders, neither was 
likely to be bought in large numbers over a protracted period; the reality was that their 
capacity to generate a continuous and substantial income hardly existed at all. 
Although the Army, via the War Office made the first move towards adopting a 
rangefinder, it did relatively little to encourage the development of an optical munitions 
49 McConnell (1992) p. 61. 
50 HSBC Bank Group Archives, Abstract of entries in the Yorkshire Banking Company Board Minutes 
relating to T. Cooke & Sons, 1882-1900, references X19 to X24, provides the source for the financial 
details in this section. 
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industry. It was the Royal Navy that did most to stimulate growth through its own efforts 
to find a rangefmder that began shortly before the Army decided to adopt the Mekometer 
and continued over several years until a suitable instrument had been developed. 
1.4 The Admiralty and the Rangefinder 
Unlike the Army, the Royal Navy had never officially employed any instruments for 
measuring distances at sea and had evolved neither an intellectual nor a technological 
paradigm on rangefinding. The Navy was directed towards the problem by the same 
emerging weapons and propellant technologies that had affected the War Office, as well 
as the growing in attention to naval policy after 1884 that led to the large spending 
programme of the Naval Defence Act of 1889.51 Faced with the prospect of new ships 
armed with improved guns which could shoot further and quicker, 52 the Admiralty 
decided to investigate whether a satisfactory rangefinder for shipboard use could be 
obtained. This is one situation where it may be claimed that `hard' technological 
determinism in the shape of new guns and propellants was indeed `driving' the process 
of change, at least in the Navy. There, the combination of rapid-firing guns with far 
greater effective ranges than anything previously made created a situation where the 
advances were so great as to overcome any social factors of resistance within the 
professional community faced with the implications of change. Irrespective of the nature 
of the evolution of those new technological innovations, once they attained a condition of 
practical utility (or stabilisation) their advantages were so manifest that the next stage in 
the progress of naval gunnery was set in motion. That process, though, was effected 
through a combination of circumstances whose explanation resists a deterministic model 
and which is most appropriately achieved through the ideas of Thomas Hughes' systems 
approach. 
In 1889, the Royal Navy still depended on the War Office for its supplies of guns, and it 
was to the Director of Artillery at Woolwich that the Navy first took the issue of 
S' For background to the 1889 Act, see Bastable (20(4) pp. 189-192, and C. Trebilcock, The Vickers 
Brothers: Armaments and Enterprise 1854-1914 (London: Europa Publishers, 1977), pp. 52-55. 
52 For details of the new guns, see E. W. Lloyd and A. G. Hadcock, Artillery: Its Progress and Present 
Position (Portsmouth: J. Griffin & Co., 1893) Chapter VII. 
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rangefinding in June that year. 53 The first Infantry rangefinder trials had just been held 
and the second set was due to start soon when the Navy' Ordnance Committee 
announced on June 14th that `the question of a naval rangefinder is one of pressing 
importance'. The Navy's gunnery school, HMS Excellent, was also asked for an expert 
opinion. Its captain's reply on the 260' was that he did `not attach great importance to 
rangefinders' as `a far more practical means of obtaining the ranges quickly' was by 
observing the splashes made by misses from the new quick-firing guns that were then 
being introduced. He thought there was no need for the Ordnance Committee to pursue 
the matter. The Director of Naval Ordnance (DNO) was but little impressed with 
Excellent's advice and on July 9t' told the Director of Artillery that it would be a `great 
advantage' to have an effective ship-borne rangefinder and asked for the benefit of his 
experience. The Director passed on the names of the entrants to the current trials but 
offered neither advice nor comment. 54 A year later, the DNO asked him to set in motion 
the process of finding a suitable naval rangefinder, and on April 8th 1891 sent a set of 
conditions which the successful instrument must achieve. 
Although the War Office was responsible for instigating the selection process, it took no 
part in the actual trials which were conducted entirely by the Navy, and there were 
significant differences in the way that the Admiralty competition was managed. Firstly, a 
number of inventors were specifically invited to submit designs for it, including the 
entrants to the 1889 trials . 
55 And secondly, the specification itself was framed in such a 
way as to seek a solution rather than define the nature of what was expected in the way 
the War Office had done. 56 The technical demands were considerable: the device had to 
measure ranges to an error no greater than 3 per cent at 3,000 yards, irrespective of ship 
motion, speed, or the course of either its own vessel or its target, it had to take ten 
readings per minute (to produce a mean range) and have provision for `some system of 
instantaneous communication' to send them to the guns, and it had to be as simple and as 
s' Hampshire County Record Office, Priddy's Hard Material, collection reference 109W91 (subsequently 
HCRO)PQ2, Great Britain, Admiralty, Gunnery Department. Monthly Record of Principal Questions Dealt 
with by the Director of Naval Ordnance July-December 1889, provides the source material for this section 
unless otherwise indicated. Dates are given in the text. 
54 Moss and Russell (1988) p. 25. 
ss HCRO/PQ6, Recommendation of Director of Naval Ordnance, 9.2.1892. 
56 See Appendix for the full list of conditions. 
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durable as possible to withstand conditions at sea. William McBride suggested that in 
late 19"' century navies, although `officers had become members of a technology-based 
profession' they did not necessarily accept new technologies automatically as 
improvements. 57 HMS Excellent's Captain of two years previously, who considered that 
observing shell splashes was the best way to find the target's range, may have been an 
extreme example of `filters against adoption' of the new, but the 1891 specification's 
demand for transmission of data suggests that the Royal Navy was looking for new 
technology by asking not just for a rangefmding device but for what amounted to a 
system for gunnery control centred on an optical instrument. 
Submissions were made by a mixture of private inventors and serving officers. The 
Admiralty trials in 1892 and their favourable result for Barr and Stroud have been 
described by Moss and Russell, but it is worth noting that once again the outcome may 
not have been as straightforward as they imply. 58 The two strongest contenders were Barr 
and Stroud and, once again, Major Watkin whose submission was a derivation of his 
successful coastal range-and-position finder. He had integrated his two-observer design 
into an electrical circuit which supplied two angle-readings from widely separated points 
to a central control station which, like the depression type, converted them into ranges for 
transmission to the guns. 59 This was an attempt to transfer the Army's rangefinding 
paradigms to naval use, and in the context of a technologically conversant society might 
have been expected to find favour. Its failure was, officially at least, due to its inferior 
accuracy, but in the light of later attitudes shown towards similar ideas for integrating 
gunnery direction, the fact that it demanded the installation of a whole system was likely 
to count against it, and not just with those gunnery officers who espoused the philosophy 
of HMS Excellent's captain. 60 Watkin's system demanded the installation of cabling and 
a control room, both of which were likely to be expensive and also difficult to arrange 
S7 McBride (2001) p. 4. 
sa Moss and Russell (1988) pp. 24-26. 
s' A. Pollen, The Great Gunnery Scandal (London: William Collins & Co. Ltd, 1980) pp. 66 and 260. 
6o See Pollen (1980) Chapter 2, and I. T. Sumida, In Defence of Navel Supremacy: Finance, Technology, 
and British Naval Policy 1889-1914 (London: Routledge, 1993) Chapter 5 for attitudes towards shipboard 
instrumentation. 
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with existing ships. The Barr and Stroud design made little impact on a ship's structure. 
It was only five feet long and could be used - literally- as a `stand alone' item capable of 
being moved around from one mounting point to another, almost like a telescope. 61 
Although the Royal Navy's gunnery branch recognised the need for integrated fire 
control, the still-evolving state of gunnery and weapons together acted as filters amongst 
some officers to resist changes whose immediate application seemed of little import62 
The absence of any rangefmding paradigm in the Navy, together with a still imperfectly 
defined one for gunnery would have combined to favour Barr and Stroud even if their 
rangefinder had not shown a superiority in accuracy. 
1.5 Barr and Stroud - from Cottage Industry to Manufactory 
Winning the competition was still no guarantee of financial reward. On June 10t' 1892 
the Admiralty wrote to Barr about what might happen next about the rangefinder. 63 The 
letter raised the question of terms and conditions in the light of Barr and Stroud 
proposing to sub-contract manufacture and asked what `you and Mr Stroud [sic] are 
willing to accept for these instruments' should Navy adopt them. There were three points 
which the Admiralty wanted answered before it would consider whatever price the 
inventors might ask. Was the rangefinder patented? Had its details been made public? 
Could secrecy be guaranteed? The final issue materially affected the terms to be offered. 
If secrecy could be assured, then the Government was interested in acquiring the sole 
rights to the rangefmder, either by a lump sum or a royalty on each one bought. Moss and 
Russell said that after further trials in June `the Admiralty then asked [the inventors] to 
offer their patents to the Crown', a privilege for which Barr demanded £75,000 in view 
of their `enormous commercial potential' and which was subsequently declined. 64 As the 
Admiralty's main pre-occupation was secrecy rather than buying-up a potential 
commercial investment, there can have been little chance of Barr being paid such a large 
sum, irrespective of the accuracy of his valuation. Having set aside any ideas of buying 
61 For details on the uses of telescopes, see PRO ADM 116/407, `Long distance telescopes: trials and issue 
to H. M. Ships', 1893 to 1896. 
62 For examples of 19'" century naval attitudes, see P. Scott, Fifty Years in the Royal Navy (London: John 
Murray, 1919) Chapters 2 to 5. 
63 UGD 295/16/1/5, Correspondence, Admiralty to Professor Barr, 10.6.1892. 
"Moss and Russell (1988) p. 26 
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sole rights, at the end of November the Admiralty asked Barr to quote for six of his 
`improved single-observer rangefinders for further trials' marking the start of a 
commercial relationship that was to outlast the naval life of the optical rangefinder. 
The procession from inventors to successful entrepreneurs by Archibald Barr and 
William Stroud between 1888 and 1899 accords well with Thomas Hughes' ideas in his 
systems approach to development, and in particular with his three-stage model of 
technological innovation which stressed the importance of contextual influences outside 
the immediate field of a particular technology. 65 Hughes modified Joseph Schumpeter's 
earlier analytical model, which divided technological change into the three phases of 
invention, innovation and diffusion, by first defining invention as an idea that may solve 
a problem rather than it necessarily being a working artefact. He then fused the notions of 
innovation and diffusion into what he called the development stage, where the proposed 
solution was tested and modified until it became viable. And finally he re-defined 
innovation to mean its transfer first into an appropriate commercial marketplace and 
subsequently into a wider contemporary `social and cultural context'. 66 In that phase, 
entrepreneurial factors became paramount in building up what he called the `momentum' 
of the technology which enabled it to exert a progressive influence over external contexts 
such as political or economic factors. The growth of Barr and Stroud's rangefinder 
business in the 1890s was the most important aspect of optical munitions manufacture in 
Britain and its examination in the light of Hughes' ideas also gives an understanding of 
why there was little development in other areas during these years. 
In February 1893 Archibald Barr and William Stroud had neither the means to make the 
instruments' parts themselves nor even a workshop in which to assemble bought-in 
Barr was by then Regius Professor of Engineering at the University of components 67 
Glasgow and Stroud still at the Yorkshire College in Leeds, a separation of some 250 
65 Hughes, T. P. "Technological Momentum. " In Does Technology Drive History? The Dilemma of 
Technological Determinism, edited by M. R. and L. Marx Smith (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1995) pp. 
103-113. 
" Bastable (2004) p. 8. 
67 UGD 295/4/11, Letter Book, Barr to Director of Naval Contracts acknowledging receipt of Admiralty 
acceptance of tender for contract CP NS4886-927383/1620. 
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miles which complicated the production of the first batch of rangefinders for the Royal 
Navy. 68 The instruments to be made reflected the research done by the pair since 1888, 
which had, in the meantime, produced another five rangefinder-related patents. 69 The 
new model had advanced considerably since 1889, having a longer measuring base of 
five feet, a stronger double-tube body of non-ferrous metals to avoid influencing ships' 
compasses, and finally a revised optical system that avoided the use of the problematic 
large end-reflecting prisms by the substitution of speculum-metal reflectors that were 
intrinsically more stable than glass mirrors. The components were all made by outside 
contractors and gathered together for final assembly in Glasgow, this time not on 
University premises but in Barr's own home under circumstances that Moss and Russell 
described, engagingly enough, as a `cottage industry'. 
The fabrication of mechanical parts was done by James White & Co. in Glasgow, but the 
optical work was spread between Adam Hilger in London and Chadburn Brothers in 
Sheffield, Yorkshire. 70 Chadbum's is not mentioned at all by Moss and Russell, but the 
firm was an important supplier of the simpler optical components in Barr and Stroud's 
rangefinders from at least 1892 until well into the Great War. Founded late in the 18th 
century, Chadburn's made a wide range of optical instruments, as well as lenses for the 
ophthalmic trade. 71 Although the main telescope part of the rangefinder demanded high- 
grade lenses, its aiming viewfinder and some other parts could be made satisfactorily 
with simple ophthalmic lenses, and it made no sense to pay Hilger's or Cooke's for 
higher quality components when they were not needed. For the more sophisticated 
achromatic lenses and the small complex eye-piece pentagonal prisms, orders continued 
to go to Hilger's who supplied some of the components directly to Glasgow and others to 
68 Moss and Russell (1988) pp. 25-31 provides source material for this section unless otherwise indicated. 
69 UGD 295/22/1/8, patent specifications, includes British Patents 11025/1889,4185/1890,12448/1890, 
12736/1890, and 3172/1891. 
70 UGD 295/4/11, Letter Book 1893, contains a series of eighteen letters from Barr to Chadbum's ordering 
n assortment of lenses. See in particular 3.3.1893 requesting piano-convex lenses, and 25.5.1893 ordering 
eight different types of piano-convex lenses. . 11 The Century's Progress: Yorkshire Industry and Commerce 1893 (London: The London Printing and 
Engraving Co., 1893. Reprint, Brenton Publishing 1971) p. 141. 
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Stroud in Leeds. 72 He then built up the complicated central arrangement of prisms and 
lenses that presented the separate images to the operator's eye before despatching each 
finished component to Glasgow for assembly in the rangefinder body and final 
adjustment. 
This method of sourcing and assembling components was adequate only for orders for 
small numbers of instruments, and Barr was aware that once demand grew a 
transformation would be required. The first stage in the progression from cottage 
industry to a manufacturing organisation came when Barr hired one of his own 
university students, Harold Jackson, as his full time salaried administrative and technical 
assistant in 1893.73 Although then only 21, Jackson quickly came to occupy a key role in 
the progress of the business, and to play a part scarcely less important than Barr himself. 
The second step was the negotiation of a sales agency agreement the same year with the 
Newcastle-on-Tyne armaments maker and warship builder, W. G. Armstrong Mitchell & 
Co. 
The circumstances of this agreement are, once again, not as straightforward as the 
published account suggests. For an informal partnership of two academics whose total 
business to date amounted to just one order for six rangefinders, the need to set up an 
international marketing structure so soon seems premature. However, as William Stroud 
noted later, once the Admiralty had announced its decision to buy rangefinders, foreign 
interest rapidly burgeoned and `within a few months enquiries poured in from places as 
far apart as Tokio [sic] and Washington' 74 Naval and military attaches arrived `to study 
the instrument' and the prospects for foreign business quickly seemed encouraging. 
According to Moss and Russell, Barr approached Armstrong's in April 1893 to ask if 
they would become `sole agents' for sales to foreign navies, but in fact it was the 
company that first approached Barr through one of its technical staff, Commander E. W. 
72 UGD 295/16/1/5, Correspondence, Strang papers, Stroud to Hilger on methods of making pentagonals 
for the rangefinder, 6.10.1890 and UGD 295/4/11, Letter Book, Barr to Hilger complaining of incorrect 
angles of pentagonals. 
73 Moss and Russell (1988) p. 29. 
74 Stroud, Early Reminiscences, marginal note in Stroud's own handwriting on p. 12 of the copy in UGD 
295/26/1/55. 
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Lloyd. In late March, Armstrong's had set matters in train by asking Barr whether he was 
able to supply rangefinders and at what price. Having quoted a figure, he followed it up 7s 
by enquiring in May whether or not Armstrong's would be able to get any orders, which 
seems to have prompted Lloyd to arrange a meeting at which he put the question of an 
agency to Barr. 76 
Lloyd, who had recently retired from the Royal Navy, already knew about the Barr & 
Stroud rangefinder and had mentioned it in his recently published work Artillery: its 
Progress and Present Position, although when he wrote it he was still - like the Captain 
of HMS Excellent some two years earlier - unconvinced of the instrument's value. 77 
However, when the Admiralty's decision triggered foreign interest, Armstrong's would 
have recognised that orders were likely from their overseas clients and moved to 
concentrate the export sales of the rangefinder in their hands rather than any 
competitor's. The discussions with Lloyd led Barr to prepare a draft agreement which he 
returned to Armstrong's after some amendments in early July with an accompanying 
letter that said: 
One of my chief concerns for desiring to come to some such agreement as you 
had proposed was that we had not the machinery for securing prompt payment 
in the case of business being done with the Smaller States. This, Captain [sic] 
Lloyd said would be no difficulty to you and I understood that you are willing to 
undertake the financing of foreign business in so far as the securing of payment 
is concerned. " 
Barr may have been stimulated by the idea of foreign sales, but financing them would 
indeed have been problematic. By 1893 the expenditure on research and patenting had 
become considerable, and according to Stroud `We were now approaching the end of our 
'S UGD 295/4/11, Letter Book, Barr to Armstrong Mitchell quoting for supply of thirteen rangefinders at 
£700 less 12.5 percent commission. 
76 UGD 295/4/11, Barr to Armstrong Mitchell 9.5.1893, and Barr to Armstrong Mitchell 3.7.1893. 
7' E. W. Lloyd and A. G. Hadcock, Artillery: Its Progress and Present Position (Portsmouth: J. Griffin & 
Co., 1893) p. 9 for the rangefinder and p. 10 for the spotting the fall of shot as an aid to ranging.. 
78 UGD 295/4/11, Barr to Armstrong Mitchell, 3.7.1893. Emphasis added. 
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financial tether'. 9 Their losses so far were at least £1,247, all of which except for £300 
had come from their own resources. 80 Barr's income at Glasgow University in 1893 was 
£468,81 and Stroud's salary at Leeds was unlikely to have been greater, so that their 
situation in the absence of outside financing must indeed have been difficult. Work done 
for the British government was `safe' in the sense that payment was guaranteed and 
could be financed through eking out suppliers' credit terms, but foreign sales were a 
different matter, as Barr's letter to Armstrong's made clear. 
The ten-year agreement that was signed in September 1893 was potentially advantageous 
to Barr and Stroud. 82 Armstrong's would promote the Barr and Stroud rangefinder to the 
exclusion of any other by using their influence on foreign navies who were their clients 
for ships or guns. Barr and Stroud would fix the selling prices, and Armstrong's would 
guarantee payment within three months of taking delivery, irrespective of whether or not 
the foreign client had paid for them. In return, Armstrong's would earn a 12.5 per cent 
commission on all sales from foreign enquiries except - at Barr's insistence - those from 
Germany. Almost at a stroke, and at no cost, Barr had acquired both a foreign sales 
department and a guarantee of payment within a set time limit, a combination he might 
well have been pleased with. 
Despite the expectation that Armstrong's would generate new trade, few orders resulted 
until well into 1894, when Barr and Stroud's total business amounted to just thirteen 
rangefinders, eight of which were for the Admiralty. Despite Stroud's insistence that 
there was much foreign interest, there was little concrete to show from it. Navies - 
including the Royal Navy - were still to be convinced that the rangefinder worked 
efficiently or was even necessary, and Barr was keen to get the Admiralty to commit 
" Stroud Early Reminiscences p. 10. 
80 This figure is taken from J. M. Strang's research material for the unpublished history of Barr & Stroud 
cited by Moss and Russell. Both the material and typescript are in UGD 295 Unclassified Material, Strang 
papers. 
Extracted from UGD F2/16, University of Glasgow Records, Ledger II, pp. 80-87. 
82 UGD 295/4/11, Letter Book, Barr to Armstrong Mitchell, 7.7.1893 and 9.8.1893 detail the terms; 
28.9.1893 confirms signature of agreement. 
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itself in order to gain what he rightly saw as a valuable endorsement. 83 In late May, 
Jackson asked the Admiralty whether the Navy thought the rangefinder was `suitable' for 
adoption, and encouraged a favourable answer by saying further improvements had been 
made and offering a discount of 10 per cent for orders of 50 or more. 84 Eventually in 
February 1895 the Admiralty confirmed that the instrument had been `definitely adopted' 
by the Navy. 85 
Foreign interest was still not stimulated to the point where large orders were being placed 
and the stance of the Imperial German Navy perhaps sums up contemporary attitudes. In 
April 1894, the German Naval Attache in London, Captain Tülick, had asked about 
delivery of a sample to Berlin, asking if someone could be sent to demonstrate it `without 
charging anything, or only a moderate sum'. 86 The response to that has not survived but a 
fortnight later, undeterred by what he had been told, the Attache wrote again to enquire 
`if you are doing any other interesting work for the British Admiralty'. Irrespective of 
whatever he learned from that attempt at espionage by post, a rangefinder was 
subsequently ordered, to be collected by a German `expert' in July, but only after 
payment had been made. The correspondence illustrates some of the problems that Barr 
was having promoting sales. Tülick had asked to visit what he thought was Barr's factory 
in Glasgow to see for himself not only the rangefinder but whatever else Messrs Barr and 
Stroud were making, and he also wanted a firm delivery date for the one just ordered. 87 
The reply, sent over Barr's signature but from its style composed by Jackson, neatly 
juggled assurance and embarrassment. Firstly, Barr and Stroud were specialists; they 
only made rangefinders, a subject with which `few men are acquainted'. On delivery 
times, the `peculiar nature' of the work meant that `unforeseen accidents might slightly 
retard completion', but once finished it would be best to gather as many experts in Berlin 
as could be managed at one time to show them the rangefinder. As for a factory visit, the 
83 For the influence that Royal Navy had on foreign powers, see C. Trebilcock, The Vickers Brothers: 
Armaments and Enterprise 1854-1914 (London: Europa Publishers, 1977) chapters 3 and 4. 
84 UGD 295/4/12, Letter Book, Jackson to Admiralty, 26.5.1894. 
$S UGD 295/4/13, Letter Book, Jackson to Armstrong Mitchell informing them of the decision. 
86 UGD 295/16/1/13, Foreign Letters, German Embassy, London, to Barr and Stroud, provides the source 
material for the following quotations in this paragraph, 2.4.1894,20.4.1894,23.6.1894, and 12.7.1894. 
87 UGD 295/4/12, Letter Book, Barr to Captain TUlick, 23.4.1894 provides the source material for the rest 
of this paragraph. 
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letter confessed `We have not a workshop of our own, except a small one in Professor 
Ban's house... ' and that `the important parts' were made in various locations. This did 
not deter German interest, and the rangefinder was duly delivered on time and sent to 
Berlin where, instead of Barr being to show it off, it was (according to Stroud) 
immediately `forwarded to Zeiss to be copied'. 88 
Orders were slow to come in from sources other than the Admiralty and income 
remained modest until 1896. 
Table 1.1: Barr & Stroud, comparison of British and foreign orders 1893-1899.89 
Year British Orders 
(units) 
Foreign 
Orders 
(units) 
Total Orders 
(units) 
Sales 
£s 
1893 5 1 6 400 
1893 8 5 13 2,700 
1895 20 9 29 3,025 
1896 41 14 55 13,409 
1897 50 7 57 11,668 
1898 Nil 29 29 14361 
1899 105 26 131 8,556 
The slowness of growth up to 1895 was influenced by both the Admiralty and the 
Professors still being in the early phases of developing both its application and design, a 
combination of social and technical factors. For the Navy, the question was one of how 
to employ the rangefinder, and for Barr and Stroud the problem was how to refine the 
instrument to produce a satisfactory product that could be marketed with the endorsement 
of large-scale adoption by the British Admiralty. In Hughes' model of technological 
change, the development stage has the proposed solution to a requirement being 
88 Stroud, Early Reminiscences p. 14. 
89 These figures are extracted from UGD 295/26/1/93, Personal papers of Dr. W. Strang, 'rough notes', and 
UGD 295/26/1/27 and 28, `historical notes' prepared for Dr Strang's proposed history of the firm.. 
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redesigned and re-tested until a satisfactory state is reached, a case that describes what 
was happening with Barr and Stroud. The two inventors had not only to develop the 
rangefinder but also to evolve a commercial structure that would be appropriate to how 
they thought the business should develop. 
Moss and Russell hinted at the rangefmder's gradual technical evolution, but it is clear 
that up to 1895 each instrument delivered differed slightly from its predecessor. 90 Only in 
that year was the `FA2' model introduced, representing the reaching of a plateau where a 
standardised product could be manufactured to a fixed specification rather than 
individual examples being modified as they were produced. 91 In April 1895 the 
Admiralty asked for a quotation for twenty, 92 so that with the design having reached a 
stage of stability and a substantial order from the Admiralty, it became feasible to 
advance the development of the business by acquiring, for the first time, workshop 
premises and operatives to do part of the manufacturing. The previous year, the inventors 
had created the formal partnership of `Barr & Stroud's Patents' to exploit the value of the 
designs already registered. 93 That had allowed for either licensing or manufacturing, but 
by early 1895 the partners' attention was concentrated on the latter, not least because the 
earlier question of producing some means of transmitting data electrically from the 
rangefinder to the ship's guns had been resurrected. 
The original specification had called for the provision of such a system even though it 
had not been required at the trials, and in November 1893 the Admiralty had finally 
asked for the submission of the necessary `electrical apparatus'. A set of these `Range 94 
and Order' instruments was tested by mid-April 1894, but no decision about them had 
been made when in early 1895 Armstrong Mitchell had raised the question on their own 
90 UGD 295/4/12, Letter Book, Barr to Captain Hall on HMS Resolution, compares differences between 
individual rangefinders delivered, 27.8.1894. 
" Moss and Russell (1988) p. 33. 
92 UGD 295/4/13, Letter Book, Barr & Stroud to Director of Naval Contracts, tender dated 22.4.1895. 
93 Moss and Russell (1988) p. 31. 
94 UGD 295/16/1/5, Admiralty Correspondence, Admiralty to Barr, 11.11.1893. 
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account in the context of incorporating them into ships under construction. 
" The 
possibility of extra business coming from Armstrong's sooner than from the Admiralty 
must have impressed on Barr the increasing urgency of having some workshop premises 
of his own. 
Although Barr's University of Glasgow contract left him free to undertake whatever 
consultancy work he wished, the earlier unsettling experience of Stroud at the Yorkshire 
College emphasised the need to keep different domains clearly separated. 96 In June 1895 
he signed a lease for a 700 square-feet workshop in Byres Road, conveniently equidistant 
between the University and his home. 97 The move marked the start of a substantial 
increase in activity, but with a workforce of only six, including Harold Jackson and two 
boy-workers, Barr & Stroud's Patents was still almost wholly dependent of out-sourcing 
for almost all its components and only equipped to do assembly work and some fine 
machining for experimental work like the Range-and-Order (R&O) instruments. 
At the same time, Barr began to put pressure on Armstrong's to produce some substantial 
business, showing that he had made himself aware of naval and military affairs generally. 
At the end of April he warned Armstrong's that the move to Byres Road would cause 
short-term delays, but subsequently delivery times would improve. Five days later he 
suggested promoting the idea of rangefinders to shipping lines, and in the same letter 
asked if there was not an opportunity to sell more to the Imperial Japanese Navy, whose 
Naval Attache he had just met. In early May, he urged that they should persuade the 
Chilean Navy to order rangefinders, and reminded them of their contractual obligation to 
`influence prospective clients'. 98 In August, he badgered Armstrong's again, expressing 
`disappointment' that no orders had come in. He reminded them that the Imperial 
Japanese Navy was ordering `large quantities of new material' and hoped for `an order 
for a considerable number' as a result, particularly as he had provided a rangefinder 
9S UGD 295/4/12, Letter Book, Barr to Admiralty, 25.4.1894 summarises submission dates and trial results; 
UGD 295/4/13, Letter Book, Barr to Armstrong Mitchell, 7.5.1895, summarises work done and the 
Admiralty's current attitude. 
96 Moss and Russell (1988) p. 24 describes his terms of employment. 
Moss and Russell (1988) pp. 31-33 describe the premises at Byres Road 
98 UGD 295/4/13, Letter Book, Barr to Armstrong Mitchell, 24.4.1895,29.4.1895, and 5.5.1895. 
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gratis for demonstrations. Five weeks later he told Armstrong's that he could not 
understand why foreign navies for whom they were building ships were not buying 
rangefinders, and suggested promoting them for land artillery as well. By November, 
Barr wanted pressure putting on the French and American governments, and then in the 
following January pointed out that Armstrong's orders were far less than the 
Admiralty's. 99 In fact, they were not doing as badly as Barr implied and had sold fifteen 
rangefinders to seven different foreign powers since the agency was set up, but what he 
wanted was large orders, rather than small trial purchases. 
Armstrong's apparent lack of success resulted from circumstances that, ironically, the 
firm had created. The problem was not with the rangefinder, but with the question of 
what was to be done with it by its purchasers. There was still no intellectual paradigm to 
direct its tactical use, not least because of Armstrong's success in promoting the 'quick- 
firing, (QF) gun which was one of their main ordnance specialities. loo The tactics of the 
QF gun prescribed large volumes of fire delivered rapidly at relatively short ranges, 
rather than deliberately aimed shots at greater distances. So long as Armstrong's were 
building warships whose main armament was the QF gun, the tactics of the weapon 
tended to diminish the usefulness of the rangefinder which seemed more appropriate to 
the largest ships with the biggest (and slowest-firing) guns. The British Admiralty was as 
interested in the rangefmder's role for navigation and ship station-keeping as it was for 
gunnery control in the large cruisers and battleships it was tried on. '0' 
Despite Barr's frustrations, business continued to grow. In 1896 the Admiralty ordered 
another forty FA2 rangefinders, and foreign business added another fifteen to the total. 
The year saw another stage in the firm's enlargement, with seven staff added and, for the 
first time, some optical work being done in-house. 102 Moss and Russell paid little 
attention to 1896, but it was an important year for the firm. They omitted completely the 
long trip that Barr made to the USA, ostensibly on University business but largely as a 
"UGD 295/4/14, Letter Book, Barr to Armstrong Mitchell, 9.8.1915,9.8.1895,6.11.1895, and 20.1.1896. 
goo Lloyd and Hadcock (1893) Chapter VII. 
101 Moss and Russell (1988) p. 29. 
102 UGD 295/4/14, Letter Book, Barr to Adam Hilger & Co. confirming he had obtained an optical worker. 
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research and marketing exercise for Barr & Stroud's Patents, lasting from mid-April until 
late June and taking in `sixteen colleges and many engineering works' as well as the US 
Army and Navy. '03 Apart from studying engineering methods and business management 
practice, he gave quotations to the US Army's Chief of Ordnance and even got a US 
Navy order for a trial rangefinder, before coming home convinced that if Barr & Stroud 
wanted to sell in quantity to the US Government, then arrangements to manufacture there 
would be essential because of a prohibition on the purchase of war materiel abroad. He 
returned to a situation that, despite the growth, had underlying difficulties that demanded 
attention. 
There were two particular difficulties retarding growth: the development of the electric 
range-and-order instruments was bogged down, and the problem of obtaining 
consistently high-grade optical work from Hilger's was getting worse. Matters came to a 
head in January 1897, revealing serious tensions in the firm that were not touched on by 
Moss and Russell. Shortly before, Adam Hilger had raised with Barr the possibility of 
`an amalgamation of some kind' that would benefit both firms. '°4 That did not wholly 
appeal to Barr, who thought that nevertheless some kind of working agreement could be 
reached if Hilger moved part of his business to Glasgow into vacant premises close to the 
Byres Road workshop. This, he told Stroud, would ease matters by avoiding the `the 
great delays we now have in sending things back and forward and writing to and fro - 
just as we now have in writing about [range-and-order] recorders instead of talking the 
matter over with you on the spot'. 
It was, he continued, `a very serious matter' about the slow progress being made with the 
complex stepping motors and circuitry needed for the control system that was 
evolving. '05 It was `quite impossible' to continue under current conditions, and `the 
whole position requires to be well talked over and the course of the future mapped out'. 
103 UGD 295/4/14, Letter Book, Barr to Capt. W. S. Cowles, US Navy, US Legation London, announcing 
his proposed itinerary; Barr to Armstrong's from New York announcing he was there on University 
business, 24.4.1896; Barr to Jackson, 24.6.96, and Barr to Colonel Ludlum, 13.4.96. 
104 UGD 295/16/1/9, Archibald Barr, Personal Correspondence, Barr to Stroud, 26.1.1897, provides the 
source material for the rest of this section, unless otherwise indicated. 
los Moss and Russell (1988) pp. 34 and 35 describe and illustrate the equipment. 
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Stroud should come to Glasgow without delay - `Make some arrangement whereby you 
can come down' he concluded peremptorily. Three things drove Barr to lecture his 
partner so strongly and atypically. He saw the R&O system as crucial to the Royal Navy 
adopting the rangefinder on a large scale, and so opening an even larger foreign market. 
It was not a diversion from rangefinder manufacture, but an extension of it, so the delay 
in the process of invention was unacceptable. Jackson, upon whom Barr was increasingly 
relying, was `quite down in the mouth' about the lack of progress; if he left the business 
replacing him would be far from easy. And, for reasons that are far from clear, Stroud 
was loathe to visit Glasgow, a reluctance that meant every detail of design had to be sent 
by letter which resulted in misunderstandings and further delays because Jackson and 
Barr found themselves dealing separately with him on aspects of the same problem. 106 
The proposed association with Hilger did not go through, possibly because Stroud 
thought Hilger's standards would not automatically improve through moving to 
Glasgow, but more likely because Hilger's skilled workers were unwilling to go with 
him. The tensions between the partners then seem to have relaxed, although what 
remedies were taken is unknown. Some of Barr's letters to Stroud from 1897 and 1898 
were removed posthumously from his private papers because they contained `some 
details that should not be published'. 107 Business also improved, and although Barr 
continued to tell Armstrong's that they were not `pushing the matter [of rangefinders] 
sufficiently', 108 the workload increased enough to justify taking additional premises and 
the Admiralty ordered another fifty rangefinders before the end of 1897. Most 
importantly, by June the following year, the R&O problem was finally solved and a 
viable system introduced which was offered to the Admiralty. 109 
The R&O system was also offered to foreign clients, and the Imperial Japanese Navy 
acted quicker than the Admiralty, deciding in July 1898 to install the equipment in every 
ship already fitted with Barr & Stroud rangefinders. This was the marketing break- 
106 Neither Barr's nor Stroud's surviving papers give any reason for this reluctance. 
lo' Typescript note initialled `JWF' on an empty envelope labelled ` Letters from Dr Barr of period 1897- 
98' in UGD 295/16/1/2, Barr's Personal papers. 
tos UGD 295/4/15, Letter Book, Barr to Armstrong's, 26.4.1897. 
109 Moss and Russell (1988) p. 34. 
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through that Barr had been seeking. Firstly, equipping a battleship with R&O 
installations as well as rangefinders doubled the value of business, adding approximately 
£800 to the £750 cost of the rangefinders. 11° Even more importantly, the system removed 
one of the main obstacles to persuading navies' gunnery specialists to adopt the 
rangefmder on a larger scale by providing an effective means to convey range readings 
around the ship, irrespective of weather or battle conditions. In overcoming a 
technological `reverse salient', Barr & Stroud had also dealt with a tactical one, so 
creating for themselves the possibility of moving forward on a much broader commercial 
front. 
Both foreign sales and the expectation of greater domestic business grew in 1898, 
although the total orders actually received fell from the previous year's 57 to only 29. 
The Admiralty bought none that year, mainly because it was preparing to fit rangefinders 
on every capital ship in the war fleet. In anticipation of the very large order, and in 
response to the growing foreign interest, the firm looked for larger premises where the 
growing business could be better handled. In May 1899 Barr & Stroud moved into a 
factory building of 3,360 square feet, only a hundred yards from the existing premises. 
New machinery was installed, increasing the range of work that could be done and 
reducing the dependency of outside supplies of mechanical components, although the 
need to buy-in optical components was still not reduced. By late 1899, Barr and Stroud 
was running as the world's only `naval rangefinder manufactory' with a workforce of 
about sixty, six of whom were university graduates. 
1.6 Conclusion 
The story of the optical munitions industry from 1888 to 1899 is largely about the 
growing importance of one instrument - the rangefinder - and of one maker in particular. 
Where there had been no identifiable optical munitions industry eleven years earlier, by 
the close of the 19th century there was a small, concentrated, and distinctive British 
manufacturing base for a device whose sole application was for use in warfare. Its 
10 Moss and Russell (1988) p. 35. 
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emergence had been governed not just by the deterministic influence of advancing 
weapons technologies, but also by a set of evolving social forces that influenced the scale 
and variety of demand as well as the predicted use for optical devices in war. These 
forces lacked the experience of combat to act as an evaluator of either technological or 
intellectual paradigms, and as only the lessons of battle could be an effective arbiter of 
both equipment and tactics there was still no definite understanding of the utility of 
optical munitions. The next chapter examines the effect of the Boer War on the industry 
and considers the influence of increasingly rapid developments in armaments technology 
and the interaction between manufacturers and the armed forces. 
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Chapter 2 
The growth in importance from the Boer War to 1906 
2.1 Introduction 
Before the start of the Boer War in 1899, the optical instruments employed by the British 
armed forces had yet to be used on active service, and there had been no experience to 
demonstrate their effectiveness. By the end of 1906 the British Army had not only 
accrued experience of how its optical munitions performed in the Boer War but had 
started to consider more carefully its needs for them, even though its expenditure on 
them remained small. The Admiralty continued to be the industry's more important 
British service client, its demands increasingly driven by a combination of both social 
and deterministic factors evident in evolving attitudes to gunnery, improvements in 
ordnance, and the emergence of what amounted to entirely new weapon systems in the 
submarine and the Dreadnought battleship. The optical munitions industry grew during 
this period partly through those developments in the Royal Navy, and partly through 
growing foreign demand. The Royal Navy's example in adopting the Barr & Stroud 
rangefinder stimulated foreign attention and helped to create a substantial export market 
which was further encouraged by the Russo-Japanese war of 1904, so that by late 1906 
most major navies were either using or evaluating rangefmders, almost all of which were 
supplied by Barr & Stroud. This chapter examines how British service attitudes to optical 
munitions evolved during this time and affected manufacturers, and considers how Barr 
& Stroud came to dominate the British industry. 
2.2 The Army's experience of optical munitions in the Boer War, 1899 - 1902, and 
the reactions to it. 
The Boer War was the first to see optical munitions employed to any significant extent. 
Although fought on land, it nevertheless provided experience for both services which 
indicated the benefits to be gained from the use of optical aids in warfare whilst 
simultaneously demonstrating the shortcomings of those then in service. Although the 
war's lessons were of greater relevance to the Army, the Royal Navy's involvement in the 
fighting ashore with 'naval field artillery provided some useful education about the need 
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for efficient telescopic gun sights in an era when the war fleet had no opportunity for 
action at sea. ' 
The guns used in South Africa reflected recent progress in weapons technology and 
design. In particular, a new nitro-glycerine based propellant had displaced the less 
efficient black powder, substantially extending the ranges of both small-arms and 
artillery. 2 These longer distances demanded more exact sight setting, for which the 
Infantry and the Artillery used variants of the Mekometer rangefinder which had been 
adopted in 1891. Criticisms of its effectiveness had been quick to emerge, and its 
eventual performance in action fell far short of expectations. 3 The topographical and 
climatic conditions of the veldt were unlike any experienced previously, and the 
Mekometer's shortcomings soon became evident in the clear air which permitted 
visibility at far greater distances than the British Army was used to. The Boers regularly 
opened fire at long ranges, inflicting casualties on British troops who were frequently 
exposed with little cover. Problems using the Mekometer to find the range quickly for 
effective retaliatory fire soon became apparent. The 1889 trials had been conducted using 
`clearly defined' targets under conditions which posed no threat to the operators' safety, 
but in South Africa the enemy dressed to blend in with the background making it hard to 
identify a rangefinding mark, and was able to shoot at the Mekometer teams because they 
had to stand in the open while taking readings. 4 Range readings were erratic, and the 
ever present risk of high casualty rates led to the instrument being little used. s 
' For an account of the involvement of the Royal Navy, see P. Padfield, Aim Straight: a biography of Sir 
Percy Scott (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1966) Chapters 6 and 7. 
2 For details of the artillery weapons used, see H. C. B. Rodgers, Artillery through the Ages (London: 
Seeley, Service, 1971), Chapter X. 
For more extensive comments on conditions generally, and problems in rangefinding particularly, see C. 
Callwell and J. Headlam, History of the Royal Artillery, 3 volumes (Woolwich: The Royal Artillery 
Institution, 1937) Vol. 2, Chapter III. 
4 Callwell & Headlam (1937), Vol. 2, p. 46 supplies content about South Africa. For details of the method 
of using the Mekometer, see Great Britain, Army, Regulations for Musketry Instruction 1896 (London: 
HMSO, 1896). 
S William Stroud, Early Reminiscences of Barr and Stroud Rangefinders (privately printed, ca. 1932-1936) 
p. 9, refers to high casualties; George Forbes Experiences in South Africa with a New Infantry Rangefinder 
(London: J. J. Keliher & Co. Ltd, 1902), p. 4 refers to the Mekometer's lack of use. 
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The earlier criticisms during the 1890s indicated both a lack of confidence in the 
Mekometer and an awareness that something better was needed, even before the fighting 
began. 6 Barr & Stroud had been promoting their own design for infantry and artillery use 
since 1892, and the German firm of Zeiss had recently introduced a model which 
competed with it. 7 Officers set about acquiring these instruments privately, either buying 
or borrowing them from their makers, and their published comments invariably 
emphasised the superiority of the commercial products over the service ones. 8 
The Mekometer was unsatisfactory in South Africa for both the Artillery and the 
Infantry, who subsequently followed separate paths in seeking replacements. The 
'functional failure' experienced in the Boer War affected the two branches differently; the 
Artillery remained wedded to the existing type of instrument whilst the Infantry began to 
reconsider what might best serve its needs. 9 In the Artillery, the existing paradigm of the 
long-base two-observer rangefinders continued, despite the Mekometer's acknowledged 
deficiencies. This supported William MacBride's suggestion that, when presented with 
new technology, established military hierarchies can react in a manner that is hostile to 
change. 10 Despite the favourable impression made by the Barr & Stroud single-observer 
rangefinder in trials for fortress use in 1899,11 the Artillery not only ignored its potential 
as a mobile instrument but subsequently set out to 'reconsider the claims of the telemeter' 
(an earlier long-base device) simply because it was 'undoubtedly more accurate than the 
Mekometer'. 12 This completely ignored the South African experience that had shown the 
difficulties in operating a similar instrument outweighed any potential increase in 
6 Great Britain, School of Musketry, Annual Report 1893 (London: HMSO, 1893) p. 89. 
Gleichen, A. The Theory of Modern Optical Instruments: A Reference Book for Physicists, Manufacturers 
of Optical Instruments and for Officers in the Army and Navy. Translated by H. Emsley and W. Swain. 
(London: HMSO, 1918) p. 196. 
$ Michael Moss and Iain Russell, Range and Vision: the f irst 100 years of B arr & Stroud (Edinburgh: 
Mainstream Publishing, 1988) p. 42, and G. Forbes, Experiences in South Africa with a new Infantry 
Range-finder (London: Keliher & Co. Ltd., 1902). 
' Callwell and Headlam (1937) Vol. 2 pp. 107 and 108. 
10 W M. McBride, Technological Change and the United States Navy 1865-1945 (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2000) p. 4. 
" University of Glasgow Archives, Barr & Stroud collection reference UGD 295, (subsequently UGD 
295): UGD 295/4/744, Letter Book 1897-1911, Barr & Stroud to War Office asking for details of W. O. 
requirements, 29.8.1899. 
12 Callwell & Headlam (1937) Vol. 2 p. 108 provides the source material for the rest of this paragraph. 
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accuracy. Although the Artillery would eventually adopt the single observer rangefinder 
for general service in 1913, the persistence in clinging to the older, and already 
discredited, two observer types can be explained through the idea of an intellectual 
paradigm being strong enough to overcome the 'presumptive anomaly' formed by the 
internal-base design. 13 
Edward Constant's conceptualisation of a'presumptive anomaly' provides an appropriate 
explanation for the Royal Artillery's attitudes and policies relating to the rangefinder 
during this period. The notion involves an alternative technology being presumed to be 
superior to an existing technological paradigm. 14 That paradigm, according to Constant, 
involves 'an exemplary artefact and a cultural framework devoted to sustaining that 
artefact. ' The Royal Artillery's exemplary artefact was the two-observer rangefinder, and 
the cultural framework sustaining it was the regimental mind-set which regarded the use 
of artillery as the sole domain of the professional artillerymen within that society. The 
two-observer long-base rangefinder had been the only pattern used by the Artillery since 
the 1860s, and repeated consideration of the problems in rangefinding had emphasised 
that such instruments were the only ones that could be expected to give accurate distance 
readings; the failure of early single-observer designs reinforced this belief and by the 
early 1880s it had become accepted as a canon that such designs were bound to be 
inferior and unacceptable to the Artillery. The Infantry rangefinder trials of 1889 
apparently confirmed this, and the Mekometer was subsequently taken up by both 
Service branches. 
In the years immediately after 1902 the Royal Artillery clung to the idea of inherent 
technical superiority in the long-base instruments justifying their retention and 
refinement, using as a basis for its justification the tactical philosophy - or intellectual 
paradigm - for the employment of its guns in action which had evolved since the 
introduction of rifled artillery in the 1860s. That philosophy held that speed of 
deployment was the prime requirement and if range readings were to be taken, then their 
13 Edward Constant II (1980) p. 15 
14 Edward Constant 1T (1980) see Chapter 1. 
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accuracy was paramount and they needed to be made as guns were being brought into 
action in order to deliver immediately effective fire. In the late 1850s, the presumptive 
anomaly of greater accuracy in rifled weapons, as compared with the existing smooth- 
bored ones, had successfully overcome any latent resistance to change. In 1903, however, 
even though the existing technological rangefinding paradigm had been proven wanting, 
the Royal Artillery clung to the intellectual component of its rangefinding philosophy 
and for the present rejected the presumptive anomaly that the Infantry began to consider. 
To the artillerists, the technical benefits apparent to the Infantry were much less apparent. 
The South African war had been largely fought by the Infantry, and the experiences of 
the Artillery had not provided the same degree of stimulus for change. 
There was considerable significance in this rejection of the concept of superiority of the 
single observer instrument. Although an assortment of optical devices would be taken up 
by the Army in the next ten years, after approval by committees made up largely of 
artillerymen, none of these instruments challenged any technological or intellectual 
paradigm. The new observation instruments adopted in small quantities, such as the 
prismatic binocular telescope, caused no controversy because they did not impinge on an 
existing tradition and because they had no influence of the performance of the guns 
themselves. 15 No decision on the large-scale adoption of the self-contained artillery 
rangefinder was finally made until 1913. Such sustained conservatism, which at the time 
effectively denied the opportunity for any firm to build up a business in optical munitions 
optimised to the Army's needs, was in contrast to the Admiralty's attitude in taking up the 
rangefinder. In essence, the Artillery's policy towards rangefinding remained scarcely 
modified from 1889 almost up to the start of the Great War, reflecting the ability of 
internal social factors to resist external technological progress. 
Like the Artillery, the Infantry had found the Mekometer greatly lacking but, instead of 
looking to improve an exemplary artefact, it set about finding its replacement even before 
the war was over. Less influenced by the existing technological paradigm, the Infantry 
turned more readily towards the single-observer rangefinder as the preferred type and in 
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the autumn of 1902 began trials to select a new instrument. 16 However, that was not to 
say the Infantry was free of a cultural framework influencing the selection process, and 
the conduct and outcome of the 1902 trials suggests that the Army's pre-disposition to 
prefer solutions originating within its own hierarchical structure could have just as 
inhibiting effect on progress as commitment to an existing application of an individual 
technology. 
There were three principal contenders in the 1902 trials, two from outside the Army and 
one from a serving officer. The first of the civilian designs was submitted by Professor 
George Forbes as a private venture, and the other by Barr & Stroud who, at the War 
Office's request, had prepared `two specially constructed instruments' that were 
essentially smaller versions of the firm's well-established naval models. 17 The third was 
designed by Captain A. H. Marindin, an infantry officer who had been interested in 
rangefinders since 1895 and had produced his first working model in 1901, entirely at his 
own expense without any assistance from the Army. 18 Barr & Stroud, having acquired 
unmatched rangefinder experience and having being specifically asked to submit for 
trials, ought possibly to have been encouraged as to its chances of success but, as in 
1889, its partners had doubts that were to be fully justified. 
After its earlier failure to get War Office orders, the firm had turned its attention to naval 
rangefinders, not least because it considered any infantry model it made would be - to 
the Army - `prohibitively expensive' compared to the Mekometer. 19 Having this in mind, 
William Stroud was uncertain about what type was most likely to win the competition, 
being particularly worried by Forbes' entry. George Forbes's rangefinder first came to 
Barr & Stroud's attention when an account of it was published in the journal Nature late 
'S Callwell and Headlam (1937) Vol. 2, p. 109. 
16 PRO U11223, Proceedings of the Ordnance Council, 12.6.1908, Question of Reward to Captain A. H. 
Marindin, p. 3. 
'UGD 295/4/26, Letter Book, H. D. Jackson to Major Guinness, 25.10.1902. The request must have been 
made in 1901 - see UGD 295 16/1/10, Correspondence from William Stroud, H. D. Jackson to Stroud, 
29.11.1901. 
1° PRO TI/11223 (1908), p. 8. 
"UGD 295/1611/10,, letter to H. D. Jackson, 26.5.1902. 
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in July 1901.20 The device was quite unlike the company's own design and used the 
principle of stereopsis (binocular vision) to measure distances. 21 Although the German 
Zeiss company already made a patented rangefinder working on the same basic idea, 
Forbes' design did not clash with any of its patents and he had persuaded them to make 
the special prismatic binocular which formed the basis of his instrument. A folding 
lightweight accessory unit was attached to the binocular to give the stereoscopic images, 
the binocular itself providing a series of measuring marks that were used to judge the 
range of a target. The Forbes instrument worried Stroud, who was entirely responsible 
for the firm's optical design, because it offered light weight, accuracy and, he believed, 
relatively low cost. By late November, he was so convinced of its advantages that he 
suggested taking it up because in his opinion Barr & Stroud could `lick Forbes at his own 
game' and there was `no justification' for making a short-base rangefinder of lesser 
accuracy. 22 Stroud's concerns were not taken up. Harold Jackson immediately reminded 
him that the firm had not been asked to design a rangefinder on a new principle, but to 
produce one on their established pattern: `It is what the War Office has asked for ... ' 
he 
wrote, 23 anxious to restrain Stroud from being diverted into efforts that would inhibit the 
production of satisfactory competition instruments. 
Between November 1901 and the late summer of 1902, Forbes promoted his design 
vigorously, presenting papers to the Society of Arts, the Royal Society, and the Royal 
United Service Institution. The final one, delivered after his return, recounted his 
experiences and claimed wide endorsement by officers in the field, including the theatre 
commander, Lord Kitchener. 24 Much encouraged by his field trip, Forbes dismissed the 
20 UGD 296/16/1/10, Stroud to Jackson, 26.7.1901. 
21 For an explanation of this principle, see F. Auerbach, The Zeiss Works and the Carl Zeiss Stiftung in 
Jena. Translated by F. Cheshire and S. Paul. 2nd ed. (London: Marshall Brookes & Chalkely, 1904, (pp. 66 
and 67, and G. Smith and D. A. Atchison, The Eye and Visual Optical Instruments, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997) pp. 450 and 451. 
u UGD 296/16/1/10, Stroud to Jackson, 27.11.1901 and 29.11.1901. 
23 UGD 296/16/1/10, Jackson to Stroud, 29.11.1901. 
24 VIA AJB 210.2.5, lecture to the Society of Arts, 18.12.1901, paper read in absentia to the Royal 
Society, 20.3.1902, and lecture to the Royal United Service Institution, 13.5.1902. Professor G. Forbes, 
'Experiences in South Africa with a new Infantry R angefinder' in Journal oft he Royal United Service 
Institution, 13th May 1902, describes his experiences and test results in detail and provides the source for 
the rest of this section, unless otherwise indicated. 
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Mekometer out of hand, saying it was never actually used by the Infantry because of its 
inconvenience and danger to its operators, and hardly ever by the Artillery as 'officers 
seldom rely on it'. All this worried Stroud, who continued to suggest ways of beating 
Forbes stressing the need to produce a rangefinder costing no more than £25 (less than 
half the price of the fum's own instrument) to `win the day'. 25 Although no one else at 
Barr & Stroud agreed with him, Stroud's concerns were by no means misplaced even if 
he was not absolutely correct in his reasoning. The third competitor in the trials, the 
Marindin rangefinder, was to deny the firm War Office business through a combination 
of factors that embraced both cost and institutional bias. 
Marindin had approached the London firm of Adam Hilger & Co. Ltd. in 1900 for help 
in making up his design. 26 Hilger's were by then making optical parts for Barr & Stroud 
which formed `a very important part' of the firm's activities and absorbed most of the 
attention of its senior staff. 27 Hilger's close involvement with Barr & Stroud meant the 
firm knew as much about the instruments as anyone else in the country and was well- 
placed to assist Marindin in developing his ideas. Frank Twyman, then Hilger's manager 
and later its managing director, recognised the problems posed by existing patents and 
translated Marindin's plans into a design which not only avoided the protected features 
of Barr & Stroud and Zeiss, but had sufficient novelty to patent in its own right. 28 
Irrespective of Twyman's contribution, British Patent 16647/1901 was in Marindin's 
name alone, probably because Twyman was uncertain about Barr & Stroud's reaction to 
his involvement and unwilling to prejudice the relationship between the two firms which 
was not always harmonious, but on which Hilger's relied for a substantial part of its 
business. 29 
25 UGD 296/16/1/10, Stroud to Jackson, 6.7.1902. 
26 Science Museum London, Library, Adam Hilger Collection (subsequently HILG), 3/1, Typescript of Mr 
Twyman's Lecture, August 1944, p. 15. 
27 HILG 3/1, p. 24. 
28 H1LG 3/1, p. 15. 
29 UGD 295/4/21 Letter Book, H. D. Jackson to Hilger, a series of letters between 3.10.1900 and 3.12.1900 
describes how relations fluctuated. 
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By June 1901, Marindin was involved `in earnest', and Hilger's was building a 
functioning rangefinder. 30 Between then and June 1902, Hilger's submitted thirty three 
invoices to him totalling £416.00, and by August 1902 had manufactured a number of 
prototypes, the first of which Marindin had been sent to the Chief Inspector of 
Rangefinders as early as December 20th 1901.31 Having experimented with them over the 
next seven months, and before the start of the rangefinder trials scheduled for the 
autumn, the Chief Inspector reported `satisfactory results' and on August 26th the War 
Office formally asked Marindin `to state on what terms he was prepared to offer his 
invention for the use of the Crown'. 32 This suggests that the Infantry had already 
signalled its wish to adopt the Marindin as its standard instrument and that the War 
Office was prepared to adopt it without necessarily giving serious consideration to any 
other instrument. None of this was known to either Forbes or Barr & Stroud, although the 
latter was certainly not over-optimistic as to the outcome of the trials. 
In late September, George Forbes had sufficient confidence to propose to Archibald Barr 
that they should each concentrate on one of the Services. 33 Without revealing his 
production plans, he suggested that he should supply rangefinders to the Army, and that 
Barr & Stroud should continue with the Admiralty. Barr's reply showed some caution as 
to the outcome of the tests. Having had dealings with committees at Woolwich before, he 
pointed out that there was no guarantee that either of them would actually get any orders, 
and any agreement would be premature. And, he said, even if there were orders the 
financial benefits were uncertain as `the War Office can claim the use of any patented 
invention with or without the consent of the inventor', implying - quite incorrectly - that 
the State had powers of sequestration without reward. 34 Under the circumstances, he saw 
no possibility of coming to any accommodation with Forbes and declined to go further. 
30 PRO TI/11223 (1908), p. 8 
31 PRO TI/11223 (1908), p. 13, List of payments received by Adam Hilger Ltd., and PRO TI/11223 (1908), 
32 
3. 
PRO TU11223 (1908), p. 3. 
33 UGD 295/4/744 Letter Book, Barr's reply to Forbes' undated proposal, 2.10.1902 provides source 
material for the rest of this paragraph. 
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Perhaps endorsing Barr's caution, efforts to enhance the firm's chances by endorsement 
were not accompanied by any success. In early December - when the testing programme 
was almost complete and the Rangefinder Committee was starting to evaluate the results 
- Jackson attempted to organise the appearance before it of Major C. D. Guiness of the 
Royal Artillery as an expert witness. 5 The Committee's president had already agreed to 
this in principle, but on the 10th Guiness telegraphed Jackson to say he could not appear 
without the direct authority of the War Office. 36 Three days later, Jackson wrote in 
terms suggesting either he did not expect Guiness to give evidence, or that whatever he 
said would be of limited help: `We have noted what you say concerning the probable 
tone of your evidence before the Committee. We quite understand the position... '. 7 
Barr's earlier caution was entirely justified. In January 1903, the Committee reported its 
unanimous endorsement of the Marindin rangefmder's suitability, and its 
recommendation that `at least 100 instruments should be provided for tests... '. 8 Barr & 
Stroud believed the choice was based on price, echoing Stroud's earlier concerns, but 
Frank Twyman thought it was rather because of lighter weight 39 Neither was apparently 
aware of the preference shown for it before the trials, and Twyman may actually have 
been surprised by the decision. He later noted that the `government experts' on the 
Rangefinding Committee were convinced that the Marindin was `much more imperfect 
than its competitors, an opinion with which I may say I privately agreed' 40 That the 
design was not wholly satisfactory is partly borne out by the failure to place any 
substantial order in 1903, despite the recommendation. The Army asked Marindin for 
further trial models in 1903, and then carried out more rangefinder testing in October 
's See Patents, Designs and Trade Marks Act 1883, Section 27 (2) which refers to terms between inventors 
and the Crown. 
'S UGD 295/4/26, Letter Book, Jackson to Guiness, 8.12.1902. 
36 UGD 295/4/26, Letter Book, Jackson to Guiness, acknowledging receipt of his telegram, 10.12.1902. 
" UGD 295/4/26, Letter Book, Jackson to Guiness, 13.12.1902. 
38 PRO TU11223 (1908), p. 3. 
" For Barr & Stroud's opinion, see GUA UGD 295 Unclassified Material, Russell Research Notes: 
9.1.1903, H. D. Jackson to Archibald Barr. Russell cites a Letter Book'BS4/21'. UGD 295/4/31 is noted as 
having an earlier designation as '21', but this book covers April to June 1904. Russell's notes were made 
before the University acquired the Barr & Stroud records, and some of the material which Russell quotes is 
not now present in the University Archives. For Twyman's interpretation, see HILG 3/1, p. 15. 
40 H1LG 3/1, p. 15. 
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1904, February 1905 and July 1906, each time asking for modifications to his design. 41 
None were ordered for troop trials, and a final decision to take it into general service was 
not made until early 1907, an account of which will be given in the succeeding chapter. 
Given Twyman's reservations, it is possible that the choice was influenced by factors not 
unlike those bearing on the 1889 trials. In its separate evaluation of the Marindin before 
the official trials, the Infantry chose it without reference to any of its civilian designed 
competitors, an apparently premature decision that might be explained through the 
tendency of `social groups [to) identify with and champion' artefacts emanating from 
within themselves, and the accompanying characteristic of favouring one artefact over 
another through social rather than purely technological pressures. 42 In such cases, the 
`appropriate solutions' to perceived problems are coloured by the nature of the evaluation 
process, and in this case the intra-societal origin of the Marindin may have encouraged 
its ready, and perhaps inadequately questioned acceptance. Even though the Infantry 
successfully avoided the Royal Artillery's inclination to maintain an existing inferior 
technological paradigm, by prematurely endorsing a design which originated from within 
their own society they may have encouraged the adjudicating committee to succumb to a 
parallel latent instinct which was predisposed to attain closure of the issue and attain 
`relative social tranquility' in respect of the rangefinding question. Whatever the 
motivations or intentions, the Marindin rangefmder was to prove a far from stable entity, 
and will be encountered again later in this story. 
2.3 The effects of Army demands on the optical manufacturers 
The effects of the Boer War were of little long-term significance for the optical 
munitions industry. War Office Contracts Department records show that purchases of 
telescopes and binoculars increased greatly during the war itself, peaking in 1902 but 
41 PRO T1111223 (1908), p. 12 and PRO T1111223, Proceedings of the Ordnance Council, 8.6.1909, pp. 5 
and 10. 
42 W. McBride, Technological Change and the U. S. Navy 1865-1945 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2000) p. 234. 
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tailing off sharply once the war had ended and contracts had been filled. 43 Roy and Kay 
MacLeod suggested that during the war government orders for 'quantities of magnifying 
devices (particularly field glasses and telescopes)' and 'new types of optical munitions 
[rangefinders]' led to the creation of additional manufacturing capacity within the optical 
instrument manufacturing trade but that this capacity did not last once War Office orders 
were discontinued, and much of the new machinery was then'... sold for little more than 
scrap value . 44 The implication is of substantial business being placed and firms being 
encouraged to expand, but the evidence for this is not convincing. The MacLeods cited in 
support just two editorials from trade magazines published in 1916 when the optical 
industry was lobbying hard for the creation of an institute for optics in London and 
pointing out past failures to gain support for British optical manufacturing. 45 Neither did 
more than assert that such events took place and gave no corroborative evidence. 46 It is 
more likely that War Office orders during the Boer War, even if much larger than 
previously, were still relatively small, issued piecemeal and by no means confined to 
domestic makers, so that the possibility of a substantial enlargement of the optical 
industry was never great. 
There is no doubt that the sudden surge in demand caught the War Office unprepared, 
without sufficient stocks of many optical stores. To make good those shortages the 
Director of Army Contracts began issuing `Requests for Tender' to firms on its list of 
approved makers, irrespective of whether they had experience in producing any 
particular product. 47 The notice sent to Barr & Stroud in July 1901 included the 
Mekometer, the Watkin Depression Rangefmder, observation telescopes and telescopic 
" These figures, and others in this section, are extracted from PRO WO 395/1, Annual Report of the 
Director of Army Contracts, Financial Years ending 31.3.1899 to 31.3.1902, and PRO WO 395/2, Annual 
Reports 31.3.1903 to 31.3.1906, unless otherwise indicated. 
" Roy and Kay MacLeod, 'War and economic development: government and the optical industry in 
Britain, 1914-18' in J. M. Winter, ed. War and Economic Development (Cambridge: University Press, 
1975) p. 168. 
as For the background to this, see Great Britain, Ministry of Munitions, History of the Ministry of 
Munitions: Vol. XI The Supply of Munitions; Part III Optical Munitions and Glassware. (London: HMSO, 
1922). 
"The optician, editorial articles in issues 31" March 1916 and 14'" July 1916. 
47 These procedures remained unchanged until after the Great War began: for details see OH Vol. I, Part 1, 
pp. 53 to 58 
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sights, all of which the firm subsequently tendered to supply, with varying degrees of 
success 48 In August the War Office rejected a tender for observation telescopes, but in 
September accepted bids for the Mekometer and Depression Rangefinders. The same 
month, the company told the Director of Contracts that an order offered for a hundred 
telescopic sights was 'not of sufficient magnitude' to be profitable, and in November that 
it would not even tender for them in smaller numbers. By February 1902, Barr & Stroud 
was clearly unhappy about the way the War Office was issuing contracts for only parts of 
tenders, and scaling-down or cancelling orders already issued. 49 The total value of 
business resulting from the Boer War between 1901 and 1903 came to little more than 
£1,020, a figure too small to justify creating any additional capacity. S° Indeed, the theme 
of the correspondence was that Barr & Stroud's existing capacity was being under-used 
by the War Office whose Contracts Department seemed oblivious of how best to 
organise the distribution of orders. 
It is also clear that orders were placed outside Britain, particularly for binoculars, so that 
far from generating new capacity, the chance to open up a new branch of the industry 
was completely ignored. The Annual Report of the Director of Contracts for 1901-1902 
noted that `a considerable number' of the 5,810 binoculars bought that year were made 
`on the continent', and the next year that `a considerable proportion' of the 13,500 
obtained was bought `as usual, from the continent'. The average unit price of £1.25 
shows that these were simple non-prismatic instruments, but numbers of the more 
complex (and expensive) prism types of commercial production were also bought in 
South Africa by the Army Ordnance Department and regimental commanding officers 
for issue directly in the theatre. sl Reports from troops receiving these commercial types 
(mostly German, made by Zeiss) showed how much better they were than the non- 
48 UGD 295/4/23, Letter Book, H. D. Jackson to War Office stating that Barr & Stroud could produce those 
types if asked, 30.7.1901. This letter book provides the source material for the rest of this section, unless 
otherwise indicated. 
49 UGD 295/4/24, Letter Book, Jackson to Director of Army Contracts, 12.2.1902. 
so UGD 295/19/2/1, Customer Order files 1901 to 1903, order numbers CO 193,215,235,245,291,294 and 
348. 
s' PRO WO 395/1, Annual Reports of the Director of Army Contracts, Financial Years ending 31.3.1899 to 
31.3.1902 provide the unit prices: such instruments sold commercially at prices between £1.00 and £1.50. 
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prismatic ones issued officially by the War Office. Only 10 percent of those reporting on 
the latter were satisfied with them, whilst 95 percent of those commenting on the prism 
patterns gave favourable reports. 
The overall benefit of War Office business to the optical manufacturers from 1899 to 
1906 seems to have been very small. The immediate fillip given by the Boer War was not 
on a scale large enough to justify the creation of new businesses specifically for optical 
munitions, or to set up special departments within existing businesses. Nor did any 
increase in demand last much longer than the war itself. 52 If there was the kind of 
expansion that the MacLeods suggested during the war, any firm that had been so 
optimistic as to invest in plant or tooling would have been disappointed after 1902. But 
to have made any such investment without thought as to the long term prospects for 
military business would have been, at best, commercially imprudent. Without any 
significant permanent expansion in the size of the British Army, and in the absence of 
any tendency to adopt new patterns of optical munitions on a large scale, there could not 
have been any reasonable expectation of new opportunities for business with the War 
Office. 
2.4 The Admiralty and its approach to optical munitions 
In 1899 the Royal Navy was the British industry's largest customer for complex optical 
munitions such as the rangefinder, even though it employed them on a relatively small 
scale. Up to then it had bought 123 Barr & Stroud rangefinders out of the 189 the firm 
had sold, 53 but in the next seven years its purchases of rangefinders and other optical 
gunnery instruments grew substantially as more attention was paid to accurate shooting 
at increasingly long ranges. 
PRO WO 108/278, Extracts from Reports by Officers Commanding Units in South Africa during 1899 - 
1901: Signalling Equipment, Telescopes and Binoculars, provides the data regarding local purchases. SZ Barr & Stroud's last War Office order is recorded on 8t' October 1903, and was for seven shillings' worth 
of Mekometer spares GUA UGD 295/19/2/1 Customer Order files 1901,1902 and 1903 (CO 348). 
53 UGD 295, Strang papers. 
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The subject of gunnery in the Royal Navy between 1889 and 1906 has been examined by 
Jon Sumida in his In Defence of Naval Supremacy. 54 In explaining the genesis of 'fire 
control instruments' (devices to enable the gunfire of one moving ship to hit another at 
long ranges), he stressed the importance of understanding 'the history of the Royal 
Navy's previous efforts to find a solution to the problem of naval range-finding [sic]. '55 
However, his coverage of rangefmding was largely confined to the dates of introduction 
of different Barr & Stroud models, their relative standards of accuracy, and the 
difficulties of using them. 56 Sumida correctly emphasised that the rangefinder gave 
neither `a final or complete solution to the sight-setting problem', but his emphasis on the 
instrument's limited utility because of the lack of means to transmit ranges to the guns, 57 
suggested he was unaware of Archibald Barr and William Stroud's early understanding 
of the need for an integrated control system which was demonstrated in their 
development of `range and order' instruments to transmit range and bearing data 
automatically either to individual guns or a central control point. 58 Sumida subordinated 
the importance of optical devices, and gave hardly any attention to the essential need for 
telescopic sighting devices in the system of gunnery then evolving. 
There were problems in hitting even stationary targets. In 1900, firing tests against a 
battleship moored at 1,700 yards showed that more than 60 percent of the shots missed. 59 
Two reasons, separately or jointly, could account for this poor showing; the range had 
been wrongly set on the sights, or the guns had not been aimed properly at the target, 
both problems that could be corrected by suitable optical apparatus. Setting the range 
correctly was important - Admiralty ballistic tables showed that at 1,700 yards to hit a 20 
foot high target representing a ship, the permissible aiming error was 142 yards, at 2,000 
yards it was 38 yards, and at 3,000 yards only 24. Aiming correctly was as important as 
having an accurate range, but the `open sights' in general use required the gun-layer to 
sa Jon T. Surnida, In Defence of Naval Supremacy: Finance, Technology, and British Naval Policy 1889- 
1914 (London: Routledge, 1993) see Chapters 1 and 2. 
ss Sumida (1993), p. 71. 
56 Sumida (1993), pp. 72 to 76. 
s' Sumida (1993), p. 73. 
58 Moss and Russell (1988), pp. 34 and 35. 
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line up two points on the sight with the target itself, giving considerable scope for human 
error. 60 Although telescopic sights giving a magnified image and a single aiming mark 
had been in service since 1887, their use had actually been discouraged by an Admiralty 
Order in March 1896 and they were rarely used except for occasional drills 61 An aiming 
error coupled with a range setting error could easily cause a battleship to be missed even 
at close range, as the 1900 trials had demonstrated. 
Aiming problems were addressed robustly after 1898 by Captain Percy Scott, who 
became an eloquent and aggressive advocate for the universal employment of telescopic 
sights 62 Peter Padfield suggested that Scott was responsible for the introduction of such 
sights into the navy, 63 but Scott rather revived their use. He also became a ruthless critic 
of the quality of the existing types in service, lobbying for more powerful types with 
finer aiming reticles. " His appointment to command the gunnery school, H. M. S. 
Excellent, in April 1903, lead directly to the Admiralty's decision in 1905 to carry out a 
wholesale revision of gun sighting and gunnery control arrangements of all fighting ships 
in the fleet. 
In 1904, Excellent had prepared a report on the navy's sighting equipment which 
recommended the general introduction of new improved telescopic sights. 65 On 11th May 
1905, the First Sea Lord approved a programme to accomplish the `re-sighting' of the 
entire fleet, a substantial programme to be funded out of both the current and following 
years' Estimates. A circular in June showed the extent of the proposals, detailing which 
ships were to receive what telescopes, and pointing out that 'These alterations will 
necessarily take a considerable time to carry into effect as the number ... to be provided 
S9 D. K. Brown, The Grand Fleet: Warship Design and Development 1906-1922 (London: Chatham 
Publishing, 1999) p. 26. 
60 H. Garbett Naval Gunnery (London: George Bell, 1897) pp. 201 to 203. 
61 Gun Sighting Telescope type AP 360 had been introduced in 1887, and type AP 700 in 1891: 
PQ 1091M/91/PQ11 details the instructions not to use the sights. 
62 Sumida (1993), p. 46 if. 
63 P. Padfield, Aim Straight: a biography of Sir Percy Scott, the father of modern naval gunnery (London, 
Hodder & Stoughton, 1966), Chapter 5. 
64 PRO ADM 116/602 Naval Armaments and Equipment; experiences gained on active service in South 
Africa, has comments on the quality of naval telescopic sights. 
65 PQ 109/M/91 /PQ 16,16.2.1905. 
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is very large'. 66 The 1905-1907 programme represented, numerically, the largest order for 
optical instruments that the Admiralty had ever placed, amounting to approximately 
4,000 assorted telescopes 67 The Director of Naval Ordnance (DNO) had pointed out that 
'as far as efficiency permits' existing telescopes would be used in the programme'68 but 
either efficiency did not so permit, or the DNO was being disingenuous, as neither of the 
two patterns of sighting telescopes then in service was to be used. 69 
Five new types were to be ordered: two of fixed magnification at 3 and 6 power, and 
three of variable magnifications at 3 to 9,5 to 15, and 7 to 21 power. They were all of 
straightforward optical design, but made to standards of robustness far beyond any civil 
telescope and quite unlike anything being sold commercially. The standards of optical 
design and precision in manufacture needed, though, were no higher than any high class 
optical firm would have employed in its regular production. The contracts were divided 
between two established London makers, Ottway & Co. Ltd., and the Ross Optical 
Company. Design details were left to each firm within the general specification 
governing magnification, angle of view and connections for attaching them to the guns. 70 
Ottway received orders for all five patterns, Ross for only two. Using the values given in 
the Admiralty's Rate Book for Naval Stores, 71 it is possible to assess the total contract 
value as about £50,000, spread over the financial years 1905-1906, and 1906-1907. This 
was indeed a significant order (some £3.5 million at 1998 values). 72 Some measure of its 
size and importance to the optical munitions industry can be gained from comparison 
with the approximately £22,000 of rangefinder orders Barr & Stroud received from the 
66 PQ 109/M191/PQ16,2.6.1905. 
67 This figure has been extrapolated from the scales of issue in the schedule, and from armament details in 
Jane's Fighting Ships 1905-1906. 
68 PQ 109/M/91/PQ16,16.2.1905. 
69 They are not mentioned at all in the Royal Navy's Manual of Gunnery for His Majesty's Fleet Volume 1, 
Part I (London: Eyre & Spottiswood, 1907) 
70 Great Britain, Admiralty, Gunnery Department. Manual of Gunnery for His Majesty 's Fleet (London: 
HMSO, 1907). 
71 Rate Bookfor Naval Stores: Authorised List and PriceList of Naval Stores (HMSO, annually from 
1870). 
72 Calculated using data from R. Twigger, Inflation: The Value of the Pound 1750-1998: (London: House 
of Commons Library, London., 1999. 
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Admiralty in the same years. 73 In the absence of company records for either Ottway or 
Ross, the effects this business had on them must be conjectural, but Ross' advertisement 
in the 1907 edition of Jane's Fighting Ships announced that they had made extensive 
additions to their works in consequence of what they demurely described as 'increased 
demand' for their telescopes, and that their production and prices would benefit as a 
result. 
Important as this business was, it was not sustainable in the way that manufacture of the 
rangefinder was. The Royal Navy's very size, and, it may be argued, its earlier 
backwardness in failing to keep up with the growing potential of naval gunnery, provided 
a unique business opportunity for the firms who won sighting telescope contracts in 
1905. It was a'one-off, much in the same way that the War Office orders had been in the 
Boer War. Once the re-equipment was complete, demand for sighting telescopes would 
be geared to new shipbuilding and replacement of attrition. The telescope, as an 
instrument, offered little possibility of radical improvement in design or performance, 
and so early obsolescence was unlikely, and it was not individually of particularly high 
value. The rangefinder, though, was a much more expensive device that was still 
evolving, and new, improved designs had the potential to render obsolete earlier 
versions, creating a self-sustaining demand. Welcome as the sighting telescope orders 
undoubtedly were, they did not presage the development of a sustainable new branch of 
optical munitions manufacture. Their significance was that they established Ottway and 
Ross as the Navy's telescopic sight makers, a status which was sustained (albeit at a low 
level of activity) by the shipbuilding programmes that continued until the Great War. 
At the same time that new sighting apparatus was being considered, the construction of 
the novel battleship Dreadnought emphasised the pressing need for a rangefinder of 
greater accuracy. Unlike earlier capital ships, Dreadnought had a main armament of 
uniform calibre where five turrets each mounting two 12-inch guns replaced a mixture of 
73 Extracted from UGD 295/19/1/2, Customer Orders 1900-1910. 
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turrets with guns of different calibres. 74 The guns themselves were little different from 
those of immediately preceding battleships, but the important difference, the presumptive 
anomaly, was the potential improvement in the damage that the new ship's heavy 
armament could inflict at longer ranges. 75 To hit at increased distances demanded greater 
precision in the aiming process, errors in aiming and distance setting had to be eliminated 
before satisfactory shooting could be expected. The whole question of 'fire control', the 
integration of all the problems involved in long range artillery fire at sea began to be 
studied seriously in late 1903 and 1904, even before the design of Dreadnought had been 
finalised. Once again, as in the previous decade, technological advances were so strong 
that they not only challenged established norms but demanded investigation of the way to 
further efficiencies in gunnery. The Royal Navy was unavoidably faced with the need for 
'inventing accuracy', to provide a targeting system that would enable an unguided 
projectile fired from one moving ship to hit another moving vessel whose course between 
the projectile's despatch and arrival was unpredictable. 6 The start of the process had to 
be the knowledge of the range of the target vessel, and as any error in range would 
disrupt any possibility of accuracy, the performance of the rangefinder was of paramount 
importance. Without that instrument, gunnery control would be inadequate and the 
performance of the entire weapon system that was the battleship would be devalued. 
Serious as that was, there was another situation in which the presence of optical 
instrumentation alone permitted the deployment of a new military technology. 
2.5 The Submarine Periscope 
In 1901, the Royal Navy acquired its first submarines to evaluate the menace posed by 
the underwater vessel armed with torpedoes, and to determine the best ways to counter 
74 For examples of earlier armament combinations, see A. Preston, Battleships of World War 1: An 
Illustrated Encyclopaedia of the Battleships of All Nations 1914-1918 (New York: Galahad Books, 1972) 
vr. 98 to 111. 
Sumida (1993) p. 49. 
76 T he quotation is taken from D. M ackKenzie, Inventing Accuracy: a Historical Sociology ofNuclear 
Missile Guidance (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1990). 
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it. 77 The threat of the underwater vessel lay principally in its invisibility when 
submerged, but to exploit its potential the vessel's crew needed to be able to see what 
was happening above the water in order to navigate and position the boat for an attack. 
Neither the idea of the submarine nor a device to see from it was new; experimental 
submarines had been built by several navies in the late 19th century, and all used some 
kind of primitive device to permit observation when under water. 
78 The effectiveness of 
these early methods was far from satisfactory, many being little more than glazed panels 
in an extension of the boat's hull that projected above the water when the vessel was 
below the surface. In other cases, combinations of simple lenses and mirrors were 
employed in a tube passing from the crew space through the hull to reach above the 
water. These `periscopes' were more useful, but by no means widely adopted in the early 
submarines partly because of their optical limitations and partly because of the 
mechanical problems of making them watertight and durable. The early development of 
the submarine as a weapon was inhibited as much by the lack of the means to see as by 
other engineering difficulties. 
All the first British submarines had periscopes that were, by contemporary standards, 
effective enough to allow the boat to be used as a weapon. The earliest ones were made 
up to the specification of Captain Reginald Bacon in 1901 or 1902 79 Bacon, a leading 
proponent of the military utility of the submarine was subsequently introduced by the 
boats' builders, Vickers, to Sir Howard Grubb, the owner of the Dublin astronomical 
telescope making firm, who - according to Bacon - subsequently produced an improved 
version of his original design. 8° Bacon's claim may have been mistaken, as Grubb's first 
periscope patent was granted in 1901.81 The patent specification shows this to have been 
a sophisticated prismatic design, providing an erect, normal image, unlike earlier devices 
which either reversed or inverted what the observer saw. Grubb's good relations with 
" N. A. Lambert, Sir John Fisher's Naval Revolution (South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 
1999) p. 38 fl 
78 M. F. Suetter, The Evolution oft he Submarine b oat, Mine, and Torpedo (Portsmouth: Griffin, 1908) 
describes these in some detail in the text. 
" Cited in I. S. Glass, Victorian Telescope Makers: Thomas and Howard Grubb (Bristol: Institute of 
Physics Publishing, 1998) p. 206. 
so Glass (1998) describes the other accomplishments of the firm. 
73 
Vickers gave him a monopoly of supply for all the Vickers' submarines built in the next 
five years, and he had the vast majority of periscope business from the Royal Navy until 
1914. Norman Friedman suggests that Grubb may have supplied periscopes for U. S. 
submarines built by the Electric Boat Company as early as 1902, and describes the firm 
as one of the major manufacturers `early in the century'. 82 Assessing Grubb's 
contribution to the early development of the optical munitions industry is made difficult 
by the paucity of available records for the fum and a more extensive consideration of its 
activities must remain contingent on the emergence of more information. 83 
The importance of the periscope in the development of the submarine cannot be 
underestimated. As the rangefinder made effective gunnery at long ranges possible, so 
the periscope permitted the submarine to become a practical weapon delivery system. It 
became not just a navigational tool (its original purpose) but also the sighting device to 
permit the submarine's offensive weapon, the torpedo, to be aimed with precision. 
Proponents of the submarine were quick to see the possibility of using the periscope as a 
type of fire control system, and in 1903 L Y. Spear of the Holland Torpedo Boat 
Company, New York, asked Barr & Stroud to design a rangefinder that could be 
incorporated into the periscope. 84 Archibald Barr had reservations about the possibility of 
doing this, because the company had no knowledge of periscopes, and subsequently 
declined to take on the project. 
The Royal Navy's willingness to consider an alternative paradigm in naval warfare in 
response to an emerging technology permitted another branch of optical munitions 
manufacture to become established in Britain, although without further research it is not 
possible to understand the relationship between the appearance of the essential optical 
device and the weapon itself. Unlike large surface warships, which were typically 
produced to meet a government requirement, the submarine was a private venture which 
1 Glass (1998) p. 208 82 N. Friedman, U. S. Submarines through 1945; an illustrated design history (Annapolis, MD: Naval 
Institute Press, 1995) p. 270. 
83 Tyne & Wear Archive Services, Newcastle on Tyne, holds unsorted records for the successor company. 84 UGD 295, unclassified material, Russell Research Notes, Barr to Spear, 6th October 1903. 
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was promoted by its inventors to governments. Possibly the desire to offer an effective 
weapon stimulated the builders of submarine to hasten the development of the periscope, 
the reverse of what had happened in the emergence of the rangefinder. 
2.6 Barr & Stroud - the principal optical munitions maker 
The increasing commitment to long range gunnery, and the concomitant necessity for fire 
control, meant that Barr & Stroud was virtually guaranteed a monopoly of Admiralty 
rangefinder business by 1905. No other British optical maker had that firm's accrued 
expertise in the mechanics of rangefinder construction, nor such an established working 
relationship with the Royal Navy. Donald MacKenzie points out that accuracy (in 
missile targeting) is 'the product of a complex process of conflict and collaboration 
between a range of social actors' and not merely the 'inevitable consequence of technical 
change'. 85 It was the Royal Navy's willingness to accept Barr & Stroud as its monopoly 
supplier as much as the firm's command of technology that allowed the firm to buildup 
not just its domestic business but its even more successful export trade up to the close of 
1906. 
The Admiralty had indicated during 1898 that it wanted to acquire a very substantial 
number of rangefmders and because of concerns that prices were excessively high 
through Barr & Stroud's monopoly, had raised the question of acquiring the rights to 
produce them, either itself or through other contractors. 86 The firm's response indicated 
how far it had shifted from the founding partners' original intention to derive an income 
from licensing their patents to others. 87 Having had the potential value of the rangefinder 
indicated by the growing interest from both the Admiralty and foreign enquiries Barr & 
Stroud was now much more interested in supplying than in licensing, and had no 
inclination willingly to relinquish its monopoly. On May 30th, the firm reiterated its 
insistence on a royalty of £100 per instrument made by anyone else, and insisted that the 
as D. MacKenzie (1990) p. 3. 
86 UGD 295/5/744, Letter Book, Barr & Stroud to Admiralty, 30.5.1898, cites Admiralty letter 
CP/4919/8720,27.4.1898. 
87 See Moss and Russell (1988) p. 17 for details of Archibald Barr and William Stroud's first joint design, a 
patented device for malting lantern slides, licensed to another to manufacture. 
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selling price of £250 for each rangefinder was absolutely the lowest possible. The firm 
refuted robustly the Admiralty's allegation that the bulk of the selling price represented 
'royalty and commission', rather than a more usual mark-up on manufacturing costs. 88 
The company's riposte was that, besides materials costs, the final price actually reflected 
the expenses of setting-up, research and development, and a return on the accrual of 
expertise. To this aggregation, which they termed their'oncost', they added a percentage 
to cover labour costs, operating overheads, and then a final margin for profit. 
Faced with what may be interpreted as either a reasonable commercial assessment of 
their products' value, or as downright obduracy by the company, the Admiralty 
abandoned the idea of acquiring the manufacturing rights and eventually issued a 
contract for a hundred rangefinders on 30th June, 1899, at the price demanded by Barr & 
Stroud. The Admiralty found itself in an unusual position with Barr & Stroud. Although 
a monopsonist domestic customer, the Admiralty was never able to exert its 'enormous 
market powers' over Barr & Stroud. 89 Even though the Patents Act gave the Crown the 
right to 'use [a patented] invention for the service of the Crown' without the prior 
arrangement of terms or conditions, 90 no matter how much the Admiralty may have 
objected to the fern's prices and the proposed licensing fee, it was hardly in a position to 
take advantage of that right. The Act did not give the Crown any power to compel an 
inventor to manufacture for it, nor was there any other maker of naval rangefinders to 
whom the Admiralty could turn in the hope of obtaining a better deal. The scale of its 
demand by 1906 had been insufficient to support more than one maker, even if any other 
firm had been able to produce competitive instruments. Barr & Stroud's various patents 
made the task very difficult, and the key one covering the prism and range scale 
arrangements to measure and display the range remained in force until 1903.91 The only 
potential rival for Barr & Stroud in 1898 was the German Zeiss rangefinder, which was 
built on a fundamentally different principle and itself well protected by patents. The 
88 UGS 295/5/744, Letter Book, Barr & Stroud to Admiralty, 30.5.1898. 
89 C. Trebilcock, The Vickers Brothers: Armaments and Enterprise 1854 - 1914 (London: Europa 
Publications, 1977) p. 3. 
90 Patents, Designs, and Trade Marks Act, 1883, Section 27(1). 
91 The provisions of British Patent 9520/1888 were also in force in France, Germany and the USA. 
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Zeiss instrument was both foreign, which made it less than desirable to the Admiralty, 
and exceedingly demanding in manufacture, which would probably have made it even 
more expensive than the Barr & Stroud instrument. 
The Admiralty's options were limited either to agreeing to the company's royalty 
demands or to paying the price demanded for complete instruments. The decision to 
continue buying from Barr & Stroud rather than seeking another maker was perhaps 
influenced by the company's emphasis in its riposte on setting-up costs and accrued 
expertise. If the Admiralty wanted another and presumably cheaper source for its 
rangefinders, it would need a contractor both willing and able to manufacture at a lower 
price, and would also have to allow for delays while such a firm became proficient in 
making a specialised instrument which was quite unlike anything else being made by the 
British optical or scientific instrument industry. No doubt these difficulties persuaded the 
Admiralty to maintain the status quo, a circumstance that repeated itself some fifteen 
years later and will be described later in this story. However, the continued dependence 
of Barr & Stroud on outside suppliers for many of its components was a potential 
weakness for the firm that might have provided a means by which another source of 
supply could have been established had the Admiralty been so minded. So long as the 
patents remained in force, Barr & Stroud could dictate royalty terms, but once these 
expired in 1903, then the firm might be vulnerable to competition, particularly if it was 
still dependent on outside suppliers. The Admiralty's principal need in 1899 was the 
immediate acquisition of rangefinders, and short-term priorities overcame any question 
of future alternative sources of supply. The company was therefore safely able to 
anticipate the Admiralty's new business and proceed with plans to expand both the scale 
and scope of their operations. 
By the time the contract was signed in mid-1899, Barr & Stroud had completed its 
expansion into a purpose-built engineering workshop equipped with a range of machine 
tools to allow the manufacture of some at least some of the components used in the 
rangefinder, its mounting, and the Range and Order' instruments which formed part of 
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the rangefinder's shipboard operating system. 92 This investment was in a year when 
turnover declined from over £14,000 to £8,500, and it represented the anticipation of 
Admiralty business rather than a response to orders already received. It showed the 
measure of confidence which the firm then had. The move marked the beginning of a 
period of sustained expansion which was to lead the firm into a second move only three 
years later. This short interval saw the company's business expand and diversify, not just 
in the products being made but in the clients to whom they were supplied. This growth 
also directed Barr & Stroud towards an increasing level of autarky which was achieved 
only with some difficulty. 
The growth of the business can be measured from the surviving details of orders and 
turnover. The turnover and sales figures quoted below are partly from schedules prepared 
during the late 1960s in connection with a proposed, but uncompleted, company history. 
Other figures were prepared in 1987 by Barr & Stroud Ltd from then-surviving cash 
books in connection with Michael Moss and lain Russell's Range and Vision, which was 
published in 1988. Those books apparently did not survive subsequent company re- 
structuring, but Strang's draft material contains extensive details which, where 
comparisons can be made, do correspond with the abbreviated material published in 
Range and Vision. The order figures before 1901 come from Strang's material which was 
produced from then-existing factory records, seemingly now lost. Order records from 
1901 onwards survive in their entirety for the period under review, providing a wealth of 
detail about quantities, prices and delivery times. 3 
Moss and Russell suggest that the firm's order book shrank between 1900 to 1902 to such 
a level that serious concerns were felt about prospects for the immediate future. Orders 
had been received for 44 rangefinders in 1900,33 in 1901 and 26 in 1902, and 
consequently turnover had shrunk from £27,731 in 1900 (largely composed of receipts 
92 Moss and Russell (1988) p. 37. 
93 UGD 295/19/2/1,19,2/2.19/2/3 Customer Orders December 1900 onwards. 
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from the Admiralty's large order of June 1899) to £15,070 in 1901, and to £14,522 in 
190194 As a result the partners became 
acutely aware of the over-reliance of the business on the willingness of the 
governments of the world to continue to spend vast sums on expanding and 
modernising their navies. 
Moss and Russell point out that William Stroud was 'particularly concerned' that the 
business had failed to get War Office to adopt its designs, and he persuaded the other two 
partners that 'the time had come to diversify the range of products' the business was 
making. In 1899 Stroud wrote a series of letters from Leeds to Archibald Barr revealing 
an assessment of the firm's prospects which was much less optimistic than his partners'. 95 
He was still living in Yorkshire as Cavendish Professor of Physics at what had then 
become the University of Leeds, and spent very little time in Glasgow. In March, when 
in poor health, he wrote a letter revealing his thinking. Referring to the drafting of a new 
co-partnership agreement to avoid the possibility of bankruptcy following the death of 
one partner, he wrote 
You see, I regard the business as a very precarious one. If we had [vacuum] 
pumps really selling, and recorders [range and order instruments] &c &c I 
should believe in the stability of B&S much more. 96 
Between April and July, still in poor health, he wrote a series of generally pessimistic 
letters on the financial problems that might result from the death of a partner but then, 
probably recovering from his illness, he became more positive and specifically urged on 
Barr the need to reduce manufacturing costs so that, if necessary, selling prices could be 
reduced when the original patents expired in 1903 and other competitors might appear. 97 
The point about the likely problems when the original patents expired was particularly 
94 Moss and Russell (1988) p. 42 provides the source for figures and quotations in this section. 
95 UGD 295 16/1/10 Personal Correspondence of William Stroud. 
's UGD 295/16/1/10 Personal correspondence, Stroud to Barr, 16d March 1899. 
97 UGD 295/16/1/10 Personal correspondence, Stroud to Jackson, 7`s July 1899. 
79 
telling, and ties in with the decisions made soon afterwards to expand and assume greater 
control of components manufacture. 
This picture Moss and Russell paint is only partly correct, as it can be shown that, despite 
Stroud's concerns about the future prospects for military and naval orders, the business 
was actually starting to grow substantially. The subsequent decision in 1902 to move 
again, this time to a much larger site, was taken because of the developments in naval 
business, and not through any programme of diversification into non-military products. 
The revenue from the firm's own vacuum pumps, and the licensed Becker electric 
clocks, which were sold from 1899 and 1901 respectively, was very small indeed. 98 The 
order records after December 1900 show little demand for them, their individual selling 
prices were less than a tenth of a rangefinder and their contribution to the business could 
at best have been only marginal compared to that from naval orders. 
The value of orders received for rangefinders and associated items grew steadily in value 
from 1901. 
Table 2.1: Barr & Stroud: comparison of British and foreign orders, 1901-1906.99 
Year British Orders £s Foreign orders £s 
1901 2,908 8,776 
1902 6,569 13,906 
1903 11,583 12,525 
1904 36,651 52,975 
1905 11,537 33,162 
1906 24,315 28225 
98 Moss and Russell (1988) p. 43. 
99 Extracted from UGD 295/19! 2/1, Customer order file. 
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Order values increased steadily through this period, the peak in 1904 being influenced by 
the large amount of business from the opposing navies just before and during the Russo- 
Japanese war. However, even without those atypically large orders, the value of business 
would still have been substantially up on that for 1903: even excluding foreign orders 
from 1904's figures, incoming business still rose by approximately 52 percent. 
The overall growth came not only foreign orders but also from the Admiralty's increasing 
investment in fire control instruments. The original specification for the rangefinder in 
1891 had called for the provision to relay ranges from the instrument to the guns, and 
Barr & Stroud had begun work on such apparatus at the same time as the rangefinder. In 
1892 the Admiralty had decided that there was no immediate need for this transmission 
device, but the firm carried on and by 1893 they had developed a basic design which was 
submitted for trials at in 1894.100 The Admiralty's tests continued until 1901, with the 
design of the 'range and order' instruments evolving steadily. In that year, despite Barr's 
irritation at the time taken, '0' the first of a series of substantial orders was placed. 
Between 1901 and the end of 1906, British contracts for fire control instruments totalled 
£33,522 compared with £50,318 for rangefinders. 102 
Important though this was, it was overshadowed by the growth in overseas orders in the 
same period. In every year from 1901 to 1906 foreign orders were greater than domestic 
ones, as shown in figure 1 above. The customer records show that these orders were 
almost entirely for rangefinders, the reverse of the pattern of Admiralty ones, implying 
either that foreign navies had failed to appreciate the need to integrate rangefinding into a 
gunnery control system, or that the extensive (and expensive) shipboard modifications 
needed to accommodate the electrical circuitry were unacceptable. Only the Imperial 
Japanese Navy was a regular purchaser of control instrumentation, but by no means on 
the same scale as the Royal Navy. In 1904, when Russian and Japanese purchasing was 
its greatest, less than 5 percent of the spending was on fire control apparatus. 103 
10° UGD 295/4/12 Letter Book, Archibald Barr to Secretary, Admiralty, 25.4.1894. 
101 UGD 295/4/23 Letter Book, Barr to Stroud, 7.9.1901. 
102 extracted from UGD 295/19/2/1 Customer Orders 1901 to 1910. 
103 UGD 295/19/2/1 Customer Order files 1901 to 1910. 
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Moss and Russell considered that `when demand for rangefmders picked up in 1903' this 
was because of the introduction of an improved model, the FA3. '°4 There certainly was 
an increase in Admiralty orders for rangefinders after 1903, but whether the FA3 itself 
was responsible for them is not certain. By 1904, the Royal Navy was increasingly 
accepting that gunnery improvements were possible through the better methods 
emphatically prescribed by Captain Percy Scott when he took charge of the navy's 
gunnery school, HMS Excellent in 1903,105 and it was the Navy's willingness to entertain 
a `paradigm shift'106 in its approach to gunnery that caused larger purchases of 
rangefinders, rather than simply the availability of a better instrument. As for foreign 
business, the escalating tension between Russia and Japan would have generated the 
same orders, irrespective of recent technical advances. The Russian Navy was severely 
disadvantaged in its gunnery methods compared to the Japanese and its purchases of the 
older (and less expensive) FA models suggested that it was principally concerned with 
quantity rather than the latest improvements. '07 
Even before this surge of business, the actual and expected growth in orders for a 
increasing range of naval gunnery instruments led, in 1902, to the decision to build a 
much larger factory. 108 The existing site at Ashton Lane was unsuitable for expansion 
because of the density of surrounding building, and the workshops themselves, spread 
over three levels, were increasingly inconvenient and not big enough to handle the larger 
instruments being considered for development. The new site was some two miles from 
the existing works, in largely open country, adjacent to a railway station and at the end of 
tram route which conveniently served the areas where most of the existing workforce 
lived, as well as others from which extra workers might be drawn. The firm hoped the 
clear air of the more rural setting, free from the effects of Glasgow's atmospheric 
104 Moss and Russell (1988) p. 43. 
105 Padfield, P. Aim Straight: A Biography of Sir Percy Scott (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1966) p. 135. 
106 W McBride (2000) p. 6 
107 For the relative state of gunnery in the two navies, see H. W. Wilson, Battleships in Action. 2 vols. Vol. 
1. (London: Conway Maritime Press, 1995) Chapter XI; Russian order details extracted from UGD 
295/19/2/1, Customer Order files 1901-1910. 
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pollution, would allow the final visual checking of the rangefinders to be done more 
efficiently and without interruption. A further benefit, from Barr's point of view, was that 
the new factory would be `a place where workers could earn a decent living under clean 
healthy and happy conditions'. 109 The land for the new works was purchased in 1902, 
and building began in the autumn of 1903. Additions to building plans were made in 
1904 and 1906, largely in the expectation of more Admiralty business. ' 0 The story of 
Barr & Stroud between 1899 and 1906 is largely one of expansion and profitability, 
based partly on the firm's own abilities and partly on a fortuitous combination of 
circumstances which saw a steady increase in concern with gunnery in the Royal Navy, 
bolstered by the profits generated from supplying both protagonists in the Russo- 
Japanese war. 
It would be wrong, however, to assume that the progression to 1906 was straightforward. 
This was certainly not the case, and although the business grew substantially and was 
generally profitable as shown in table 2.2 below, there were problems to be dealt with. 
Table 2.2: Barr & Stroud, turnover and pre-tax profits 1899-1906.111 
Year Turnover Pre-tax Profit 
1899 8,556 Loss (688) 
1900 27,731 11,761 
1901 15,070 3,699 
1902 14,522 920 
1903 20,889 5,906 
1904 49,691 23,924 
1905 77,512 29,196 
1906 64,246 23,586 
108 Moss and Russell (1988) p. 45 provides source material for the rest of this section, unless otherwise 
indicated. 
'09 UGD 295, unclassified material, Strang manuscript, p. 61. 
110 Sumida (1993) discusses the reasons for the Admiralty's policy about rangefinder purchases in Chapter 
3. 
111 Extracted from UGD 295/26/1/47, Table of Sales. 
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Some organisational weaknesses became apparent in the development of Barr & Stroud 
after 1898. When the firm moved into the Ashton Lane factory, its chief abilities were in 
mechanical and electrical engineering, rather than in optics. Archibald Barr's own 
abilities lay firmly in those fields, and the staff he had recruited in Glasgow added to this 
strength. ' 12 William Stroud, who was still living in Leeds, was the only person in the 
firm who was able to design optical components, and he also played a very significant 
role in the design of the Range and Order instruments which were to assume an 
increasingly important part of the business after 1901. Stroud's location, some 250 miles 
away, was to cause difficulties in the process of product development. 
Stroud's letters to Glasgow show the volume and detail of correspondence between him 
and Archibald Barr when new designs were in progress. Daily letters suggested ways to 
overcome difficulties, and arguments over the best ways to proceed were conducted on 
paper. At times, Barr's frustrations were evident. In 1904, when the War Office had 
asked for a design for a new type of artillery sight, Stroud had dismissed the type of 
instrument as being of no value. Barr wrote to him bluntly, saying `I do not agree with 
you [about the sight's utility], but we need not discuss that; they are wanted and are to be 
introduced into the service ... '113 In December 1904, Barr wrote `I do not agree that you 
can do the best for B&S by staying at home [in Leeds]'. ' 4 Stroud obdurately refused to 
visit Glasgow, and the question of his moving to live and work there was not once 
mentioned directly in any of the personal correspondence still preserved from this time. 
His continual, and at times seemingly determined, absence could hardly have helped the 
process of optical design development. ' 15 
When the move to the Ashton Lane factory was made in 1899, Barr & Stroud were 
relying on one principal supplier of mechanical components and two suppliers of optical 
1 12 Moss and Russell (1988) provides details of the qualifications of scientific staff, p. 37,38. 
1 13 UGD 295/4 /739, Letter Book, Barr to Stroud, 16.11.1904. 
114 UGD 295/4/739, Letter Book, Barr to Stroud, 14.12.1904. 
115 In March 1901 he refused to travel up to Glasgow, citing the presence of smallpox in the city as too 
great a risk. UGD 295/16/1/10, Stroud's personal correspondence. 
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parts. James White, the Glasgow firm with which Lord Kelvin, (Barr's earlier mentor at 
the University of Glasgow) was closely associated, '16 had supplied castings and 
fabricated parts for both the rangefinder and its mounting. Chadburn Brothers of 
Sheffield, Yorkshire, supplied both spherical lenses and plane glass panels, and Adam 
Hilger of Camden, London, made some spherical lenses and all the prisms. Barr & 
Stroud constantly had difficulty with the quality of the optical contractors' products, as 
well as deliveries. 
The problems with optical components were frequent and sometimes serious. Chadburn 
Brothers had been suppliers of the simpler optical parts since 1889, when they made 
parts for the very first instrument. ' 17 Barr & Stroud used them for the less critical 
components in the rangefmder's optical system, such as the optics for the aiming 
viewfmder and the protective glass covers for the objectives. Even with these relatively 
simple items Barr & Stroud frequently returned parts to Chadburn's with complaints 
about inadequate quality and errors in execution, ' 18 but rather than looking for a 
replacement supplier seemed content to instruct and educate, presumably because there 
was no other closer or more convenient source. 119 
The relationship with Adam Hilger & Co. was particularly important because for much 
of this period Hilger was practically the only company in Britain able to provide the most 
important optical parts of the rangefinder. The Barr and Stroud instrument used two 
telescopes which provided the operator with separate images of a target: these images 
were brought into alignment through a system of prisms to provide a direct reading of the 
target's range. The telescopes were not particularly complex in design, but it was 
important that they provided images of almost identical magnification as possible. They 
16 T. N. Clark, A. D. Morrison-Low, and A. D. C. Simpson, Brass & Glass: Scientific Instrument Making 
Workshops in Scotland (Edinburgh: National Museums of Scotland, 1988) for an account of this business 
and the connections with Lord Kelvin. 
"7 UGD 295/Unclassified material/ Russell research notes: Private Ledger No. 1 (1888-1902) is mentioned 
as showing payments to Chadburn Brothers from 1889 onwards. 
118 For example, UGD 295/4/22, Letter Book, Barr & Stroud to Chadburn Bros, 25.2.1901 complains that 
'in almost every instance ... we get a wrong lens... '. ; 119 Clark et al. (1990) gives no listing of optical manufacturers. 
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presented a manufacturing problem rather than a design difficulty. Stroud specified their 
necessary magnifying power and angle of view and left Hilger's to compute the lens 
curves necessary to provide them. Stroud's skill lay in the design of the prism systems 
which provided for the superimposition of the telescopes' images, but as with the 
telescopes he was entirely dependent on Hilger's to produce them accurately; not 
achieving precisely the specified angles would cause a prism to fail in its purpose. 120 
Problems with both quality and delivery times from Hilger had been evident almost from 
the start of the companies' relationship. Sometimes Hilger's work was praised, but often 
it fell below Barr & Stroud's requirements. As early as February 1893, Barr & Stroud 
were returning prisms as unsatisfactory and difficulties continued on a regular basis. 121 In 
1897 Adam Hilger, presumably as a result of the increasing volume of business, mooted 
the idea of moving the business to Glasgow, and Barr reported to William Stroud that 
'Hilger appears to favour an amalgamation of some kind'. 122 However, despite the'great 
delays in sending things back and forward', neither partner was 'disposed to favour this' 
and nothing came of the idea. The following year though, Barr & Stroud complained that 
the defects in Hilger's prisms were causing them'endless worry and expense'. 123 Between 
October and December of 1900 a series of letters to Hilger written by Harold Jackson, 
Barr & Stroud's general manager, showed how bad matters had become between the two 
firms. 124 
Having had yet more problems with prisms, Jackson warned Hilger's on 4`h November 
that Barr & Stroud now had the means to check precisely the standards of optical work 
delivered. By the 28`h, Jackson was saying that the Hilger's proposed mutually 
acceptable standards were 'ridiculous' and on the 30th he threatened to go elsewhere for 
prism work. The threat, which was repeated on P December, was really a hollow one 
120 for a description of prisms and their working in the rangefinder, see L. C. Martin, Optical Instruments, 
their Construction, Theory and Use (London: Blackie & Sons, 1924) p. 113 if. 
121 UGD295/4/11 Letter Book, Barr to Hilger, 23.3.1893 and 4.4.1893. 
12 UGD 295/16/1/9, Letter Book, Barr to Stroud, 26.1.1897. 
123 UGD 295 Unclassified Material, Russell Research Notes, H. D. Jackson to Hilger, 10.9.1898. 
124 UGD 295/4/21 Letter Book, H. D. Jackson to Hilger, a series of letters between 3.10.1900 and 
3.12.1900. 
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because Barr & Stroud no other source to turn to and although its real purpose was 
doubtless to encourage Hilger's to improve their quality, Jackson may have been 
overzealous and pushed the London firm to a point where it wanted to cease doing 
optical work for Barr & Stroud. A complete breakdown in relations between the two 
firms during December 1900 seems to have been averted only by Barr's personal 
intervention in a letter of 13t' December, apologising for the 'hurt' which earlier 
correspondence had caused. 125 But, even this conciliatory letter reiterated (if less harshly) 
the possibility of taking orders elsewhere, and difficulties between the firms over quality 
control continued to surface periodically, although business between them continued 
without interruption. 
The dependence on Hilger clearly concerned Barr & Stroud, and they periodically 
investigated obtaining optical components not just from other domestic sources, but from 
the German optical industry as well. 126 In 1897 they had made C. P. Goerz of Berlin their 
German agent, and afterwards periodically bought lens samples from them, as well as 
asking for quotations for the manufacture of prisms. 127 In 1899, they attempted to buy 
objective lenses from Steinheil of Munich, but encountered problems similar to those 
they had already had with Hilger: either the very specific instructions given were not 
adhered to or the quality was inadequate and sometimes the price was considered 
excessive. 128 In 1899, Stroud suggested asking Carl Zeiss of Jena to quote for optical 
components, but there is no record that his idea was followed up. 129 
Barr & Stroud's continued dependence on Adam Hilger through to the end of 1906 was 
principally the result of an established relationship that, despite frequent problems, 
worked well enough to let them produce satisfactory rangefinders. It was also because 
they still lacked the expertise to do the work themselves, although after 1904 they began 
'25 UGD 295/16/1/9 Letter Book, Barr to Hilger, 13.12.1900. 
'26 UGD 295/4/17 Letter Book, Barr & Stroud to Ross Optical Co., requesting them to tender for telescope 
objectives 12.12.1898. 
'I for example, see UGD 295/4/22 Letter Book, Jackson to Goerz, 28.3.1901, requesting quotations for 
'fine quality prisms'. 
12$ UGD 295/4/17 Letter Book, 10 objective lenses ordered 31.12.1898. They were returned faulty on 
6.3.1899 and the subject of a subsequent dispute. 
87 
to organise the means to do this, partly from the desire to control costs but also to gain 
greater control of the quality and speed of delivery of components for experimental 
work. 130 Attempts to obtain more satisfactory quality from German suppliers had failed 
(suggesting that contemporary perceptions of the superiority of the German optical 
industry were not wholly justified), and even if Barr & Stroud had been inclined work 
their way through the entire catalogue of German makers, the growing inclination of the 
Admiralty to be independent of foreign suppliers even for materials in British made 
products would have been a strong deterrent. Given the lack of any other British firm 
who could be relied on to perform better than Hilger, Barr & Stroud had little alternative 
to becoming optical workers themselves. This process began in 1904, but only developed 
significantly after 1907. 
2.7 Conclusion 
The period from 1899 to 1906 saw an increasing complexity in both the industry and its 
relationship with its government clients, the War Office and the Admiralty. Those 
complexities were brought on not simply by the increasing complexity of instruments 
and their scale of use, but also by a range of external and internal factors contingent on 
both makers and buyers. Those included both political and financial dimensions, as well 
as the goals and prejudices of the social groups that constituted the communities 
producing and using the apparatus. At the close of 1906, the optical munitions industry in 
Britain was both larger and more important than at the start of the Boer War. The Royal 
Navy was by far its largest single customer, although providing less income than the total 
of foreign orders. When the business placed by foreign navies up to 1906 is added, it is 
clear that optical munitions were still predominantly naval artefacts. Driven by a 
combination of improved weapons, an increasing realisation of the potential 
effectiveness of gunnery, and new types of ship, the Royal Navy's capabilities were 
becoming inextricably connected to its optical equipment. That growth was to confirm 
the Admiralty as the optical munitions industry's largest domestic client, but as the 
129 UGD 295/16/1/10 Personal correspondence from William Stroud to H. D. Jackson 7.7.1899. 130 UGD 295 Unclassified Material. Russell Research Notes. Barr's Private Letter Book No. 1, Barr to Mr 
A. Hilger [sic] 19.1.1904. 
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succeeding chapter will show, the increase in European land armaments was to start to 
generate an increasing demand from the War Office. 
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Chapter 3 
Expansion and consolidation, 1907 to 1914 
3.1 Introduction 
The period from 1907 to the start of the Great War saw optical munitions production 
grow at increasing rate and by 1914 a clearly identifiable sector of industry was engaged 
permanently, if not always entirely, in the production of instruments which, with few 
exceptions, had no civil applications. Only a small part of the optical instruments trade 
was engaged in this work, reflecting not just the specialised nature of what was being 
made but also the scale of demand for military and naval optics. That demand grew after 
1907, not so much because advances in optical technology permitted the creation of new 
instruments, but because developments in weapons technologies and increasing political 
instability created a climate that encouraged European states in particular to increase 
their expenditure on armaments and take up equipment which increasingly depended on 
optical instrumentation for its effectiveness. For the first time, the British War Office 
became a systematic buyer of optical munitions, greatly increasing its spending in the 
last two years of peace. Even though its budgets for such equipment were far less than 
the Admiralty's, it brought firms regularly into munitions work and established them as 
regular contractors. The Royal Navy's demands increased at a faster rate than the 
Army's, although a smaller number of firms produced its requirements and established 
closer working relations than with the War Office. This chapter examines the extent to 
which the optical munitions makers benefited from government business, assesses 
existing conceptions of the industry at this time, and compares the relative success and 
failure of the businesses that competed to supply what continued to be the single most 
important item in the optical armoury, the large naval rangefinder. 
3.2 The industry and the War Office's influence on it. 
In 1907 the Army was still a very small-scale user of optical munitions, most of which 
were already acknowledged within the service as unsatisfactory and obsolescent. Little 
had been done to rectify the shortcomings demonstrated in the Boer War and the Army's 
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spending on optics since then had averaged only £1,700 a year. ' That changed after 1908 
when decisions were made to adopt new instruments, causing spending to increase and 
generating new business for optical manufacturers. It has been previously suggested that 
not only did the War Office do little to support the domestic optical industry, but through 
a combination of favouring foreign makers and distributing orders piecemeal amongst 
British companies it discouraged the home industry from becoming involved in military 
contracting. 2 An examination of ordering patterns does not bear out this view, showing 
rather that War Office business was concentrated on a few British firms who thus became 
progressively more experienced in optical munitions production. That is not to say that 
the British Army was a prolific spender or that, unlike the Admiralty, it deliberately 
encouraged the home industry, but nevertheless military orders were placed at an 
increasing pace after 1910. The interaction of the War Office with the optical 
manufacturing community can be demonstrated by examining the process of selection 
and purchase of three key types of optical munitions - the single-observer rangefinder, 
the panoramic artillery gun sight (the `dial sight'), and the prismatic binocular. 
The records of the Army Contracts Department from April 1907 to 31" March 1914, 
show that some £175,000 was allocated to optical orders 3 Approximately £49,000 was 
for rangefinders, £66,000 for dial sights, and £45,000 for binoculars. Of the balance of 
£15,000, some £10,000 was spent on telescopes for signallers, and the rest on an 
assortment of other telescopes and gun sights. None of those latter purchases were 
recorded in sufficient detail to give any meaningful picture of their distribution amongst 
manufacturers and they are excluded from following account. 
3.3 The Rangefinder 
In 1907, the Army still lacked a satisfactory rangefinder despite numerous trials which 
had repeatedly recommended that the Marindin design should be adopted by the 
' The National Archives, Kew, London, War Office records (subsequently PRO) WO 395/2, Annual 
Reports of the Director of Army Contracts, financial years 1903-1904,1904-1905,1905-1906,1906-1907; 
data extracted from Contracts for Scientific Instruments. 
2 R. and K. MacLeod, "Government and the Optical Industry in Britain 1914-1918. " In War and Economic 
Development, edited by J. M. Winter. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977) p. 170. 
3 Extracted from PRO WO 395/2 and WO 395/3, Annual Reports. 
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Infantry. 4 Only in January that year was it finally considered necessary `that an infantry 
rangefinder should be immediately supplied' and the following month the Marindin was 
formally approved. 5 The quantities needed were, however, uncertain, because the scale of 
issue for rangefinders was currently being reviewed. If the Marindin simply replaced the 
earlier Mekometer, then the Field Army's Infantry (the `front line' troops) would need 
only 300, but if a wider issue were adopted then the total for the entire Infantry of the 
Regular Army would be 1,040. Budgeting for either quantity was problematical because 
no detailed costings had ever been requested by the War Office. 
Captain Marindin, the inventor, had his trial instruments made by Adam Hilger & Co., 
but there had been no formal liaison between the firm and the Army and the only price 
mentioned had been Marindin's informal estimate of £35 if `very large' numbers were 
ordered. The Master General of the Ordnance was being pressed to organise the 
rangefinder's `early introduction' even before its formal adoption, and he proposed to 
supply the Field Army with 300 during the next two years. He thought Marindin's 
estimate unrealistic as the trial instruments had each cost at least £85 each, and he 
reckoned the likely cost to be `nearer ... £50 each', possibly using as his yard-stick the 
current price of the Barr & Stroud infantry rangefinder. Having decided on the need to 
buy 300 rangefinders at a cost likely to exceed £15,000, the Master General could only 
allocate £5,000 in the Annual Estimates for the fiscal year 1907-1908 but nevertheless 
was content that, somehow, `steps will now be taken as to ... obtaining a supply'. 
Obtaining any supply was complicated because Marindin and the War Office were in 
dispute about the question of financial reward. 7 When asked in 1902 about his terms for 
making the rangefinder available to the Crown he had valued it at £25,000, but no further 
discussions took place until Marindin learned in early March 1907 of the decision to 
4 See Chapter 2 above. 
The National Archives, Kew, Treasury Records, (subsequently PRO) T1/11223, Proceedings of the 
Ordnance Council, 12.6.1908, Question of Award to Captain A. H. Marindin, The Black Watch for One- 
man Range-finderforlnfantry (subsequently Tl/11223 (1908), p. 5. 
6 PRO TI/11223 (1908), p. 4. This provides the source material for the rest of this section, unless otherwise 
indicated. 
7 PRO T111 1223, Proceedings of the Ordnance Council, 8.6.1909, Question of Award to Captain A. H. 
Marindin, The Black Watch for One-man Range; finder for Infantry (subsequently T111 1223 1909) p. 6. 
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adopt his rangefinder and immediately resurrected the matter. Pending a judgement, he 
refused to hand over the its detailed drawings to the Chief Inspector of Optical Stores at 
Woolwich Arsenal, stopping the War Office from drawing up a specification in order to 
request tenders for manufacture. The impasse was only broken by the Secretary of State 
for War who reminded Marindin that he was `witholding the information necessary for 
the manufacture of the instrument for His Majesty's Service' and, in practical terms, 
ordered him to surrender the details immediately. As a serving officer, he had little 
alternative but to acquiesce and hand over what was needed, trusting to fortune about his 
eventual reward. 
A request for tenders was issued by July 1907, but it was five months before any contract 
was placed. In November, Adam Hilger & Co. was given an order, not for the hundred 
which had been budgeted for, but for just sixteen instrument for troop trials. 8 That was 
because the War Office had decided that Marindin's claim could only be judged after 
seeing how well the rangefinder performed when issued to `ordinary' infantry units, 
linking its monetary value to its utility in general service. Until the claim was settled, the 
War Office was reluctant to commit itself to further purchases until an offer was been 
made to Marindin in June 1908, after which only fifty were ordered despite funds for a 
hundred already being available. Marindin rejected the offer and then appealed to the 
Treasury, a process that took a further year and gave him not £25,000 but a royalty of 
just 15 percent on each rangefinder accepted for service, plus his earlier expenses. 
The number of Marindin rangefinders ordered up to April 1914 was just 337 at a total 
value of £22,305, far less than was either needed or originally expected. It was never 
ordered on a scale large enough to equip the entire Infantry, partly because there were 
problems with it in service, partly because Hilger's were unable to manufacture at a rate 
greater two than per week, and not least because the War Office was unable to persuade 
any other maker to attempt its production. 9 The only other firm to tender and supply 
a University of Glasgow Archives, University of Glasgow Archives, Barr & Stroud, City of Glasgow, 
Optical Instrument Makers, collection reference UGD 295 (subsequently UGD 295) 295/4/744, Letter 
Book, H. D. Jackson to Adam Hilger Ltd., 9.8.1907, and 20.11.1907. 
9 PRO TI/11223 (1908) p. 4 and p. 10. 
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sample instruments was Thomas Cooke & Sons Ltd in 1908, but the company never 
received any production contracts. 10 The Marindin provided few benefits for the industry, 
either through large orders or any kind of spin-off that might have opened up new 
avenues for its maker. Adam Hilger's problems that restricted their benefiting from it 
will be described later in this chapter, but the rest of the optical industry was deterred 
from competing to produce it principally because the technical and logistical difficulties 
in setting-up outweighed the guarantee of reward; without the assurance of continuing 
orders no business was willing to tackle a manufacturing problem that was outside its 
prior experience. 
Eventually, in 1912, the War Office ordered a small quantity of infantry rangefmders 
from Barr & Stroud and the next year followed almost every other European army's 
example and began to buy them in bulk. Orders in 1912 totalled £4,313, rose in 1913 to 
£9,724, and in the first seven months of 1914 leapt to £54,000, almost two and a half 
times the money spent on the Marindin in the previous six years. " The War Office also 
spent £13,055 on German Zeiss rangefinders for experimental issue to the Field Artillery 
in 1911 and 1913, apparently supporting the notion that domestic industry was being 
discouraged. However, no decision had been made about standardising a pattern, and the 
purchases demonstrated the Artillery's inability to decide on what design of rangefinder 
it actually wanted rather than discrimination against domestic models. By the summer of 
1914, with a European war looking ever more likely, the Infantry was finally starting to 
be equipped with a satisfactory rangefinder, but the Field Artillery was still deliberating 
over what was required. The management of rangefinder procurement over the previous 
seven years may not have reflected well on the War Office, but the procurement of 
artillery sights and prism binoculars went far more satisfactorily. 
10 PRO WO 395/3, Contracts Department, Annual Report 1907-1908. 
" Extracted from UGD 295/19/2/1,295/19/2/2 and 295/19/2/3, Customer Order files. 
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3.4 The Artillery 'Dial Sight'. 
The Russo-Japanese war had emphasised that a more effective means of aiming artillery 
weapons was needed when the line of sight was obstructed. 12 Engaging obscured targets 
by `indirect firing' was not new to gunners, and was accomplished by aiming-off from a 
proxy target whose angular displacement from the actual one had been measured, so that 
the gun's sight could be set to an appropriate deflection in order to point the barrel in the 
correct direction. 13 The displacement angle was measured using surveying techniques, 
and the sighting done with an instrument using an aiming telescope fixed to a large, 
precisely divided circular dial - the so called `dial-sight' which was awkward to use, 
bulky, and relatively fragile. In 1904, the Berlin company, Optische Anstaldt C. P. 
Goerz, introduced a radically new type of optical sight that significantly improved on 
previous designs. 14 This `panoramic' dial sight was a compact prismatic aiming telescope 
that functioned as periscope: it traversed through a full circle whilst maintaining a 
magnified normal image for the observer who could now remain protected behind the 
gun's shield. Tests began in Britain in 1904 and, as with the Marindin rangefinder, went 
-oirfor several ycurs before the device was-+eventualiyapproved forservice-in 1907 and 
ordered as the `Dial Sight No. 7'. 
It was taken into use far quicker and more successfully than the rangefinder, and on a 
larger scale. Between April 1909 and April 1914 it accounted for more expenditure than 
any other single optical store purchased by the Army Contracts Department - £65,698, or 
37 percent of the total expenditure on optical munitions, with 1,662 sights eventually 
being contracted from six makers. ls Sufficient were ordered to match the gradual 
introduction after 1904 of new guns which were the principal recipients of the sight. 
Between then and July 1914, approximately 1,650 new guns were ordered for the British 
and Indian Armies, and although contracts for dial sights only began in 1908 they did 
12 Callwell, C. E. and J. F. Headlam. The History of the Royal Artillery. 3 vols. (Woolwich, London: Royal 
Artillery Institution, 1937) Vol. II, Chapters III and X. 
" Callwell and Headlam (1937) Vol. II, pp. 95 to 101 describe the problems of indirect firing and aiming 
and provide the source material for the rest of this paragraph.. 
14 See B. K. Johnson, "The No. 7 Dial Sight, Mk. 2. " Transactions of the Optical Society 21(1920): pp. 
176 to 86. 
15 Extracted from PRO WO 395/2 and 395/3, Annual Reports of Director of Army Contracts. 
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eventually match gun deliveries. 16 The scale of orders, unlike the Marindin rangefinder, 
was therefore as much as the optical industry could have expected to receive. 
Roy and Kay MacLeod suggested that before 1914 the War Office did not aid its optical 
suppliers in the way it went about doing business with them. In particular it `was a 
customer for German dial sights which ... led to the active discouragement of British 
firms in this area'. 17 And, they said, the War Office spread small contracts across 
different firms `in a misguided effort to stimulate competition' which had the unfortunate 
opposite effect of forcing up prices and discouraging mass production through the small 
quantities -just `tens' - of instruments involved. Although the War Office did buy dial 
sights from Germany, and did spread orders across a number of makers, the evidence of 
contract records leads to a conclusion rather different to the MacLeods'. 
The sight was made in Britain under a licensing agreement with the German Goerz 
company which held international patents for it. The arrangement required the purchase 
of some instruments from Goerz and the payment of royalties for those made in Britain. 
Only 30 percent of the orders went directly to Goerz and, in an apparent paradox, the 
War Office may actually have considered Goerz as a British supplier. The Contracts 
Department identified all foreign purchases in its yearly reports, but only two of Goerz's 
four contracts were so described, in the financial years 1910-1911 and 1911-1912; those 
in the next two years were listed along with domestic ones. Goerz had set up a London 
subsidiary company ('Tochtergesellschaft') in 1908, partly in response to the new 
requirements of the Companies (Consolidation) Act, 1907 which required foreign 
businesses trading in Britain to disclose full details of their parent company's financial 
affairs, and partly because of the new Patents Act of the same year. 18 Under the latter, if a 
British patent held by a foreign patentee was not being `worked' on a commercial basis 
in Britain, the patentee was obliged to grant a licence to any `interested person' who 
16 For numbers of guns ordered, see Hogg and Thurston (1972) pp. 58,80,102 and 116, and for 
introduction into service see Callwell and Headlam (1937) Vol. II, p. 101. " MacLeod (1977) p. 170 is the source for this and other quotations in this paragraph. '8 A. Hagen, Deutsche Direktinvestionen in Grossbritannien, 1871-1918 (Stuttgart: Steiner Verlag, 1997) 
pp. 174 and 175 provides information about Goerz, and A. Hagen "Export Versus Direct Investment in the 
German Optical Industry. " Business History, no. 4 October 1996 (1996) p. 5 details on the effects of new 
legislation on German companies trading in Great Britain.. 
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wished to take it up. The creation of a British company - the C. P. Goerz Optical Works 
Ltd. - avoided the demands of the Companies Act and opened the way to side-stepping 
the Patents Act through the licensing arrangement with the War Office. The business was 
incorporated with an initial share capital of £5,000 that was subsequently increased to 
£10,000. 
It is not clear if Goerz actually made, or even assembled, instruments in Britain. Antje 
Hagen's brief description of the fun's British activities suggests that, unlike the larger 
firm of Zeiss (which did set up a manufacturing business in addition to its import and 
marketing structure), it remained no more than a marketing company - `einer 
Vertriebgeselleschaft'. However, its share capital of £10,000 was the same that Zeiss 
employed in both its manufacturing and distribution, raising the question of why such a 
large amount was needed by a smaller business operating, according to Hagen, on a 
lesser scale. Without more evidence, any answer must be conjectural, but so far as the 
Army's purchasing department was concerned, by April 1912 the company was being 
treated as a British supplier. 
The other 70 percent of dial sight orders were spread between six companies, again 
seeming to support the MacLeods' argument that War Office contracts were spread too 
thinly to be attractive to makers. Barr & Stroud, Beck, Cooke's of York, Goerz, Ross and 
Vickers all received orders. However, Vickers had no optical capability, and the contract 
would have been carried out by Cooke's which had both connections with Vickers and 
earlier experience making the sight. 19 The orders given to them and to Barr & Stroud 
were very much smaller than the others: 
" A. McConnell, Instrument Makers to the World. A History of Cooke, Troughton & Simms (York: 
William Sessions Ltd,, 1992) p. 65 describes the connections with Vickers. 
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Table 3.4: Dial Sight contracts, 1909-1914.20 
Firm 1909-10 1910-11 1911-12 1912-13 1913-14 Total % 
Cooke 15 63 78 4.7 
Barr & Stroud 55 25 80 4.8 
Beck 15 125 130 '222 492 29.6 
Goerz 168 100 100 124 492 29.6 
Ross 20 100 196 204 520 31.3 
total 85 188 350 489 550 1662 
Over 90 percent of the orders were divided between just three firms, in roughly equal 
proportions. To what extent this was through a misplaced desire to `stimulate 
competition' is open to debate, but the assertion that it drove up prices seems far from 
justified. The original Goerz order in 1910 was at £40.05 per instrument, a figure 
repeated in 1911 and 1912, and the final Goerz contract in 1913 was lower at £38.00. 
Goerz was already making the sight in large numbers for the German forces, and 
allowing for the resulting economies of scale and lower German wage costs, it might be 
expected that, if the MacLeods were correct, then the British firms' prices would have 
been significantly higher. Beck's were more, but only by 5 percent: £42.50 in 1911, 
£42.20 in 1912, and £40.00 in 1913. The prices from Ross were actually cheaper - 
£35.00 in 1910 and 1911, £37.50 in 1912 and £37.75 in 1913. Although one of the 
Contract's Department's responsibilities was to ensure that prices charged were 
reasonable, it also had to ensure deliveries were made at rates appropriate to service 
requirements, and the division between Beck and Ross may have been necessary to 
obtain the numbers required to match gun deliveries. 
The idea of distributing orders in small numbers primarily to stimulate competition has to 
be questioned. The size of contracts was governed both by the funds available and the 
timetable of need. Even under pressure to provide an effective infantry rangefinder 
`immediately' at a cost exceeding £25,000, the War Office had only been able to budget 
20 Extracted from PRO WO 395/3 Director of Army Contracts, Annual Reports, except for the Barr & 
Stroud order 1909-10 which comes from UGD 295/19/8/1, Customer order records, Works Order CO 
1115,2.1.1910. 
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£5,000 in each of the current and following financial years because that was the limit of 
funds available. 21 Spending on munitions contracts in 1907 was the `lowest for twelve 
years, ' and orders for weapons for the Army until the end of 1910-1911 continued to be 
lower than even before the Boer War. 22 The need for dial sights was geared to the 
delivery of new artillery weapons whose rates of production were initially slow, so with 
limited budgets it made no sense to contemplate ordering in advance the full outfit of 
sights for the whole gun programme. Fiscal prudence rather than misguidance would 
better account for the absence of larger-scale dial sight orders. A single large contract 
might have resulted, as the MacLeods suggested, in economies of scale which could have 
reduced production costs, but the financial conditions to place such an order simply did 
not exist, even if any single contractor had been able or willing to take on the work. 
Although ordnance spending was low, the overall level of commercial trade was good, 23 
and if the War Office had offered a very big order it may well have found itself having 
to persuade instrument makers to take the contract, rather than finding them eager to bid 
for government work, a situation that would hardly have driven prices down. Many of 
the same factors also applied to the prism binocular, the third category of optical 
munitions ordered in substantial numbers up to 1914. 
3.5 The Prism Binocular 
The organisation of prismatic binocular purchasing differed from rangefinders and dial 
sights. The quantities involved were greater, the unit pieces much lower and, importantly, 
the instrument was already being made in Britain for the commercial market so, unlike 
the dial sight or rangefinder, there was not necessarily any obstacle to persuading firms 
to compete for contracts. Military binoculars were little different to civil ones, although 
the high levels of compliance to specification demanded by the War Office were 
unknown in the civil market. The MacLeods placed prismatic binoculars alongside the 
dial sight in censuring War Office policy, their most serious criticism being that the 
21 PRO TI/11223 (1908) p. 4. 
u C. Trebilcock, The Vickers Brothers: Armaments and Enterprise 1854-1914 (London: Europa 
Publishers, 1977) p. 12 and then p. 11. 
23 Clive Trebilcock The Vickers Brothers p. 14. 
99 
British Army was actually a client of the German optical industry so that domestic firms 
were consequently disadvantaged. 24 Once again, the evidence in contracts records shows 
these strictures to be unfounded. 
Figure 3.1 : Distribution of Prismatic Binocular Orders, 1908-1909 to 1913-1914: 25 
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Between 1908 and 1914, approximately 11,500 prismatic binoculars were ordered which 
was enough for the peacetime Army on a scale of one for every twenty officers and 
men. 26 Their total value was some £45,000 of which, in contradiction to the MacLeod's 
claim, only £7,500 or 17 percent was directly spent abroad. Purchases began in 1908, 
when 1,500 were ordered from the German firm of Carl Zeiss whose only British 
representation was then a sales office in London. In 1909, driven by the same 
considerations as Goerz, Zeiss set up an additional British subsidiary manufacturing 
company at Mill Hill, London, which `produced field glasses' whose components were 
sent from Jena. 27 This new business, Carl Zeiss (London) Ltd., received approximately 
24 R. and K. MacLeod (1977) p. 170. 
25 PRO WO 395/3 Annual Reports of the Director of Army Contracts. 
26 This proportion is obtained from PRO TI/11223, as the scale of issue laid down by the Master General of 
the Ordnance. 
27 Antje Hagen, `Export versus Direct Investment in the German Optical Industry' Business History no. 4, 
October 1996, p. 6. 
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£5,600 worth of orders between 1911 and 1914 which, as with Goerz, the War Office 
treated as domestic business. 28 The Mill Hill Zeiss works was jointly managed by 
German and English staff, but its workforce was predominantly English and its 
binoculars were marked as though made entirely in England. 29 Even if all the business 
placed with Zeiss were counted as foreign, then the approximate total of £13,100 was 
still less than 26 percent of all prism binocular orders which hardly made the Zeiss the 
chief supplier, or the War Office reliant on foreign instruments. 
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Figure 3.2: Distribution of binocular orders by maker, 1908-1914: 30 
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3.6 Summary of the War Office's ordering patterns 
The War Office may not have been a large customer and may have deserved censure 
because of the way it handled its rangefinder needs, but its business was scaled to an 
army only a quarter the size of Germany's and it could not have offered the optical 
makers orders on the scale that the German industry received from its own War 
28 Some of the orders are listed in the Director of Contracts' Annual Reports as being shared with other 
companies. Assuming an equal share of contract values produces this figure. 
29 For example, see Binocular No. 3 Mk II, number 810 marked `Zeiss London'; collection of William 
Reid. 
30 Extracted from PRO WO 395/2 and 395/3, Annual Reports. 
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Ministry. 31 Its hesitant selection procedures certainly retarded the placing of rangefinder 
orders but nevertheless it was still a far better client than the MacLeods suggested and 
generally ordered as many instruments as the Army actually needed. It certainly did not 
place obstacles in the way of the domestic industry, nor was it so badly served by British 
contractors that it had to depend on German imports. Its suppliers were a group of 
specialist British makers who had emerged from within the general optical instrument- 
making community and so far as these devices were concerned were separate from it. Far 
from scattering small contracts across the greater optical trade before 1914, the War 
Office actually concentrated its orders on a small number of firms who accordingly 
became familiar with producing instruments to the particular standards demanded by the 
Army. Although the scale of War Office spending increased between 1907 and 1914, it 
has to be recognised that it was still very much less than the Admiralty's which provided 
both a larger and different market for optical munitions. 
3.7 The Admiralty and its effects on the industry 
The Admiralty continued to be a much larger customer for optical munitions than the 
War Office up to the outbreak of war in 1914, and rangefinders dominated its orders. The 
Royal Navy's demand for them was substantial and of very considerable value, far 
outweighing that for other optics. Rangefinder requirements were linked to a substantial 
ship building programme intended to maintain a margin of superiority over other navies, 
and which is usually associated with battleships and battlecruisers. 32 However, the 
cruisers and destroyers that were also built added to the scale and variety of demand for 
optical munitions. Although capital ships demanded the largest and most sophisticated 
types, cruisers were to be provided with outfits of optical instruments which, only a 
decade earlier, would have been seen as lavish even on the biggest warships. In addition, 
from 1907 the Admiralty began to ask for rangefinders that could be used on the smaller 
31 D. G. Hermann, The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War (Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1996) p. 234. 
32 J. T. Sumida, In Defence of Naval Supremacy: Finance, Technology and British Naval Policy 1888-1914 
(London, Routledge, 1993) p. 185 to p. 196. 
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vessels such as destroyers, which carried weapons of lesser range, and lacked the space 
to mount the nine-foot base models which were becoming standard on larger vessels. 3 
The Royal Navy not only purchased rangefmders, it also bought other optical 
instruments, particularly for its larger ships. Telescopic sights and observation telescopes 
of increasingly sophisticated design were needed for the gun turrets of capital ships, as 
well as simpler sighting telescopes for their secondary armament. 34 Similar sights were 
also required for the cruisers and destroyers built during this period. The massive 're- 
sighting' programme of 1905 - 1907 described in the previous chapter had provided only 
for ships in commission or about to complete so that the construction of new ships, 
coupled with increasing attention to gunnery, meant that by mid-1914 the Admiralty was 
demanding greater numbers of more varied and sophisticated optical munitions. These 
orders continued to be placed amongst the contractors with whom the Admiralty had 
already built up working relationships, so that only one firm - Barr & Stroud - supplied 
rangefinders, two - Ottway and Ross - made gun sighting telescopes and three - Ottway, 
Ross, and Thomas Cooke's of York (which supplied them to Vickers) - produced 
observation and sighting periscopes for surface vessels. 5 Submarine periscopes were 
almost entirely made by Sir Howard Grubb & Co. of Dublin, who made them under 
contract to Vickers at a time when they had a virtual monopoly of submarine building for 
the Navy. 
The amounts spent on optical instruments by the Admiralty were not recorded in the 
same way as those by the War Office, and it has not been possible to calculate the total 
value of the Navy's optical munitions business. However, Barr & Stroud's records detail 
the sums spent with the firm on rangefinders and their related instrumentation, making it 
at least possible to indicate how much larger a customer was the Admiralty than the War 
Office. 
" UGD 295 Unclassified material: Russell Research Notes refer to Barr & Stroud letter book BS4/25: J. B. 
Henderson, Naval College, Greenwich, to Harold Jackson, 5 October 1907, describing the problems for 
rangefinding caused by vibration in destroyers. 
34 Great Britain, Admiralty, Manual of Gunnery for His Majesty's Fleet, 1915. (London, HMSO, 1915) 
Vol. 1, Chap. XII, p. 291 to p. 304 describe and illustrate various patterns. 35 Great Britain, Admiralty, Manual of Gunneryfor His Majesty's Fleet, 1917, (London: HMSO, 1917) 
Chap. XII. 
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Figure 3.3 : Barr & Stroud: comparison of War Office and Admiralty orders, 1907- 
1913.36 
Value £s 
 War Office orders QAdmiralty Orders 
From 1907 to the end of 1913, the Admiralty spent almost £313,000 with Barr & Stroud 
alone, compared with the War Office's total expenditure on optics with all suppliers of 
£47,000. 
Greater demand did not only come from a growing modem fleet after 1907, it was also 
driven by efforts to improve the probability of hitting distant moving targets as fighting 
ranges of 10,000 yards and more were being increasingly envisaged. 
37 Shooting at such 
distances necessitated some means to predict where the moving target would be at the 
end of a projectile's flight time, which at 10,000 yards was more than 15 seconds. 
38 The 
concept of `fire control' -a systemised means to direct a ship's guns against a moving 
36 Extracted from UGD 295/19/2/1,295/19/2/2 and 295/19/2/1, Customer Order files 1907-1914. 
37 See J. T. Sumida (1993) Chap. 5 for background material. 
38 Great Britain, Admiralty, Gunnery Department, Manual of Gunnery for His Majesty's Fleet (London: 
HMSO, 1917) p. 423. 
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and distant target - became gradually accepted as essential, and increasingly complex 
electrical and mechanical systems were developed using the optical rangefinder as the 
primary means for generating the required data. The development of fire control systems 
has been examined in detail by Jon Sumida, but he paid little attention to the optical 
instrumentation involved. He concentrated on the evolution of the mechanical computing 
aspects of such schemes, and in particular the one devised by the civilian inventor Arthur 
Pollen which competed unsuccessfully against another one devised by a serving officer, 
Captain F. C. Dreyer. 39 In another instance of a seemingly deterministic condition, fire 
control needs drove the demand for more accurate rangefinders, and the Admiralty began 
to call for instruments to measure accurately at distances considerably further than the 
longest range at which shooting was expected to start, in order to collect range and 
bearing data from which the target's future position could be predicted. By October 1907 
the Admiralty wanted to measure ranges of 15,000 yards with an accuracy of 1 percent, 
in order to open fire accurately when the distance closed to 10,000 yards 
4° This standard 
was beyond the capability of the instruments then in service, although rangefinders to do 
a similar task had already been mooted by the Imperial Russian Navy in 1906 
41 The 
growing stress on greater accuracy and longer ranges helped to stimulate the 
development of larger and more complex instruments as part of a system of gunnery, 
emphasising that large naval rangefinders could no longer be seen as isolated from the 
rest of a ship's armament. It was this evolutionary state of fire control instrumentation 
that introduced Thomas Cooke & Sons Ltd of York as potential commercial rivals to 
Barr & Stroud, and a comparison of their progress during this period offers some insight 
into the variety of technological and social forces acting on and within optical munitions 
contractors. 
" See J. T. Sumida (1993) Chapter 3. 
40 UGD 295 Russell Research Notes Box 2: letter from J. B. Henderson, Admiralty Research Laboratory, 
to William Stroud, 5 October 1907. 
41 UGD 295 Russell Research Notes Box 2: Acknowledgement of order for a 4m 57cm rangefinder from 
Col. Petrov, Imperial Russian Navy. 
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3.8 Thomas Cooke & Sons Ltd as a competitor for Barr & Stroud 
Cooke's of York was no stranger to optical munitions in 1907, although everything that it 
had made previously had been relatively simple in optical design and construction. 42 The 
firm's chief designer, H. D. Taylor (1861-1943) seems first to have been directed 
towards optical munitions during the Boer War when he designed an optical sight to 
improve accuracy of shooting at long ranges. He was granted a patent in connection with 
rangefinders in 1903, soon afterwards obtaining two more relating to a novel layout and 
the use of rotating prisms to produce a high level of robustness. 3 Between 1904 and 
1906 Cooke's built five different experimental models to his designs, culminating in the 
unsuccessful submission of a ten-foot instrument for Admiralty trials against Barr & 
Stroud's latest nine-foot model 44 During this period, Cooke's had come into contact with 
Arthur Pollen through making the optics for his own abortive two-observer rangefinder 
in 1905,45 an experience which seems to have encouraged the firm to delve deeper into 
rangefinder design as the connection between it and Pollen grew stronger. In 1907, 
Taylor began to refine his earlier efforts and between then and 1911 was granted seven 
more patents covering a range of increasingly sophisticated designs. 46 These seem to 
have produced only two experimental models, which were superseded by a radically new 
design in 1912 that was meant to form an integral part of Pollen's fire-control system 
and to be sold as a component of it. 7 
The extent and complexity of Pollen's relationship with Cooke's is outside this account 
(and only hinted at by both McConnell and Sumida), but some mention of it must be 
given to provide essential context. Pollen's involvement with Thomas Cooke & Sons Ltd 
came firstly through his need for the high precision mechanical engineering that Cooke's 
employed in survey instruments and astronomical telescope clock controls, in order to 
42 See Chapter 1 above. 
" British Patents 1436/1901 for an optical rifle sight, and 23038/1903,12735/1904, and 12902/1905 for 
rangefinders. 
" VIA AJB 070 1.3, Drawing Office Index, drawings 1674/5,1873,1885/6,1898, and 2175. 
`s Sumida (1993) p. 85. 
46 British Patents 7322/1907,13562/1907,15200/1907,20315/1908,6082/1910,7392/1910, and 
9306/1911. 
47 See British Patent 30090/1912 for details of the instrument, and McConnell (1992) p. 74 for a summary 
of the evolution of Pollen's system. 
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produce the high precision cams and intricate gearing used in the mechanical analogue 
computer he was developing. 48 In 1908 Pollen became a shareholder and director of the 
firm, 49 and so created for himself the opportunity of also using Cooke's optical skills to 
develop a complete fire control system including a sophisticated rangefmder which might 
be sold as a patented package. 50 This provided potentially serious competition for Barr 
& Stroud, because of Cooke's considerably greater optical design capabilities. H. D. 
Taylor was an internationally recognised expert in the design of telescope optics and, 
unlike anyone at Barr & Stroud, he was well able to compute complex lens and prisms 
systems which Cooke's by then were capable of making entirely by themselves. sl Barr & 
Stroud saw Cooke's involvement with rangefmder design, either on its own or through 
Pollen's Argo Company (his marketing arm) as giving the Admiralty the prospect of an 
alternative supplier, and possibly ending the monopoly previously guaranteed by being 
the only British maker. Harold Jackson, Barr & Stroud's general manager, was taking 
Pollen seriously as early as 1908, when he told his resident engineer in Portsmouth (who 
had regular access to the Royal Dockyard) to find out all he could about Pollen's 
activities and plans as `we understand ... he is on with something'. 
52 In March 1911 
Jackson believed that Cooke's and Argo in combination would `in all probability shortly 
be serious competitors'. 53 The Admiralty, although totally committed to buying British 
made instruments, was by no means contracted to one domestic supplier in perpetuity. 54 
Despite Barr & Stroud's concerns over the possible competition of the Cooke/Argo 
rangefinder it is likely that such fears were misplaced, because the Admiralty had a 
number of forces acting on it to shape its policies concerning rangefinders. These 
included not just technological issues but also cultural and political ones that had 
`$ McConnell (1992), Chapter 7 describes the range of Cooke's engineering activities. 
49 VIA AJB 030/1.1.1, T. Cooke & Sons Ltd., Directors' Minute Book entry, Annual General Meeting 
1908. 
so Pollen operated through the Argo Co. Ltd, which Sumida treats as being the manufacturer of the Pollen 
instruments. Argo was Pollen's marketing company, and bought all its apparatus from Thomas Cooke & 
Sons Ltd. 
s' McConnell (1992) p. 65 If. 
52 UGD 295/4/1, Letter Book, H. D. Jackson to J. Heather, 24.12.1908. 
53 UGD 295/4/3, Letter Book, H. D. Jackson to J. Heather, 21.3.1911. 
sa PRO ADM 116/3458, Correspondence between Admiralty and the Treasury on the need for only British 
optical glass to used in Royal Navy instruments: Admiralty Report 27.8.1915, noting correspondence 1910 
to 1913. 
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sometimes subtle, but sometimes very direct, influences on its decisions. Here, it is 
essential to consider simultaneously both the social and the technical in understanding 
what drove the Admiralty's thought and actions. 
One advantage that Barr & Stroud undoubtedly had over Cooke's and Pollen was the 
existence of beneficial contacts within the Navy itself. One of those was Professor J. B. 
Henderson, who had earlier worked with William Stroud in Leeds and then with the firm 
in Glasgow as head of its scientific research department. Henderson was appointed 
Professor of Applied Mechanics at the Royal Naval College at Greenwich in 1905.55 He 
subsequently corresponded regularly with his old employers, and in October 1907 wrote 
privately to Stroud to advise him of the influence Pollen's ideas were having on naval 
gunnery, and in particular of the problem of hitting moving targets at very long ranges. 
Henderson not only told Stroud that a rangefinder of much greater accuracy would soon 
be called for, but also directed him diplomatically towards the idea of becoming involved 
in fire-control instrumentation by saying `Pollen is a fairly skilful mechanical inventor, 
but he is not a scientist and cannot tackle the problem'. 56 Stroud had previously worked 
on the design of the firm's electro-mechanical `Range-and-Order Indicators' which 
transmitted range and other gunnery information to individual gun mountings and were 
the rudimentary precursors of what Henderson was now discussing, so he would have 
appreciated the amount of work and the complexity of the problems likely to be 
involved. 57 That knowledge may have persuaded him that were the idea be taken up 
successfully, it would require more expertise than the firm. had available, leading the 
company to begin a collaboration with the Dutch artillerist and engineer Admiral W. 
Mouton that proceeded until temporarily interrupted by the outbreak of war. 58 
As with the earlier Indicators, Barr & Stroud saw fire control instrumentation as an 
extension of its activities rather than diversification, although to what extent it saw the 
ss Moss and Russell (1988) p. 38. 
36 UGD 295 Unclassified material, Russell research notes, Box 2, Henderson to Stroud, 5.10.1907. 
Henderson was eventually proved quite wrong, as Sumida clearly demonstrated. 57 See Chapter 1 above for the difficulties encountered with those far more rudimentary devices. 58 UGD 295/4/109, Letter Book, J. W. French to Adm. Mouton, Royal Dutch Navy, reviewing progress 
and attitudes, 29.7.1914. 
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Admiralty as its main client is uncertain. Given the Admiralty's long-running dealings 
with Pollen and Dreyer, which were certainly no secret, the firm may have seen the new 
product as wholly export-oriented from the outset; certainly a delegation from the 
Imperial Japanese Navy examined one of the earliest versions of the `predictor' 
mechanism in March 1912 at a time when they were ordering large amounts of 
rangefinders and Range-and-Order instruments. 59 Progress was as slow as Stroud might 
have feared, and not even a complete prototype had been finished when the war began, 
most likely because the company was wholly occupied with other projects that were 
considered of more pressing importance. 
Whilst Pollen's relationship with the Admiralty was frequently less than harmonious, 
leading to distrust and even hostility, Barr & Stroud retained a significant degree of 
confidence from the Navy, despite potential conflicts of interest over the amount and 
nature of foreign trade the firm carried out 60 In 1908, the Director of Naval Construction 
asked for an assurance that foreign officers visiting the factory would not be able to see 
any `confidential work' being done for the Royal Navy, to which Jackson had to reply 
diplomatically that there was actually nothing being supplied to the Admiralty that had 
not already been sold abroad. Despite numerous earlier offers to keep designs secret, he 
said, `in no case [had] our offer been accepted' and the firm had repeatedly been told it 
was free to submit them to foreign governments, which it had done. 61 Jackson tactfully 
pointed out to the Director that in consequence foreign trade had become so important 
that `we cannot ignore it'. Irrespective of whether he was mollified or chastened, the 
Director let the matter drop, but four years later, on a different tack, he asked Jackson for 
details of what foreign navies were ordering and whatever else they were asking about. 
Jackson responded that as he had no specific instructions from any overseas client to 
observe confidentiality he considered the firm was `quite at liberty' to tell the director 
whatever he wanted to know. 62 By that time, much of the Admiralty's work was 
sufficiently different to foreign contracts that a special department had been set up to 
59 UGD 295/4/80, Letter Book, J. W. French to W. Stroud, 25.3.1912. 
60 For examples of Pollen's problems, see A. Pollen, The Great Gunnery Scandal (London: William 
Collins & Co. Ltd., 1980). 
61 UGD 295/4/53, Letter Book, Jackson to Director of Naval Construction, 26.9.1908 and 30.9.1908. 62 UGD 295/4/4, Letter Book, Jackson to Director of Naval Construction, 30.11.1912. 
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handle it, and soon after telling the Director exactly what every foreign power had 
ordered recently, Jackson asked if he could allow trainee rangefinder technicians from 
the Imperial Japanese Navy into the rest of the factory as orders from Japan were `by no 
means inconsiderable'. 3 The director was quite happy to permit this, evidence that both 
parties were tacitly recognising the symbiotic relationship that had developed between 
them, something that Cooke's lacked and which they were never able to cultivate, very 
much to their detriment. 
The intricacy of Cooke's association with Pollen and the Argo Company may not have 
been clearly understood by Barr & Stroud, but the construction and significance of 
Taylor's 1912 rangefinder design mentioned earlier most certainly was. M Jackson 
described its principal features to the firm's Austrian agent in July 1912, detailing its 
novel optical design and gyro-stabilised data-transmitting mounting, both of which he 
had to concede Barr & Stroud had nothing to compete with. Putting a brave face on it, he 
observed the rangefinder was `very complicated and ... very costly' but had to concede 
that its unusual optical system provided `extra brightness' that made it more useful in the 
bad lighting conditions typified in the North Sea. He also noted that the gyro-stabilised 
mounting let the operator take readings more quickly and certainly than either the 
pedestal or turret mountings provided by Barr & Stroud. 
Despite Jackson's concerns about the threat from the `Cooke-Pollen' rangefinder, it stood 
little chance of being adopted by the Admiralty. There were several reasons. Firstly, it 
was an integral part of Pollen's fire control system, which he was struggling with 
increasing difficulty to persuade the Royal Navy to accept. As Sumida has shown, by 
1912 the Navy was inclined to prefer a simpler and more familiar system designed by a 
serving officer - another instance of an established paradigm resisting a destabilising 
anomalous technology, and similar to the War Office's circumstances with the 
Mekometer in 1889.6s By 1914, when the trials finally ended, the Pollen system was 
63 UGD 295/4/4, Jackson to Director of Naval Construction, 7.12.1912. 64 UGD 295/4/88, Letter Book, Jackson to Capt. A. H. Seibert, 20.7.1912, saying he believed Pollen was 
Argo's `designer'. This letter is also the source material for the rest of this paragraph. 
65 See Chapter 1 above. 
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rejected, and with that went the chief hope of selling the complex rangefinder. However, 
although the Argo system demanded the Cooke-Pollen instrument, the rangefmder did 
not need the complex fire control system to work with, and could therefore be sold 
independently of it. But, adding to the difficulties of association with Pollen in selling it 
to the Royal Navy, Taylor's design had constraints that made it virtually impossible for 
the Admiralty to consider it as a possible replacement for the existing Barr & Stroud 
patterns. 
Taylor's rangefinder provided a brighter image of higher contrast than the Barr & Stroud 
models, which enhanced its use in adverse lighting conditions. 6 This had been achieved 
through Taylor's ability entirely to re-design the telescope portion of the rangefinder to 
benefit from the properties of new advanced optical glasses being made by Schott & 
Genossen of Jena in Germany, which permitted substantial improvements in the 
performance of telescope lens systems. 67 Barr & Stroud had never used these glasses, 
partly because the firm had no designer of sufficient ability to compute systems around 
them, and partly because using the `old' flint and crown glasses it was possible to make 
telescopes that, even if less than `state-of-the-art', were still satisfactory for most 
purposes (such as in a rangefinder). Taylor had used the `new' Jena glasses almost as 
soon as they became available, had suggested modifications in their formulation to Otto 
Schott, their inventor, and become wedded to their employment wherever possible. 68 
These sophisticated glasses were hardly made at all in Britain, which would have posed a 
considerable difficulty in selling the rangefinder to the Admiralty in view of its insistence 
on domestically made glass for all its optical instruments. 
That policy was rooted in the desire to be independent of foreign suppliers in time of 
war. In 1910, fearing that relying on imported optical glass would lead to severe 
problems if supplies were interdicted by an enemy, the Admiralty had begun to stipulate 
66 E. W. Taylor, The New Cooke-Pollen Rangefinder' Journal of the United States Artillery, Vol. 41, No. 
3, May-June, 1914 describes and illustrates the instrument. 
67 F. Auerbach, The Zeiss Works and the Carl Zeiss Stiftung in Jena. Translated by F. Cheshire and S. Paul. 
2nd ed. (London: Marshall Brookes & Chalkely, 1904) describes the advances in optical design in this 
period and the benefits of the new glasses that were constantly being introduced. 68 VIA AJB 220/2.6: H. D. Taylor's 1895 paper on the adjusting and testing of telescope objectives made 
clear his espousal of the new types. 
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that British optical glass should be used wherever possible 69 Consultations were 
encouraged between the instrument makers and the only British optical glass maker, 
Chance Brothers of Birmingham, to assure supplies of both the established and new 
formulations. Chance already made a wide range of `old' glasses but attempts to get them 
to produce domestic alternatives to the new Jena glasses met with only limited success. 
The firm saw optical glass as an unprofitable aspect of its business, it lacked both the 
technical staff and facilities to make rapid headway in catching up lost ground, and was 
unwilling to invest heavily in its development. 70 This greatly restricted the `new' glasses 
available in Britain but represented little difficulty for Barr & Stroud who had already 
given a categorical assurance in 1911 that they were independent of imported material. 
Taylor may not have been aware of the problems he had created in producing a 
rangefinder that depended on what were in effect proscribed raw materials for its much 
of its optical superiority, but in the end the Cooke-Pollen rangefinder was rejected for an 
altogether different reason. Its failure to gain Admiralty endorsement came not because it 
was part of a larger rejected system, had unfavourable associations with Pollen, or used 
unacceptable materials, but simply because in its 1914 trials it consistently failed to read 
ranges accurately. Its obituary notice pronounced by the Admiralty read that `It is a 
beautiful instrument but it has one serious defect, namely that it will not measure 
distances'. " Taylor's sophisticated rangefinder failed through mechanical difficulties 
that might well have been remedied by revision and modification, but the declaration of 
war only three months later ended its chances of success and Cooke's were kept out of 
the business of making large naval rangefinders. 
Cooke's failure to break into the rangefinder market was not because the firm lacked 
optical expertise, but because it was coming, at an inopportune moment, late into a field 
where the Barr & Stroud models had already established, in Thomas Hughes' expression, 
a considerable technological momentum. For the Taylor-designed instrument to have 
69 PRO ADM 116/3458 Correspondence between Admiralty and Treasury on optical glass supplies, 1910- 
1913 provides the source material for the following section unless otherwise indicated. 70 J. F. Chance, A History of the Firm of Chance Brothers & Co. (London: Spottiswoode, Ballantyne & 
Co., 1919) p. 182 to p. 184. 
" UGD 295/4/107, Letter Book, Jackson to S. Vronski, quoting from an unidentified Royal Navy officer, 
14.5.1914. 
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displaced them would have required firstly the clear demonstration of superiority and 
secondly the institutional willingness to accept it as a `presumptive anomaly' - an 
alternative technology presumed to be superior to the existing technological paradigm 
which had become wholly identified with the Barr & Stroud models in service. 72 Given 
that they apparently functioned well, in the absence of failure there was little incentive 
for the Navy to discard the familiar and adopt a new pattern, particularly when it was 
associated with a novel technology which the Navy was culturally and institutionally 
disposed to reject. It was perhaps ironic that Barr & Stroud, a business far less able in 
optical design, should enjoy a conspicuously greater degree of success selling complex 
optical munitions. 
3.9 Barr & Stroud's evolution 
Barr & Stroud did indeed enjoy business considerable success between 1907 and 1914, 
both in sales and profits, and its domination of the rangefinder market. The development 
of Barr & Stroud between 1907 and the start of the Great War has been described by 
Michael Moss and lain Russell, who observed that the business `grew steadily... as the 
fum brought improved instruments onto the market'. 73 There was indeed growth, as 
figure 4.8 shows: the firm made a substantial profit every year, and although pre-tax 
margins on turnover slipped between 1909 and 1912 to an average of 25 percent they 
recovered in 1913 to 32 percent. For the seven years, turnover was almost £806,000 and 
earnings after tax £240,381, equal to a healthy net margin of 29.8 percent 74 
72 See W. McBride, Technological Change and the U. S. Navy 1865-1945 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2000). 
" M. Moss and and I. Russell,. Range and Vision: The First Hundred Years of Barr & Stroud. (Edinburgh: 
Mainstream Publishing, 1988) p. 69. 
74 The figures up to 1912 have been extracted from UGD 295/26/1/27 `Correspondence and notes', and 
UGD 295/26/1/47 Table of Barr & Stroud sales 1901-1912. The later figures come from UGD 295/11/1, 
Balance sheets for 1913. 
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Figure 3.4: Barr & Stroud, turnover and pre-tax profits 1907-1913: 75 
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A substantial proportion of those earnings came from foreign business. Moss and Russell 
referred to the extent of the firm's overseas sales efforts, describing particularly how Barr 
& Stroud went about securing European orders for infantry and artillery rangefinders, but 
they gave no indication of the relative size of foreign and domestic business. The 
company's Customer Order files record the distribution of orders, and provide a picture 
of the extent of the company's dependence on foreign armies and navies. 
75 Sources as note 74 above. 
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Figure 3.5: Barr & Stroud, orders received from the British Admiralty and War Office, 
and all Foreign clients, January 1907-July 1914: 76 
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Apart from 1907, when foreign orders accounted for 27 percent of the total received, 
overseas business formed the majority of the value of work coming in to the firm from 
1901 (when the detailed records started) until the end of 1913. Between January 1907 
and December 1913, British orders amounted to £335,583 and foreign ones £623,217, a 
total of £958,800 excluding repairs and spare parts. Moss and Russell have described in 
some detail the efforts made by the firm to secure this business and the effects of 
competition by the German makers Hahn, Goerz and Zeiss, but they gave little attention 
to how Barr & Stroud actually managed the growing amount of trade, and in particular, 
they passed over the efforts that the company made to extend its optical capabilities. 
77 
The production of lenses and prisms was still largely done by outside contractors in 
1907, with most the simpler lenses bought from Chadburn Brothers in Sheffield and the 
76 Extracts from UGD 295/19/2/1,295/19/2/2, and 295/19/2/3, Customer Order files 1907-1914. 77 Moss and Russell (1988) pp. 59-72 
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more complex ones and prisms from Adam Hilger & Co. in London. Most of the optical 
work done at Glasgow was still connected with the building up prism assemblies and the 
mounting of lenses into their cells for incorporation in the rangefinder bodies, rather than 
the grinding and polishing of optical glass into finished components. This was a 
difficulty that had vexed the firm since it began, and despite two previous attempts to 
achieve some degree of self-sufficiency through integrating the Adam Hilger business, 
Barr & Stroud remained dependent on remote suppliers who frequently failed to deliver 
parts promptly and of adequate quality. 78 
The possibility of acquiring the Hilger business reappeared in 1907 through the decision 
of the War Office to adopt the Marindin rangefinder which has been described earlier in 
this chapter. Being well-placed by the existing association with both the instrument and 
its designer to bid for whatever contract was offered, Hilger's managing director, Frank 
Twyman, moved to establish a collaboration with Barr & Stroud for production on a 
scale which his company could not undertake on its own. 79 Barr and Stroud had made 
most of the mechanical components for the experimental rangefmders that Hilger's had 
built, and had dealt personally with Marindin on several occasions. Having learned of the 
War Office's selection, Harold Jackson wrote to him on July 12th 1907 observing, 
perhaps a little sourly, that as it had been `impossible' to work with the War Office Barr 
& Stroud would in future concentrate on foreign armies. Soon afterwards, Twyman 
approached Jackson with the idea of tendering jointly for anticipated business, a proposal 
which Jackson accepted on July 26`' but quickly set aside in favour of a plan to set up a 
completely new business. On August 9th a detailed draft proposal was sent to Twyman 
under which each firm would provide half the capital for a venture to `erect and 
complete' rangefinders using mechanical parts from Barr & Stroud and optical ones from 
Hilger's. 
At first sight, the proposal looked simply to establish a cartel to market the Marindin 
design. The draft agreement noted that it was `to their mutual advantage to work in 
78 See Chapters 1 and 2 above for examples. 
79 UGD 295/4/46, Letter Book, provides the source material for the following section unless otherwise 
indicated. Dates and correspondents are given in the text. 
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association', and that in its seven year life Barr & Stroud would not make the instrument 
on their own behalf and Hilger's would not make `rangefinders or parts for rangefinders' 
for anyone except the new company and Barr & Stroud. The failure to fulfil any of the 
agreement's clauses by either party would incur a penalty of £5,000. Despite Twyman's 
acceptance within a week, the draft was very much to his disadvantage because it 
committed Hilger's to not making any rangefinder products at all on the firm's own 
account. Jackson's draft did not limit the prohibition to the Marindin, which precluded 
Hilger's, or Twyman individually, from benefiting from any opportunities of spin-off 
that the rangefinder might generate. That sat slightly at odds with the covering letter 
Jackson sent with the draft, which hoped that the project would `enable the intimate 
relationship ... between us to 
be continued'. During September, Twyman began to have 
second thoughts and requested changes that would let him exploit any new skills or 
opportunities that arose, only to be rebuffed by Jackson who refused point-blank to give 
way. His letter on October 2°d said Barr & Stroud would not continue to give Hilger's 
optical work while Twyman was free for work that might `seriously tell against [Barr & 
Stroud's] interests'. He closed by saying that he would nevertheless be `best pleased' if a 
closer working arrangement could be achieved and invited Twyman's suggestions. 
Between October and mid-November, proposals for a `wider agreement' were prepared, 
but nothing had been signed either for it or the earlier idea when it became clear that 
there was not going to be any large order for the Marindin. 80 In November 20th Jackson 
congratulated Twyman on his War Office contract for just sixteen rangefinders, and 
although assuring him that Barr & Stroud would supply the parts, cast him adrift to 
handle the work alone, saying `I hope you will be entirely successful'. Jackson then 
raised issues which suggest that despite the pleasantries, he was actually seeking to annex 
Adam Hilger's. Twyman was reminded that the failure to win a large order `only 
postponed' the earlier proposal to form a joint production company which would be 
immediately implemented if a big contract eventually emerged, or if `the suggested wider 
agreement' was not carried through. This apparently left Twyman in a difficult situation, 
where failure to accept Jackson's proposals would require him to find half the capital for 
8° The agreement is referred to in Jackson's letter of November 20th, but no details of it were given. 
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a new company and works which would subsequently have nothing to do except make 
sixteen rangefmders. If he demurred and sought to avoid that expense, then he would be 
liable to pay Barr & Stroud a very substantial penalty of £5,000 that would possibly have 
left him seriously harmed financially. Jackson's assurance that the `wider agreement' 
would not change either the name or the character of Adam Hilger & Co. Ltd was 
doubtless of little consolation to him. 
Having brought Barr & Stroud to a position where it looked likely to gain practical 
control of Hilger's, Jackson's next action comes as a surprise. With Twyman in a 
situation where he seemingly could do little but agree to whatever was being put to him, 
on December P Jackson wrote that Barr & Stroud now wished to withdraw from the 
matter and retain the status quo. His reason was that `Mrs Hilger' (the widow of the 
firm's founder and Twyman's fellow-shareholder) might suffer if Barr & Stroud 
encountered poor trading which would, under the proposed arrangements, `seriously 
affect Hilger's financial position' and even wipe out its profits completely. Barr & 
Stroud, said Jackson, had previously had years of trading at an `absolute loss'(by which 
he was referring to the early 1890s) and `we would not like to contemplate such a 
contingency'. He ended with the comment that under the circumstances it would be 
better for the firms to remain independent `unless you are willing to consider the sale of 
your business outright, which I do not think likely', a remarkable volte-face. 
This curious outcome has only one likely explanation, which relates to the firm's 
management structure and the characters of its owners. Although the business was a 
partnership wholly owned by its two founders, Jackson was, in Moss and Russell's 
words, its `commercial manager in all but name [who was] undoubtedly the architect of 
the business organisation' and also a man who, in his own words, believed that good 
management involved someone with `the power of putting his foot down' and being 
prepared to get things done. 8' His frequent letters to Twyman at Hilger's show the extent 
of the complaints he made about workmanship and delivery times, and the frustrations 
were sometimes evident - on one occasion he wrote that `We cannot express ... how 
°1 Moss and Russell (1988) p. 38. 
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strongly we have been annoyed by the way you have neglected us [over an order]'. 82 Nor 
was he alone; William Stroud also had strong feelings about their chief optical 
contractor's abilities, writing in early 1907 that he doubted if Hilger's knew `one 
hundredth of what Zeiss knows'. 83 Given Jackson's philosophy of business management, 
his letters to Twyman suggest that he believed improvements could be made by 
reconstructing Hilger's direction, which was solely under Twyman's control. The careful 
phrasing of the proposed agreement in 1907 indicates that Jackson intended to achieve a 
situation where Barr & Stroud would have management control, if not outright 
ownership of its principal optical contractor. His change of mind may have been dictated 
by pressure from the Professors Stroud and Barr, although each of them might have been 
motivated by quite different reasons. Stroud thought little of Hilger's or Twyman, and 
although always unable to suggest any alternative, had previously resisted suggestions of 
any formal connection. 84 Barr, on the other hand, had had a long acquaintanceship with 
the now-dead Hilger brothers, both of whom he had respected and seen as friends, as 
well as a largely amicable attitude towards Twyman. 85 Jackson's efforts to badger the 
latter into relinquishing control of Hilger's would have been unlikely to appeal to either 
partner - to Stroud because of his low opinion of the firm, and to Barr because of his 
previous personal involvement. Despite his energy and commitment to the business, 
Jackson lacked the power to force his principals into acquiescing in his proposals and he 
was obliged to extricate himself as well as he could from a situation that had escaped his 
control, leaving the firm still with an unresolved problem about optical components. 
Relations with Hilger's reverted to their earlier pattern, and not until 1912 did conditions 
force Barr & Stroud seriously to reconsider their arrangements for high-grade lens and 
prism work. By then, the large pentagonal prism end-reflectors which had become 
standard in the rangefinders were being flat-polished at Glasgow from pre-moulded 
82 UGD 295/4/4 1, letter Book, Jackson to Hilger, 7.6.1906. See also index entries in other Letter Books in 
the UGD 295/4 series for evidence of the volume of correspondence. 
$' UGD 295 Unclassified material, Russell Research Notes, Folder `Private Letter Books, BS4/21' Stroud 
to Barr, 24.1.1907. (`BS4/21' is not listed among the re-classified material now in the UGD 295 
collection. ) 
84 See chapters 1 and 2 above. 
$s UGD 295/4/744, letter Book, Barr to Twyman expressing condolences on Otto Hilger's death, and 
explaining the sense of loss he felt, 20.12.1902. 
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blocks supplied by Chance Brothers in Birmingham, with nineteen glass-workers 
employed full-time. 86 Most of the spherical lens work was still done by outside 
contractors. Orders increased substantially that year and Jackson began to seek suppliers 
besides Hilger's, not just because of quality problems or limited capacity there but also 
because the Admiralty had begun to suggest that Barr & Stroud should reduce its 
dependency on a single supplier. 87 He approached the Dallmeyer Optical Company, the 
Ross Optical Company, and Taylor, Taylor & Hobson Ltd for lenses, as well as ordering 
more from Chadburn Brothers. 88 In an effort to acquire a full complement of skilled 
workers and all the expertise needed to let Barr & Stroud attain self-sufficiency in 
spherical lens production, Jackson took the bold step of attempting to recruit (or poach) 
simultaneously the entire workforce of the Periscopic Prism Company in London, a firm 
with which he had been doing business since April 1911.89 He told his contact there, Paul 
de Braux, that if Barr & Stroud could get an `energetic and capable foreman' the firm 
would enlarge its optical shop and be `quite willing' to employ as many skilled men as 
could be persuaded to leave the Periscopic Company. As de Braux was the firm's 
proprietor, he was (perhaps understandably) somewhat unwilling to give up his own 
business to be Jackson's energetic foreman, and he declined the offer leaving Jackson to 
carry on the search. 
The problem was made worse for Jackson because there was no comparable work being 
done in Glasgow (or anywhere else in Scotland), nor any facilities for training in optical 
manufacturing outside London. Starting a spherical lens shop from scratch could not be 
done without a nucleus of skilled labour, and all efforts to tempt workers from England 
had so far been almost wholly unsuccessful. Then unexpectedly in November 1912, 
seven optical workers from Thomas Cooke & Sons approached Barr & Stroud and 
offered to move to Glasgow because work at the York factory had `become slack' 
86 UGD 295/4/80, Letter Book, Jackson to Chance Brothers, urging delivery of pentagonal blocks; Jackson 
to Twyman on wage rates for polishers, 3.4.1912; and Jackson to P. de Braux 3.4.1912.. 
87 Science Museum Library, Hilger Collection, History of Adam Hilger (subsequently HILG) 3.1, 
Typescript of `Mr Twyman's lecture, August 1944'. 
as UGD 295/4/81, Letter Book, Jackson to Dallmeyer, 23.4.1912, to Ross 23.4.1912, to TT&H 23.4.1912, 
to Chadbum 6.4.1912. 
89 UGD 295/4/81, Jackson to P. de Braux, 3.4.1912. 
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following Arthur Pollen's delays in selling his fire control system to the Admiralty. 9° 
Welcome as the recruits doubtless were, the increasing level of orders throughout 1912 
and 1913 meant that the lack of optical capacity continued to cause delays in output. 
Jackson added the London firm of W. Watson & Sons to his lens and prism suppliers and 
even began buying large pentagonal prisms from the German firm of J. D. Moeller in 
response to their unsolicited offer of supplies, presumably to meet overseas orders in 
view of the Admiralty's proscription of foreign glass 91 
Barr & Stroud's efforts to integrate backwards into lens and prism and production by 
1914 were still not enough to make the firm independent of suppliers over whom it had 
little direct control. Had Jackson's moves to annex Hilger's been allowed to proceed in 
1907, then the firm would have been able to develop its capacity either by wholesale 
removal of the factory and workers or, more likely, by the acquisition and transfer of 
technology and the savoir-faire of craft technique that was still part and parcel of optical 
manufacture in the early 20th century. Passing over the opportunity delayed that phase of 
development, and the Admiralty's later emphasis on the dilution of suppliers temporarily 
diverted attention away from the need for self-sufficiency with the result that the firm 
failed to match optical capacity with that for mechanical engineering and assembly, a 
situation that, as the following chapter will show, posed serious (though not insuperable) 
difficulties when the Great War began. 
3.10 Conclusion 
By 1914, Barr & Stroud had become the world's largest maker of optical munitions, and 
was far closer in character to the armaments industry than to the scientific instruments 
industry where it has usually been thought to belong. 92 Clive Trebilcock has defined the 
characteristics of armaments firms just before the Great War in terms that endorse the 
90 UGD 295/4/86, Letter Book, Jackson to J. W. French, 26.11.1912. 
91 UGD 295/4/95, Letter Book, Jackson to Watson, 12.5.1913, and Jackson to Moeller, 14.5.1913. 
92 See M. E. W. Williams, The Precision Makers: A History of the Instruments Industry in Britain and 
France, 1870-1939 (London: Routledge, 1994) Chapter 2, and R and K. MacLeod, "Government and the 
Optical Industry in Britain 1914-1918. " In War and Economic Development, edited by J. M. Winter. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977). 
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inclusion of businesses making military and naval optics amongst them. 93 Compared to 
commercial manufacturing, military supply was `a terrain both unwelcoming and largely 
unrecognisable' and those who catered for it bore little resemblance to `their peaceable 
contemporaries. ' He noted that private enterprise rather than government was responsible 
for `the major part of advanced weaponry design' and included in a list of such 
innovations the rangefinder. The bulk of these innovations were `as far removed from 
articles of general commerce as the best of contemporary science ... could take them. ' 
The `real forte' of the arms industry, according to Trebilcock, lay in its ability to 
combine such disparate skills as heavy engineering and `the most delicate' engineering 
work. The last sentence might have been written especially to describe the kind of work 
done by Barr & Stroud, who fitted prisms as small as an inch long into massive metal 
structures fifteen feet in length and so heavy that they required lifting gear to move them 
around the assembly shop. Even if large rangefinders were not wholly typical of optical 
munitions manufacture, other instruments like the dial sight and submarine periscope 
nevertheless conformed equally well to Trebilcock's characterisation of armaments, in 
that they had no civil market and their demand was inseparably linked to the State's 
needs at any time, so that attempts to sell them were constrained by factors quite different 
to those in civil markets. 
By the beginning of August 1914, Britain had evolved an optical munitions industry that 
had the capacity to supply not only all the nation's own peacetime demands, but many of 
those of foreign powers besides. It was a numerically small but distinct industry 
specialising in the manufacture of optical goods for the armed forces that the majority of 
optical companies were unable or unwilling to tackle. Most of the constituent firms 
produced military optics in addition to, but separately from, other unrelated commercial 
products, deriving only a proportion of their incomes from government contracting, but 
the largest one relied entirely on the international demand for armaments to provide its 
business. None of these firms had been given any State assistance in developing what 
they made, but neither had they been discriminated against as has been previously 
93 See C. Trebilcock, The Vickers Brothers: Armaments and Enterprise 1854-1914 (London: Europa 
Publications, 1977) pp. 1-7 for the following quotations in this section. 
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suggested. The armed forces most certainly did not rely on imported instruments; they 
could - and did - draw their whole requirements from an independent and generally 
capable domestic industry that was geared to the level of peace-time demand. 
The factors bearing on the shaping of the industry up to the outbreak of the Great War 
may be interpreted at first as showing the characteristics of technological determinism, 
with inexorable advances in gunnery and weapons systems driving the need for more 
complex optical support systems, but on closer examination it becomes clear that the 
industry's evolution was governed by a combination of social and technological issues 
whose understanding is crucial in understanding the path that was taken by all the actors 
on both sides of the story. It is not possible properly to comprehend the industry without 
grasping the complexities of the forces driving clients as well as suppliers. 
The ability of the optical munitions industry to deal with the challenges and problems 
that followed the declaration of war in August 1914 will be considered in the next three 
chapters, the first of which charts the first stage of industrial mobilisation up to the 
middle of 1915. 
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Chapter 4 
The impact of war, August 1914 to mid-1915 
4.1 Introduction 
The optical munitions makers, like almost all of British industry, were unprepared for 
war and encountered problems between August 1914 and the early summer of 1915. 
These difficulties were partly outside the industry's own control but came also from the 
structure of optical instrument making generally. The principal difficulty was an 
unanticipated, increasing demand from an Army that was expanding on an unprecedented 
scale and which had been inadequately equipped with optical apparatus before the war. 
The War Office failed both in not quantifying its own requirements and not concentrating 
its orders on the makers who were best suited to deal with them, and there was 
consequently an inability to recognise, let alone come to terms with, the strengths and 
limitations of both the general and specialised optical sectors of the industry. The 
strengths were largely ignored during 1914 and early 1915, and historians have 
subsequently emphasised the ensuing shortcomings as signifying a chronic weakness, 
particularly in having failed to keep up with German competitors. In fact, the problems in 
optical munitions output, were more rooted in the problems of industrial mobilisation 
than in any backwardness of the industry. The procurement process was, initially, the 
greater difficulty. 
Of the two British services, the Army's equipment with optical munitions was by far the 
more unsatisfactory, with the large-scale ordering of rangefinders having only just begun. 
Most of the problems met by the optical munitions makers in the first year of war were in 
trying to satisfy the War Office's rapidly developing needs. The Navy's requirements 
were geared to the quantities and types of ships in service rather than its manpower, but 
the Army's was directly related to its numerical strength which grew with extreme 
rapidity in contrast to the Navy's ship strength which increased far more slowly. 
Emphasising the differences, the Admiralty had previously been a regular and substantial 
purchaser of optical instruments and had established an efficient supply chain with 
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makers who were familiar with its needs, whereas the Army had never been either a large 
or consistent buyer from the optical community. 
4.2 The capability and capacity for optical munitions manufacture 
Even before 1914, there had been concerns about the Army's ability to get the optical 
apparatus it would need in the event of war. These worries focussed on the British optical 
instruments industry as a whole, which was seen by some as inadequate to meet possible 
requirements should Britain be drawn into a European war. The British Science Guild 
considered that under such circumstances British firms `could not, unaided, produce 
sufficient quantities' of the optical devices that would then be wanted by the armed 
forces. ' These sentiments echoed others already voiced by some of the members of the 
optical industry itself. 
According to the account subsequently left by the Ministry of Munitions, which was 
created in the spring of 1915, the capacity for the supply of optical instruments to the 
British Army in late 1914 became a matter of grave concern. The official History of the 
Ministry of Munitions described British optical manufacturing as then being both 
`seriously undercapitalised' and `very conservative', with `such machinery as existed 
[being] antiquated'. There was also `a singular lack of comprehension' of the benefits of 
machine tools, suggesting that a serious or even chronic lack of capacity to manufacture 
quickly and in quantity. 2 That gloomy depiction was echoed by Roy and Kay MacLeod 
who considered that the industry was `a fragmentary collection of craft based family 
firms' which suffered from a `scarcity of capital for investment and research. 3 
Furthermore, they believed that British makers had actually been discouraged from 
making some key optical munitions because `the War Office was a customer for German 
dial sights and prism binoculars .. .' Mari Williams shared this view, considering that 
once the war began `it was vividly brought home to the British government ... that they 
1 British Science Guild; Report of the Technical Optics Committee respecting the Proposed Establishment 
of an Institute of Technical Optics, June 1914, Appendix C to the Ninth Annual Report of the BSG (June 
1915) pp. 29-31. Cited in Roy and Kay MacLeod; `Government and the optical industry in Britain, 1914- 
18', in J. M. Winter, ed. War and Economic Development (Cambridge: University Press, 1975) p. 170. 2 Great Britain, Ministry of Munitions; History of the Ministry of Munitions, (subsequently OH) Vol. XI 
`The Supply of Munitions', Part III. (London: HMSO, 1922) p. 13, p. 9, and p. 18. 3R and K. MacLeod (1975) p. 170 provides this and the subsequent quotation. 
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were heavily dependent upon Imperial Germany both for finished precision instruments 
and for many component parts. '4 The domestic industry's ability to meet even the 
immediate demands of the Anny was clearly doubted by contemporary accounts which 
have been uncritically accepted subsequently. 
This impression is far from correct. In mid-1914 there was a viable British optical 
munitions manufacturing base which was more than adequate for all the requirements of 
the peace-time armed forces. Its constituents were well able to manufacture high 
precision complex military optics, frequently progressively minded, and far from 
antiquated. The Army's problems in obtaining its optical requirements after August 1914 
ought not to be laid solely at the industry's door. They came about from the combination 
of a totally unprecedented scale of demand, shortcomings in the War Office's 
procurement mechanisms, and limitations in the optical munitions sector which were 
principally - though by no means exclusively -a consequence of the British Army's pre- 
war attitude towards its optical inventory. 
The first stage in the industry's war-time growth was largely concerned with increasing 
output to meet the growing demands of the Army. Most of the pressure exerted on the 
makers from August 1914 to the summer of 1915 was to produce more of what was 
already being made. The Admiralty and War Office competed for manufacturing 
capacity without any co-ordination, each exerting pressures on makers to satisfy its own 
requirements and apparently ignorant of conflicts of interest, with the greater pressure 
coming from the War Office. In addition, the Army's need for new types of optical 
munitions began to emerge early in 1915 in response to specific requirements shown by 
the fighting, and the design of items like the telescopic rifle sight was passed by the War 
Office to firms who usually did not have the expertise to design for large scale 
manufacture, compounding delivery problems still further. There was, as Roy and Kay 
MacLeod rightly pointed out, little in the way of co-ordination of research, design or 
4 Mari Williams; The Precision Makers: a History of the Instruments Industry in Britain and France 1870- 
1939 (London: Routledge, 1994) p. 8. 
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output during this stages The optical industry - unlike, for example, the small arms 
industry - was left entirely to its own devices in organising its industrial mobilisation. 
6 
4.3 The industry that was available to meet increased War Office requirements 
Although the British Army was no stranger to optical munitions, its pre-war deployment 
of them had hardly been lavish. The relatively small scale of War Office purchasing has 
already been mentioned in the preceding chapter, and in the financial year to 3 1St March 
1914 only £49,000 had been spent. 
Table 4.1: War Office optical munitions contracts 1913-1914: 7 
Maker 
Financial Year 
1913-1914 
Aitchison & Co. Ltd London £1,752 
Barr & Stroud Ltd Glasgow £8,720 
Beck & Co. Ltd, London £8,880 
C. P. Goerz, Berlin' £4,712 
Ottway & Co. Ltd, London £ 640 
Ross Optical Co. Ltd, London £10,865 
Troughton & Simms, London £ 214 
W. Watson & Sons Ltd, London £4,279 
Carl Zeiss (London) Ltd £8,850 
* The business was part of a licensing arrangement for artillery dial sights that included their manufacture 
by Beck and by Ross. 
Irrespective of the small value of recent business, there was nevertheless a core group of 
makers experienced in producing specialist instruments to War Office requirements. 
Those included strict conformity to specifications and quality at a level not required in 
the civil markets where almost all the contractors except Barr & Stroud also competed. In 
'MacLeod 1975, p. 175. 
6 For details of the organisation of private sector small-arms production, see OH Vol. XI, Part 4, `Rifles', 
pp. 3-21. 
Details extracted from The National Archives, Kew (subsequently PRO) Records of the War Office, WO 
395/3, Director Army Contracts Annual Report 1914. 
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the preceding three years, ten British companies had supplied seven categories of optical 
munitions to War Office contracts: 
Figure 4.2: British optical munitions contractors to the War Office, 1911-1914: 8 
Manufacturer Products 
Aitchison & Co. Ltd, London Prismatic binoculars 
Barr & Stroud Ltd, Glasgow Single-observer rangefinders 
Beck & Co, Ltd, London Panoramic gun sights (Dial sights) 
Cooke & Sons Ltd, York Depression rangefinders, Panoramic gun sights 
A. Hilger & Co. Ltd, London Single-observer rangefinders 
W. Ottway & Co. Ltd, London Sighting telescopes 
Ross Optical co. Ltd, London Panoramic gun sights, Prismatic binoculars, 
Si allin telescopes 
Taylor, Taylor & Hobson Ltd, 
Leicester 
Signalling telescopes 
Troughton & Simms, London Sighting telescopes, Signalling telescopes 
W. Watson & Sons Ltd, London Prismatic binoculars 
In addition the German Carl Zeiss company had established a `branch factory' in London 
in 1909, setting up a British company called Carl Zeiss (London) Ltd. It produced 
prismatic binoculars principally for sale to the War Office which by 1914 regarded the 
business as a domestic manufacturer. 9 
These companies manufactured all the types of optical instruments used by the Regular 
Army. Their apparent failure to meet the Army's needs can be explained through 
examining the course of events after the declaration of war. 
$ Extracted from PRO 395/3, Director of Army Contracts Annual Reports, 1912,1913, and 1914. 
9 Antje Hagen; `Export versus Direct investment in the German Optical Industry', Business History Vol. 38 
No. 4, October 1996: see also chapter 4 above. 
128 
4.4 Procurement Problems 
The despatch of the Expeditionary Force to France started a process which was to lead to 
the creation of an unfavourable image of the optical munitions industry in the light of its 
apparent lack of success in meeting demands. This was, in fact, largely due to a failure of 
the War Office in organising procurement rather than a breakdown of production. There 
were two problems facing the War Office. Firstly, the equipment of the peace-time Army 
with up-to-date optical apparatus was still far from complete because some of the most 
important orders had only recently been placed. Earlier contracts (described in the 
preceding chapter) were still being filled, so that initial deficiencies in numbers resulted 
not from failure on the makers' part, but from the timing of War Office orders. The 
second difficulty compounded the first; the immediate calling-up of reserves drew into 
the Army large numbers of men who were largely un-provided with optical instruments 
of any kind. 
The peace-time strength of the Army was approximately 234,000, of whom 192,000 
were front-line troops. 1° From these, an Expeditionary Force of 150,000 was meant to be 
despatched to the continent. The domestic Territorial Force of 256,000 men was to be 
mobilised to `take over the defence' of the British Isles. " The only optical munitions 
available for the latter were those which had earlier been released from the front-line 
units as new patterns came into service, and those left over from acquisitions made 
during and immediately after the Boer War. Nothing else had been done to provide 
optical instruments for the Territorial Force because no pressing need had been 
recognised and because funds were more urgently needed to supply front-line units. 
Then, there were additional reserves of 200,000 men of whom 56,000 formed a `Special 
Reserve' intended to `feed the Expeditionary Force' with replacements and 
reinforcements. These soldiers needed the same equipment as the Regulars, but once 
again no provision had been made for optical munitions. The Army thus had the 
immediate prospect of mobilising for front-line service 150,000 men who were 
inadequately supplied with optical stores, plus another 56,000 who were totally without 
10 OH Vol. I Part I, Appendix 2, p. 145, and David G. Hermann, The Arming of Europe and the Making of 
the First World War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996) p. 234. 11 OH Vol. I Part I, p. 8, provides the source material for the rest of this paragraph. 
129 
up-to-date instruments. Besides those, another 400,000 men in the Territorial and general 
reserves almost entirely lacked optical equipment, constituting a problem that would 
have to be addressed if they were to be committed to action. 
The supply problem almost immediately worsened as it became apparent that a much 
larger field force than 150,000 was going to be required. 12 On August 6th Parliament 
approved the provision of an extra 500,000 men, of whom 100,000 enlisted before the 
end of the month. A further half million was voted for on September 106x, and before the 
end of November approval was given for another million, increasing the Army's pre-war 
strength eightfold, to around 2.5 million. By the beginning of November, enlistments of 
one million since the declaration of war were starting to impose a massive burden on the 
supply of all types of munitions. All these factors constituted a recipe for chronic 
problems in optical munitions supply. 
The scale of the Army's need for optical devices had, like much else, rapidly multiplied 
beyond anything ever envisaged - `nobody had planned for an expansion of the army on 
the scale undertaken by Kitchener'. 13 The head of Woolwich Arsenal's Optical 
Inspection Department quantified the Army's requirements in November 1914.14 His 
department was responsible for inspecting all optical stores and he was fully conversant 
with their scales of issue. These meant that excluding gun sights and signal telescopes, 7 
percent of the Army would require binoculars and every hundred men would want a 
rangefinder. In mid-November, the Army had reached a million, so that 70,000 
binoculars and 10,000 rangefinders were already required in addition to what the pre-war 
Regular Army and reserves still needed. The provision for another million men meant the 
figures would double by the following July when those new soldiers had all been 
inducted, making a total shortfall of 140,000 binoculars and 20,000 rangefinders, 
excluding telescopes and gun sights. 15 
12 OH Vol. I Part I pp 9 and 10 provide the data for the rest of this section on the enlargement of the Army. 
13 H. Strachan, The First World War: Volume 1: To Arms. ( Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) p. 
1067. 
14 Roy and Kay MacLeod (1975), p. 171, and A. C. Williams, "The Design and Inspection of Certain 
Optical Munitions of War. " Transactions of the Optical Society XX, no. 4 (1919), pp. 97-100. 
15 OH Vol. I Part I, p. 10. 
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The responsibility for procuring all munitions supplies lay jointly with the Master 
General of the Ordnance (MGO) and the War Office Contracts Department. The 
historian of the Ministry of Munitions provided an explanation of their respective 
functions which can hardly be bettered: 
The size of the Army being determined by Parliament, and the scale of 
equipment being approved, the formulation of definite requirements was a 
straight-forward matter. It was the duty of the Master General of the 
Ordnance and his officers to prescribe what equipments should be 
supplied and the duty of the Contracts Department was limited to 
procuring from the armaments firms such portions as might be definitely 
requisitioned. 16 
The MGO ought to have been able to calculate what `definite requirements' in optical 
stores were needed according to the growing size of the Army, and then issue 
instructions - `contracts demands' - to the Contracts Department to procure the 
quantities needed. The latter should then have sought tenders from manufacturers before 
awarding contracts. 17 Because the instruments needed in late 1914 were all of existing 
patterns, and because established sources of supply already existed, it might be expected 
that sufficiently large orders would have been placed to meet the immediately emerging 
demands. In fact this was not done, so that by mid-1915 there was both a substantial and 
growing deficit in orders to meet the growing demand and a shortfall in deliveries of 
optical munitions already required. " The pattern of ordering was as much responsible for 
the failure of the industry to provide adequate supplies as were the shortcomings in its 
structure and background suggested by the Ministry of Munitions. Unlike rifles, small- 
arms ammunition and artillery shells, where the ever increasing and massive orders 
eventually led to the re-organisation of the supplying industries, large contracts for 
16 OH Vol. I Part I, p. 53. 
17 OH Vol. I Part I, pp 53 to 58 supplies the contract procedures in the rest of this section. 
" PRO MUN 4/745, Orders Placed for Scientific and Optical Instruments &c., 1.8.1914 to 31.3.1917, 
illustrates the state of outstanding orders. 
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optical munitions were, with one important exception, never placed. 19 This was the exact 
reverse of most other munitions. 20 
The problems of industrial mobilisation certainly did apply to the optical sector. Clive 
Trebilcock has said that `the requirements of modem hostilities ... create unique 
problems of supply', pointing out that complex artefacts need to be made to standards of 
`precise replication' in quantities not normally required in peace time. 1 In addition, 
Trebilcock drew attention to the fact that in normal times such items are usually made by 
only a small number of specialists. The pressures of war create the need for their 
products to be turned out `in the greatest quantity possible and at the highest possible 
speed - adding the difficulties of mass production under crisis demand to those of quality 
and reiteration'. 22 This is a near-perfect description of the situation which the optical 
munitions makers faced during late 1914 and early 1915, but the true state of their 
problem was obscured by the failure of the MGO and Contracts Departments to place 
orders large enough to expose the real nature of the situation and meant that the ability of 
the optical industry to supply war demands was never properly examined until mid-1915 
when it fell under the aegis of the Ministry of Munitions. 
At first glance, this failure seems inexplicable. The scales of issue were known, as was 
the rate and extent of the Army's expansion. The items needed were not novel and a list 
of `approved contractors' already existed, amongst whom orders could have been 
distributed. Furthermore, funding was available to cover whatever munitions stores the 
MGO put out to contract. The reasons why large-scale ordering across the industry did 
not take place were not to do with incompetence, but are to be found in the operating 
system imposed on the Contracts Department by the regulations governing the 
organisation of the War Office as a whole. 23 
19 OH Vol. XI, Part 4, `Rifles', chapters 2 and 3. 
20 R. J. Q. Adams, Arms and the Wizard; Lloyd George and the Ministry of Munitions 1915-1916. (London: 
Cassell, 1978) Chapters 1 to 3 illustrate the events leading up to this. 
21 Clive Trebilcock, 'War and the failure of industrial mobilisation: 1899 and 1914' in J. M. Winter, ed. 
War and Economic Development (Cambridge: University Press, 1975) p. 140. 22 Clive Trebilcock, 'War and the failure of industrial mobilisation: 1899 and 1914' in J. M. Winter, ed. 
War and Economic Development (Cambridge: University Press, 1975) p. 140. 23 OH Vol. I Part I, pp. 46 to 71 provides the basis for this section relating to the handling of contracts. 
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The War Office procurement system was hedged around with safeguards to protect 
against exploitation and default by contractors, and to ensure that the Army obtained 
goods of consistently good quality which conformed strictly to specifications and for 
which the State paid no more than necessary. In summary, the system meant that priority 
was to be given to the lowest price tendered from an already approved supplier. To 
acquire that status, a manufacturer had to apply to go on the `approved list' and be vetted 
to ensure he was actually capable of carrying out the work involved. The MGO's office 
issued instructions to place orders whose total levels it determined to the Contracts 
Department, which then sent `invitations to tender' only to those who were on the 
approved list. The system worked well in peace-time but had serious defects in war. 
These were explained in 1916 by the civilian head of the Contracts Department, U. F. 
Wintour. 24 
His remarks highlight the mind-set of those responsible for munitions procurement and 
partly explain the inadequate levels of ordering for almost all optical munitions between 
late 1914 and mid-1915 when the Ministry of Munitions took over. Understanding the 
constraints under which his department operated helps to explain the allegedly poor 
performance of the optical industry in this period. 
Wintour asserted that being forced by high levels of demand to obtain tenders 
simultaneously from all on the approved list had `several vicious consequences' for the 
War Office. These included revealing to the supplying industry the actual scale of the 
Army's needs and letting the industry see for itself `the relation of [Army] demand to the 
probable supply'. The urgency in 1914 and 1915 meant that `all or most offers' had to be 
accepted, so that there was absolutely no chance `to keep prices down to a reasonable 
level' by refusing tenders considered too expensive. Because one of the department's 
chief obligations was to secure the lowest practicable prices, attempts were made to force 
them down. This was done at first by issuing requests for tender in quantities lower than 
actually needed. That proved counter-productive because bidders quoted higher unit 
24 OH Vol. I Part I, p. 53. 
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prices reflecting the lost economies of scale on very large quantities. Another ploy 
involved asking for prices based on whatever quantity could be offered by a specified 
date. That, according to Wintour, created an impression of a potential demand larger than 
it really was, and encouraged the makers to keep prices at a high level. The Contracts 
Department seemingly worked from the premise that contractors would over-charge in 
the absence of any control mechanism. 
Whether the optical suppliers fitted this pattern is uncertain. Barr & Stroud's records (the 
only detailed ones available for this period) suggest that prices only increased in line 
with actual costs. 25 There certainly were increases in the price of raw materials, 
particularly glass, and because much of the optical industry was concentrated in London 
there may have been opportunity for collusion over pricing levels, but the remaining War 
Office contract records do not give enough detail safely to reach any conclusion. 26 
Another, more insidious, effect of these attempts to manipulate market forces was the 
effect on the prices and apparent availability of raw materials. Wintour said that when all 
the firms on an approved list were simultaneously asked to tender for large quantities 
they all `went into the market at the same time for the raw materials' needed, by which 
he meant that they took options on what they might need. In consequence, the apparent 
demand `multiplied several times over' causing `complete chaos in the market and 
[forcing up prices] to quite fictitious and unwarranted level'. With optical munitions, 
something on these lines may indeed have taken place with optical glass, whose price 
rose considerably and which was periodically in very short supply during 1914 and 
191527 
Shortcomings in the quality control role of the tendering system also affected deliveries. 
When a supplier was given a contract for an instrument not supplied previously, samples 
25 Data extracted from prices charged in UGD 295/19/2/4 and /5, Customer Order files 1914 and 1915. 
26 PRO MUN 4/745, Orders placed for Scientific and Optical Instruments &c, l' August 1914 to 31 
March 1917, does not give any prices. 
27 For examples of Barr & Stroud's efforts to maintain supplies, see UGD 295/4/113, H. D. Jackson to 
Chance Bros., 11.11.1914, and Jackson to LePersonne & Co., 9.12.1914; UGD 295/4/118, Jackson to 
Chance Bros, 18.5.1915; UGD 295/4/119, Jackson to Parra Mantois & Cie., 16.6.1915. 
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had to be submitted for approval before a decision to order was made. This, according to 
Wintour frequently caused delays as samples went `astray' and replacements had to be 
obtained. Further delays occurred, as the contractor had to be told of any shortcomings 
and given an opportunity of correcting and re-submitting them, when the whole cycle 
would be repeated. 
For the Contracts Department, there was to be neither an open cheque book nor any 
relaxation in the procedural system despite earlier clear signals from Government to the 
MGO's department that changes were necessary to speed the machinery of procurement. 
The tendering system had already been effectively made redundant in October 1914 
when Lloyd George, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, had given the Ordnance 
Department `virtual carte blanche approval' for the purchase of munitions stores, 28 but 
little difference became apparent at the Contracts Department. The existing system of 
competitive tendering and its now largely redundant safeguards for the public purse 
continued, even after the Ministry of Munitions was created in 1915. As late as February 
1916, Wintour complained that conditions of supply had become such that there was `no 
real competition' between prospective suppliers so that even the allocation of orders 
according to price could not ensure `that the Department gets the best value for its 
money. ' 
The tenacity with which the Contracts Department held on to its peace-time procedures 
suggests that William McBride's notion of military hierarchical structures tending to 
show inertia and resisting any change that challenges an established stability is by no 
means confined to the technological context that he cited as evidence. 29 Wintour, 
although a civilian, was summarising the Department's practices prior to the changes 
caused by the creation of the Ministry of Munitions which effectively took over the 
placing of contracts once requirements had been produced by the War Office. Despite the 
then-manifest shortcomings in earlier procedures, and the political will to disregard the 
emphasis on competitive tendering, he was emphasising that the Department considered 
28 Adams (1978) p. 18. 
29 W. McBride, Technological Change and the U. S. Navy 1865-1945 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2000) p. 4. 
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its problem was essentially that the market was failing to conform to previous 
expectations, and that what had been perceived as necessary was some means to re- 
establish the earlier familiar stability in the procurement process. Whether or not 
institutional inertia was all that encouraged the Contracts Department to maintain the 
status quo, there is no doubt that the tendering system had an unfortunate effect, at least 
on optical munitions procurement. In fairness, though, it must be remembered that in the 
month before Lloyd George sanctioned the relaxation of procurement, von Donop had 
deliberately concealed from the armaments industry the provision of £20 million by the 
Treasury for plant extensions, `fearing a great onrush of supplicants for the funds', and 
that he was generally reluctant to sanction large-scale expenditure 3° It is not 
inconceivable that the implications of Lloyd George's removal of strict scrutiny in 
munitions purchasing in October 1914 never actually reached the Contracts Department. 
The net result of all this for the optical munitions suppliers was that, apart from Barr & 
Stroud, they were never asked even to attempt to provide sufficient capacity to cope with 
the massive demands for the growing Army. The case of Barr & Stroud is particularly 
interesting because it shows simultaneously some of the strengths and weaknesses 
present in the early war-time industry, and suggests that had the War Office approach to 
ordering been modified to reflect the needs of the Army rather than the desire to preserve 
an existing administrative structure, then the Ministry of Munitions might well have 
found an altogether different picture to the one it claimed to discover in mid-1915. 
4.5 Barr & Stroud's experience in the first year of war 
By August 1914 Barr & Stroud was the world's only company devoted exclusively to the 
manufacture of optical munitions, and had become Britain's largest producer of high 
precision optical apparatus. The Admiralty depended wholly on the company for its 
rangefinders, and the firm had achieved a monopoly in supplying rangefinders to the 
navies of France, Italy and Japan, as well as an hegemonical position in virtually every 
other modem navy except Germany's. Its sales of rangefinders to the world's armies 
were also very substantial, with France being the largest single client between 1912 and 
30 Adams (1978) p. 18, and then pp. 21-23. 
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1914. This success had been achieved without any substantial orders from the War Office 
before 1914, and there was no well-established relationship between the company and 
the Army. 
The fin had been dependent on foreign orders for most of its profitability since 1901. In 
its financial year ending 31's December 1913,64 percent of the turnover of £268,000 
came from overseas business, compared with 34 percent from the British Admiralty and 
only 2 percent from the War Office. 31 Profit margins on overseas business were higher 
than on similar items sold to the British forces - infantry rangefinders for France were 
sold at £66.50 when the same item was priced at £55 to the War Office, for example. 32 
Output was divided between large naval instruments, principally for the Royal Navy, and 
the smaller portable models for land service which had been sold almost entirely abroad. 
For these, the principal customers were European armies, with France being by far the 
biggest client with over £100,000 of orders in 1913 alone. 
It was only in the spring of 1914 that Barr & Stroud received its first large War Office 
orders. 33 These were not awarded through the usual competitive tendering process 
because the firm was effectively a monopoly supplier. No other British maker could 
supply anything similar in quantity, and the only foreign competitors were both German. 
The uncertain political climate in Europe meant there was no possible source other than 
Barr & Stroud and the Contracts Department's duty to obtain best value was accordingly 
redundant. The first War Office orders were certainly large, but by no means unusually 
so for Barr & Stroud. Between January and July 1914 four separate contracts were placed 
for £54,000-worth of rangefmders, compared with over £185,000 of foreign business and 
£73,000 from the Admiralty. The War Office orders did not represent a complete outfit 
of instruments even for the Regular Army's front line Infantry strength of 150,000 men 
where at least 1,500 were needed but only 680 were ordered. Similarly, only 150 were 
ordered for the whole of the field Artillery, which was also inadequate. The declaration 
'1 Extracted from UGD 295/19/2/3, Customer Order files 1913, and UGD 295/11/1, audited accounts and 
balance sheet 1913. 
32 UGD 295/19/2! 4, Customer Order files, sample French contracts 1913 and War Office ones 1914. " UGD 295/19/2/4, and /5, Customer Order files 1914 and 1915 provide the source material for this 
section unless otherwise indicated. 
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of war prompted an increase in ordering, with new contracts before December 31st for 
£119,000-worth of instruments, followed by orders for over £300,000 by the end of July 
1915. These later contracts were indeed very large. The firm's greatest annual peacetime 
orders had been £268,000 in 1913, but by the end of 1914 new business totalled over 
£491,000. Both the Ministry of Munitions' own history and Roy and Kay MacLeod 
noted that rangefinder supplies alone of optical stores for the Army were `assured' right 
from the outbreak of war, 34 suggesting that the company had little difficulty coping with 
the new War Office business. Although Barr & Stroud did indeed keep up with demand, 
this came about only through a combination of fortuitous circumstances and the firm's 
largely successful management of a diverse set of problems. 
The company's growth in 1912 and 1913 came through the rapid increase in demand for 
infantry and artillery rangefinders, a market encouraged by growing political tension in 
Europe. France had been the largest buyer, and the company had increased its capacity to 
handle the extra business. During the same years, Barr & Stroud had courted business 
from the Austro-Hungarian and Russian armies, and by mid-1914 already had its first 
contracts from the former and was close to finalising matters with the latter. 35 
Manufacture for Austro-Hungary had begun, but the declaration of war saw the client 
become an enemy, and put the Russian negotiations into abeyance, freeing space and 
manpower already allocated for the anticipated business. The French contracts were 
coming to an end, all of which meant that spare capacity was available when the new 
War Office contracts arrived. 
Factory space and tooling, although essential, by no means defined the limits of 
manufacturing problems. Despite making optical instruments, Barr & Stroud regarded 
itself primarily as a mechanical engineering company. The bulk of its shop space, tooling 
and workforce were allocated to fabricating the rangefinder's mechanical structure. 
Optical components were at the instrument's heart, but it also depended on skilled and 
precise mechanical engineering for its efficient working. Optical and mechanical 
34 MacLeod (1975) p. 171. 
35 M. Moss and I. Russell. Range and Vision: The First Hundred Years of Barr & Stroud (Edinburgh: 
Mainstream Publishing, 1988) pp. 65-67. 
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engineering were absolutely interdependent in a successful rangefinder. Barr & Stroud 
was entirely self-sufficient in the mechanical side, but still depended heavily on sub- 
contractors for many of its optical components. The way the business sought to manage 
the sudden increase in requirements for them provides a useful illustration of the ability 
of the optical industry as a whole to cope with war-time demands in 1914. 
Although Barr & Stroud rangefinders all shared a basically similar optical design, the 
different models required their own outfits of lenses and prisms, depending on the base- 
length and magnification. Some were made in-house, but many were still being done by 
outside contractors who frequently failed to reach the specified standards needed for the 
instruments to work properly. Barr & Stroud's problems with increasing output in 
response to demands for rapid delivery were largely centred on maintaining the quality of 
externally-sourced components from suppliers over whom there was no direct control. 
The scale of demand for lenses and prisms was governed by the requirements of the two 
British armed services, which in turn influenced the extent to which Barr & Stroud had to 
depend on contractors who were both far distant and pre-occupied with their own 
business. 
Once war was seen as inevitable, the directors began to put themselves on a `war 
footing'. On 31' July they assured the Admiralty that priority would be given to Royal 
Navy contracts over foreign ones and, apparently, over War Office ones as well 36 On 3'd 
August general manager Harold Jackson, wrote to his optical subcontractors urging 
immediate attention to `all our orders in hand'. 37 When war was declared the following 
day he sent the Admiralty a detailed list of all rangefinders on order, for both allies and 
enemies alike, and specifically requested an assurance that there was no objection to 
continuing supplies to France. The company accepted that the Admiralty had the ability 
to direct exactly what it could and could not do, which stood to affect the firm's 
requirements for optical components from outside suppliers. Having been assured on the 
36 UGD 295/4/6, Letter Book, Jackson to Director of Navy Contracts, 31.7.1914. 37 UGD 295/4/109, Letter Book, a series of almost identical letters was sent out between 3.8.1914 and 
5.8.1914. 
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6th that there were no objections to deliveries for the French army and navy, Jackson 
began attempting to arrange for adequate supplies of lenses and prisms. 38 
The correspondence in the following months illustrates the problems that the optical 
munitions makers had to deal with, and shows that irrespective of capacity, skill or 
ability, there was indeed a lack of organisation in the optical industry. The firm's efforts 
were ultimately successful not through obtaining larger deliveries from existing 
suppliers, but through the expansion of internal capacity and the establishment of a new 
relationship with one particular maker. 
Barr & Stroud's oldest optical supplier was Adam Hilger Ltd, and it was their Managing 
Director, Frank Twyman, that Jackson first approached. The two companies had been 
associated since 1889, and on at least two previous occasions a merger had been 
discussed. 39 Nothing had resulted, and by 1914 Hilger's - although still the principal 
British maker of complex prisms - had lost the near monopoly of Barr & Stroud optical 
components it once had. Hilger's had felt the diminution of Barr & Stroud orders very 
keenly after 1913 when the effect had been `very bad'. 0 This reduction may partly have 
been because Barr & Stroud was becoming more self-sufficient but Twyman later 
considered the real cause was Admiralty pressure on Barr & Stroud to insure against the 
dangers implicit in the possible failure of one key sub-contractor, which had led the 
company not only to expand its own optical output but to engage other suppliers as 
well 41 Whilst the Admiralty certainly was aware of dangers in interruptions to its supply 
of optical munitions, it is equally possible that the stimulus for self-sufficiency may have 
been encouraged by Hilger's continued inability to maintain sufficiently high and 
consistent standards. Although orders were still being placed for lenses and prisms in 
38 UGD 295/4/6, Letter Book, Jackson to Secretary of the Admiralty, 6.8.1914. 
39 See Chapter 2 and Chapter 4 above. 
40 Science Museum Library, Adam Hilger Collection (subsequently SML): HILG 3/1, typescript `Mr 
Twyman's lecture August 1944, p. 17. 
41 SML HILG 3/1, typescript p. 27. 
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1914, complaints of poor quality were frequent. Nevertheless, it was on Hilger's that 
Barr & Stroud at first intended to rely for the expansion of deliveries. 2 
Scarcely a week after the war began, Jackson asked Twyman for delivery dates for 
everything on order. Jackson emphasised that the size and the new urgency of existing 
orders meant Twyman must hire as many optical workers as possible, and visit Glasgow 
to discuss the situation with Barr & Stroud's directors. That letter, dated the 10`", must 
have been written knowing that an urgent War Office order for 558 infantry rangefinders 
was already on its way to Glasgow. 43 A meeting was held on 21 t August, when the firm 
presented Twyman with a proposition he may well have felt unable to refuse. 
Barr & Stroud proposed to give Hilger's `all the [optical] orders that we cannot undertake 
ourselves'. 44 These were greater than Hilger's own capacity, so the directors knew 
Twyman would have to subcontract many of them. As Barr & Stroud was already out- 
sourcing a substantial amount of optical work to firms besides Hilger's, the offer 
suggests that either the directors wished to simplify their own administration or, more 
likely, that such a desire was combined with the knowledge that their existing 
subcontracting network would very soon be insufficient. Tywman could subcontract, 
provided he would be responsible for the prompt delivery and quality of the work. The 
directors thought that Hilger's was `at the centre of the optical trade' and therefore 
`probably better able to subcontract [and] control the quality of the work than we are'. To 
assist Twyman, they would help to obtain optical glass from the sole British makers, 
Chance Brothers of Birmingham, as well as providing advice on manufacturing methods. 
This was, at first sight, a substantial vote of confidence in Hilger's which - if justified - 
would have left Barr & Stroud free to concentrate on its own manufacturing without the 
burden of co-ordinating the work of numerous subcontractors. It was, however, still short 
of a total endorsement and by no means gave Twyman any guarantee of subcontracted 
work because, irrespective of the proposed agreement, Barr & Stroud reserved the right 
42 UGD 295/4/110, Letter Book, contains a series of letters from Jackson to Twyman which provides the 
material concerning Adam Hilger for the rest of this section unless otherwise indicated. 43 UGD 295/19/2/3, Customer Order file. 
44 UGD 295/4/110, Letter Book, Jackson to Twyman, 21.8.1914. 
141 
to extend its own optical department as it thought necessary. Jackson's summary of the 
meeting noted that `for the present neither you nor we can undertake [unaided] the work 
in hand', implying that that he saw no reason why his firm should not move closer to that 
condition. 
Whether or not Barr & Stroud meant to flatter Twyman by saying that Hilger's were `at 
the centre of the optical trade', the statement was literally correct. In 1914 London 
remained the principal locus of the optical instruments (but not necessarily optical 
munitions) industry. Apart from Barr & Stroud, the only substantial companies not based 
in London were Thomas Cooke & Sons Ltd in York and Sir Howard Grubb & Co. in 
Dublin, both of whom were directly involved in optical munitions. There were other 
optical makers in the provinces, but none of them were either large or substantially 
engaged in making for the armed forces. The London businesses ranged from relatively 
large and successful ones such as the Ross Optical Co. Ltd which employed over 350 
workers, 45 down to small firms which were mainly engaged in ophthalmic optics and 
sometimes employed only one or two workers. 6 There was a concentration of makers in 
the Clerkenwell district where Hilger's was located, so that Twyman was indeed 
conveniently placed to liase with many optical manufacturers although his competence to 
do so was not so readily apparent. 
Twyman's interests lay principally with the development of new types of optical 
instruments for science, particularly the spectrometer. 47 His company's other main area 
of expertise was the making of complex prisms, in which it had something approaching a 
monopoly in Britain. Both were essentially small scale operations reflecting 
contemporary levels of demand, so that Hilger's remained a small business of less than 
thirty workers and Twyman had no experience either of volume production or the 
organisation of subcontracting on the scale that was now necessary. Barr & Stroud's 
directors knew this, and it is unclear why they so readily devolved the task to him. The 
4s A. B. Dewar, The Great Munition Feat 1914-1918. (London: Constable, 192 1) p. 221. "Hugh Barty-King, Eyes Right: The Story ofDollond & Aitchison Opticians 1750-1985 (London: Quiller 
Press, 1986) p. 125. 
47 SML HILG 7/1, Twyman obituary reprint (unidentified), p. 270. 
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most probable explanation is that Twyman, through his prism work, was well acquainted 
with most, if not all, of the London firms who regularly did the high grade spherical lens 
work used in the scientific instruments that employed Hilger's prisms. These firms, few 
of which Barr & Stroud had ever dealt with, were now likely suppliers, if they could be 
persuaded to take on the work. Personal persuasion and cajolery might have been 
recognised as more effective recruiters than Jackson's letters and telegrams from 
Glasgow. 
Whatever Barr & Stroud's thinking, by the end of October it was apparent that 
Twyman's efforts were not going well. Although none of Hilger's surviving records 
relate to this, Barr & Stroud's letter books document the problems and the frustrations 
they caused. Despite offering to make Hilger's responsible for all orders beyond Barr & 
Stroud's own capacity, the firm not only excluded Taylor, Taylor & Hobson Ltd from 
Hilger's remit, but also continued to deal directly with three London firms who were 
already supplying parts. R. & J. Beck, the Periscopic Prism Company, and W. Watson & 
Sons all had contracts which continued to be administered from Glasgow subsequent to 
the arrangement with Twyman. 48 Nor did Barr & Stroud leave Twyman alone to get on 
with his task; Jackson repeatedly intervened with instructions as to how the 
subcontracting should be organised. 
Twyman's instructions to exclude Taylor Hobson resulted from Archibald Barr's 
acquaintance with Wilfred Taylor and his high opinion of Taylor Hobson's workmanship 
and methods that dated from 1903 49 The Leicester company moved into lens making as 
part of a programme of diversification from the manufacture of small precision machine 
tools and doing fine mechanical work, had begun contracting for the War Office from 
1910, and by 1914 had expanded its optical side into the series-production of high quality 
photographic lenses to designs licensed from Thomas Cooke & Sons Ltd of York. 5° On 
48 UGD 295/4/11, Letter Book, Jackson to Beck, 26.10.1914; Jackson to Periscopic Prism Co., 6.10.1914; 
Jackson to Watson, 14.10.1914 
" UGD 295/26/1/25, Barr to William Taylor, 3.6.1903 requesting help in obtaining optical workers and 
endorsing Taylor Hobson's small machine tools. 
so McConnell, A. Instrument Makers to the World: A History of Cooke, Troughton & Simms. 
(York: William Sessions Ltd,, 1992) p. 73. 
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August 9th, Taylor offered Archibald Barr his firm's `assistance' in the production of 
rangefinder object lenses, and this was quickly accepted after a meeting of the two firms' 
directors. sl Whether this was a deliberate hedge against Hilger's failure is uncertain, but 
in view of how the other subcontracting exercise turned out, it was a propitious move. 
Taylor told Barr & Stroud on 25th August that he had received third-party enquiries 
(which he did not identify) for quotations for lenses to be supplied directly to Hilger's. 
Then, on September 2"d, he was asked by Cooke's of York to quote for objective lenses 
to be delivered to Adam Hilger & Co. Their specification identified them as being for 
Barr & Stroud rangefinders and Taylor consequently declined the business. 52 Cooke's 
were one of the country's best known lens and telescope makers, and were not currently 
engaged on any large scale British government contracting. The referral of the order to a 
third party could hardly to have been because of a lack of capacity or ability, but was 
more likely because they were attempting to sell rangefmders of their own design 
intended for use with the Pollen fire-control system to the Admiralty and the Russian 
governments, as well as promoting smaller versions for land-service use. 53 Whatever 
Cooke's reasons or motives, Taylor's letter warned Jackson that if Twyman's 
subcontractors were passing-on work, it could pose threats to maintaining quality control, 
and he promptly gave Twyman specific instructions to tell them that they were not to 
pass orders on to a third party. 
This division and sub-division of manufacture highlights a problem facing firms seeking 
to increase optical output in late 1914 and early 1915. The capacity of most optical 
manufacturers to expand production rapidly and substantially was constrained by the 
structure of the pre-war industry which had operated on a scale geared to domestic and 
export demands that generally lacked urgency. The optical munitions component of the 
larger optical instruments industry had no significant peace-time problems in meeting the 
demand, whether through in-house manufacture or outsourcing. Even where the scale of 
demand had been consistently large, as with Barr & Stroud's business, the required 
S' UGD 295/4/109, Letter Book, Jackson to Taylor, Taylor, Hobson, 11.8.1914 and 18.8.1914. S2 UGD 295/4/110, Letter Book, Jackson acknowledges advice from Taylor, Taylor, Hobson, 25.8.1914. 
53 McConnell (1992) p. 75. 
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delivery rates had usually been leisurely enough to allow supplies to keep up with 
schedules. The expansion of orders and the need for increased speed of output strained 
the opticians to whom Barr & Stroud and Hilger's immediately turned. Beck, Cooke and 
Watson, for example, were already producing both optical munitions components and 
complete instruments but were not wholly devoted to those fields; they also had a 
substantial involvement in the general commercial market for optical goods which they 
were initially loathe to relinquish. Increasing output for Barr & Stroud meant either 
reducing output of something else or investing in new tooling and labour. Early in the 
war there was a general reluctance to do this when its duration - and hence commercial 
value - was expected to be short rather than long, and when there was no avalanche of 
orders from the War Office to counteract this view. Faced with such uncertainties and the 
lack of any centralised State direction, it is hardly surprising that firms attempted to cope 
with what they saw as a short term phenomenon by equally short term measures such as 
further sub-contracting. 
For Barr & Stroud, that reasoning was secondary to the immediate problem of obtaining 
enough components of a sufficiently high standard. Throughout September Harold 
Jackson complained to Twyman about slow deliveries and erratic quality. 54 By the 14`'', 
-he was so worried about Hilger's prism output that he urged Twyman to approach the 
Periscopic Prism Company (with whom Barr & Stroud was already dealing) for extra 
supplies of the rangefinder pentagonal prisms which had previously been one of Hilger's 
specialities. On the 25th, he provided Twyman with a list of firms to approach, suggesting 
there had been little headway in organising deliveries. Matters deteriorated further 
throughout October, and by the end of the month were so bad that Jackson travelled to 
London to try to resolve the problem. 
There were two difficulties for Barr & Stroud. Firstly, in Jackson's words, Hilger's could 
not supply `even our minimum demands for optical parts' and secondly, the War Office 
had asked Hilger's to re-start production of the unsatisfactory Marindin rangefinder 
s` UGD 295/4/110, Letter Book, Jackson to Twyman on various dates. 
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which it had bought in small numbers between 1907 and 1913.55 To Barr & Stroud, that 
idea was wholly unacceptable. Many of the parts for the Marindin had actually been 
made in Glasgow, and Jackson knew that Hilger's had constantly struggled to maintain 
output and quality; its resurrection threatened to affect Barr & Stroud's output by 
diverting Hilger's efforts. 56 Ignoring the War Office's right to order what it chose, 
Jackson wrote bluntly that `We do not see how you can undertake the manufacture ... ', 
and threatened that `if we cannot get from you the supplies on which we have been 
counting we shall be forced immediately to get our supplies elsewhere. ' Exactly where 
they might come from Jackson did not say, but the threat persuaded Twyman to convince 
the War Office that re-starting Marindin production was not feasible, probably because 
its mechanical components would be unobtainable. 57 
Hilger's inabilities were to some extent lessened by the Barr & Stroud's growing self- 
sufficiency. Jackson complained yet again to Twyman about shortcomings on December 
9th, pointing out that Barr & Stroud had now increased its optical capacity to the point 
where `we are held back by you, and only by you'. 58 In consequence, Barr & Stroud 
would start making the parts which Twyman had failed to deliver, and the ultimate 
outcome would be Hilger's exclusion altogether. Jackson possibly misled Twyman by 
implying that optical output at Glasgow had increased; although new equipment had 
been ordered from the Standard Optical Company in Switzerland in mid-September, 
there had been little enough time for it to be made, delivered and installed, and operatives 
trained to use it S9 Indeed, the building extensions needed to accommodate the extra plant 
were only started in November and could not yet have been finished. 60 It is likely that the 
increased optical capacity was actually Taylor Hobson's in Leicester, whose ability to 
handle large orders was becoming established, so that the need to employ subcontractors 
at third-hand through Hilger's was starting to diminish. 
ss UGD 295/4/110 Jackson to Twyman, 30.8.1914. 
56 UGD 295/4/744, Letter Book, Jackson to Hilger, 9/8/1907. 
57 UGD 295/4/112, Letter Book, Jackson to Twyman, thanking him for his co-operation, 7.11.14. 
S8 UGD 295/4/112, Jackson to Twyman, 9.12.1914. 
59 UGD 295/4/112, Barr & Stroud to Standard Optical Company, 17.9.1914. 
60 UGD 295/4/112 Barr & Stroud to Sir William Arrol & Co. (builders), 5.11.1914. 
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According to Barr & Stroud, Hilger's performance was indeed greatly deficient. Jackson 
refused to give Twyman any further orders on 90' December, pending `reliable 
information' about what improvements would be made 61 The reply to this has not 
survived, but Jackson's riposte has. 2 The unfortunate Twyman was given a piece of 
Jackson's mind; less than 35 percent of 1,393 items ordered had been delivered on 
schedule, 804 others which had not been ordered at all had been sent in error, and 
Twyman's claims for Hilger's output were `if you excuse us saying so ... all nonsense'. 
Despite this, Barr & Stroud wanted to carry on with Hilger's, and would provide weekly 
requirements lists so Twyman could prioritise his own deliveries. Even if alternative 
sources were becoming available, Hilger's were clearly still essential to maintain output. 
Sentiment certainly had nothing to do with it. Although well aware that costs were 
escalating, Jackson flatly refused to tolerate a proposed price increase, countering that he 
hoped Twyman would instead be able to reduce costs through `the experience you are 
now gaining with manufacturing large quantities'. His dependence on Barr & Stroud left 
Twyman little choice but to accept both criticisms and demands. Jackson's 
acknowledgement of his assurances twisted the knife still further by pointing out that 
quality was as important as quantity and speed, and that before the war the bulk of 
Hilger's current output would have been rejected at Glasgow. 63 
In January 1915, Barr & Stroud began to concentrate its outside orders on Taylor Hobson 
because the Leicester firm consistently worked to high enough standards and was willing 
to adopt `novel' methods in both optical and mechanical engineering to improve quality 
and output TM Jackson conceded that Leicester-made objectives were better than those 
being made, or likely to be made at Glasgow, and asked Taylor Hobson substantially to 
increase production. 65 At the same time, orders placed with other previously substantial 
suppliers began to be cancelled or not renewed. Complaints were made to both Beck and 
Watson, both of whom had earlier been given large orders for lenses, about late 
deliveries and poor quality, and ordering from both firms apparently ended by June of 
61 UGD 295/4/112, Letter Book, Jackson to Twyman 9.12.14. 
62 UGD 295/4/112, Letter Book, Jackson to Twyman 14.12.14. 
63 UGD 295/4/112, Letter Book, Jackson to Twyman 17.12.14. 
64 UGD 295/4/110, Letter Book, Jackson to Edward Taylor, 10.9.1914, records novel methods. 
6s UGD 295/4/114, Letter Book, Jackson to Taylor, Taylor Hobson, 8.1.1915. 
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19 15 66 This shifting of emphasis and reduction of dependency on a multiplicity of 
outside suppliers resulted principally from establishing an accommodation with a firm 
that was prepared to innovate to aid Barr & Stroud's output. The firm's letter books show 
that Jackson had never hesitated to complain about suppliers, so the lack of critical 
correspondence strongly supports the assumption that the working relationship with 
Taylor Hobson went well during the first half of 1915. Rather than simply complaining 
about inadequate quality, problems which arose led to collaboration in solving 
manufacturing difficulties, with both fines contributing equally to the effort67 That 
deliveries from Leicester met requirements for both speed and quality must have 
encouraged Barr & Stroud to dispense with less satisfactory suppliers, particularly if, as 
Jackson had claimed, the firm's own output was also starting to increase. 68 
The problems of achieving adequate optical production were also eased by the plateau in 
Army rangefinder orders that followed those in the autumn of 1914. Unlike the other 
optical munitions makers, Barr & Stroud's monopoly supplier status meant that it was 
not faced with tendering for a multiplicity of small contracts, and during the first six 
months of 1915 the company could organise its production (albeit not without 
difficulties) in the light of a known level of demand. As a result, its deliveries for War 
Office contracts kept largely on schedule, something that could not be said for most of 
the optical munitions industry. 69 
To increase optical output, Barr & Stroud had at first been able to employ a number of 
experienced makers who performed with varying degrees of success. Then it had 
embarked on a subcontracting exercise designed to supplement supplies without 
increasing its own burden of administration and co-ordination. When this proved 
unsuccessful the fum fostered relations with a new supplier which it helped to reach a 
position where it could replace virtually all the other subcontractors. That there was 
66 Entries in the Letter Books cease after this date, the last one being to Beck. 
67 UGD 295/4/112, Letter Book entries for early 1915. 
68 UGD295/4/118, Letter Book, Jackson to Taylor Hobson, 18.5.1915 confirming that Taylor Hobson is 
now the sole outside supplier of FT20 objective lenses, and 2.6.1915 asking for quotation for another 1,100 
similar lenses. 
69 From examination of progress details recorded in UGD 295/19/2/3 and /4, Customer Order files 1914 
and 1915, and from contract progress comments in PRO WO/745, Order and Supply List. 
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sufficient capacity in the optical industry be able to pick and choose before selecting one 
prime sub-contractor suggests that the demands being placed on the industry were 
insufficient even to occupy its capacity let alone overwhelm it, a situation that could only 
have resulted from the War Office's failure to place substantial contracts across the 
optical manufacturers. In December 1914, the Periscopic Prism Company had asked Barr 
& Stroud for more work, despite already getting business directly from Glasgow and via 
Hilger's, and was also able to take on the design of a telescopic rifle sight for the War 
Office. Aldis Brothers in Birmingham also had sufficient spare capacity to take sub- 
contract work from Hilger's and to start making telescopic rifle sights of their own 
design. 70 
4.6 Labour shortages 
Barr & Stroud's problems were by no means confined to obtaining components from 
outside suppliers. Like other manufacturers, the firm was affected by the loss of men who 
left to `join the colours' in response to the government's recruiting campaign, 
particularly those who had skills essential to the production of optical components. 71 As 
early as 13th August the Jackson warned the War Office that optical workers (who made 
up just 6 percent of the workforce) were vital to production. If they left, they could not be 
replaced in Glasgow which would seriously compromise production. 72. Even though 
some of the Territorial Army members in the workforce were called up and others 
volunteered for the Army, there was a net increase in workers from 1,200 in July to 1,400 
by late October'73 although most of them were likely to have been unskilled or semi- 
skilled. The greatest labour problem in August and September 1914 turned out to be the 
temporary loss of `all our best rangefinder adjusters', the highly skilled men who were 
`lent' to the Royal Navy in July to check the rangefinders of the fleet before it was 
dispersed to war stations 74 Three days after the declaration, Jackson flatly refused to 
70 I. Skennerton, The British Sniper (Margate, Queensland, Australia: I. D. Skennerton, 1984) pp. 41 and 
47. 
" Moss & Russell (1988 p. 73. 
72 UGD 295 Unclassified, Russell research notes, Barr & Stroud Letter book Vol. 99, and UGD 295/4/625, 
Letter Book, Jackson to Ministry of Munitions, 20.7.1915. 
" UGD 295/4/11, Letter Book, Jackson to Glasgow Tramways, 28.10.1914. 
74 UGD 295/4/7, Letter Book, Jackson to Director of Naval Construction, 7.8.1914. 
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provide any more of them, asked for the speediest return of those in English ports, and 
warned that Admiralty deliveries would be `impossible' unless his request was met. 
The loss of skilled labour in the munitions industry and its subsequent replacement has 
been discussed by R. J. Q. Adams, particularly the efforts in 1914 and 1915 to employ 
skilled Belgian mechanics who had been displaced by the German invasion. 75 In mid- 
December 1914, Barr & Stroud told the Board of Trade that although extra workers were 
urgently needed in all departments, it declined to take any of the `skilled' Belgian 
workers which the Board had offered to provide. 6 The reason given was that the 
Admiralty had forbidden the employment of foreign workers in the factory, but this was 
a half-truth; what the Admiralty insisted on was that no foreign workers were allowed 
into the area where its contracts were being worked on. There was no reason why such 
workers could not have been employed elsewhere, and in fact Japanese naval personnel 
`workers' were already present in the factory taking part in the assembly of rangefinders 
for the Imperial Navy. 77 Presumably the shortage was not critical if the company could 
afford to turn away skilled mechanical engineers. The complaint about a shortage of 
workers may have been a pro-active device intended as a hedge against the possibility of 
future difficulties rather than an immediate problem. What Jackson wanted was to keep 
men who were skilled in Barr & Stroud's methods, not to have to train and integrate 
foreign workers. His dealings with Hilger's illustrate a pronounced willingness to 
emphasise or deliberately exaggerate the severity of a problem in order to obtain a result 
beneficial to the company. 
4.7 Barr & Stroud and Anglo-French friction 
The first year of war produced other problems that were unique to Barr & Stroud. Before 
the war, the firm, regarded the Admiralty as its most important client, not necessarily 
because the Admiralty was always the largest spender, but because the Royal Navy had 
come to involve the company regularly in its requirements for rangefinders and tended to 
influence other navies by its adoption of new equipment. Where the Royal Navy went, 
'S Adams (1978) Chapter 7. 
76 UGD 295 unclassified, Barr & Stroud Letter book Vol. 103,16.12.1914. 
77 UGD 295 unclassified, Russell research notes: this cites Barr & Stroud Letter Book 110,31.10.1914. 
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others tended to follow and for Barr & Stroud the cachet of being the Navy's sole 
rangefinder supplier was invaluable. When European armies began to buy smaller, man- 
portable rangefinders in growing quantities, Barr & Stroud developed another kind of 
relationship with the French Army as it became by far the largest client for them. This 
differed from that with the Royal Navy in being principally one of supplier and client 
rather than the more complex and symbiotic one of design and production interaction that 
existed with the Admiralty. Nevertheless, Barr & Stroud developed a sense of 
responsibility towards its French client, because as with the Royal Navy there was the 
benefit of endorsement, besides the considerable income from French government 
business. The Admiralty had always recognised Barr & Stroud's need for overseas 
customers, allowing the company to balance its domestic and foreign commitments and 
obligations. The outbreak of war and the ascendancy of the War Office as a new major 
client had a significant effect on these arrangements and eventually came close to 
compromising Barr & Stroud's relationship with its French patron. 
The possibility of conflicts of interest over new government business and existing private 
contracts between munitions suppliers and their customers became a matter of concern 
soon after the war began. The Board of Trade feared that firms might not give absolute 
priority to government orders when they already had existing orders to meet, as doing so 
might place them in breach of contract under civil law. 78 The Defence of the Realm Act 
already gave the Admiralty and the Army Council powers to take over part or all of the 
output of `any factory or workshop in which arms, ammunition, or warlike stores' were 
produced, or even to take possession of the premises themselves. 79 Rangefinders were 
`warlike stores' and at the outbreak of war almost all those still in Barr & Stroud's 
factory had been claimed by the Admiralty and the War Office. The only exceptions 
were French orders, for which the firm had already negotiated with the Admiralty what 
amounted to an immunity. By December though, the War Office had told Barr & Stroud 
to limit French deliveries to no more than fifteen per week, causing an embarrassed Barr 
& Stroud to explain to the French Military Attache that supplies would be delayed by 
79 OH Vol. I, Part II, pp. 58,59. 
79 OH Vol. I, Part II, p. 59. 
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several months and depended entirely on the permission of the War Office. 0 This 
interference with foreign business was a matter of concern to the company, not just 
because of its perception of responsibility to the French, but because of the overall 
importance of its foreign trade. 
The firm's frustrations over such restrictions were evident in Jackson's letter of January 
4th to the Secretary of the War Office. 81 Jackson pointed out that although `The whole of 
our output is at the disposal of the British Government' the War Office had actually 
failed to take all the rangefinders it had been offered. Those not taken were still in the 
factory, but they could not be sold elsewhere despite the firm still having uncompleted 
and urgent orders (for identical instruments) for Greece and France. Jackson complained 
of the ambiguity of War Office instructions which, if taken at face value, meant that no 
foreign orders at all could be dealt with until every British contract had been completely 
filled. He followed this with a second letter concerning a request from the United States 
Army to quote for rangefinders, which he had been forced under the War Office's 
instructions, to decline. 2 With ill-disguised spleen, Jackson stressed that it had taken 
`several years of trials' to get so far, and as a result `The order for these instruments will 
probably be placed with an American fine [Bausch & Lomb] who are agents for a 
German firm [Zeiss] to the detriment of the British trade'. Having got the bit between his 
teeth, he wrote again the following day about a new Russian naval enquiry for 32 large 
rangefinders which, he complained, Barr & Stroud would not be able to accept because 
of the War Office policy, despite the fact that it `would not affect the production of small 
rangefinders for the War Office'. None of these letters had any effect on the War Office; 
the rangefinders earmarked for Greece remained in store until 1918, and the embargo on 
foreign business continued in force, even after the Ministry of Munitions was created. 83 
so UGD 295/4/110, Letter Book, Jackson to French Military Attache, 1.12.1914. 
81 UGD 295/4/110, Letter Book, Jackson to Secretary, War Office, 2.1.1915. 
82 UGD 295/4/110, Letter Book, Jackson to Secretary, War Office, 4.1.1915. 
83 For deliveries to Greece, see UGD 295/19/2/3, Customer Order files 1913-1915, and for prohibition of 
exports see PRO BT/55/23, Evidence to Engineering Industries Committee of Enquiry, evidence of 
Archibald Barr, 20.10.1916 and 16.11.1916. 
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4.8 Conclusion 
The first nine months of the war saw the optical munitions industry make a by no means 
uniformly successful transition from peace to war. It was beset by problems that were 
rooted in the context of a war for which planning was virtually non-existent and had to 
cope simultaneously with technical, political, economic and social problems that truly 
made up the `plethora of variables' in which the industry's artefacts had to be made and 
placed. 84 In this stage the industry functioned as a number of un-coordinated and 
disparate units, a collection of small communities that were rather pushed apart rather 
than drawn together by the pressures of war. 
This period, unlike elsewhere in the industry, went relatively smoothly for Barr & Stroud 
and the process of industrial mobilisation was more successful than elsewhere in the 
optical munitions community. In a sense, the business was already mobilised because 
unlike every other business, all it made was optically-based systems for warfare and the 
lack of civil products meant that the conversion to war conditions was simpler than for 
anyone else in the optical industry. The most noticeable change at Glasgow was the 
disappearance of almost all the foreign clients and their replacement by the War Office 
rather than, as happened with much of the rest of the optical industry, the phasing-out of 
civil markets and products and their replacement by a State client whose requirements 
were inadequately formulated for products that were often unfamiliar, and whose 
procurement system entirely unfamiliar to those having to deal with it. The rest of the 
optical industry, or at least the part of it for which records are available, fared less well 
than Barr & Stroud, irrespective of the external factors bearing on it. As a result, the 
output of optical munitions other than rangefinders was, by the spring of 1915, far less 
than needed. In this, the optical sector was no worse than, say, small-arms or artillery 
shells, and the same remedy proposed for them by the government would be applied to 
instrument manufacture. 85 The creation of the Ministry of Munitions in May 1915 was to 
influence the optical trades significantly, and the next chapter examines the mechanisms 
" J. Law, `Technology and Heterogenous Engineering: The Case of Portuguese Expansion', in Bijker et al. 
112. P; 
For the difficulties of small arms manufacture, see OH Vol. XI, Part 4. 
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by which a large-scale and largely effective optical munitions industry was constructed 
out of an existing infrastructure that at first seemed reluctant to make the transition. 
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Chapter 5 
Industrial Mobilisation - The Ministry of Munitions and its creation of 
an image for the industry 
5.1: Introduction 
The second stage of the optical munitions industry's war was one of industrial 
mobilisation, and is inextricably interwoven with the policies and attitudes of the 
Ministry of Munitions towards it. The creation of that Ministry in the late Spring of 1915, 
and in particular the setting up a department dedicated to optical output, was responsible 
for increasing both the volume and diversity of production between then and the end of 
the Great War in 1918, and so bringing into being what can be best described as a 
`conscript' optical munitions industry that submerged the identity of what existed during 
the first ten months of war. The story of this mobilisation is complicated by the existence 
of parallel aims for both short and long-term change within the Ministry's Optical 
Munitions and Glassware Department (OMGD) that simultaneously looked back at the 
pre-war optical instruments industry and forward to a new, reconstructed post-war one 
that would replace both the old and the temporary conscript one that the OMGD was 
required to create. These `socially constructed' aims were sometimes in conflict with 
each other, and struggled to find expression within a framework of problems that were 
essentially technical in character, being grounded in shortages of materiel and what may 
be called a technological infrastructure. The account of how these dimensions were 
managed, as left by the OMGD, has been responsible for colouring later perceptions of 
both pre-1915 optical manufacturing in Britain and the effectiveness of war-time 
measures. This account of mobilisation in this and following chapter therefore looks as 
closely, or even more so, into the motives and actions of the OMGD as into those of the 
industry itself in order to account for the process of mobilisation. It is here that the 
process of the creation of a `system' of optical munitions production is better explained 
through the ideas of Thomas Hughes, which were introduced earlier in the story, than 
through other models of explanation for the development of technology. 
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5.2 Agendas and attitudes 
The creation of the Optical Munitions and Glassware Department marked the start of an 
expansion in output as well as a considerable transformation in the industry. According 
to the Department's own records and its printed account in the Ministry's official 
History, this constituted a major achievement which contributed greatly to the war effort 
and was attained in the face of problems within the industry that had been brought 
forward from peacetime. Although acknowledging the efforts made by almost all the 
companies it was involved with, the History made the point that most - if not all - the 
improvements could not have come about without OMGD's initiatives. This has been 
accepted by later writers, particularly by Roy and Kay MacLeod, and Mari Williams, 
who concluded that the industry was indeed generally inadequate in education, training, 
organisation and equipment in early 1915.1 Some of this is true, but the deficiencies did 
not all apply across the whole of the industry, and parts of it had as much to teach 
OMGD as the department had to tell them. The story of optical munitions manufacture 
after mid-1915 is really of a demand-led and conscripted industry that benefited 
principally from the co-ordination and allocation of resources provided by the Ministry 
of Munitions, rather than being transmogrified through the direct action of the Optical 
Munitions and Glass Department. 
Even allowing for partiality in the official History there is no doubt that the Ministry's 
optical section acquired a chaotic and thoroughly unsatisfactory procurement structure, 
whose origins have been considered in chapter S. The severity of the problems was 
considered to be so great that delivery prospects for optical items were then `more 
unsatisfactory than in any other class of munitions' and the entire optical manufacturing 
industry was `in a critical position'. The condensed version of subsequent events in the 
official History gives little sense of the difficulties that were encountered. 
' R. & K. MacLeod, "Government and the Optical Industry in Britain 1914-1918" in War and Economic 
Development, edited by J. M. Winter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977) p. 165 ff; M. E. W. 
Williams, The Precision Makers: A History of the Instruments Industry in Britain and France, 1870-1939. 
(London: Routledge, 1994). 
2 PRO BT 66/2IMMW 11, Col. Wedgwood to Mr Booth CMG/5315,20.8.1915, and Great Britain, Ministry 
of Munitions, History of the Ministry of Munitions (subsequently OH), 12 vols. (London: HMSO, 1922), 
Vol. XI `The Supply of Munitions', Part 3 Optical Munitions and Glassware, p. 1. 
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5.3 The influence and policies of Frederick Cheshire. 
One of OMGD's first personnel was Frederick Cheshire (1860-1939) who was recruited 
by the Ministry from the Patents Office initially as `an expert on optical questions'. 
When the Optical Munitions and Glassware Department was formally established he was 
appointed as its joint head with particular responsibility for what the official historian 
coyly described as the `technical side' of its operations. According to the official History 
he had `an extensive knowledge of the [optical] trade and of the difficulties under which 
it worked', but this description hardly did him justice. Professor Cheshire had entered the 
civil service in 1880, joined the Government Laboratory in 1882 and then transferred to 
the Patent Office in 1885 where he rose to become Examiner of Patents, the senior post 
which he held on joining the Ministry. He was also lecturer in physics at Birkbeck 
College, London, a position he took in 1895 and still occupied in 1915, by which time he 
was an Associate of the Royal College of Science and a Fellow of the Institute of 
Physics. Cheshire's work at the Patent Office had placed him in a privileged position to 
keep abreast of optical developments. He saw all the specifications received from British 
and foreign applicants, as well as the British ones suppressed from public view relating 
to military and naval applications of optics which the State wished to conceal in order to 
maintain secrecy. s In 1913 he had delivered the Royal Photographic Society's annual 
Traill Taylor Memorial Lecture on the subject of rangefmding instruments and its text 
was subsequently published as The Modern Rangefinder, one of the very few works on 
the subject in the English language. 6 Cheshire was better placed than almost anyone else 
in Britain to know the current state of optical instrumentation for warfare, and his 
appointment allowed him to exert a profound influence in the way energy was directed 
towards British optical manufacture during the war. He become the driving force in the 
optical department's efforts to reconstruct technical education and training in the 
industry, working towards achieving what he saw as essential changes in its constitution 
and performance. 
3 OH Vol. 11, p. 1 to 7 provides source material for the rest of this section, unless otherwise indicated. 
4 Who Was Who 1929-1940 (London: A. and C. Black, 1941). 
S For secret patents, see T. H. ODell, Inventions and Official Secrecy; a History of Secret Patents in the 
United Kingdom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), especially chapters 4 and 5. 
6 F. J. Cheshire, The Modern Rangefinder (London: Harrison & Sons, 1916). 
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His involvement with optics was not confined to Britain. He had long established 
connections with the influential German optical instrument firm of Carl Zeiss at Jena. In 
1902 he had co-translated Felix Auerbach's history of Zeiss and the neighbouring optical 
glass manufacturer Schott & Genossen which was effectively its subsidiary.? The Zeiss 
Works drew attention not only to the size and diverse manufacturing programmes of the 
two companies, but also to their emphasis on scientific training and investment in 
technology. It was the first widely available detailed account in English of German 
optical engineering practice and appeared at a time when concerns over the condition of 
British `opto-technics' were beginning to be voiced in England. 8 The book revealed the 
extent and variety of the firm's activities, giving details of staff and workers as well as its 
output and turnover, showing that no single British instrument maker was comparable in 
size, diversity or scale of trading. Auerbach was not a Zeiss employee but a close friend 
of Ernst Abbe, the principal motivating force behind Carl Zeiss, 9 and the book was meant 
to be a statement of Abbe's business philosophy and its translation into practice. To 
many, it emphasised the differences between German and British optical manufacturing, 
although in fact Zeiss was by no means typical of German (or any other) instrument 
makers, particularly in scale and the extent of its vertical integration. That Cheshire was 
greatly impressed by Zeiss is certain; he referred to his `Jena friends' in a foreword to a 
subsequent printing of The Zeiss Works and freely acknowledged their pre-eminent 
importance in the fields of technical optics and instrument manufacture. 
Cheshire's high opinion of Zeiss was echoed by many in Britain who had come to see 
German optical firms and their methods as inherently superior. This sense of inferiority 
was not new in 1915. There had been unease amongst the optical instrument makers for 
over a decade that German companies were taking an increasingly large share of the 
United Kingdom's optical market. 10 Matters reached a head in 1911 when the London 
County Council's Education Committee, under sustained pressure from members of the 
' Felix Auerbach, The Zeiss Works Trans from 2°d German Edition by S. F. Paul and F. J. Cheshire 
(Marshall, Brookes and Chalkey, London, 1902) 
8Sylvanus P. Thompson, "Opto-Technics. " Journal of the Royal Society of Arts (1902), pp. 518-27. 9 Personal communication from Dr Wolfgang Zimmer, Archive der Carl Zeiss Jena GmbH, 12.11.2004. 
1° See K&K. MacLeod (1977) pp. 169 and 170. 
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largely London-based optical industry, held an enquiry into the need for organised 
scientific training in technical optics. " This concluded that the establishment of an 
institute for training on the lines of the German system would be highly beneficial, but 
no funding was forthcoming either locally or nationally, let alone from the industry itself, 
so the matter was left in abeyance. The problems of munitions supply that led to the 
creation of the Ministry of Munitions gave those subsequently involved in the production 
of military optics an unprecedented opportunity to remedy what they saw as crucial 
shortcomings in the whole of the British optical industry. 
The remedial process began almost immediately after the OMGD was created. At the 
start of August `the whole trade was in a critical position' regarding deliveries. 12 Because 
of this, the War Office Contracts Department `was quite unable to meet the [Army's] 
demands for optical munitions' and the optical section had to deal with `the shortage of 
optical instruments'. The official historian was re-iterating what subsequently became 
OMGD orthodoxy, that the lack stemmed from inadequate output, and was a production 
rather than a procurement problem. Shortages resulted from a lack of organisation in the 
manufacturing industry, inadequate technical equipment, and a scarcity of raw materials. 
To make matters even worse, there was a lack of working capital which had not been 
properly addressed by the War Office Contracts Department in the preceding months. 
The situation was, by this account, at the least problematical. In Cheshire's privately 
expressed opinion it was even worse. 
On August 13th he wrote to his immediate military superior, Colonel Wedgwood, 
summarising the severity of the difficulties the optical branch faced. 13 It did not make 
good reading. Cheshire began by saying that `for many years before the war broke out, 
the optical [instruments] trade in England was a dying one. He went on to say that very 
few of the makers were paying dividends and in his opinion `it would be surprising to 
London Metropolitan Archives, LCC/MIN/2967/1911 "Report of the Education Committee of the 
London County Council: Proposed Establishment of a Technical Institute for Optics, March Ist 1911. " 
(subsequently LCC Report) London, 1911. 
12 OH Vol. XI, Part 3, p. 1 supplies this and the following quotations. "PRO MUN 4/55, Control of Optical Firms 1915-1916, Cheshire to Col. Wedgwood, War Office: 
13.8.1915 provides the source material for the rest of this section. 
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learn that a single one ... was in a satisfactory and prosperous condition'. When the war 
began, the trade was in no condition to meet the demands suddenly made on it. By 
August 1915 output was only half of current needs, and his prognosis was that supplies 
would fall further behind as demands continued to grow from the Army's expansion and 
battlefield attrition. What Wedgwood received was a discouraging picture of a moribund 
industry in desperate need of assistance. 
Cheshire must have known that his description of the pre-war optical trade did not 
accord with reality. His assertion that only `a few firms had been more less kept alive' 
was, to say the least, misleading. Leaving aside the firms already involved in optical 
munitions manufacture in 1914 mentioned in the preceding chapter, there were at least 
fifteen more optical instrument makers who were very much in business producing 
optical instruments. 14 Whatever his reasons for writing in such a vein, that it was no 
temporary aberration is shown by a later draft report written on the progress made up to 
October 1917.15 This said that when the war began the country had been in a `deplorable 
condition' regarding its ability to produce optical munitions on a large scale, and that the 
machinery employed within the optical trade was inadequate and antiquated. Warming to 
its theme, it went to say that `The workshops were shanties' and the trade as whole - in 
the opinion of `many men in a position to judge, "already dead and damned" '. 16 Given 
Cheshire's experience and knowledge, such remarks must raise the question of motive. 
Why should he project such a misleading image in the first place, and why maintain it 
two years later ? 
His concerns for the industry in 1915 were genuine, grounded on the fear that optical 
manufacturing in Britain would sooner, rather than later, be completely outclassed by 
Germany. With the exception of Barr & Stroud, all the peace time optical munitions 
makers had relied on their civil trade to provide part, if not most, of their incomes. 
Cheshire realised their commercial trade was vital and that if in the future it became 
14 Extracted from R. G. W. Anderson, J. Burnett and B. Gee, Handlist of Scientific-Instrument Makers' 
Trade Catalogues 1600-1914 (Edinburgh: National Museums of Scotland, 1990). 
PRO MUN 4/55 Draft Report 19.10.1917 
16 The draft gives no indication of who were those `in a position to judge'. 
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unprofitable, there would be large-scale failure in the optical industry eliminating much 
or possibly all of the capacity to manufacture for the nation's defence. The 1911 LCC 
Report had highlighted apparently serious flaws in the structure of the British optical 
industry, the strongest evidence for which was that the country was a net importer of 
optical instruments. 17 That conclusion was derived from data published the in Annual 
Statement of the Trade of the United Kingdom up to 1909, but was not in fact properly 
justified. 18 The Report recognised that the classification providing the data - `Scientific 
Instruments and Apparatus other than Electrical' - lumped together optical instruments 
with other items, such as photographic film and printing-paper, which made it difficult to 
identify the size of the optical component. Despite that problem, the Report's authors 
were content to assume that because the whole category was in deficit (£157,000 in 
1909) then so must be optical goods. In 1910, however, Customs and Excise separated 
out all the sensitised and related photographic materials, leaving in the category 
telescopes of all kinds, photographic cameras and their lenses, microscopes and 
ophthalmic apparatus, lenses and prisms for scientific instruments, and survey 
instruments. 19 This re-arrangement caused a wholly different picture to emerge, although 
no attention was subsequently drawn to it, least of all by Cheshire, for whom it would 
have weakened the case for reform in the industry. 
Table 6.1: Balance of Trade of Scientific Instruments, 1911-1914: 20 
Year Imports Exports Surplus 
1911 555,106 713,328 158,222 
1912 645,379 707,061 61,682 
1913 710,341 767,402 57,061 
1914 471,525 646,493 174,968 
" LCC Report, p. 11. 
'$ Great Britain, Government, Customs & Excise Department; Annual Statement of the Trade of the United 
Kingdom with Foreign Countries and British Possessions (HMSO, London, published annually). 
Subsequently Annual Statement. 
19 These corresponded to the categories identified in the 1907 Census of Production (London: HMSO, 
1909) except for spectacle lenses which the Annual Statement recorded under a separate heading. "Extracted from Annual Statement, 1911 to 1914. 
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Even though this showed a declining trend up to 1913, the optical trade in toto was 
clearly in a far from a terminal condition using the yardstick of overseas trade. The 
underlying condition was really one of relative rather than absolute decline, a condition 
also identified in other industries. 21 Although imports were rising, so were exports and 
the level of domestic optical production was increasing, even without taking into account 
the figures for naval and military rangefinders which, as `munitions of war', were treated 
separately in the Statement. 22 With them, the recorded surplus would have been even 
larger. Taking into account the War Office's imports of all types of optical munitions, 
and Barr & Stroud's export orders for rangefinders, then an even stronger position 
appears: 
Table 6.2: Balance of Trade of Scientific Instruments plus Optical Munitions, 1911- 
1914: 23 
Year Civil 
surplus 
Rangefinder 
exports 
War Office 
Imports 
Total 
1911 158,222 50,241 -7,428 201,035 
1912 61,682 160,768 -10,579 211,871 
1913 57,061 185,330 -4,631 237,760 
1914 174,968 114,057 nil 289,025 
These figures also indicate the size of optical munitions exports relative to those of the 
whole optical instruments industry. In 1912 they accounted for 22.7 percent of the total, 
and 24.2 percent in 1913 before the declaration of war disturbed trading patterns and 
curtailed exports of optical munitions. 
21 D. Edgerton, Science, Technology and the British Industrial Decline' 1870-1970 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996) pp. 3-5 discusses the idea of relative decline and its significance. 
22 Although exactly where they were buried is impossible to locate. 
11 Extracted from Annual Statement, 1911 to 1914, and PRO WO 395/3, Annual Reports of the Director of 
Army Contracts 1911 to 1914, and UGD 295/ 19/2/2 and /3, Customer order files, 1911 to 1914. 
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But Cheshire was not concerned in June 1915 to point out hidden strengths in the greater 
optical industry, rather he wanted to highlight and rectify the weaknesses in finance, 
scientific education and training, and the slow adaptation of modem technologies that 
might compromise the output of now urgently needed optical munitions. To go about 
this, he deliberately built on the existing idea that the optical industry was inadequate to 
the task it now faced. Whether or not that notion was entirely justified, the scale of the 
immediate problem demanded some sort of planned solution that would quickly 
ameliorate the difficult situation he had to manage. What Cheshire faced was the 
simultaneous need for a `quick-fix' to overcome what was represented as a critical 
situation, as well as long term measures to lift the industry out of the circumstances that 
were represented as having brought about the predicament. His confidence in being able 
to tackle the problem is shown by the speed with which he defined the optical section's 
role. By the time he first wrote to Wedgwood he had already identified its intent as 
falling under five headings: 24 
1. to provide financial aid where necessary 
2. to supply expert technical advice 
3. to expedite deliveries of raw materials and components 
4. to provide trained labour 
5. to set up research centres `to set the trade on a sound basis' 
The first three might be implemented quickly, but the fourth and fifth would certainly 
require more time to bring about. The aim of setting up research centres was in harmony 
with the long term goal of the progressives in the industry since 1902, which was to 
25 provide advanced scientific training and establish systematic technological research. 
There were major problems to be addressed before the OMGD could begin to build a 
coherent and efficient optical munitions industry out of the chaotic conditions in the 
summer of 1915. Firstly, those firms already involved in military production lacked any 
real motivation to increase output because of previous War Office contracting policies. 
Then, making matters worse, many businesses felt threatened by the prospect of control 
24 OH Vol. XI, Part 3, p. 1. 
25 Sylvanus P. Thompson, "Opto-Technics. " Journal of the Royal Society of Arts (1902): 518-27; "The 
Proposed Establishment of an Institute of Technical Optics. " 31-34. London: British Science Guild, 1914. 
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under the Munitions of War Act which been passed on 2d July. Besides the question of 
corporate morale there was a shortage of machine tooling and skilled labour, as well as a 
critical lack of optical glass. And finally there was no trade organisation within the 
optical industry that might facilitate co-ordination between its constituents. Despite the 
sweeping powers conferred on the Ministry, and Cheshire's optimism, the OMGD 
frequently found it hard to bring about the influences on the industry it regarded as 
essential. 
5.4: Immediate measures and the role of Alfred Esslemont 
To apply Cheshire's five-point action plan, the OMGD was divided into technical and 
administrative sections. Although previous writers have concentrated on the efforts and 
achievements of Frederick Cheshire's technical section, so far as the contemporary 
industry was concerned the head of the administrative side had a more immediately 
important role to play. Little is known about the background of Alfred Esslemont (d. 14`h 
September 1918), beyond his being a Fellow of the Optical Society-, 26 the official History 
gives no details of his earlier career (beyond telling us that he came from the `North 
East') and he is absent from any edition of Who's Who. His post in the Ministry suggests 
he was engaged for his combination of organisational abilities and technical knowledge, 
and throughout his work with the OMGD he was constantly engaged in liaison with both 
the instruments and glass industries, becoming a Director of the Department in 1917. 
Esslemont not only had to create a departmental structure that could bring some sort of 
order from the chaos of 1914 and early 1915, he also had to persuade the trade to adopt 
new working methods and to accept the subsequent imposition of the State's war-time 
controls. The administrative side of the OMGD extended far beyond keeping records and 
allocating contracts, overlapping Cheshire's remit and spreading into technical matters 
including instrument and machine-tool design it came to embrace a diplomatic role 
between industry and the State. The administrative section under Esslemont was vital to 
the success of the industry from 1915 until his premature death in 1918. 
26 Transactions of the Optical Society, Vol. XX (May 1919), obituary notice. 
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Esslemont began by motivating the existing War Office contractors to increase their 
output, and in June he called them together to address `the dangerous condition of 
affairs'. 27 According to the OMGD, the previous dealings of the War Office Contracts 
Department with the trade had created a `most paralysing effect' on it, and firms had 
generally become `dissatisfied' with government contracting, acquiring a `strong distrust' 
for the methods used in placing orders. Their chief complaint was that no company ever 
received an order large enough to justify tooling-up for quantity production, with 
contracts for small numbers of instruments being scattered amongst a number of firms. 28 
In short, they found it hard to make money working for the War Office. Its ordering 
policy, founded on considerations of peace-time fiscal probity and perpetuated by 
institutional inertia, had created a delivery situation that was unsatisfactory for everyone. 
Esslemont managed to re-assure the manufacturers that under the OMGD's umbrella, 
they would now be `as fairly dealt with as possible under the circumstances' with regard 
to the distribution of orders. A subsequent series of `personal interviews' with individual 
companies, along with the offer of some financial assistance were, perhaps 
optimistically, thought to be enough to ensure that `a maximum of effort' would now be 
made, and as evidence of this the OMGD noted in late July that some makers were 
`expending considerable sums on their own initiative, and output began to increase `by 
leaps and bounds' according to the later words of the Department 29 The department's 
own recording system, did indeed register a substantial increase during late 1915, but as 
not infrequently happened with the OMGD matters were not quite all they appeared to 
be. 
27 PRO MUN 4/5006, Weekly Reports about Supply, Design and Production, Box 1, June 1917 provides 
the source for the rest of this section, unless otherwise noted. 28 See Chapter 5 above for War Office policy on placing contracts. 
29 PRO MUN 4/55, DDGC to DGMS, 27.7.1915. 
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Figure 6.1: Monthly Optical Munitions output on War Office contracts, May 1915 to July 
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The OMGD's figures call for some comment. July's output, before the department could 
have had any effect, was £9,186 for all contractors employed on War Office business. By 
October that had risen to £16,588 - an increase of almost 81 percent on July. This may 
have looked encouraging as a percentage, but as a proportion of the industry's total 
capacity it was miniscule. Gross exports alone of civil `scientific instruments' in 1913 
had been E767,402. October's output equalled an annual total of scarcely £200,000, 
which is so greatly removed from 1913's levels that the OMGD's figures need treating 
with some circumspection. It is unlikely that commercial production still accounted for 
the largest part of output because the Defence of the Realm (Amendment Act) had 
already empowered the Admiralty and the War Office to obtain precedence for their 
orders by requiring makers to put aside other work , 
31 and by mid- 1915 it is doubtful if 
any makers had not been affected by the changed circumstances of the war. A more 
likely explanation for the low figures is that they referred to acceptances after inspection 
at Woolwich Arsenal, a process which continually created back-logs; only then were 
invoices passed for payment and recorded by the OMGD. Another possibility, and one 
'o PRO BT66/6/MMW46, Optical Munitions and Glassware Branch, Financial Turnover for Optical 
Munitions. There were no figures recorded in August 1915. 
" PRO MUN 7/78, Instructions to Contractors, 13.5.1915, reminded suppliers of this obligation. 
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that best fitted Cheshire's agenda, was that the industry was simply incapable of doing 
any better without substantial assistance. 
However, Esslemont's reports of his June meetings indicated that problems in War 
Office procurement procedures had been as much to blame as any structural failings in 
the industry, and one way Esslemont proposed to re-assure the trade was making the 
distribution of contracts a matter for the OMGD itself. 32 Dealing with an agency whose 
managers understood their problems was doubtless a vast improvement for the makers, 
but the OMGD had to argue strongly to justify this departure from what was intended to 
be standard Ministry practice. Cheshire and Esslemont asserted that optical munitions 
orders were more complex than others dealt with by the Ministry and were `enormously 
complicated' by shortages and changes to specifications. Almost every one required 
`detailed and expert knowledge' by the staff responsible for its placement and subsequent 
oversight 33 The suggestion was that the optical industry was so specialised that only 
dedicated technically competent staff within the Ministry were properly able to manage 
dealings with it. This was not entirely accurate, but Cheshire and Esslemont had quickly 
produced an image of failure and chaos that let them employ an argument that was 
actually intended to let them manage the nascent optical munitions industry and control 
its development so as to maximise the benefits the optical instruments industry would 
derive from the expansion in war-time business. Their lobbying succeeded, and for the 
rest of the war the OMGD continued, uniquely, to operate its contracts directly with the 
trade. 
A substantial part of Esslemont's success in gaining assurances of co-operation from the 
makers resulted from assuring them that orders would now be placed on a large scale and 
for a considerable length of time. The acceptance of the notion that the war would be 
measured in years and the accompanying necessity to ensure a continual and large-scale 
supply of munitions had together been responsible for the creation of the Ministry of 
Munitions for which Esslemont now acted as principal negotiator with the optical 
32 OH Vol. XI, Part 3, p. 2 
33 PRO MUN 7/96, Wedgwood to DGMS, 23.3.1916. Cited by R. & K. MacLeod (1977) p. 176 
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producers. The Ministry's powers to direct and control industry were vested in the 
Munitions of War Act which came into force on 2"d July 1915 and, although the 
legislation gave Esslemont considerable powers to assist the optical industry, some of its 
provisions quickly created considerable unease amongst the so-recently mollified 
manufacturers and led to friction between the OMGD and its political masters at the 
ministry. - 
5.5 Control and Profits 
Industry had been subject to controls even before the Munitions Act was passed. In 
March 1915, the Defence of the Realm (Amendment) Act allowed the armed services to 
require manufacturers `to give precedence to the completion of all orders and contracts' 
for government work, to ensure that neither commercial nor foreign government business 
obstructed production for the State. 4 The new `Regulation 30A' prohibited `all dealing 
in optical instruments which are of service to the Admiralty and War Office ... except 
under special permit'. S This was intended to, and in the opinion of the OMGD actually 
did, bring about `the extinction of private work' in the optical trade. 36 This may have 
been so; even before the 1915 amendment, Barr & Stroud had told the London 
instrument makers Negretti & Zambra it could longer sell to individual army officers, 
and informed Dollond & Co. that it would be `many months' before there could be any 
hope of supplying any non-government clients. 37 These constraints may have been 
irksome, but they were nothing compared to those embodied in the Munitions Act. 
Its broad purpose was to further `the efficient manufacture ... and supply of munitions 
for the present war', by imposing a body of regulation on both employers and workers. 38 
For the optical munitions industry there were serious implications in the creation of what 
"PRO MUN 7/78, Instructions to Contractors, 13.5.1915. 
's PROBT 66/61MMW47, `Government Control of Industry. Report on the manner in which direct control 
is exercised'. 1918. 
31 OH. Vol. III, Part 3, p. 35. 
" UGD 295/4/111, Letter Book, Jackson to Negretti & Zambra 13.10.1914; UGD 295/4/112, Letter Book, 
Jackson to Dollond, 27.11.1914. 
33 OH, Vol. I, Part 4, p. 1, provides the quotation; for further background information and detail on the Act, 
see OH Vol. I, Part N, Chapter I; OH Vol. III, Part 3, Chapter II; R. J. Q. Adams, Arms and the Wizard. ' 
Lloyd George and the Ministry of Munitions, 1915-1916 (Texas A&M University Press, College Station, 
Texas and Cassell, London, 1978), Chapters 4,5,6 and 7. 
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was to be known as the `controlled establishment' and the attendant regulation of profits. 
Broadly speaking, the Act sought to remove restrictive practices on the part of labour and 
as a quid pro quo to limit the profits employers might make from war work. The 
legislation gave the Minister of Munitions the power to declare as a `controlled 
establishment' any business engaged on munitions production and whose output was 
considered as essential for `the successful prosecution of the war', 
39 so that any business 
involved in optical contracting for the Services was likely to be placed under Ministry 
control. The limitations on profits were seen by both Cheshire and Esslemont as an 
obstacle to improvements in the industry and they attempted to insulate it from direct 
control in much the same way that they had done with contracts. 
Control under the Act `did not involve any interference ... with the management of the 
firm'. Rather, it `relieved the establishment of the restraints imposed by trade union 
restrictions' although `on the other hand' it did very much restrict the profits to be gained 
from government contracting. 40 It was that issue that most worried the optical makers 
who, having just been assured that they might expect a large volume of business for 
some considerable time, now faced the prospect of having their future earnings greatly 
diminished. The Act did not prohibit, or even restrict, the making of profits; instead it 
incorporated a formula restricting the amount of profit that a business could retain. A 
`standard amount of profit' for a firm was to be determined by averaging its pre-tax 
profits for its last two financial years before August 1914. All but 20 percent of profits in 
excess of that went to the Treasury, the remainder being taxed at the same rate as the 
`standard profit'. Although this was seen as politically essential to maintain the co- 
operation of the trades unions, it was a disincentive for businesses to maximise output, 
particularly where increased investment was needed to handle enlarged volumes of war 
work. Both Acts also demanded that contractors did not hinder production in any way, 
which meant that a firm coming under control stood to be locked-in to meeting the 
Ministry's demands at levels of profit that were significantly restrained. 
" OH Vol. III, Part 4, p. 17. 
40 OH Vol. III, Part 3, p. 31 ff provides the source material for the rest of this section. 
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What made matters worse for the optical trade was that - according to Cheshire - its 
profits before the war had been far from good. 41 In mid-August he told the Ministry that 
very few companies had been paying dividends at all and `indeed, it would be surprising 
to learn that a single one of these important firms was in a satisfactory and prosperous 
condition'. In his opinion, the placing of existing contractors under control would 
disadvantage them financially compared to firms left outside. Esslemont echoed this 
sentiment, which had already been expressed by some of the optical companies, adding 
that attempts to increase output depended largely on their `goodwill' and so it was 
important `to take notice of their points of view' if co-operation was to be maintained. 
However, despite the firmness of Cheshire's assertions, the accuracy of his profit 
assessments is open to doubt. 
Few financial records survive for the firms Cheshire was writing about, but four of them 
have left figures that allow some evaluation of his comments. Barr & Stroud's audited 
accounts show pre-tax profits for 1912 and 1913 as £32,555 and £59,530 respectively, on 
turnovers of £126,593 and £188,007, which gives net margins of 25.7 percent and 31.7 
percent, representing returns of 16.3 percent and 29.8 percent on the share capital 
employed and hardly those of an ailing company. For Thomas Cooke & Sons Ltd, entries 
in the Directors' Minute Book for the same years give profits of £7,287 and £7,899, with 
dividends of £2,615 and £5,545 to be paid from them. Taylor, Taylor & Hobson's 
Minute Book entries record pre-tax profits of £2,433 in the trading year for 1912 after 
payment of unspecified preferential dividends and new buildings costing £3,663. For 
1913 the figure was £8,130 after dividends and af rther factory extension costing 
£6,400.42 Although the sales figures for the second two firms are not recorded, both were 
much smaller businesses than Barr & Stroud and their percentage margins seem to have 
caused no concerns in their records. These three companies certainly did not fit the image 
painted by Cheshire. 
PRO MUN 4/55, Cheshire to Col. Wedgwood, 13.8.1915 is the source for this section. 
42 Sources for these figures: for Barr & Stroud, UGD 295/11/1, Audited Accounts: for Thomas Cooke & 
Sons Ltd, University of York, Borthwick Institute, Vickers Instruments Archive (subsequently VIA), T. 
Cooke & Sons, AJB 0301.1.1, Minute Book 1897-1924: for Troughton & Sims Business Records, VIA 
AJB 060 1.2.3, Balance sheets 1908-1919: for Taylor Hobson, Cooke Optics Ltd, Leicester, unclassified 
records, Taylor Hobson Directors' Minute Book No. 1, entries dated 8.10.1912,7.1.1913, and 11.3.1914. 
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Troughton & Sims' accounts, however, give a picture which is less good. The firm was 
similar in size to Cooke's and produced a similar product range, but had little or no 
previous background in munitions production. 43 In 1912 there was a pre-tax profit of 
£4,347 on sales of £26,292, but in 1913 only £1,169 on turnover of £21,921, with no 
indication of any substantial expenditure on plant or premises to account for the 
reduction. " Not only were the end results poorer than the others', but the business 
apparently ran inefficiently, at least in comparison to Barr & Stroud. Profit on turnover 
was only 16.5 percent and 5.3 percent, compared to 25.7 percent and 31.7 percent at Barr 
& Stroud, while `stock in trade' was equal to 47 percent of 1913's sales against Barr & 
Stroud's 12.4 percent. Wage costs were over 57 percent of sales, a proportion more than 
half as much again as the larger firm. Despite all this, `less good' is by no means the 
same as `bad', and Troughton & Sims was certainly solvent in 1913 with £11,800 cash in 
its bank and current trade debtors owing £3,884, with trade creditors standing at only 
£759. 
Cheshire's woebegone depiction of the industry's financial condition was at odds with 
these companies. To what extent he was aware of trade's detailed economic 
circumstances is uncertain, but his connections with it must have given him some 
indication of its general state. This may indeed have been less than satisfactory, but the 
fact that three of these four businesses were solidly profitable in 1912 and 1913 implies 
that things were by no means as bad he alleged. The wording of his minute to Wedgwood 
suggests he was leaving himself some latitude in what he was saying. Terms such as 
`prosperous' and `satisfactory' could be applied to other areas besides financial 
performance and Cheshire may have had in mind less easily quantified aspects of 
business performance such as scientific and technological expertise, a theme to which 
both he and Esslemont would later return. 
43 A. McConnell, Instrument Makers to the World: A History of Cooke, Troughton & Sims (York: William 
Sessions Ltd,, 1992) Chapter 5 describes Troughton & Sims' activities, but the author's suggestion of 
involvement in rangefinder production lacks evidence in support. 
" VIA AJB 02012.3. 
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Keeping the optical companies outside control in 1915 would have given them the 
opportunity to benefit from profits very much greater than in peace-time or the first year 
of the war, and would have aided Cheshire's intention to advance the scientific and 
technological basis of the optical industry. Long-term improvements would need 
companies to be financially sound, although State loans might overcome immediate cash 
shortages they would ultimately need repaying out of future profits. Expansion of output 
would require large spending on new tooling and premises and it was by no means clear 
in the early form of the Munitions Act that the State would cover any portion of this 
expenditure or permit businesses to derive any significant financial benefit from it. 
Even though the Act provided for the introduction of rules to allow for `any special 
circumstances such as increase of output, provision of new machinery or plant, alteration 
of capital or other matters which require special consideration' in assessing profits, none 
had yet been formulated when Cheshire wrote his August minute about excluding the 
optical industry from control. 45 They only appeared in September, `after long and 
exhaustive discussion within the Department' and would have gone a long way to 
meeting Cheshire's aims, but `before any definite system for treating special cases ... 
was able to take final shape' its implementation was interrupted by the a Finance Bill 
which introduced the idea of an Excess Profits Duty (EPD) to tax at a higher than normal 
level all profits `in excess of a pre-war standard' 46 
That had serious implications for Cheshire's desire to retain profits within the industry. It 
intended to take 50 percent of all `excess' earnings from the outbreak of war, and unlike 
the Munitions Act allowed only for `exceptional earnings and redundancy of plant'. 47 
The Ministry of Munitions recognised that the EPD proposals were likely to overlap the 
munitions levy, with the prospect of controlled firms being liable to pay both, an illogical 
- and unreasonable - situation. Negotiations between the Ministry and the Treasury to 
exempt controlled firms from the new proposals were inconclusive, which must 
45 OH Vol. III, Part 3, p. 32. Pages 31 to 35 provide the source material for the rest of this section on profits 
and taxation. 
46 OH Vol. III, Part 3, P. 33. 
47 OH Vol. III, Part 3, p. 34. 
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encouraged Cheshire and Esslemont to lobby persistently and tenaciously to keep the 
optical contractors outside control. 
Both measures stood to deny the optical industry the opportunity for earnings whose 
previous lack was, according to Cheshire, responsible for much of its woes. Faced with 
still-incomplete rules in the Munitions Act and even greater uncertainty over the 
proposed finance bill, Cheshire's only feasible strategy was to plead that the optical 
firms' inclusion would result in loss of co-operation and a consequent catastrophic 
decline in output. Much of his denigratory comments on the industry in the confidential 
internal minutes could only have been deliberate hyperbole intended to increase the 
strength of his pleadings whilst concealing the true reason for them, which would have 
been wholly unacceptable in the political context of the Munitions Act. The Ministry of 
Munitions was, as the official History subsequently reminded its readers, `primarily 
concerned with the output of munitions, not with revenue', 48 but Cheshire's tactics 
indicate that he was much concerned with earnings for the industry as with output for the 
State. 
Both Mari Williams and the MacLeods pointed out that the OMGD dealt with its 
industry in ways different to other sections of the Ministry of Munitions but did not 
identify this important underlying reason. Williams considered that Esslemont opposed 
control simply because `some instrument firms were reluctant' to be controlled and that 
their wishes had to be considered, whilst Cheshire wished to avoid what he described as 
`upsetting a very delicate balance' between the trade and his department on the grounds 
that, in his own words to Colonel Wedgwood, `the manufacturer is master in his own 
workshop and is stimulated ... 
by the prospect of a fairly assured reward. But under the 
provisions of the Munitions Bill [sic] he loses ... his status as master and no guarantee 
of reward is given him if he has not been a profit earner in the past'. 9 This could only 
have been a deliberate distortion of the truth; Cheshire must have known both that the 
Munitions Act did not interfere with routine management and there was provision in it 
" OH Vol. III, Part 3, p. 33. 
49 Williams (1994) pp. 63 and 64. She cites PRO MUN 4/55, Cheshire to Wedgwood, 13.8.1915. 
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for dealing with previously unprofitable businesses. Roy and Kay MacLeod also pointed 
out the `delicate relationship' that existed, and although recognising that the OMGD was 
not in step with general Ministry policy they did not seek any other explanation. 50 The 
reality was that the joint directors of the OMGD were deliberately seeking to pursue a 
policy that ran counter to the very heart of the principles of the Munitions Act in order to 
let contractors derive substantial extra financial benefits from their war work in order to 
benefit the entire industry's efficiency and competitiveness once the war ended. 
These efforts enjoyed some success. In July, Barr & Stroud, Cooke's, Heath & Co., Ross, 
Troughton & Simms, and Carl Zeiss (London) Ltd had been placed on the list of firms to 
be controlled, sl but all were quickly (if only temporarily) removed, despite reservations 
and opposition within the Ministry. In late July the Ministry line was that firms `should 
be controlled whether they want [it] or not' and it would be `difficult to avoid including 
the [optical] firms in the controlled lists'. 2 Opinion then hardened in favour of listing, 
control being depicted as `a status which carries with it material advantages' to which 
only Ross had so far objected. On August 9th a decision was taken to go ahead, but by the 
1e, Cheshire had persuaded Wedgwood and Eric Geddes to tell the Director General of 
Munitions Supply that the Ministry now felt `a very strong case was needed to justify 
putting these firms on the controlled list', a complete reversal of the earlier position. The 
Director General, F. W. Black, conceded the point although he excepted Barr & Stroud 
because of its `engineering content'. 53 Cheshire's pleadings, perhaps better described as 
lobbying, on behalf of the optical instruments makers had been - for the moment - 
successful in their guise of creating an efficient optical munitions industry. 
The only other optical firms taken under control in the remainder of 1915 were Ross and 
Carl Zeiss (London) Ltd., both at their own request. Ross' change of heart may have been 
because the Ministry was prepared to put up a sizeable proportion of the £25,000 the firm 
so Roy & Kay MacLeod (1977), p. 176. 
51 PRO MUN 4/55, Control of Optical firms, DDGC to DGMS, 27.7.1915. 
52 PRO MUN 4/55, Control of Optical Firms, Wedgwood to Sir H. Llewellen Smith, 30.7.1915. 
ss PRO MUN 4/55, Control of Optical firms, supplies the source material for this preceding section: DDGC 
to DGMS 27.7.1915, Beveridge to Sir H. Liewellen Smith 30.7.1915, Wedgwood to Eric Geddes 
14.8.1915, Geddes to DGMS 14.8.1915. 
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had earlier decided to spend enlarging its works to handle an order for 2,000 dial-sights 
worth over £110,000 which the OMGD had placed in August. 54 Ross had previously 
suggested that if placed under control, the firm would be unwilling to spend its own 
money on the project, so the request to be designated a controlled establishment was very 
much a volte face. Carl Zeiss (London) Ltd. was a small subsidiary of the very large 
German Zeiss organisation which since the outbreak of war had been operating in a kind 
of limbo, cut off from its parent, unsure of its future and, ironically, assembling 
binoculars for the War Office from dwindling stocks of pre-war German-made 
components. 55 Matters came to a head when its directors and senior managers were 
interned in 1915, and the business put in the hands of a controller from the Board of 
Trade who doubtless found that control represented a solution to its current problems as 
well as removing any stigma that attached to it being an `enemy' firm. 
In January 1916, political pressure caused the Ministry to reconsider the status of the 
optical firms still outside. Cheshire's success in presenting the optical industry as a 
special case was beginning to rebound, the comment being made that that the exclusion 
of such `an important industry' left the Minister (Lloyd George) `with absolutely no 
answer to any criticism' of the decision. On February 1, Esslemont was reminded that 
he had still to provide the names of firms to be placed on the controlled list but he still 
prevaricated, replying through OMGD's liaison officer that the Department did not see 
`any sufficient reason' to include any other optical companies. He concluded with the 
blunt statement that `I am not satisfied that the Ministry or the firms have anything to 
56 gain from control'. 
The tenacity with which Cheshire and Esslemont sought to keep most of the industry 
outside control reflects how much they were concerned that it would hinder not so much 
the creation of a temporary war-time munitions industry, but the long term growth of the 
54 PRO MUN 4! 745, Orders placed for Scientific and Optical Instruments &c, 1 august 1914 to 31° March 
1917. 
55 Anýe Hagen, "Export Versus Direct Investment in the German Optical Industry. " Business History, no. 4 
October 1996, p. 7. 
56 PRO MUN 4/55, Control of Optical Firms provides the source material for this section: Memorandum of 
Meeting 17.1.1916, O. H. Smith to Esslemont 1.2.1916, Wedgwood to Smith 4.2.1916. 
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entire optical industry, which they saw as being the future locus of optical munitions 
manufacture. Unfortunately for them, the political implications of what they wanted were 
too serious to allow success. Wedgwood's letter expressing Esslemont's ideas brought a 
measured and slightly menacing riposte from the Ministry's Owen H. Smith, who wrote 
that not only were the continued exclusions exposing the Minister `to the possibility of 
serious criticism' but it was `rather a grave decision' to continue them. `If there is a real 
reason for exclusion, can you send me a short minute? ' he ended. Wedgwood's reply had 
to admit there was little to add beyond reiterating that only the `very careful handling' of 
the trade had permitted improved output, and that he was `apprehensive of the effect' of 
anything disturbing current circumstances. Smith was un-moved and on March 1' told 
the Director General of Munitions Supplies that he considered fears about reduced output 
`groundless' and that `it seems there is no justification for excluding an industry which is 
so important from the point of view of munitions work'. He finished by asking for 
permission `to issue [immediately] a special list including all the optical frms'. 
57 That 
marked the end of attempts keep the optical trade outside the financial constraints of the 
Munitions Act and Cheshire and Esslemont's energies were henceforth more closely 
focussed on other efforts to transform the industry. 
5.6 Scientific training and technical management 
For Cheshire, the other pillar of support for the optical industry was significantly better 
scientific and technical education. In late 1915 and 1916 the argument for introducing 
new centres to provide this was reinforced by the argument that the existing industry was 
constantly being held back from meeting `its production targets' because there were not 
enough `skilled workmen, designers and [lens] computers available'. 58 This was 
substantially correct, although other factors such as the lack of machine tooling and 
factory space were greater and more immediate impediments to increasing output of 
equipment already in service. 59 The London County Council's Education Department 
took up the work it had done in 1911 and in June 1916 its Education Officer, Robert 
s7 PRO MUN 4/55, Control of Optical Firms, Smith to Wedgwood 11.2.1916, Wedgwood to Smith 
17.2.1916, Smith to DGMS 13.1916. 
5E R. & K. MacLeod (1977) p. 185. 
59 PRO MUN 2/la, Secret Weekly Reports Vol. 1,18.9.1915,23.10.1915 and 6.11.1915. 
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Blair, suggested a `national scheme for training in technical optics'. 
60 The only facility 
that then existed was at the Northampton Polytechnic Institute at Clerkenwell in London 
(the location of much of the London optical trade), which provided worker training for 
the production of optical components, rather than for design and computation. 
" Despite 
the need to increase output, Blair's consultations with the optical industry and the 
Ministry of Munitions had persuaded him that the manufacturers were `less preoccupied 
with the need to train workmen, than with the need to secure advanced postgraduate and 
research work', and his recommendations took that requirement principally into 
account 62 The existing Clerkenwell scheme would be enlarged to take 60 `students' at a 
time, evening classes would be provided at `junior technical schools', but most 
importantly a new department would be created at Imperial College to provide 
undergraduate and post-graduate training, as well as facilities for research workers. That 
would provide a centre of excellence for optics which, although familiar in Germany, 
was still unknown in Britain. 
Blair's suggestions were adopted and in May the following year Frederick Cheshire was 
appointed as Professor of Technical Optics at Imperial College. This meant his stepping 
down as joint head of OMGD, but he maintained a direct connection through reverting to 
his original Ministry post of `expert advisor in technical optics'. The extent to which 
Cheshire influenced Blair's thinking must have been considerable, particularly as the 
greatest energies were devoted to the area where the immediate demand was least urgent. 
Despite the assertion that output was threatened by a lack of designers, the inescapable 
fact remains that in 1915 and 1916 what the War Office chiefly wanted was instruments 
that were already in production such as rangefinders, dial-sights, prism binoculars and 
telescopes. 3 Where novel items were required, such as the telescopic rifle sight or the 
trench periscope, the design was done by existing firms (such as Aldis Brothers, Beck, 
and Watson) who already had competent optical designers. " What the war-time 
munitions industry needed most was extra capacity, but the OMGD was convinced that 
60 R. & K. MacLeod (1977) p. 186. 
61 OH Vol. XI, Part 3, p. 109. 
62 R. & K. MacLeod (1977) p. 109. 
63 PRO MUN 4/745, shows the extent to which existing patterns made up the bulk of orders. 
64 See Chapter 7 below for details of Aldis Brothers. 
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in the context of the long-term, what the optical instruments industry needed was quite 
different. 
Once Blair's ideas were accepted by the LCC, the Department of Scientific and Industrial 
Research and Imperial College, an advisory committee was set up to co-ordinate 
progress. Although the OMGD had no official part in what Blair proposed, it was 
represented on this Technical Optics Committee by Alfred Esslemont, along with Frank 
Twyman from Adam Hilger Ltd, Conrad Beck from R. & J. Beck Ltd, and T. Watson- 
Baker from W. Watson & Sons Ltd from the `optical trades' 65 Twyman, although now 
totally (if temporarily) committed to munitions contracting, was principally interested in 
scientific instrument manufacture, as were Beck and Watson-Baker. Before the war, 
although all had been engaged in optical munitions manufacture, their businesses had not 
been as heavily involved as others; Ottway and Ross both did more government 
contracting, and Barr & Stroud was totally committed to military and naval work. All 
three had been anxious to advance the instruments industry and Beck and Twyman had 
both been involved in efforts to establish a makers' association, continuing even after the 
war began. Their concept of what optical production would benefit most from were 
almost certainly more closely in tune with Cheshire's than anyone else in the London 
industry. This cross-influence was also reflected in the other appointments to the new 
department at Imperial College, with two of Watson's designers filling key posts. 
Just before the first classes at Imperial College started in 1917, Cheshire published an 
open letter to the trade in the journal Optician that amounted to a summary of his policy 
for reforming optical manufacture in Britain, justifying it by the experiences of the war-66 
It was, he said, only the pressure of war-time demands that had impressed on the makers 
the need for scientific method to replace the old ways of trial and error, and had provided 
a climate where changes would be accepted. The setting-up of the department at Imperial 
College was the start of a systematic approach to optical design that, by implication, was 
long overdue. There is no doubt that much of what Cheshire wrote was true, but it did 
6s R. & K. MacLeod (1977) p. 201. 
R&K. MacLeod (1977) p. 186 and p. 201. cite the quotations in this paragraph. 
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not apply universally. In particular, the three firms represented on the advisory 
committee were no strangers to scientific method, nor were companies such as Barr & 
Stroud, Ross and Taylor Hobson. What the facilities at Imperial College were meant to 
do was provide a pool of scientifically trained opticians who would, it was hoped, bolster 
the abilities not only of companies who already employed such staff, but also of those 
who had previously been unable to hire skilled designers. In June 1918, the Technical 
Optics Committee summarised Imperial's first optical academic year by saying the 
courses would meet `the urgent need' for `first class designers and computers' and would 
eventually produce `a sufficient supply of men ... for the higher positions 
in the 
industry'. 
Cheshire's policies for long-term improvements became more relevant to optical 
munitions production after late 1916, and his enthusiasm for using short-term pressures 
to promote progress on a broader front should not be allowed to distract from the benefits 
that parts of the munitions industry gained from his work. Even though he may initially 
have exaggerated the size of the `reverse salient' of shortages in trained designers, the 
problems embedded in the War Office's methods of producing specifications for its 
optical munitions was a reminder that he had identified a significant problem. Whether, 
in the context of immediate war-time demand, he actually produced the best short-term 
solution is open to debate. The War Office had never prepared any optical specifications 
in detail so businesses coming into optical munitions manufacture were faced with 
designing lens systems for themselves. Once the OMGD began to look for new sources 
of supply in late 1915 and 1916, the problems inherent in this situation made themselves 
quickly apparent. 
For firms like Beck and Ross, which had optical designers, computing optical systems 
was no problem, beyond the time-consuming nature of the work. But, because they were 
already fully occupied, the OMGD increasingly looked to newcomers who did not 
always have the abilities to do the calculations themselves. Making lenses was relatively 
easy once a suitable optical glass had been selected and their curves and thicknesses 
computed, but without those specifications nothing could be done, and it was in the 
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efforts to bring in firms who lacked these abilities that the shortage of lens computers 
was first and most keenly felt. Cheshire's planned three-year courses, though, were far 
beyond what was needed to solve that particular lack, and in recognition of that Cheshire 
and the chief designer of Watson & Sons, Eugen Conrady, set up six-week `crash 
courses' at Imperial College in late 1916.67 These were sufficient to allow both prism 
binocular and terrestrial-telescope systems for gunsights to be designed by people with 
no previous mathematical training, and proved adequate to set up an entirely new factory 
in Leeds for binocular production in 1917 without needing to rely on any outside optical 
design aid. 68 Despite the utility and importance of these short courses when they were 
run, the official History does not mention them, nor do the MacLeods in their 
examination of the optical industry's relationship with government in the Great War. 
Possibly they were not entirely successful, either in numbers trained or the skills 
transmitted. In February 1918, the Sherwood Optical Company, a firm which had been 
set up in 1915 and which had binocular contracts, was reported by the OMGD's 
Technical Branch to have suspended its output as it was waiting for a `new optical 
system to be calculated by Mr Chalmers'. In March, the binocular makers Kershaw, who 
had designed their own lens system after training on one of the Cheshire-Conrady 
courses, changed over to making a system designed by Taylor Hobson. 69 The problem 
with both seemed to be rooted in design limitations rather than quality of manufacture. 
5.7 The problems of failure to standardise designs 
The lack of standardised design for optical instruments was a problem that the OMGD 
never addressed, despite the problems which it caused in extending sources of supply. 
Even the largest and most competent of firms found problems in dealing with it. In 
August 1916, after lengthy and detailed negotiations, Barr & Stroud were given a 
contract to make 200,000 binocular prisms for supply to other firms who were already 
67 Leeds Industrial Museum, Armley Mills; Kershaw papers (unclassified), typescript by Norman Kershaw, 
`The History of Kershaws', p. 6 gives details of his lack of experience and training and the benefits of the 
course. 
68 This is detailed in chapter 6 below. 
69 PRO MUN 4/5006, Reports of Technical Branch; Inspection of Labour, report 28.2.1918 for Sherwood 
and 7.3.1918 for Kershaw. 
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making complete instruments. 70 The `specification to govern manufacture' gave no 
information about the prisms beyond requiring that they be made of boro-silicate glass, 
and the firm had to consult OMGD for the necessary dimensions. Its technical branch 
could only confirm the glass type needed, and the permitted tolerances on the prism 
angles, telling Esslemont that `It would be advisable to obtain from Ross two sample 
prisms to be forwarded to Barr & Stroud, from which they could take their own 
measurements. ' 71 No standard existed (Ross presumably made prisms to fit their own 
gauges), and a binocular was eventually sent directly from Woolwich Arsenal, the 
OMGD seeing no purpose in recording the details for itself. It was Barr & Stroud who 
provided the dimensions for incorporation in the contract to manufacture. Then, having 
set up to produce prisms on a scale larger than ever done previously in Britain, 72 the firm 
found that its two clients (Kershaw and the Brimfield Optical Company) made binocular 
bodies that called for prisms of slightly different heights that differed from the samples 
provided. This complicated and slowed production, and eventually Barr & Stroud 
collaborated with Kershaw, by far the larger client, to produce a compromise that would 
fit both firm's bodies through relaxing the tolerances that had originally been decided in 
the contract issued by the ministry. Deliveries went directly from Glasgow to the two 
binocular factories, the prism were fitted and the finished instruments sent to Woolwich 
for inspection. Then, in October 1918, the Ministry's own Inspector of Optical Supplies 
became responsible for prism acceptances, and batches sampled began to be rejected 
because they failed to conform to the dimensions agreed in 1916. After a series of letters 
occupying a month, the Inspector finally agreed to accept the size that had been working 
perfectly for over a year, and assembly of binoculars was resumed. 73 
A different, though related, problem was illustrated when Barr & Stroud was asked to 
take on the manufacture of a gun sighting telescope in July 1918.74 This was actually an 
Admiralty pattern that had been made previously by Ross and by Watson, and unlike 
70 UGD 295/19/2/4, Customer Order files, CO 2965,23.8.1916. 
" UGD 295/26/2/49, Bryson to Esslemont 4.4.1916. 
72 PRO MUN 4/5004, Weekly Reports, 8.1.1917. 
73 UGD 295/4/634, Letter Book, Barr & Stroud to Director of Inspection of Optical Supplies, 8.10.1918, 
17.10.1918, and 8.11.1918 provide the source material for this section. 74 UGD 295/4/634, Letter Book, Barr & Stroud to Controller of Optical Munitions Supply, 23.7.1918, 
24.7.1918 and 27.7.1918 provides the source material for the rest of this section. 
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War Office practice there were drawings for it. These were sent to Glasgow, along with a 
sample of each firm's manufacture. Difficulties were immediately found, because the 
two samples were distinctly different, each having its own set of drawings. A further 
complication was that the Watson telescope, which struck Barr & Stroud as being 
potentially easier to make, did not actually conform to its own drawings and used five 
different types of glass in its seven-component optical system, a degree of complexity 
which the firm thought un-necessary. 
5.8 Maintaining output 
Sampling the OMGD's weekly reports shows that its staff spent a large proportion of 
their time getting round similar problems for firms who were either too small or less able 
to take remedial steps themselves, and dealing with failures in firms that ought probably 
to have been better able to manage their own affairs. 51L & J. Beck Ltd, whose principal 
Conrad Beck, was associated with Frederick Cheshire's efforts, was criticised on October 
18t 1917 for the poor overall quality of their output, and on 7th February 1918 for 
binocular deliveries that were so slow that the contract might as well be cancelled. At the 
same time, the firm was in dispute with the inspection department at Woolwich Arsenal - 
on which the OMGD's comment was (intriguingly) `It is impossible to condense all that 
our inspector has to say about this firm and the testing at Woolwich'. On Adam Hilger 
Ltd the comments were even worse; on 26th January 1917 the firm's binocular lens sets 
were `unsatisfactory', on 15`x' February they were `far from satisfactory', and on 1' 
November they were still `not fit for service' and the entire workshop was dirty and 
`must be swept out'. The Dublin firm of Sir Howard Grubb and Co. was far behind with 
its deliveries and on 28th February 1918 the OMGD noted that not a single telescope 
from a contract placed in October 1916 had yet been supplied, and for it to get back on 
schedule would depend `on the help of supernatural agencies'. Broadhurst & Clarkson, a 
telescope maker established well before the war, had been proposed as a maker of 
Admiralty-pattern gun-sighting telescopes, but on 12th July 1917 the OMGD dismissed 
the suggestion as `its plant is inadequate, its men unaccustomed to the work and ... the 
's PRO MUN 4/5004 Box 1, and MUN 4/5006, Weekly and other Reports, provide the source material for 
this section, dates as given in the text. 
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deliveries promised could not be made'. And in early February 1918 the Ross branch 
works at Mill Hill was noted to `complain bitterly' that binocular bodies supplied by W. 
Watson & Sons for fitting with graticules were so dirty that it was impossible to work on 
them. 
These reports are simultaneously telling and misleading. The OMGD staff making them 
were handling the day to day problems of firms who were, for the most part, trying to 
cope with large orders and the pressure to deliver quickly, whilst coping with shortages 
of hands and building extensions to their works. In August 1917 the Weekly Reports 
record ten firms with construction work going on, including Grubb, Hilger, and Ross, 
most of whom were being criticised for tardy deliveries or poor quality. 76 The picture is 
one of struggle and, if not of failure, then at best of limited success that causes questions 
to asked about how effectively the OMGD managed the war-time industry. But it has to 
be recognised that problems were bound to feature more prominently than successes in 
these records, and that lack of evidence of success is by no means evidence of its 
absence. Barr & Stroud, for example, features hardly at all (at least in those sampled) 
except in relation to its problems with prism acceptances. There is little said about the 
massive output of rangefinders in Glasgow, although it must be asked whether the 
OMGD might have paid closer attention had the firm been in London, and provided more 
information as a result. It would be as unsafe to assume failure in the management of the 
industry from the records of Esslemont's administrative department as it would be to 
assume success for Cheshire's efforts on the technical side from his own contemporary 
claims. 
5.9 Conclusion 
Whatever the image created by the Weekly Reports, there was no breakdown in the 
supply of optical munitions throughout the war, even before the Ministry of Munitions 
was created. Whether or not the OMGD chose the best way to organise the industry is 
debatable, and a case can be made that Cheshire in particular gave priority to the long- 
term interests of the country's optical instruments industry over the short-term demands 
76 PRO MUN 4/5006, Weekly Report 16.8.1917. 
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to maximise output of munitions products. If he did, his intention was to produce a viable 
industry that would be able to fill a role analogous to the private pre-war arms makers 
who had traditionally been expected by the State to make up the shortfall from the 
national arsenals in time of war, a goal that would in principle have been acceptable to 
his political masters in the Ministry. It cannot be said that he succeeded in that, largely 
because the conditions that provided his opportunity also combined to frustrate one of his 
two strategies and it proved much easier to set up a university programme in optics than 
it did to let the trade profit financially from its war-work. His own departure from the 
Ministry (even though he retained an official role in it) meant that his ability to develop 
any provincial training scheme was largely eliminated, and the centre for excellence in 
optics remained a metropolitan phenomenon despite the national distribution of key 
optical munitions producers. As a later chapter shows, most of his efforts had little long- 
term effect on the optical munitions industry which, after all, had remarkably little in 
common with the instruments industry. 
Much of war-time optical industry can perhaps best be described as hermaphroditic. 
Those instrument making firms who were conscripted into becoming munitions-makers 
retained the characteristics of the former while acquiring those of the latter with varying 
degrees of completeness that subsequently affected their success in the new role. That 
Esslemont's department was often unable to make sword-smiths from tinsmiths should 
not have been a surprise; that he was able to get any of them even to make forks was an 
achievement in itself. But, from the contract records it must be conceded that the bulk of 
useful output actually came from a small number of firms who were mostly already 
experienced in optical munitions work before the war began, suggesting that 
concentrating resources and effort in developing those businesses would have been a 
more effective route in rapidly expanding optical munitions output than the one chosen. 
The next chapter examines the degree to which success was achieved in specific and 
important areas of production and considers to what extent the Ministry played a part in 
them. 
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Chapter 6 
The industry's war-time performance, 1915 to 1918 
6.1 Introduction. 
Assessing the optical munitions industry's performance after mid-1915 is not an easy 
task. War is the critical test of munitions supply, but the Great War so tested production 
that the choice of criteria by which to evaluate the industry is somewhat problematical. 
Because optical manufacturing was inextricably linked to the Ministry of Munitions' 
Optical Munitions and Glassware Department (OMGD) it is impossible to chronicle one 
without repeated reference to the other, and any assessment of optical munitions makers 
must also embrace the OMGD. An appropriate way to consider the war-time industry is 
how well, and by what means, it met the tasks imposed upon it by the exigencies of war, 
focussing on three particular examples of what Roy and Kay MacLeod called the 
`individual optical technologies', and examining them in the context of war conditions. ' 
This facilitates the recognition of a distinct and largely temporary war-time industry and 
the particular problems it encountered. The three examples selected - prismatic 
binoculars, telescopic rifle sights, and the man-portable single observer rangefinder - 
represent three distinctive approaches to war-time production and demonstrate different 
degrees of success. All show an interaction of socially constructive characteristics and 
technical factors that resists models of explanation that attempt to subordinate either of 
them to the other. 
6.2 The problems of large scale production. 
Despite the importance of developing new products in response to the changing nature of 
warfare, volume production was the chief concern throughout the war and was where the 
greatest problems were encountered. The need to produce some types of instruments in 
numbers never previously envisaged led to circumstances where the problems of 
obtaining sufficient factory capacity - in effect a manufacturing system - were 
complicated by the emergence of what Thomas Hughes has termed `reverse salients', a 
1 Roy and Kay MacLeod, `Government and the optical industry in Britain 1914-1918' in J. M. Winter, ed. 
War and Economic Development (Cambridge: University Press, 1975) p. 166. 
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metaphor describing situations where parts of an expanding technological system either 
fall behind or become out of phase with others. 2 Hughes suggested that in a 
manufacturing system, an increase in output in one section may result in the need to 
modify some or all of the other components in the system to ensure optimum 
performance, these `lagging' parts remaining reverse salients until a correction has been 
achieved. The presence of such difficulties, though, need not necessarily bring the system 
to a halt even though its efficiency may be reduced; in such cases they may be presumed 
capable of solution, and then by-passed pending that solution in order to permit interim 
progress on a `broader front'. Such circumstances were found in all the three areas 
examined below, but particularly in the ambitious moves to expand prism binocular 
production. Unlike other applications of optical technologies, this effort was not entirely 
successful, largely because the reverse salients which, in Hughes' terminology, became 
`critical problems' which although identified early were not all adequately addressed 
until late in the war, demonstrating the dangers inherent in some of the steps that had to 
be taken to create a substantially new industry at an accelerated rate. 
Whether high volume production in the optical munitions industry conformed to current 
understandings of the true nature `mass production' is a debatable point. David 
Hounshell has suggested that the term must embrace not only the manufacture of large 
quantities, but also the `basic aspect' of fully interchangeable parts and the absence of 
hand fitting in their eventual assembly into a completely finished artefact 3 He pointed 
out that the incorporation of fully interchangeable components need not ensure high rates 
of output, nor that the need for adjustments at the assembly stage necessarily precluded 
the speedy manufacture of very large numbers of a complex product, citing the half 
million sewing machines produced by the American Singer company in 1880 using 
hand-fitting methods 4 That mass production conforming to Hounshell's prescript was 
found in some areas of British war-time munitions manufacture is beyond doubt - an 
2 T. P. Hughes, "The Evolution of Large Technological Systems. " in The Social Construction of 
Technological Systems: New Directions in the Sociology and History of Technology, edited by W. E. 
Bijker, T. P. Hughes, and T. J. Pinch. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1989) pp. 73 to 75. 
3 D. A. Hounshell, From the American System to Mass Production 1800-1932 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1984) pp. 3 to 7. 
4 Hounshell (1984) p. 6. 
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excellent example being the Lee-Enfield rifle which was produced at annual rates 
exceeding a million in three separate factories, using fully interchangeable parts 
throughout. 5 However, with optical instruments matters were somewhat different and, 
although some types were made in large numbers, neither the quantities produced nor the 
methods of manufacture mirrored those for rifles, suggesting that even though production 
was far higher than ever previously attained, mass production under the strict definition 
adopted by Hounshell was never actually achieved in optical munitions contracting. 
6.3 Prism Binoculars. 
The prismatic binocular was needed in far larger quantities than any other item of optical 
munitions and posed the greatest problem of supply. 6 The War Office had already 
ordered over 58,000 between August 1914 and June 1915, both at home and in France. 
That was more than all other optical stores put together and almost twenty times the 
number ordered in the financial year 1913-1914. 
The OMGD inherited a situation in which deliveries were already far behind schedule, 
where estimated requirements had reached almost three times what had already been 
ordered, and where output was so small that the shortage could only continue growing. 
This presented a serious problem whose solution was both protracted and elusive. The 
difficulty was the lack of capacity. Although binoculars were regularly made in Britain 
before the war, their manufacture had been on a leisurely and relatively small scale that 
was far less than presently required. Ross, by far the largest British maker, had taken 
over fourteen years to produce no more than 25,000, averaging approximately 35 per 
week. 8 That binoculars could be made on a very large scale had been amply 
demonstrated by Zeiss at Jena, which had produced almost 433,000 between 1894 and 
s Great Britain, Ministry of Munitions, History of the Ministry of Munitions, (subsequently OH) Vol. XI 
`The Supply of Munitions', Part 4 (London: HMSO, 1922) pp. 17 to 31. 
6 OH Vol. XI `The Supply of Munitions', Part 3, p. 133, Appendix 111(a). 
See Chapter 4 for the details of British firms, PRO MUN 4/745 for samples of French contracts and Great 
Britain, Ministry of Munitions; OH Vol. XI, Part 3. (HMSO London, 1922) p. 133, Appendix III(a) and 
OH Vol. I, Part 1, Appendix II for details of total orders placed. 
a In the absence of factory records, these figures are based on serial numbers taken from surviving 
instruments whose dates of manufacture can positively be placed in this period through reference to 
advertisements and the maker's own catalogues. I am particularly grateful to William Reid for providing 
data from his own collection. 
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1914, averaging 50,000 yearly after 1910.9 However, this was unique, and no other 
maker anywhere had made anything like that quantity or achieved such high rates of 
output. 1° The firm was extensively vertically integrated so far as the production of 
components went, even the optical glass for its lenses and prisms coming from its `sister 
company', the adjacent Schott glassworks. 11 It had enjoyed the benefit of patent 
protection for its binoculars since 1894 and, according to the British optical trade, had 
been materially assisted by the German government's regular large-scale purchases. 
12 
With over 5,000 workers in early 1914 it was by far the largest optical manufactory in 
the world and regarded universally as a ne plus ultra. Nevertheless, the way Zeiss made 
binoculars was no secret; its works were regularly visited by representatives of foreign 
instrument makers and its production methods described in contemporary scientific and 
technical journals. Those methods, particularly for assembly, could in fact be replicated 
on a smaller scale in factories properly set up to perform the work, as Zeiss itself had 
already demonstrated with small branch works in Austro-Hungary, Russia, and 
England. 13 
A later claim that `We knew [in 1915] how to make binoculars, but not ... on a great 
manufacturing scale' was not strictly true. 14 Zeiss produced a thousand binoculars 
weekly not by employing secret or sophisticated methods, but by employing large 
numbers of workers to assemble an assured supply of suitable components. The real 
obstacle in Britain in 1915 was the lack of capacity for optical components and factory 
space and workers for their assembly. Although Aitchison, Ross, Watson, and the 
9 These figures are provided partly from data published in H. T. Seeger, Feldstecher: Fernglaser im Wandel 
der Zeit (Borken, Germany: Bresser Optik, 1989) pp. 102 - 104, and from further personal 
communications from Dr Seeger, as well as information provided by Thomas Antoniades. 
10 H. T. Seeger (1989) Chapter 4, and F. Watson, Binoculars, Opera Glasses and Field Glasses (Princes 
Risborough, Bucks: Shire Books, 1995) pp. 13-19. 
1' F. Auerbach, The Zeiss Works and the Carl Zeiss Stiftung in Jena. Translated by F. Cheshire and S. Paul. 
2°d edition (London: Marshall Brookes & Chalkely, 1904) describes the factory and its methods in detail.. 
12 R and K. MacLeod, "Government and the Optical Industry in Britain 1914-1918. " In War and 
Economic Development, edited by J. M. Winter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977) pp. 169 
and 170. 
" Antje Hagen `Export versus direct investment in the German optical industry' Business History No. 4, 
October 1996. 
14 George A. B. Dewar, The Great Munition Feat 1914-1918 (London: Constable, 192 1) p. 217. 
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London subsidiary of Carl Zeiss Jena had all manufactured binoculars before 1914, none 
of them had the capacity to handle the volume now needed. ls 
The binocular was not easy to mass produce, even when the methods were familiar. It 
required great consistency in its optics and, above all, care in final assembly if it were to 
function correctly. 16 Although its lenses and prisms could be produced by machine tools, 
the final critical adjustments aligning the two telescopes (collimation) still had to be done 
individually, which meant using large numbers of workers to avoid a bottleneck and 
obtain high output rates. In Britain this was seen as skilled work for experienced men 
who were becoming increasingly hard to find by mid-1915. Many had already joined the 
Services and, as Cheshire had emphasised, there were no institutions to provide trained 
optical workers in substantial numbers. The existing makers accordingly had little chance 
of vastly increasing their output. 
Ross and Watson were already heavily committed to both the Army and the Navy. '7 
Despite having a `beautiful factory' Ross was by no means large, employing only 320 
workers in 1914 with a binocular capacity limited to around a hundred per week. 18 
Matters were little different with Watson which made gun sights, observation telescopes 
as well as medical and radiological products, and its binocular capability was much the 
same as Ross'. 19 Aitchison & Co. had even less capacity. Its binoculars were actually 
made by the Wray Optical Co. Ltd of Bromley, Kent, in which Aitchison held a minority 
shareholding. 20 Although Wray had built a new factory specially to handle Aitchison's 
new War Office contracts, its average weekly output was only thirty instruments. 21 It was 
five miles from the old one and by no means conveniently located for the existing 
is See Chapter 4 above. 
16 F. A. Carson, Basic Optics and Optical Instruments (Mineola, NY: Dover, 1997) pp. 10-32 to 10-45 
explains the intricacies of binocular manufacture and the need for precise collimation.. 
'7 National Archives, Kew (subsequently PRO) MUN 4/745, Orders placed for Scientific and Optical 
Instruments, and PRO MUN 4/5305 to 5313, Contract Cancellation files, for details. 
18 Dewar (1921), p. 221., and PRO MUN 41745, section on Ross Ltd, p. 45. 
19 PRO MUN 4/745, section on W. Watson & Sons Ltd, p. 57. 
20 A. W. Smith, Wray (Optical Works) Ltd 1850-1971: a short history (unpublished MS, undated, Bromley 
Local Archives Collection ref. L37.8/BN 107426), pp. 1-5 provides the source material for this section 
unless otherwise indicated. 
21 PRO MUN 4/745, section on Aitchison & Co. Ltd, p. 2. 
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workforce. Built in a small wood `in fields a long distance from mains electricity cables' 
it depended for all its power on `a single 12 horsepower gas engine' whose reliability 
was uncertain: `if the gas engine stopped, the [entire] factory stopped'. The works was by 
no means self sufficient, there was no foundry for casting binocular bodies which 
consequently had to be bought-in, and despite its recent opening the whole operation was 
too small to expand its output substantially without large-scale building and extra plant 
22 
Carl Zeiss (London) Ltd, was the British subsidiary of the German company and had 
been in a kind of commercial limbo since the outbreak of war. 23 Most, if not all, of its 
German supervisory workers remained at the factory and the War Office had continued 
placing modest orders, but in early 1915 all the German nationals were interned and the 
business placed in the hands of a Controller appointed by the Board of Trade, who then 
engaged Ross to oversee the running of the works. The small size of the operation and its 
now-fragmented management were quite unsuited to handling any greatly increased 
workload and, like the other British binocular makers, the business was unable materially 
to increase overall output. 
The main problem was the lack of capacity in an industry that was quantitatively rather 
than qualitatively inadequate. That difficulty was not unique to British optical munitions 
manufacture. Even Zeiss, the world's largest optical producer, was unable to keep up 
with German demands. Although civil production was abandoned and the total 
workforce increased from 5,200 in 1913 to a war-time peak of 9,800, Zeiss could not 
maintain the substantive monopoly of government supply it had before the war. 
24 Nor 
could Goerz, the next largest optical munitions producer, make up the shortfall. The 
German government was forced to draw other companies into the manufacture of 
binoculars once it became apparent that the peace-time capacity of the specialists was 
inadequate. 25 From a situation of supposed surplus in August 1915 when, according to 
u PRO MUN 4/5006, Reports on Optical Munitions Output, Technical Inspection and Labour Branch, 
Weekly Reports, 1915-1918: Report 12.7.1917. 
2' see Antje Hagen. `Export versus direct Investment in the German Optical Industry', Business History, 
October 1996, for background material to this. 
24 F. Auerbach, The Zeiss Works (1924, ) p. 266. 
25 H. T. Seeger (1996) pp. 83 to 100. 
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official History the German government offered to exchange binoculars and telescopic 
sights for supplies of rubber, the German optical munitions industry progressively 
worked harder to keep up with its orders. 26 Despite having the world's largest optical 
industry, Germany still experienced problems with binocular output, even though they 
were less severe than in Britain. 27 
Esslemont had to devise a suitable strategy for the British problem. It became clear that a 
radical approach was needed because substantial short term improvements in deliveries 
were unlikely. Efforts to purchase French binoculars were hindered because that industry 
was no better prepared than Britain's to handle huge orders. 28 A promising source of 
supply in the USA was thwarted because the War Office objected strongly to the design 
of the instruments being supplied by the Bausch & Lomb company, principally because 
it did not conform to the constructional details specified for domestic contractors since 
1909. Despite achieving a delivery rate averaging 400 hundred a week - then more than 
the capacity of all the British contractors together - on a contract for 20,000, the Chief 
Inspector of Optical Stores refused to move from the established technological paradigm 
and would countenance no further orders, materially adding to the supply problems of the 
OMGD, which lacked the power to over-rule him. 29 By the end of 1915 the problem was 
pressing hard and the industry itself was clearly incapable of providing a solution. 
The OMGD was in favour of changing how the optical industry worked. Frederick 
Cheshire was convinced of the need for transformation through economic and 
educational changes directed at the existing firms which, in his judgement, were held 
back by a combination of educational and technological inadequacies. Esslemont, 
however, espoused a different approach, based on the premise that the root of the 
problem lay less in technological backwardness than in organisational shortcomings that 
could be overcome far more quickly. The radical solution proposed for `the supply of 
26 OH Vol. XI, Part 3, p. 42. 27 H. T. Seeger (1996) pp. 19 to 26, and pp. 83 to 100. 
28 M. E. W. Williams, The Precision Makers: a History of the Instruments Industry in Britain and France 
1870-1939 (London: Routledge, 1994) pp. 72 to 79. 
29 PRO MUN 4/745, section on Bausch & Lomb, p. 7, and PRO MUN 4/5528 letter from A. S. Esslemont 
to Sherwood, 6.10.1916. See chapter 1 above for comments on the influence of technological paradigms in 
the British Army. 
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binoculars under the scheme for development of home supply of these instruments' 
envisaged creating an entirely new factory in which would be concentrated the vast 
majority of British binocular production, and its novelty is emphasised because the idea 
originated neither within the OMGD nor the optical industry itsel£3o 
During late 1915 Esslemont began discussions with A. Kershaw & Sons Ltd in Leeds, 
West Yorkshire, a business that was not in the optical trade at all. The firm had 
successfully made film projectors for the cinema trade, mechanical components for 
cameras, and complete camera bodies which were supplied to other companies for sale 
under their own names, none of which involved optical manufacturing 
31 When the war 
began, the firm began making gun clinometers for the War Office and phased out civil 
products to cope with the increasing volume of Government work. 32 By Spring 1915 the 
business had effectively become a munitions contractor under the Defence of the Realm 
Act, a status confirmed when the Munitions Act became effective in July. The Ministry 
of Munitions' classification of products fortuitously brought gun clinometers (which 
actually had no optically worked parts) under the control of the OMGD, and so 
introduced Abraham Kershaw to Esslemont. Although Kershaw had clinometer orders of 
500 per week, the instrument was of relatively low value (shillings rather than pounds) 
and could be made by many precision engineering firms, so there was no question of 
monopoly in supply nor guarantee of an indefinite demand. What Kershaw wanted was a 
munitions product of substantial unit value which would be required in large numbers, 
because having been designated a munitions contractor under the Munitions Act his firm 
was unable to take on commercial work. 33 By late 1915 the binocular supply situation 
provided exactly the opportunity he wanted. 
Kershaw's ideas interested the OMGD. He proposed that high volume binocular 
production could be attained by applying the principles and methods he had used 
30 PRO MUN 4/672, Agreement between the Ministry of Munitions and Kershaw, 1916. 
" N. Charming and M. Dunn, British Camera Makers; an A-Z Guide to companies and Products (Esher. 
Parkland Designs, 1996) p. 63. 
32 Leeds Industrial Museum Library, Armley Mills, Leeds, W. Yorks, Kershaw material (unclassified): the 
papers left by Norman Kershaw (subsequently LIM/NK) provide the source material for the rest of this 
section unless otherwise indicated. 
33 PRO MUN 4/745, section on Kershaw p. 32. 
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successfully to produce complex articles which combined high precision components 
with others requiring no especially high standards of manufacture. To make the former 
he had used machine tooling and enforced rigid standardisation of parts, relying on a 
relatively small number of skilled machine operators and the elimination of hand fitting. 
For the assembly of parts he had been able to employ unskilled and semi-skilled female 
labour which was readily and cheaply available locally. Thus, a relatively small (and 
inexpensive) labour force of 200 was able to produce complex and precise items at 
competitive and profitable prices. 
Kershaw had a purpose built factory less than four years old and fully equipped with 
machine tooling, some of which was housed in an `air conditioned and temperature 
controlled' environment. He had financed this through selling a 47 percent share in his 
company to the Marion Co. Ltd., a London photographic wholesaler for whom he 
already made camera bodies to Marion's own designs. 
34 In exchange for transferring 
some trade names and a monopoly use of some patented designs, Kershaw obtained a 
substantial cash injection and a guaranteed buyer for those designs whilst retaining 
control of the business, a deal that seems to have been almost entirely to his own benefit 
and identified him as very much the man of `push and go' that typified the then current 
ethos at the Ministry of Munitions. 5 Despite his enthusiasm for applied technology and 
his business acumen, Kershaw had no academic background or training of the type being 
advocated by Cheshire as essential for the advancement of the optical industry, a lack 
that seems to have been no impediment to his relationship with Esslemont. 
Kershaw's combination of character and ideas suited Esslemont's needs, as well as 
Cheshire's wider aims to improve the optical instrument trade. The key element in 
Kershaw's plan was the extensive association of women workers and automated methods 
which he claimed would allow an eventual output of a thousand binoculars every week, 
equal to the pre-war output of the Zeiss works. His proposal also accorded with the 
Ministry's desire to side-step labour practices that restricted output and was firmly 
34 Channing and Dunn (1996) p. 63. 
35 R J. Q. Adams, Arms and the Wizard; Lloyd George and the Ministry of Munitions 1915-1916 (London: 
Cassell, 1978) Chapter 4 `The men of push and go'. 
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committed to the `dilution' of labour. One of the main purposes of the Munitions Act had 
been to secure the agreement of Trade Unions to relax the restrictive practices that 
excluded unskilled and semi-skilled labour - particularly women - from craft trades, but 
the largely London-based optical industry was finely against introducing female 
workers, arguing that their use would be seriously counterproductive 36 The OMGD had 
difficulties overcoming this argument about maintaining output, particularly as 
Cheshire's pleadings to keep the trade outside control used the same underlying logic of 
maintaining production at all costs, and its efforts to dilute workforces in London had 
met little success 37 As Kershaw was not involved in the optical trade and already used a 
mixed labour force, his proposals provided the welcome promise of creating a precedent 
to weaken the general opposition to the widespread introduction of women into the 
established optical companies. 
Kershaw's approach could not have been better timed or structured. Esslemont was 
willing to move outside the prevailing optical industry paradigm which considered 
instrument making to be the province of experienced skilled workers, and was happy to 
follow this new initiative. His thinking was more broadly based than Cheshire's, which 
remained concentrated on transforming the existing trade rather than creating a new 
purpose-designed war industry. Esslemont asked Kershaw to `draw up a schedule' for the 
construction of an entirely new factory and its necessary tooling, and to define his ideas 
about how best to employ both the machinery and labour in it. Subsequent events 
illustrated what could be done when `The Ministry of Munitions more or less [provided] 
a `carte blanche' budget... '. 8 Unlike the Aitchison/Wray expansion in 1914, this venture 
enjoyed not only the benefit a very large State subsidy, but also had a significantly better 
location. Kershaw found a suitable site less than a mile from the existing factory (whose 
workforce would form the nucleus of the new one) in a populous area well served by 
public transport and already providing a large pool of female workers for nearby large 
clothing factories. 
36 OH Vol. XI, Part 3, p. 18. 
37 see Chapter 6. 
38 L1M/NK, p. 2. 
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The site purchase was completed on l April 1916, and on 3`d May a formal agreement 
was signed under which the Ministry provided a `grant' of £20,000 for the project, 
which carried terms and conditions. 39 Half the money was repayable, and as security a 
charge was taken on the land as well as the buildings and plant to be erected on it 40 The 
conditions included maintaining a `technical and commercial staff sufficient to ensure the 
manufacture of binoculars in the most scientific and skilful manner possible' and `to 
train and use the service of [British born] unskilled and female labour to the utmost 
extent possible', both of which were implicit in Kershaw's original proposals. For 
Kershaw, this was a deal that was potentially even better than the one with Marion in 
1910, and which emphasised the symbiotic nature of his relationship with the OMGD. 
The firm's share of the starting costs could be off-set against high war-time taxation, the 
expected volume of business was considerable, and when the war ended Kershaw would 
have a large factory completely equipped for large volume high precision optical and 
mechanical engineering. In return, the OMGD hoped to obtain a resolution of its 
binocular problems. 
The contract issued to Kershaw on 15th June was the largest single binocular order placed 
by the OMGD during the war, but its wording suggests that it was meant to be the first of 
a series. It called for 25,000 instruments to be delivered at an escalating weekly rate, 
reaching at least 600 by 31 ' October 1916 and running at a thousand `hereafter' 41 
Ministry records show `running' contracts regularly followed initial orders, often 
prolonging the first one for several years. 2 Contract 94/T/1039 also points at a `reverse 
salient' condition on whose solution Esslemont was forced to depend for the success of 
the Kershaw project, which was itself intended to form the major part of a broader 
scheme to increase binocular supply. 
Esslemont's `broad front' was the increase of binocular output, and his immediate 
`reverse salient' the inexperience of Kershaw with optical work. The production of a 
s' OH Vol. XI, Part 3, p. 26 provides source material for the rest of this section unless otherwise indicated. 
40 PRO MUN 4/672, Agreement between the Ministry of Munitions and Kershaw. Unforhmately, only a 
summary of the actual document survives. 
4' PRO MUN 5/312, Orders for Scientific Instruments &c., Binoculars, Prismatic, p. 5. 
42 PRO MUN 4/745, for examples see sections on Beck, Ross, and Watson. 
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thousand binoculars required ten thousand individual lens elements and four thousand 
prisms, besides two thousand individual body castings, four thousand lens cell 
assemblies and similar numbers of other simpler metal parts. 43 Although the mechanical 
work was broadly familiar, teething troubles were expected with the lens work which 
would be new to Kershaw. The OMGD expected pilot work to be begin in the existing 
factory, and to provide optical sets initially, Esslemont intended to use experienced lens 
makers who had enough spare capacity to make binocular optics. These would feed 
Kershaw until its own output built up sufficiently and then carry on supplying lenses to 
another factory which the OMGD proposed as a second, though smaller, producer of 
binoculars. 
The OMGD identified six potential makers, and the department's technical advisors 
liased with them in developing satisfactory optical sets. Cooke's of York, The 
Guaranteed Lens Co., Adam Hilger, the Hummel Optical Co., J. & H. Taylor, and 
Taylor, Taylor & Hobson were engaged to make standardised eyepiece and objective 
lenses after June 1916. All of them found it difficult to satisfy the rigorous inspection 
criteria imposed by the Army's Chief Inspector of Optical Stores at Woolwich (CIOS) 
and there were delays in obtaining enough even to supply Kershaw's initial requirements. 
In February 1917 Taylor, Taylor & Hobson were delivering enough sets to allow 
Kershaw to begin assembling complete instruments in the recently finished factory, but 
the capacity to make and assemble bodies was far in excess of the supply of optics. By 
April, just 491 binoculars had been accepted by the CIOS, and Kershaw still had to reach 
the stage of being able to produce acceptable lenses itself. Only one of the six lens 
makers had reached an acceptable standard, and the lack of lenses was threatening to 
cripple the binocular expansion programme. 
Esslemont's `reverse salient' had not been dealt with, for reasons largely to be found 
within a second problem whose solution was already assumed when the Kershaw project 
was set in motion. The principal cause of delays lay in the supply of optical glass, whose 
43 OH Vol. XI, Part 3, pp 26 to 28 provides details. 
4° MUN 4/5006, Reports of the Experimental Section, CM6, on optical munitions, various dates in 1917 
and 1918. 
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quality was still by no means assured. The broad issue, of optical glass production during 
the war is too large to be covered in this study, but some salient points must be noted. 
The official History devoted considerable space to glass supply and the MacLeods 
accepted the History's verdict that early problems were satisfactorily overcome, but this 
picture is not wholly correct. Despite the progress made through Esslemont's efforts, the 
quality of certain glass types was particularly difficult to ensure, and during 1917 the 
inconsistency of those needed for binocular lenses was a constant source of trouble. 45 
These problems were mainly responsible for holding back output of binocular lens sets in 
the first part of 1917, and were only eased by the OMGD's eventual decision to seek 
alternative glasses from France, and the subsequent improvement in Chance's quality 
control 46 
Matters began to improve after May, when a Kershaw trial lens set submitted to the 
OMGD was judged `remarkably good and quite up to the standards of any [yet] 
submitted'. A week later, the OMGD finally passed a similar trial set from Cooke's, 
noting that this extra source `should ease the situation so far as Kershaw's troubles are 
concerned. 47 From then on output began to grow, with increasing numbers of binoculars 
being assembled using Kershaw's own lenses besides sets from Cooke's and Taylor, 
Taylor & Hobson. By October the factory was getting into its stride using production 
methods copied from the former Zeiss works at Mill Hill, as well as numbers of specially 
built machine tools designed in Kershaw's own drawing office, based on samples 
obtained from Mill Hill where they had been redundant since Ross bought the works 
from the Board of Trade earlier in the year. 48 By the autumn of 1918, weekly output had 
reached 800 and was still increasing when the instructions to scale down production were 
issued by the Ministry when the war ended as part of the process of industrial 
demobilisation. 49 
45 OH Vol. XI, Part 3, pp. 25 to 28, and R. and K. MacLeod (1975) pp. 172-175. " PRO MUN 2/1, Secret Weekly Report 29.3.1917. 
" PRO MUN 4/5006, Weekly Reports, 24.5.1917. 
" LIM NK p. 3, and Hagen. A. "Export Versus Direct Investment in the German Optical Industry. " 
Business History, no. 4 October 1996, p. 7. 
49 LIM NK p. 3. 
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Although delayed in reaching its goal, the Kershaw binocular project was a successful 
collaboration between the OMGD and a firm that was innovative and soundly organised. 
It proved that Kershaw's faith in the transferability of his working methods from movie 
projectors to binoculars was entirely justified. The delays caused by glass problems were 
outwith his control, and it is clear that once deliveries improved the factory was able to 
work up to the high production rates that had been promised at the start. Dilution was 
achieved on a level not found anywhere else in the optical munitions industry, 
particularly in women workers. Where Ross employed around 17 percent female labour 
and Barr & Stroud 16 percent, Kershaw's figure was 80 percent, a substantial proportion 
of which was `girl labour' aged under 18, a figure which `seemed to astound the optical 
trade at that time'. 50 The earlier claims by London firms that women would create 
catastrophic wastages in lens making were refuted at Leeds, where `very young' girls 
were trained to operate polishing machines within a matter of hours st The cost of a 
Kershaw binocular was lower than other makers, and by October 1918 the OMGD was 
proposing to discontinue lens deliveries from Cooke's and Taylor, Taylor & Hobson, 
partly because of Kershaw's output and partly because costs at Leeds were expected to 
be `cheaper than other contractors' 52 
Kershaw's success was not duplicated elsewhere in war-time binocular manufacture. 
Only one commercial company was set up during the war especially to manufacture 
them, but five existing businesses became newly involved in production, and one State- 
sponsored assembly factory was started. 53 Sherwood & Co. appeared in 1915 in response 
to War Office demands and continued to produce about fifty binoculars a week until the 
Armistice, when soon afterwards it ceased trading. The OMGD asked Beck to make 
binoculars in December 1915, but the contract was subsequently suspended to increase 
dial-sight output and, according to the firm, none were actually made. Dollond & Co. 
began production in mid-1916 producing about twenty a week, and the ophthalmic lens 
makers Theodore Hamblin Ltd. took an order for 2,000 in June 1916 which was 
50 LIM NK p. 3. 
51 Dewar (1921) p. 222. 
S2 PRO MUN 4/5006, Weekly Report 29.10.1918. 
53 PRO MUN 4/745 provides source material for the rest of this section, unless otherwise indicated. 
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completed by 1918, after which they began making for the Admiralty. H. F. Purser Ltd. 
began production in February 1916, making around twenty per week until the end of the 
war. E. R. Watts & Son had an order for a thousand in January in 1916, which were 
made at only five each week. The amounts these firms added to output were minuscule. 
Apart from Sherwood, all seem to have been induced to take up production at the time 
when the OMGD was faced with a very large shortfall in output and when, perhaps, 
anything was better than nothing. None of them ever had any large potential, but the final 
newcomer, the State-sponsored factory J. Brimfield & Co., was originally intended to do 
much better. 
Esslemont had intended that the lens makers feeding Kershaw would quickly divert 
deliveries to another new factory intended to supplement Kershaw's production. This 
involved a different approach, with the Ministry setting up a new company known as J. 
Brimfield & Co., not to manufacture parts but to be a central assembly station for 
binocular components. The costs of `equipping and fitting' the factory were met by the 
State, and all its raw materials provided free of charge. Brimfield would subsequently 
invoice the Ministry for assembly on the basis of labour and overhead costs plus a fixed 
percentage for profit. Although smaller than the Kershaw, its output was intended to be 
considerable, and five thousand binoculars were ordered on 28"' July 1916, to be 
delivered at an increasing rate, with a minimum of 100 weekly being attained in less than 
two months. 54 The surviving records show even that rate was never attained. The plant 
was dogged by the same lens delivery problems that had affected Kershaw, and poor 
mechanical quality led to very high rejection rates by the CIOS. SS Output seems to have 
been very small, and by the end of the war Brimfield was only taking in enough prisms 
to make twenty five binoculars a week, a rate similar to many of the private contractors. 56 
Brimfield's failure to live up to expectations was almost an irrelevance by the Armistice. 
The fine was never intended as a permanent part of what Cheshire hoped would be an 
improved post-war instruments industry, and Kershaw's increasing efficiency tended to 
s4 OH Vol. XI, Part 3, p. 26. 
ss PRO MUN 4/5006, Weekly Reports, 1918. 
56 UGD 295/4/132, Letter Book, H. D. Jackson to Brimfield, 15.3.1919. 
199 
make the venture redundant. Binocular production in the war had been something of the 
proverbial curate's egg, and it is probable that far fewer than the 300,000 binoculars 
`demanded' were actually delivered by the Armistice. But, by then a factory to make 
them on a scale previously unimagined in Britain was running with increasing efficiency 
and the worst that should be said of binocular production was that high volume 
production came better late than never. 
6.4 The telescopic rifle sight 
Volume was not the problem with the telescopic rifle sight. This was an instrument not 
found in the British Army before 1915 and its mass production was never required. 
Intended for use by specially selected soldiers on a small scale, it presented a very 
different manufacturing problem than the binocular. 57 Accounts of its inception and 
manufacture have been misleading and discredit the ability of the optical munitions 
industry. Roy and Kay MacLeod asserted that the industry was unsuccessful in producing 
telescopic sights until the OMGD and the National Physical Laboratory jointly attacked 
the problem in 1917, but that was not so. 58 The origins of its introduction in early 1915 
have been examined by Ian Skennerton who clearly demonstrated that that regular small- 
scale production actually pre-dated March 1915, but failed to emphasise the achievement 
that represented. 59 The telescopic rifle sight (riflescope) was one of the most successful 
applications of optical munitions technology during the war, and showed that the war- 
time industry was capable of meeting design and production requirements when an 
appropriate manufacturing infrastructure existed. Unlike binoculars, where the 
production capacity had to be created, the riflescope was needed in small enough 
quantities to be manufactured within the available resources. 
In late 1914 War Office issued an invitation to tender for a telescopic sight to be used 
with the Army's service rifle. This was in response to the German employment of 
s' see Martin Pegler. The Military Sniper since 1914 (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2001) for background 
information on the employment of snipers. 
58 OH Vol. XI Part 3 p. 9ff., and R&K MacLeod (1975), pp. 184-185. 
s' See Ian Skennerton, The British Sniper, (Margate, Queensland, Australia: 1984) Chapters 2 and 3 for 
background material. 
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specially selected marksmen using such sights, which was causing mounting casualties 
and significantly affecting morale in the absence of any satisfactory means of retaliation. 
The requirement could hardly have come at a more difficult time for the optical industry, 
because no such instrument was being made in Britain on a regular and organised basis, 
and growing demands from the War Office were increasingly occupying its capacity. 
Imported riflescopes were certainly sold through the gun trade, some with British 
makers' names on them, but there was no domestic source immediately able to supply in 
quantity. 60 Although riflescopes were similar in concept to artillery sighting telescopes, 
the firms making those were pre-occupied with a variety of work and none of the existing 
patterns were suitable or adaptable to the new requirement. Unlike either binoculars or 
periscopes, the immediate problem was one of design. 
Although all the optical munitions makers were capable of devising a riflescope, only 
two companies actually submitted designs judged worth adopting by the War Office, and 
neither had any previous connection with optical munitions. Aldis Brothers of 
Birmingham made photographic lenses, and the Periscopic Prism Company of Camden 
Town chiefly made lenses and prisms for the optical instruments trade. Neither had any 
government orders in late 1914 and unlike most of the industry both were actively 
seeking optical work. Coincidentally, each had already done sub-contracting for Barr & 
Stroud, and both had been rejected by that firm because of inadequate quality. 61 
Despite its adverse testimonial from Barr & Stroud, Aldis was well regarded for its 
camera lenses and appears to have been far distant from Cheshire's depiction of an 
industry whose workshops were little more than shanties. The business had begun 
manufacturing in Sparkhill, Birmingham in 1902 and was owned by two brothers who 
were mathematicians and both graduates of Trinity College, Cambridge. The elder, 
Lancelot, had worked at the Dallmeyer optical works and was already an accomplished 
60 Skennerton (1984) p. 34 illustrates examples but leaves their manufacturers uncertain. 61 UGD 295/4/112, Letter Book, Jackson to Chance Brothers, 7.12.1914, criticises Aldis, and UGD 
295/4/110, Letter Book, Jackson to Periscopic Prism Co., 25.8.14, threatens to cancel all orders. 
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lens designer familiar with the latest in glass technology. 62 His younger brother, Arthur, 
joined him in partnership soon after being elected to a fellowship at Trinity in 1901, then 
worked briefly for Dallmeyer before returning to Birmingham where he became 
interested in automated methods of lens manufacture. He subsequently spent time in 
Germany studying production methods, which resulted in the partners investing in 
automatic lens polishing machinery bought from the Ahlberndt company of Berlin. By 
1912 the business was doing well enough to start building a factory equipped for both 
optical and mechanical work at Hall Green, away from the polluted atmosphere that was 
63 interfering with lens grinding. 
The new works was completed just before the war began, and by 1915 Aldis Brothers' 
catalogue included twenty seven different photographic lenses and two for photo- 
micrography, all designed and made wholly in-house. M The OMGD was subsequently 
`agreeably surprised' to learn that the fine had both a `large and well equipped lens 
factory' and a `scientific staff' ble to tackle the problems of optical design. 
5 The 
brothers' design of the riflescope can be seen as endorsing Cheshire's emphasis on the 
benefits of scientific training in optics and the combination of a thorough grounding in 
mechanical engineering with a modem well-equipped factory. Within weeks a design 
(which was certainly not a copy of any existing type) was finished and satisfactory 
samples provided for the War Office, resulting in an order for a first `batch' of the 
`Pattern No. l' riflescope in January 1915 66 Two hundred had been supplied and 
accepted before July when the OMGD took over responsibility for deliveries. 67 By then, 
Aldis had already suspended photographic lens production and, like Kershaw, become a 
de facto optical munitions contractor. On 7t' July the OMGD contracted to take the 
62 J. S. Carter, An Historical Analysis of the Development and Application of Visual and Aural Aids in 
English Education from 1900 to 1970 (unpublished Ph. D Thesis, University of Leeds, 1995) p. 292. 
63 Aldis Brothers & Their Productions (Aldis Bros., Sparkhill, Birmingham, undated but probably circa 
1920. ) p. 3. 
64 The British Journal Photographic Almanac (Liverpool: Henry Greenwood & Co., 1914) Aldis 
advertisement. 
65 Aldis Brothers, p. 5. 
66 Skennerton (1984) p. 47. 
67 Skennerton (1984) p. 47. 
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`entire output' of the works at a minimum rate of 60 weekly, an arrangement that was 
increased when Aldis later began making other sighting telescopes. 8 
The haste with which the sight was designed, and Aldis' unfamiliarity with weapons may 
have led to a number of mechanical shortcomings which affected the instrument's 
durability which caused problems in service. The vibration of firing loosened the range- 
adjusting mechanism, and penetrating moisture caused fogging; either rendered the sight 
unusable and the OMGD's Technical Section recognised that re-design was necessary to 
eliminate them. The Aldis brothers may have been highly competent in computing lens 
systems, but they had no previous experience of series-producing telescopes and the 
Pattern No. 1 had been put into manufacture without any proper engineering drawings - 
not through incompetence, but almost certainly because the scale of future demand was 
not envisaged. In late summer, the likely requirements were far clearer, and OMGD 
decided to standardise an improved version for larger scale production. By mid- 
November, prototypes of the revised design had been made by Aldis and accepted, 
production drawings were finished by the Technical Section less than three weeks later, 
and manufacture proceeded without further significant technical problems until a 
decision in 1918 to adopt a completely new design sponsored by the Army itself. 
Aldis was an excellent example of how well the war-time optical munitions industry 
could perform. By building on a base of existing sound scientific and technological 
practice, and drawing on the resources of the OMGD to bridge gaps in its own pre-war 
organisation, the firm successfully moved from being a small scale civilian maker of 
photographic lenses to become a large and highly specialised maker of complex service 
optics. Its factory was extended twice during the war and by the Armistice it was six 
times the area of 1914, producing not only riflescopes but derivatives of them for aerial 
gunnery, as well as large numbers of artillery sighting telescopes. Experience gained with 
them was used to design a novel electrical Daylight Signalling Lantern (the `Aldis 
Lamp') which used a reflector and lens system to create an intensely bright point source 
of light that could be seen at long range even in the strongest daylight. The lamp needed 
68 PRO MUN 4/745, section on Aldis Bros., p. 2. 
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to be aimed precisely to permit the observer to see it, and an inexpensive but durable 
aiming telescope was designed for it. By late 1917, the firm's capacity was large enough 
to allow the Aldis brothers to compute new lenses especially for high altitude aerial 
photography, and to begin production on a substantial scale. The spin-off of munitions 
contracting provided Aldis with the basis of its post-war civil products; the range of 
photographic lenses was extended and the Lantern sold widely to both merchant ships 
and foreign governments. 
The second riflescope maker, the Periscopic Prism company, is less well documented. 
Like Aldis it was quick to produce a design because one of its directors, A. B. Rolfe- 
Martin, combined optical design skills with an interest in rifle shooting. Even if the 
quality of its riflescopes was less good than Aldis', it was numerically the larger maker 
and its products were still adequate for the tasks set. Over 4,400 had been made by April 
1917 and production continued until the war's end, by which time the firm had been 
taken over by the State and was also making sighting telescopes for artillery. 69 
Riflescope production hardly taxed the industry at all. Those used throughout the war 
were made by just two firms who met the Army's requirements with little trouble and 
marked a success for the optical munitions industry. Their importance to the psyche of 
front-line units was out of all proportion to the relatively small numbers made and the 
value of the contracts. The total of around £70,000 spent on the 10,000 or so purchased 
during the entire war was less than three-quarters of the first binocular contract placed 
with Kershaw, and only a twentieth of what the War Office spent on rangefmders with 
Barr & Stroud, but the instrument was recognised as vital to effective sniping by front 
line officers and simply had no substitute. In theory, it would have been used most 
effectively by a team that included a rangefinder to determine distances precisely, but the 
tactics of trench warfare sniping meant that ranges were relatively short so that precise 
69 PRO MUN 4/745, section on Periscopic Prism. Co., p. 41 provides contract details, and OH Vol. XI, Part 
3 p. 23 describes the take-over. 
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sight settings were not critical, and the need for the portable rangefinder to accompany it 
never materialised. 70 
6.6 The Rangefinder. 
The man-portable rangefinder was by far the most complex item of optical munitions to 
be mass produced during the war yet, in an apparent paradox, it was the instrument that 
posed the least problems in supply. And, ironically, it may well have been the least 
important optical device in the static conditions of the Western Front where the need to 
determine distances rapidly was highly uncommon. But, unlike the other optical devices 
used by the services at the start of the war, the capacity to mass produce rangefinders 
already existed with Barr & Stroud whose records reveal much about its attitude to war- 
time contracting and the difficulties encountered. 
Rangefinder production was the most successful part of the war-time supply of complex 
optical munitions and neither the Army nor the Navy suffered a shortage of instruments. 
Barr & Stroud's pre-war capacity was already considerable in August 1914, and the 
suddenly increased War Office orders then were, to some extent, off-set by the enforced 
termination of foreign business which enabled output more or less to keep up with 
growing demand. As orders continued to grow, the company expanded both its premises 
and workforce and kept pace with demand whilst simultaneously carrying on research 
and development into new manufacturing processes and instruments, a pattern of activity 
not found elsewhere in the British industry. Moss and Russell gave an overview of the 
firm's war-time activities, but they concentrated on its dealings with the Royal Navy and 
almost totally ignored the company's much greater involvement with Army orders, 
firstly directly from the War Office and later from the Ministry of Munitions. 71 
Land service business was indeed substantial, being 80 percent more in value than the 
Admiralty's during the war. 72 Moss and Russell's total of approximately 19,300 
rangefinders supplied agrees closely with the official History's figure of 3,730 artillery 
70 Pegler (2001) p. 22. 
" Moss & Russell (1988) Chapter 3. 
72 These figures have been extracted from Customer Order records in UGD 295/19/2/4, /19/2/5 and 1912/6. 
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models and 15,782 infantry ones, a total of 19,512.73 Prices varied but little during the 
war despite inflation, with their approximate average values being £80 and £58 
respectively. 74 This gives a total value of almost £1,214,000 which compares tolerably 
well with the £1,362,000 extracted from the company's surviving order records. 
The production requirements for each service's orders were quite different and handled 
separately. The Army's small rangefinders were needed in vastly greater numbers than 
the large naval ones and posed manufacturing problems similar to the binocular. The 
rangefmder was far more complex, but most of its components could (in theory at least) 
be made rapidly, as could those for the binocular. Barr & Stroud's serious problems in 
getting enough optical parts in the first year of the war have been discussed in Chapter 5, 
but as its own lens and prism production increased the main factor restricting output 
became the assembly of completed parts, where large numbers of workers were needed 
to achieve rapid deliveries of completed instruments. Like the binocular, most of the 
assembly could be done by semi-skilled workers with relatively little training, but fording 
enough hands was still a problem and manning shortages grew throughout 1915. 
By the end of the year Harold Jackson was complaining that it was difficult `explaining 
to athletic young men that ... making tiny prisms is as valuable to the Country as sticking 
a German with a bayonet'. As in other industries, it was hard to keep men away from the 
colours, and the OMGD promised to send Barr & Stroud an open letter explaining to the 
workforce how vital the firm's output really was to the war. 75 But neither the letter nor 
subsequent posters could persuade the young to eschew the bayonet and by Spring 1916 
the shortages, although not critical, were sufficient to require some urgent remedy. The 
only new source of labour available had never been used previously by Barr & Stroud, 
to whom the idea of having women in the factory was a somewhat problematical novelty. 
73 Moss and Russell (1988) p. 80, OH Vol. I, Part 1, Appendix Up. 145, and OH Vol. XI, Part 3, Appendix 
III, p. 133. 
"From UGD 295/19/2/4, /19/2/5 and 19/2/6. 
73 UGD 295/4/625, Letter Book, Jackson to Esslemont 27.12.1915. 
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Unlike much of the London optical industry, it is clear that the firm had no prejudice 
against women, but where Kershaw employed them for 80 percent of its workforce, Barr 
& Stroud never had more than 16 percent on its payroll. 76 Whatever Trade Union 
opposition existed was dealt with through the mechanism of the Munitions Act, and the 
relatively small percentage actually employed resulted from the firm's wish to use female 
workers to the best advantage. Unlike Kershaw, where `girl labour' was widely 
employed and where workers were expected to be able to carry out straightforward 
machine-minding tasks within only hours of starting work, Barr & Stroud intended to 
employ women on a variety of work including fine and skilled operations such as scale 
dividing and engraving. Because it planned to draw on those who had either never 
worked outside the home or had been employed in retail or similar trades, the firm 
recognised that the first, and possibly greatest, difficulty in employing women would be 
in their adjustment to a factory environment that was greatly different to anything they 
had known previously. Those engaged were `specially selected from a large number of 
applicants' and were originally required to `go through a short course of training ... to 
accustom [them] to factory life' before instruction began in a special Training School 
teaching skilled operations such as milling, scale dividing and even tool grinding. This 
was far-removed from the earliest private initiatives to draw in female labour described 
by Arthur Marwick, when, for example, the Ladies Moir and Cowan had begun training 
`leisured ladies' for part-time weekend work at Vickers' Erith works in Kent 77 
Barr & Stroud saw women as potentially an asset to be directed at specific skills 
shortages, but they were by no means the first Glasgow munitions makers to adopt such 
ideas and might possibly have been encouraged by the steps taken in 1915 by William 
Beardmore & Co. to train women for skilled engineering work. 78 Even though the 
ambitious training programme had to be curtailed in deference to the Ministry's policy of 
not delaying the `introduction of large numbers', women were still given individual 
instruction in the optical and fitting shops where their performance was judged `as 
76 UGD 295/26/1/14, Strang Papers, historical notes concerning women workers 1916-1918, provide the 
source material for Barr & Stroud in the remainder of this section, unless otherwise indicated. 
"A. Marwick, Women at War 1914-1918 (London: Fontana, 1977) p. 60. 
78 A. Marwick (1977) p. 60. 
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efficient as men'. Unlike some Glasgow engineering firms, such as the ordnance makers 
William Beardmore & Co., which took a considerable time to provide even the most 
basic facilities for women, 79 Barr & Stroud planned their integration from the outset and 
went to considerable lengths to provide for it in order to maximise the benefits of the 
new labour force. Separate `Cloak room' facilities were provided in 1916 for the 300- 
plus women workers expected, and a full-time `Matron' appointed to look after `the 
women's welfare and interests in every way' outside the workshops. According to 
Harold Jackson's post-war summary of the exercise, there were few difficulties in the 
workshops themselves, and the quality of work done by relatively inexperienced female 
operatives was generally highly satisfactory and their attitude to their jobs `more 
assiduous' than their male colleagues. 
Labour problems were managed more easily than optical glass. Its shortage and 
inconsistency was a different sort of problem, and although never so bad as to bring 
production to a halt it caused difficulties right up to the war's end. In late 1916 Barr & 
Stroud began small scale production of the most problematical glasses as part of a policy 
to make the firm increasingly independent of the outside supply of raw materials and 
components, measures which were so successful that by 1918 almost the only important 
remaining external requirement was for the most common glasses that were required in 
bulk. Deliveries of these were still difficult even in late 1918 but, by careful management 
and complaining vociferously to the OMGD, stocks usually remained high enough to 
keep production going. 80 
Rangefinder supply ran continuously throughout the war. Both the Army and the Royal 
Navy were adequately supplied and Barr & Stroud had enough capacity to overhaul large 
numbers of instruments damaged in service, running and staffing a workshop at 
Woolwich just to handle Army work. Far from being worn-out in November 1918, the 
firm was fu ther expanding its works to handle new Admiralty orders and was 
undertaking optical computation on an increasing scale. Where in 1914 the vast majority 
"A. Marwick (1977) pp. 61- 67. 
60 UGD 295/14/634, Letter Book, Jackson to OMGD agreeing to take on extra contracts. 
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of optical components were bought in, four years later the business was entirely 
independent of other sources for grinding and polishing and so well equipped to handle 
large scale production that it was ready to begin supplying the U. S, forces in Europe. 81 
Despite the success of rangefinder production for both services, it was initially seriously 
inhibited by the War Office's attitude to the company.; The War Office proved a difficult 
and obstructive buyer, and a crisis in output was averted only by the creation of the 
Ministry of Munitions which acted as a buffer between maker and user. The subsequent 
relationship between the company and the OMGD provides an alternative to the picture 
painted in the official History, where the industry is portrayed as the beneficiary of State 
assistance. 
When the War Office began its large orders in the Autumn of 1914, it sought to impose 
conditions under the provisions of the Defence of the Realm Act that the firm considered 
irksome and disruptive, and which greatly prejudiced the prospects for output. The War 
Office demanded priority for its orders over all other work; the Defence Act gave it the 
legal power to do so, but it seemingly remained oblivious to the problems created by 
such insistence, particularly when it sought to extend its primacy over Admiralty orders 
as well. Firstly, it prohibited the export of more than 15 rangefinders each week to 
France, despite existing orders and that country's urgent need for them. Then in January 
1915, the War Office instructed Barr & Stroud to end its efforts to secure the U. S. 
Navy's future rangefinder business, in order to concentrate on output for the British 
Army. Objections were fruitless: `The War Office has even threatened to take over the 
control of our works' wrote Jackson to his American agents with ill-concealed bad 
humour. 82 The next month the War Office totally forbade the shipping of any 
rangefinders to France, disrupting an inter-governmental agreement to obtain French 
optical glass in exchange for uninterrupted deliveries of rangefinders and bringing 
81 UGD 295/19/2/6, Customer Order files, C04000 of 22.8.1918 records an order for 300 artillery 
rangefinders for U. S. Army. 
82 UGD 295/4/114, Letter Book, Jackson to Keuffel & Esser, New York, 8.1.1915. 
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repercussions from the French government which temporarily ended all supplies of the 
optical glass on which rangefinder output largely depended. 83 
To the company, the War Office was a difficult and obdurate customer. It demanded 
priority in all things, disregarded all the firm's commitments to the Admiralty and Allies 
alike, frustrated opportunities for new foreign business, and yet failed to take up 
everything that the firm had available for delivery. By June relations had deteriorated to 
the point where there was open distrust of the War Office's good faith in Glasgow, and 
Jackson believed that it intended to buy artillery rangefinders from Bausch & Lomb in 
the USA rather than in Britain. 84 The War Office was far from an ideal client, and what 
must have been particularly irksome to Barr & Stroud was that the value of its business 
since August 1914 was still only two thirds of the Admiralty's in the same period and far 
less than France's had been in 1913.85 
The arrival of the OMGD ended this imbroglio and illustrated the pragmatic approach it 
frequently adopted. Cheshire and Esslemont both understood that irrespective of their 
duty to organise supplies for the Army, the Navy's need was equally great and could not 
be obstructed. The OMGD immediately instructed that dealings with the Admiralty 
should be done directly and independently of contracts for the War Office. 86 This 
permitted the firm to keep the Navy's business adequately prioritised and doubtless eased 
problems in proceeding with Admiralty work. Then, in July, Cheshire visited Glasgow, 
marking the start of what seems to have been an amicable and symbiotic (if 
asymmetrical) relationship between the firm and the OMGD 87 So far as control was 
concerned, the company showed no sign of opposition to it. Jackson had no doubt that 
de facto War Office control had existed since December, so that the prospect of dealing 
es PRO BT 66/1/MMW 11, Nature of Demand for Optical Glass: minute from OMGD to Ministry of 
Munitions, 8.7.1915, warned of a likely embargo on French deliveries if rangefinder deliveries were again 
suspended. 
"UGD 295/4/10, Letter Book, Jackson to Major Benson, Royal Artillery, Woolwich, 28.6.1915. 
as Extracted from UGD 295/19/2/3, /19/213 and /19/2/4, Customer Order files. 
86 UGD 295/4/625, Letter Book, Jackson to Director General Munitions Supply, 17.7.1915, acknowledging 
instructions. 
87 UGD 295/4/625, Letter Book, Jackson to Cheshire, 23.7.1915, acknowledging arrangements for visit. 
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with a new and more accommodating agency was likely to have been an agreeable 
prospect. 88 
The correspondence between Cheshire and Esslemont and the firm shows that they 
regarded both the company and its senior staff as their organisational and intellectual 
equals, rather than seeing them, like the rest of the optical industry, as being in need of 
assistance and direction. However, this sentiment was by no means wholly reciprocated, 
and the company's records indicate that it sometimes felt that the OMGD itself required 
instruction and correction. It may have helped the firm's confidence to know that almost 
its entire Board had academic credentials better than the OMGD's management and that 
the business was indisputably the world's most successful maker of optical munitions. 
In August, Esslemont asked Barr & Stroud for `private and confidential' details of its 
experiences with British optical glass, and Jackson's reply dealt at length with both the 
commercial and technical difficulties in dealing with Chance Brothers-89 His strong 
assertion that unsatisfactory business structure rather than scientific inadequacy was the 
root of Chance's manufacturing problems went beyond what had been asked for, and was 
a theme that Esslemont subsequently took up not only with the glass maker but also in 
his later approach to binocular manufacture. In September, Jackson called for a `fines' 
conference' to examine the problems of overcoming the lack of optical glass and skilled 
optical labour, which Esslemont duly organised-90 Jackson's summary perhaps made 
uncomfortable reading for the OMGD. He questioned Esslemont's confidence in 
guaranteeing adequate glass deliveries and reminded him that increased output at 
Glasgow depended on Barr & Stroud itself being able to develop `machines and 
methods' for the successful use of unskilled labour, in view of which he firmly refused to 
commit the firm to further increases in production, whatever their importance or 
urgency. 91 
°° UGD 295/4/119, Letter Book, Jackson to Senechal, 12.7.1915 complaining of effects of War Office 
control after December 1915. 
" UGD 295/4/625, Letter Book, Jackson to Esslemont, 9.8.1915. 
90 UGD 295/4/625, Jackson to Esslemont, 18.9.1915. 
91 UGD 295/4/625, Jackson to Esslemont, 21.9.1915. 
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At the same time he promised to help Frederick Cheshire to give a lecture on 
rangefinders by providing background technical information to fill gaps in his 
knowledge. Jackson sent the material and `a little model' with the firm's compliments 
and a gentle reminder that virtually every European army already had both the 
information and the model, including `the Technische Militar Komittee [sic. ] in Berlin'. 
In a tactful postscript he added `If Mr Esslemont is jealous [of the model], I shall be 
pleased to send him a duplicate'. Jackson perhaps considered that Cheshire just was 
starting on a steep learning curve. 92 
It is difficult to see any other British firm taking these attitudes. But then Barr & Stroud 
was in many ways the embodiment of what Cheshire was prescribing for the whole 
optical industry -a soundly managed, well financed and profitable business that used 
scientifically trained staff, modem plant and manufacturing methods, employed a 
motivated and well managed workforce and which was, above all, demonstrably 
successful against foreign competition. It was therefore ironic that Archibald Barr 
himself did not see the firm as an optical instrument maker, or indeed any kind of 
scientific instrument maker; he was absolutely certain it was an engineering company 
that employed optical components and the war only served to confirm this long-standing 
conviction. 
Barr emphasised this by refusing to connect the firm with other optical manufacturers. 
He repeatedly turned down invitations to have the firm represented at informal trade 
gatherings in London early in the war, and declined to join a proposed scientific 
instrument makers' federation in July 1915 because 
`honestly (and privately) we do not feel disposed to place ourselves in any way 
under obligation to abide by decisions made by those who are possibly under 
very different conditions from our own'. 93 
"For the preceding quotations see UGD 295/4/625, Jackson to Esslemont 9.8.1915. The `little model' was 
of an infantry soldier using a Barr & Stroud rangefinder. Cheshire's lecture subsequently won him the 
Optical Society's Traill-Taylor Memorial Medal for advances in optics. For the learning curve, see UGD 
295/4/625, Jackson to Esslemont, 22.10.1915; Jackson to Esslemont and Cheshire, 26.10.1915. 
93 UGD 295/4/118, Letter Book, C. Beck to Barr, 3.6.1915. 
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Eventually he drew a line under attempts to persuade him join similar bodies by very 
firmly declining not only the offer of the Vice-Presidency of the newly formed British 
Optical Instrument Makers' Association but even membership of it. He was not 
`disposed to associate' the firm because `our work is so very different... ' from other 
optical makers. 94 With 1,500 metal workers to just one hundred optical workers both the 
firm and its work were indeed as different as the way it achieved its success. 95 
6.7 Conclusion 
The optical munitions industry's efforts in the three areas examined here embraced 
degrees of success that differed in their completeness and scale. The binocular and 
riflescope were both instruments not previously produced in great quantity or at high 
speed in Britain - indeed, the riflescope had only been made in minuscule amounts. Both 
were manufactured during the war by firms who had no previous experience with them, 
the riflescope being made with much more conspicuous success largely because the 
numbers needed were relatively small and well suited to the sort of optical manufacture 
typical of British pre-war practice. But that practice was not the skilfully distorted image 
that Cheshire deliberately fostered to achieve a long-term goal, rather it embodied both 
scientific training and commercial expertise that could adapt well to a new specialised 
requirement when that need fitted in with the existing capacity. Aldis in particular built 
on its inherent skills to become a much larger entity, making a wider variety of 
instruments than it did before the war; it benefited from its war work and `span' into its 
own growth. Success in volume binocular production was harder to find because the 
lack of any adaptable facility meant everything had to be created from scratch, and 
although clearly in sight by the end of the war the promised high output rate was still not 
achieved. The characteristic of the riflescope makers in being strangers to the product 
was emphasised in Kershaw's manufacturing background, and extended by a 
considerable degree through his complete unfamiliarity with optical work. But Kershaw 
showed that his production methodologies could be successfully translated into a 
94UGD 29514/740, Letter Book, Barr to C. Beck, 8.5.1916. 
9S UGD 295/4/625, Letter Book, Jackson to Secretary of Ministry of Munitions, return of workers 
employed, 20.7.1915. 
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different field and, had the supporting infrastructure that Esslemont gambled on been in 
place, the project would have doubtless fulfilled its promise sooner. Unfamiliarity was 
shown to be no bar to successful manufacture. 
The rangefinder was a very different case to the others. Barr & Stroud showed that the 
transition from peace to war production was still problematical even when the business 
was both experienced and well equipped to handle large scale output. This was partly 
because of the unexpected scale of the war, but partly because the firm's incomplete 
vertical integration left it vulnerable to a supply structure which was much weaker than 
the body it fed. The scale and organisation of the business allowed a metamorphosis 
sufficient to eliminate most of its vulnerability and it reached the end of the war in a 
condition almost universally improved from mid-1914, able to design and manufacture a 
wider range of more complex instruments with a greater level of efficiency. Barr & 
Stroud needed little help from the OMGD, except where issues were essentially political 
such as War Office policy in 1915. If this chapter has said relatively little about problems 
in rangefinder manufacture for the Army, it is because there is really little to say, even if 
the job was problematical, the goods were delivered in sufficient numbers to satisfy the 
immediate demand. 
In early November 1918, the British optical munitions industry was working at high 
speed and full capacity, and in all the cases examined preparing either to further increase 
output or introduce new and improved instruments; the Armistice on 11th November 
apparently took all the manufacturers by surprise and created what was little short of 
chaos. The next chapter examines the reasons why that situation came about and 
examines how the industry dealt with it. 
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Chapter 7 
Industrial demobilisation and implosion, 1919 
7.1 Introduction 
For the optical munitions industry, the end of the war came unexpectedly and 
prematurely. Irrespective of the political desire to end hostilities and the sentiments being 
voiced in the press, it had been very much `business as usual' right up to November 10th 
1918.1 There had been no scaling-down of contracts and no warnings from the Ministry 
of Munitions of any imminent likelihood of cancellations. All the manufacturers were 
wholly employed in the war effort and had not even begun to consider in practical terms 
their policies for industrial demobilisation and a return to peace-time trading. The efforts 
of the Ministry to set the optical industry on a better footing had not yet reached a stage 
where substantial improvements in organisation or infrastructure had been achieved. The 
pre-war optical instruments industry had been conscripted and metamorphosised into the 
war-time optical munitions industry with some considerable success, but nothing had 
been done to cater for the inevitable end of large-scale government orders. For the hugely 
expanded industry, the transition back to peace was a difficult process. Its constituent 
firms had to come to terms with the disappearance of government business and the 
problems of making up the lost demand from a civilian market which had gone into 
suspense in 1914. The `demobilisation' of the war-time industry highlighted the 
incomplete state of the Ministry of Munitions' efforts to improve the condition of the 
optical industry, and reflected the companies' collective inability to cope with the 
organisational and financial problems which the war had generated. 
The war had gone a long way towards the creation of an effective (and clearly 
identifiable) optical munitions industry, or a `technological system' of manufacture. The 
widespread changes imposed by the closing-down of war-time demand may be 
interpreted as being simply a deterministic outcome of returning peace, but they were by 
no means uniform across the whole industry and the behaviour of Barr & Stroud in 
particular, suggests that, once again, the `more flexible mode of interpretation' espoused 
1 See Lorna S. Jaffe, The Decision to Disarm Germany (London: Allen & Unwin, 1985), Chapters 2 and 4. 
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by Thomas Hughes' most closely accords with events. Even where firms made the 
transition back to peace with little success and much difficulty, they still had to cope with 
the `plethora of variables' mentioned in the introduction to this study, attempting to 
manage a range of political, economic and social factors besides the scientific and 
technical ones relating directly to the products of artefacts. 
7.2 The problems of total mobilisation 
The Great War had drawn into optical munitions manufacture firms which previously 
had little or no experience in the field. Their pre-war business had come from 
manufacturing microscopes, survey apparatus, photographic lenses and telescopes, trade 
which had gradually vanished as the Ministry involved more and more of those 
businesses in military manufacturing. The result was that these `conscript suppliers' lost 
not only their pre-war business, but also close contact with the markets for that business. 
The Ministry's contract records show that almost all the pre-war `commercial' optical 
makers had become so involved with government contracting that by November 1918 
they were completely dependent on orders for the armed forces. Mobilisation of the 
optical instruments industry was, in a sense, complete. Not only had these businesses put 
aside their familiar products, they had also been forced to adopt changes in their 
workforce and methods of production. The demand for instruments and components on a 
scale previously unknown, along with the necessity to use less-skilled labour, had meant 
that new machinery had been introduced and what often amounted to an entirely new 
work-force had been created at the Ministry's instigation. This should have placed the 
makers in a good position to move back into the commercial marketplace, but under 
guarantees given to Trade Unions in 1915 and 1916, those who had worked in the 
industry were guaranteed re-employment at the war's end. Those returning from the war 
were ill-prepared for a changed factory environment, even if there was work for them to 
do. 
Although the optical industry had indeed been transformed by the war, 2 this 
metamorphosis had been directed to meeting the war's demands, and little or nothing had 
2 see Chapter 6 above. 
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been done to develop commercial products. The potential for more efficient manufacture 
was compromised or negated by four years of stagnation in design and civil product 
development. Although there was concern in the Ministry for the industry's long-term 
future, measures to secure that future were still only partly formed by late 1918. The 
cessation of war-related orders left the `conscript' makers in a problematical situation 
where they had neither government business nor commercial trade to rely on. 
Two of the three firms which had been most involved in optical munitions manufacture 
before the war - the `regular' contractors - had also made commercial products as well. 
Like the `conscripts', Ottway &Co. Ltd. and the Ross Optical Company were suddenly 
faced with the problems of returning to peace-time trading in civilian markets. Barr & 
Stroud, however, had no civil products before the war and relied entirely on armament 
related business which had come principally from foreign states. The ending of large 
scale munitions contracts posed an even greater potential problem for Barr & Stroud than 
it did for the other war-time makers, all of whom had at least some previous experience 
of the civil trade in optical goods. For everyone, though, the immediate problem was 
disengagement from government contracting and securing the best possible fmancial 
settlement for cancelled contracts. 
7.3 The Ministry of Munitions' plans for demobilisation 
The placing of contracts by the Ministry of Munitions had been done under rules which 
safeguarded both the State and the manufacturers, providing for the amendment of 
contracts, as well as their early termination. In the event of the latter, there was the right 
to compensation for the manufacturer, so long as he was not in breach of the contract's 
terms. 3 Many were very substantial, with lengthy periods for completion. They 
represented a steady source of business for which payment was never in doubt, and to 
which firms frequently tailored premises, machinery and workforce. Despite the apparent 
security and certainty of munitions work, the contractors should have understood that it 
was by no means immune to curtailment or cancellation, but events after the Armistice 
3 See Great Britain, Ministry of Munitions, Official History of the Ministry ofMunitions (London: HMSO, 
1922) Vol. III Part 2 pp 112-143 for details of contract termination procedures. 
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suggest that these eventualities had been disregarded or forgotten. Contract cancellations 
began on November 12 t''4 and for the Ministry's Contracts Department, it appears that 
the start of the Armistice was synonymous with the certain end of the war. 
This immediate cancellation of optical contracts was in line with the general policy that 
had been given `much attention' by the Ministry of Munitions `for many months before 
the Armistice'. 5 The greatest problem identified by the Committee on Demobilisation 
and Reconstruction in connection with the War's eventual end was the cancellation of 
contracts no longer required `with minimum disturbance to industry and labour', with the 
settling-up of contractors' accounts as the next most important matter to be dealt with. 
Two alternatives for the termination of orders had been considered in depth before a 
decision was reached that was intended to be applied universally across all munitions 
production. The first possibility was to begin by slowing down the tempo of output and 
then to reduce the scale of production so that contracts would go through a gradual 
process of arrest, spreading the rate and scale of redundancies over enough time to let 
civil production resume and absorb the munitions workers who would be progressively 
released from war-work. That process would be helped by what was expected to be high 
levels of demand for consumer goods after the shortages of the preceding three years. 
The second, more radical, option was to discontinue munitions contracts `at the earliest 
possible moment' whatever the immediate effect on the labour market, in the expectation 
that rapid freeing-up of capacity for civil products would encourage a quicker reversion 
to pre-war conditions. The final choice was for the instant discontinuation of war 
contracts because it was felt that it was `undesirable that the output of useless munitions 
should be continued a day longer than was absolutely necessary', a principle the 
Committee decided could safely be applied once it knew that `unemployment allowances 
would be paid to civilian war workers after demobilisation'. The basis on which the 
Ministry of Munitions then made its plans was that reversion to peace-time production 
4 National Archives, Kew, (subsequently PRO) MUN 4/5308, Contract Liquidation Records, shows 
responses to cancellation notices dating from November 13th, i. e. to correspondence which must have been 
written on the 11th or 12th . $ OH Vol. II, Part 1, `Administrative Policy and Organisation', Supplement, p. 16; pp. 15 to 19 provide 
source material for the rest of this section, unless otherwise indicated, and pp 20 to 42 other background 
material. 
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had primacy, and that considerations of the subsequent effects on labour were `not 
preponderating'. 
It seems that so far as the optical industry at least was concerned, there was no 
knowledge of this policy, and the Ministry's own historian conceded that `arrangements 
for demobilisation were not complete' by the Armistice. However, the plans for 
immediate contract terminations obviously were in place, and they went into operation 
without delay, to the consternation of the optical makers. 
7.4 Contract cancellations and their effects 
The immediate and sharp reactions clearly illustrate the extent of the optical industry's 
dependency on government orders. R&J Beck, probably the country's second-largest 
optical munitions contractor, wrote to OMGD on the 13th that the cancellation of their 
Dial Sight and Trench Periscope contracts would cause `the immediate lay-off of 1,300 
men'. 6 To avoid this, Beck asked for `an arrangement' whereby the contracts could be 
run-down rather than cut off short. Six days later, the Ross Optical Company, which 
shared Dial Sight contracts with Beck as well as having other large orders, told OMGD 
that the Contracts Department's instruction that all supplies were to be discontinued 
within three months meant that about half their 700 employees would be thrown out of 
work. 7 Like Beck, Ross asked for help in avoiding this. E. R. Watts & Co. (one of the 
many `conscripts') said their entire working capital of £10,000 was tied up in optical 
munitions contracts, and they had no civilian orders at all. Adam Hilger Ltd, a much 
smaller firm, warned that it would immediately have to make thirty redundancies and 
then progressively to dismiss `all the optical glass workers ... engaged 
by us during the 
war'. 8 Serious problems were rapidly emerging. 
These contract terminations were almost certainly made without prior liaison with 
OMGD, possibly because of the incomplete state of the Ministry's planning. The optical 
6 G. A. B. Dewar, The Great Munition Feat 1914-1918 (London: Constable, 1921) p. 222, and PRO MUN 
4/5308,, letter R&J Beck to OMGD, 13.11.1918. 
PRO MUN 4/5308, letter, Ross Optical Co. to OMGD, 19.11.1918. 
'PRO MUN 4/5308, letter, Hilger Ltd to OMGD, 21.11.1918. 
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section, having worked hard towards improving the industry's overall condition, showed 
immediate concern over the potentially damaging effects of sudden large-scale 
cancellations .9 As early as the 15th, there were discussions with the Treasury about 
whether contracts could be slowed down to allow a transition from war work and 
minimise redundancies. 10 Whilst insisting that it could not `deal preferentially with any 
trade except for a very short period' the'Treasury conceded that there was actually no 
objection in principle as the industry was a `new one', although a decision needed to be 
taken quickly about `the subsequent course' for its future. On the 18th, the Minister of 
Munitions asked for a schedule of likely redundancies, to which OMGD replied that 
although it was not possible to produce an exact figure, `the total number of employees 
in the whole of the optical and scientific industries is only about 10,000'. 11 The Minster 
was assured that `arrangements' would be made to minimise losses, but there was no hint 
of what these would be. 
There was ambivalence in OMGD's response to the question of redundancies. On the one 
hand was the desire to minimise the effects of cancellations, but on the other was the 
clear suggestion that the problem was of limited scale. If there were `only about 10,000' 
workers involved, then the scale of the problem could be regarded as small by the 
Government, with the implication that its solution might not be expensive or 
controversial. This was an echo of Frederick Cheshire's strategy in approaching the 
question of overhauling the industry in 1915 - the deliberate management and 
presentation of truth to create an image which would facilitate a desired outcome. A 
letter from R&J Beck to the Controller of Optical Munitions on November 18"' said that 
the firm had been told to propose a scheme `to keep a reasonable number of our hands 
employed and to prevent our disbanding an efficient organisation which might be of 
service for assisting the reconstruction of the optical industry'. 12 Beck's letter did not say 
by whom the instruction had been given, but a reasonable assumption is that it came 
9 Nothing seen in the PRO MUN contract cancellation files has shown any collaboration over cancellations 
prior to the Armistice. 
° PRO MUN 4/5308, minute, P. G. Henriques to HA Colefax, OMGD, 15.11.1918. 
PRO MUN 4/5308, minute, G. Garnsey to HA Colefax, OMGD, 18.11.1918. 
12 PRO MUN 4/5308, letter R. & J. Beck to Controller Optical Munitions Supply, 18.11.1918. 
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from OMGD's Administrative Director, and was intended to support a case for holding 
together as many skilled workers as possible. 
It was apparent that the vast quantity of optical munitions on order for Britain and her 
Allies was no longer needed and that almost all contracts would have to be ended 
prematurely. Although the industry was bound to be adversely affected, there were 
safeguards which provided for compensation payments when a contract was terminated 
by the State. 13 An `Optical Munitions Liquidation Committee' was set up to manage the 
cancellations, and by the end of November it had delivered a report. 
14 Its responsibilities 
were to decide which contracts to close, which, if any, to maintain, and to scrutinise the 
performance of companies which might be eligible for payments under the termination 
provisions. To qualify for compensation payments or `liquidation amounts', a maker not 
only had to have suffered a contract's premature ending, but also must not have been in 
default of its terms. A series of `preliminary investigations' was started to assess 
whether, from the State's point of view, contactors had actually complied with the terms 
and conditions of the orders placed. '5 
This may have been sound practice, but because of the often confused placing and 
revision of orders, any rapid and accurate assessment of compliance was likely to be 
extremely difficult. OMGD appreciated the situation many of the contractors found 
themselves in, and had what might loosely be termed a `vested interest' in their survival 
and future prosperity. There was an inclination towards supporting the makers in their 
appeals for financial assistance, although as will be shown, OMGD was by no means 
blind to the failings of some of them. The Liquidation Committee, on the other hand, was 
looking for evidence of non-compliance, and had no brief to assist the contractors. 
The first to be scrutinised in detail were Beck and Ross. Other firms had been subjected 
to `preliminary reports for liquidation [of contracts]', but on November 2901 the 
13 OH, Vol. I, section 2 details these safeguards. 
14 PRO MUN 4/5313, Contract liquidations, summary of decisions made by Optical Munitions Liquidation 
Committee, 29.11.1918. 
'S PRO MUN 4/5313, summary of decisions. 
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Liquidation Committee decided that `Special Investigations should be made on Ross and 
Beck ... at the earliest possible date', probably because of their large contracts for the 
expensive artillery `Dial Sight No. 7', whose liquidation involved very considerable 
sums of money. 16 The Controller of Optical Munitions advised that the Ministry was 
`obliged under outstanding contracts' to take an additional 4,550 sights at a cost of 
£230,000, whether it wanted them or not. 17 After rangefinders, dial sight contracts had 
been the largest in value and were the Ministry's greatest liability. They had been 
numerous, subject to much amendment, and were a mixture of `running' ones (calling for 
minimum delivery rates over an indefinite period) and those for a specified quantity (not 
always with a delivery deadline). 18 For Beck and Ross, this was valuable long-term 
business, and its premature ending must have been viewed with great concern. 
Compensation provisions gave less than the full value of the contract, and a `War Break 
Clause' allowed the Ministry to escape from the contract altogether under certain 
circumstances; evidence of default in particular would absolve the Ministry from any 
liability for payment. 
If the Liquidation Committee was hoping for a verdict against the contractors, it must 
have been greatly disappointed by the findings of the `Special Investigations'. The 
investigators reported in less than three weeks, not just on Beck and Ross but on all the 
other firms that had been subjected to `preliminary investigations'. The Liquidator 
commented that 
... practically none of our contractors have 
been able to maintain the 
contracted rates of delivery in view of the pressures put upon them by this 
department - investigation clearly shows that default has not been due to 
negligence or circumstances within the control of the contractor. 19 
16 MUN 4/5308, Contract liquidations, sundry correspondence and MUN 4/5313, Liquidation Committee 
minute, 29.11.1918. 
17 MUN 4/5308, Controller OM to Sir W. Graham Greene, 4.12.1918. 
'a PRO MUN 4/745, Orders Placed for Scientific and Optical instruments etc, provides examples of such 
contracts and their delivery terms. 
" MUN 4/5308, Liquidator's note to Liquidation Committee, 20.12.1918. 
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It is tempting to think that the Special Investigators examined the sheaves of contracts 
and alterations held by the manufacturers, shook their heads in disbelief, and then went 
back to write a diplomatically worded report that exonerated the trade whilst not 
specifically blaming any one party at the Ministry. To establish a case for default would 
have required detailed and necessarily long investigation of each individual contract. The 
report simply pointed out what everyone connected with optical munitions supply 
already knew - that the process of procurement and supply during the war had been 
characterised by pressure and confusion, had been immensely complicated by shortages 
of capacity, raw materials and labour, and not infrequently exacerbated by delays in 
acceptance by the Army through squabbles over the minutiae of quality control 2° 
The report may have been made more acceptable, or even encouraged, because by then 
`the labour situation was so difficult' that the Minister of Labour was asking Liquidation 
Officers `to avoid any action which might result in violent dislocation'. 21 Arrangements 
for paying unemployment allowances were still not in place, and there was a belated 
recognition that, as the Armistice was still no guarantee that hostilities were finally over, 
it would be imprudent to disperse `the means of production' prematurely. Those fears 
had disappeared by the start of 1919, and the process of termination resumed after a brief 
but important check that bought some small measure of relief to the optical industry. 
Having accepted, for whatever reasons, that there were no general grounds to escape 
paying for prematurely terminated contracts, the Liquidator of Optical Munitions 
Contracts told OMGD in early January that the general policy is [now] to close down 
contracts for [all] stores not required by mid-March [1919]s. 22 The Army's drastic 
reduction meant the ending of practically all War Office orders as demands rapidly fell to 
pre-war levels. The policy from March was to be one of ordering `commercial articles' 
instead in order to aid civilian industry. For the `regular' optical munitions makers, this 
was hardly a blessing. Although the War Office might support civilian industry by 
20 see Chapters 6 and 7 above. 
21 OH, Vol. II, Part 1, Supplement, p. 17. u PRO MUN 4/5308, Edmund Batty to T. Knowles, OMGD, 10.1.1919 supplies this and the following 
quotation. 
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ordering off-the-shelf products, the amount of `commercial articles' the War Office 
would need for its optical inventory was virtually nil. Specialised optical munitions were 
held in very large quantities and requirements would be minimal for the foreseeable 
future, so that the specialist capability of the firms drawn into optical munitions work 
was now redundant. It required little prescience to recognise that British military 
contracting would support none of the war-time `conscript industry' and by no means all 
of the `regulars'. 
Although compensation payments had been virtually guaranteed by the Liquidation 
Committee's findings, the instructions to cease production meant that skilled operatives 
would be without work until new business was found, and employers were unable and 
unwilling to pay an idle workforce out of limited and dwindling resources. Firms 
urgently needed some means to keep trained workers productively employed whilst 
attempts were made to recover their pre-war business and slowing down contracts would 
have been helped to do this. In fact, the Controller of Munitions Supply had told OMGD 
on December 16`h that although all contracts extending beyond eight weeks were to be 
terminated he now had authority to slow down optical contracts `instead of using the 
guillotine' 23 As his remit extended far beyond optics, this suggests that the industry's 
need for some special treatment had already been recognised. However, on January 10th 
1919, the Liquidator's announcement about closing-down contracts showed the policy 
had been revised and replaced by one of making cash payments instead, an alteration that 
compromised earlier intentions to nurture a `new industry'. 
The extreme situation of some firms is shown in surviving contract liquidation 
correspondence 24 R. & J. Beck had no new designs for commercial markets; their 
technical design staff had been `entirely engaged' on war work since 1915, and 
development of civil lines had been precluded. E. R. Watts & Son had become totally 
dedicated to war production and, having no free capital, was now 'financially 
embarrassed' with the loss of Ministry orders. The Ross Optical Company reported on 
' PRO MUN 4/5308 Minute, Controller to T. Knowles, 16.12.1918. 
24 PRO MUN 4/5308 and 4/5309, Contract Liquidation papers provides the source material for this section 
unless otherwise indicated. 
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January 20th 1919 that `All our contracts are now cancelled and all manufacture thereon 
has been stopped. ' Adam Hilger Ltd was in such a state that the firm's directors had 
applied to the Ministry of Munitions for `relief in respect of hardship through 
cancellation of contracts .. . '. Dollond & Co. Ltd was `totally engaged on government 
contracts' with over 4,000 prism binoculars in process of manufacture which were no 
longer required. These had prominent government ownership marks that were 
`impossible to remove', eliminating any chance of selling them commercially even if 
buyers could be found. W. Ottway & Co Ltd summed up the generally depressing 
situation in mid-January, writing that since the Armistice their efforts to get orders `all 
over the place', had produced orders totalling scarcely £100. Hard times had rapidly 
come on the optical industry. 
The war-time optical munitions makers had not generally been extensively involved in 
government contracting before 1915. All the fines, excepting Barr & Stroud, had relied 
on commercial sales to some extent and all had particular areas of expertise. 
25 For these 
firms, the problem was twofold; there was the matter of surviving until business could be 
recovered, and the need to scale-down both capacity and workforces from the levels 
generated by the war. Overlaid onto this need for transition were both staffing and 
financial difficulties rooted in the measures taken during 1915 to direct labour and 
control both profits and wages 26 
Despite the business it had received, the industry was by no means cash-rich at the end of 
1918. War-time profits had been geared to 1913/1914 levels which were taxed at 
increasingly higher rates and Excess Profit Duty levied on surpluses severely eroded 
retained earnings. The production of accounts during the chaotic conditions after 1915 
was generally delayed, meaning that provision had to be made for still-uncertain but 
expectedly large amounts of taxation. Operating costs had risen steeply from 1914 levels, 
27 
and the increasing rate of inflation, particularly in 1917 and 1918, meant that many 
25 See Appendix: List of Manufacturers. 
26 see OH Vol. I, part 2 for background details of this aspect of the control of industry. 
27 K Twigger, Inflation: The Value of the Pound 1750-1998 (London: House of Commons Library, 
Economics Policy and Statistics Section, 1999). 
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contracts had been far less profitable than expected when they were signed. Expensive 
additions to premises and plant had not always been funded by the Ministry of 
Munitions, and were financed either from cash reserves or with borrowed money bearing 
interest. Although the State sought to limit contractors' profits, it did not indemnify them 
against loss nor guarantee their liquidity. 
The Ministry's now-incomplete contract records indicate that the scale of compensation 
payments was substantial28 Those seen show that Beck was due to over £180,000, the 
Ross Optical Company due to almost £83,000, and Sir Howard Grubb & Co. was owed 
£20,500 for parts and optical tools alone. E. R. Watts & Son asked for an advance of 
£6,500 to cover their immediate needs which was paid immediately and without demur, 
suggesting that the total owing was substantially more. There had also been many 
contracts placed independently by the Admiralty up to November 1918. Submarine 
periscopes, complex prismatic gun sights for warship turrets, and naval rangefinders 
were never ordered through the Ministry, even after it formally assumed responsibility 
for Admiralty requirements in July 1917. Barr & Stroud's records show its Admiralty 
orders by 1918 were considerably greater than War Office ones, 
29 so it is reasonable to 
assume that Grubb, Ottway and Ross were also due to substantial amounts for Navy 
business. 
These amounts became important in the process of withdrawal from large-scale 
government contracting because they represented palliative redundancy payments for 
almost the entirety of the war-time industry. They also marked the departure of all the 
`conscripts' and some of the old `regulars' from optical munitions work. But, large as the 
liquidation payments might have been, they were far from unencumbered. Their value 
was eroded by inflation since the time prices had been originally agreed, and by the need 
to make provision for still-uncertain taxation and profits duty. But the subsequent story 
28 PRO MLJN 4/5305 to /5313, Contract liquidation records contain much information. These figures are 
taken from /5308. 
29 University of Glasgow, records of Barr & Stroud Ltd, (subsequently UGD) 295/19/6/3, London Office 
papers, Admiralty Contract Cancellation file. 
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of those departed manufacturers is not within the boundary of this account and must be 
sought elsewhere . 
7.4 Barr & Stroud versus the War Office and the Admiralty 
Given the extent of the difficulties being faced by the more broadly based firms, it might 
be expected that Barr & Stroud would have been seriously concerned by its prospects as 
it had no civil business to fall back on, and the large-scale termination of contracts 
represented the loss of most of its work. The company was in a somewhat curious 
position in 1919. During the war it had extended its competencies and skills and become 
self-sufficient in virtually all aspects of the design and production of rangefinders so it 
was potentially even stronger and more competitive than it had been in 1914. Expansion 
and vertical integration into glass production and optical computation had removed the 
two main pre-war weaknesses, and, in theory at least, equipped the firm to move into 
optical work outside munitions contracting. On the other hand, the extended factory was 
set up entirely for ordnance manufacture and the company's expertise was wholly in 
making munitions related instruments which were marketed through processes quite 
unlike civil products. Although, as already described, Barr & Stroud was largely 
insulated from many of the immediate problems facing almost all of the optical industry, 
the firm was by no means immune to the difficulties of adjusting to a peace that was very 
different to that of 1914. 
However, both its treatment and reactions were quite unlike those of the others, most of 
whom had signalled immediate and pressing problems. On November 15th, a meeting 
was held between Barr & Stroud's Harold Jackson, OMGD's administrative head, Mr 
Knowles, and a Captain Johnson who was presumably from the Ministry's Contracts 
Department 30 Jackson was asked to give `a considered statement' on the question of 
rangefinder manufacture and uncompleted orders. His summary indicates the complexity 
and confusion surrounding optical munitions ordering. Only a month before, it had been 
agreed that a large rangefinder contract be reduced from 2,000 to 1,500, but it was then 
decided that another 500 were actually needed to cover the `immediate needs' of Britain, 
30 UGD 295/4/635, Letter Book, HD Jackson to Controller of Optical Munitions Supply 20.11.1918, 
provides material for the rest of this paragraph. 
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Greece and the USA. The first contract was already being delivered, and uncompleted 
instruments were in such an advanced state of assembly that Jackson stated it would be 
`inadvisable' to terminate manufacture. As for the other 500, he thought that the Ministry 
should agree to their completion, work having already started and the firm's costing 
methods not providing for `an accurate estimate of accounts' until the entire order was 
completed. Barr & Stroud's opinion was that the Ministry should pay in full for whatever 
it had ordered, but unlike other makers, there is no evidence of desperation or 
embarrassment. On the 18th, Jackson indicated that the directors were happy to have the 
contract for a very large (and expensive) experimental coast-defence rangefinder 
cancelled, so long as the Ministry paid for all `out of pocket expenses' incurred . 
31 The 
company gave every impression of being in control of its affairs, although lay-offs were 
already starting. 
The first were the female workers that Barr & Stroud had begun recruiting once the need 
for dilution became pressing in 1917 32 Despite detailed planning for their training and 
integration, it was always clear that they were there only for the war's duration. On 
November 19th Jackson warned that redundancies were imminent and inevitable, 
advising them to seek alternative work before large numbers of other redundant women 
swamped the existing vacancies in traditional areas of female employment. 
3 The next 
day he informed the local Employment Exchange of the first of a series of redundancies 
in the male workforce which would begin on November 30th. The women numbered 
approximately 400 out of a total payroll of about 2,000, but there is no surviving record 
of the rate at which they were released. Presumably their dispersal was rapid, because by 
December 31", only 112 men out of 1,600 had been given notice, 34 which was a much 
smaller proportion of the workforce than the London firms had threatened to dismiss at 
short notice. 
31 UGD 295/4/617, Letter Book, Jackson to OMGD, 19.11.1918. 
32 see Chapter 7 for details about female workers 
33 UGD 295/16/1/58, Personal Papers of Dr W. Strang: works notices. 
34 UGD 295/1611/58, Personal Papers of Dr W. Strang: works notices. 
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This may have been because Barr & Stroud still had a considerable amount of Admiralty 
rangefinder and submarine periscope work. Over £140,000 of orders were placed during 
the first ten months of 1918, besides work in progress from the previous year's total of 
£264,000, and earlier contracts from 1916 35 These were not affected in the same way as 
War Office orders, because they related to ship construction programmes rather than 
immediate issues to troops. Warships already fitting-out were in no danger of 
cancellation, even though the urgency of completion had disappeared, and would still 
need their outfits of rangefinders. Besides these, large numbers of anti-aircraft 
rangefinders were also on order for ships in commission as well as submarine periscopes 
for boats nearing completion, none of which seemed threatened with premature 
conclusion. In addition, the Admiralty had ordered a number of experimental long-base 
rangefinders and mountings for trials in an effort to solve the gunnery problems disclosed 
at the Battle of Jutland in 1916.36 Although difficult to assess precisely, the total value of 
Barr & Stroud's Admiralty business in November 1918 must have been substantially in 
excess of half a million pounds, with a good proportion of it looking safe from 
cancellation. 37 
There was also a considerable amount of War Office work, not all of which was expected 
to terminate prematurely. Before allowing for cancellations and consolidations, some 
£292,000-worth of orders had been placed by the Ministry between March and October 
1918, (excluding contracts to repair rangefinders) which meant that a proportion of the 
workforce could be kept employed, at least in the short-term. 38 Scarcely a week after the 
armistice, the company decided to extend the lease on its Woolwich Arsenal premises 
(where instruments for repair were prepared for shipment to Glasgow) for a year, clearly 
signalling it had no immediate fears of War Office business vanishing overnight. 
39 
Nevertheless, there were still the problems of diminished government trade. The 
rangefinder contract discussed in November, for example, was worth over £100,000 and 
's Extracted from UGD 295/19/2/5 and /6, Customer Order files 1916-1919. 
36 UGD 295/19/2/5 and /6, Customer Order files 1918-1919. 
37 Estimated from figures extracted from UGD 295/19/216 and /7, Customer Order files. 
38 Extracted from UGD 295/19/2/6, Customer Order files 1916-1919. 
39 UGD 295/4/634, Letter Book, Jackson to lt, T. Lacey at Woolwich, 19.11.1918 
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its early termination involved a substantial loss of profit even after compensation. In the 
meantime, deliveries continued and there was the question of payment for them. 
Established practice was for payment only after goods had been inspected and accepted 
at Woolwich Arsenal, a procedure which had always been subject to delays. 0 The 
Ministry had been persuaded (or bullied) into paying a monthly `standard advance of 
£12,500' for instruments delivered and waiting inspection, but in January 1919 it 
proposed to terminate the arrangement. 41 The firm would have none of this, pointing out 
that dealing with the Ministry caused a `very unsatisfactory' cash position, illustrated by 
a December debit balance to the Ministry of £37,921, plus another £50,000 for work in 
progress. Rather than terminating the advance, said Jackson, the Munitions' Accounts 
Office should increase it to £35,000. The Ministry would not accept Jackson's 
exhortation to be more generous, but it did maintain the existing arrangement until the 
final liquidation payment in May 1919. 
Pressure on Barr & Stroud to accept cancellations on the Ministry's terms evidently 
grew. By the end of January, Jackson had refused to agree that no further deliveries 
would be accepted after certain dates, as well giving clear notice of Barr & Stroud's 
stance on the subject as a whole: 
We cannot ... accept cancellation of contracts without compensation, 
more especially as the reason for non-adherence to original delivery dates 
has arisen from causes entirely beyond our control. If therefore any of our 
contracts are deemed to be cancelled ... we reserve the right to claim full 
compensation. 42 
Jackson was quoting almost verbatim from the Special Investigator's report. 
40 see Chapters 6 and 7 above. 
41 UGD 295/4/634, Letter Book, Jackson to Director Munitions Accounts, 21.1.1919, provides the source 
material for the rest of this paragraph. 
42UGD 295/4/634. Letter book, Jackson to Liquidator of Optical Contracts, 27.1.1919, and UGD 
295/4/634, Letter Book, Jackson to Liquidator, Optical Munitions & Glassware Supply, 31.1.1919. 
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The skirmishing continued, particularly over the large order for 2,000 rangefinders. In 
early March, Jackson told the Liquidator that if the Ministry had not `interfered' then `.. . 
the full number of instruments would have been delivered, and presumably the full profit 
would have been made'. 43 The `fair way' was for the Ministry to pay for all materials and 
labour used, plus the previously agreed `oncost' factor of 70 percent, plus ten percent of 
that total for profit, and another ten percent, on the grand total for `royalty'. To show the 
firm's reasonable attitude to burdening the War Office with unwanted instruments, Barr 
& Stroud would then buy `the balance of the undelivered rangefmders at an agreed 
price'. 
The firm was asking compensation for some 650 instruments at the rate of £44.20 each, 
and its offer to buy them back amounted to £5,790, or less than L9 per rangefinder. 44 
Even though far less than the cost price, it was no trifling sum, implying either that Barr 
& Stroud could easily afford the purchase, or that there was some client in mind for 
them. [If there was, no sale followed; many of them were still in store in the late 1980s 
when the company finally left Anniesland when they were given gratis to any employee 
who wanted one. 45] By the 29th, the Liquidator had agreed to almost all the company's 
terms, except that he offered only 5 percent for `royalty' 46 Jackson stuck to the firm's 
guns; `We think we are entitled to some special consideration', he said, as they had been 
`inconvenienced' and in any case it was now `very hard' to sell rangefinders. As a 
parting shot, he reminded the Liquidator of a Government notice following the Armistice 
saying that `Contractors for war materials would be liberally [sic] dealt with'. By May 
2nd, the Liquidator had apparently given way, and almost all the negotiations over War 
Office contracts were ended. Jackson then wrote that £21,377 had been agreed upon for 
the rangefinders and `Everything is now settled I think, except for our claim for ... 
47 binocular prisms'. 
43 UGD 295/4/634, Letter Book, Jackson to Liquidator, Optical Munitions & Glassware Supply, 4.3.1919. 
"UGD 295/19/8/3, War Office file, papers on liquidation of rangefinder contracts 1919, Jackson to 
Liquidator, 8.4.1919 and 29.4.1919. 
45 Personal communication from Mr David Carson, head of Barr & Stroud's periscope department at the 
time of the move. 
46 UGD 295/4/634, Letter book, Jackson to Liquidator, Optical Munitions & Glassware Supply, 29.3.1919. 
47 UGD 295/4/634, Letter book, Jackson to Liquidator, Optical Munitions & Glassware Supply, 2.5.1919. 
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Although the Ministry had officially taken over responsibility for Admiralty supplies on 
June 30th 1917, Barr & Stroud continued to deal directly with the Navy over rangefinder 
contracts. Sorting out those cancellations was more protracted and difficult than for War 
Office ones, and only concluded in 1925 after much negotiation and not a few threats on 
both sides. Discussions began with the Director of Admiralty Contracts in August 1919 
and displayed the firm's willingness- to exploit its de facto monopoly position. 48 
Prices for war-time Admiralty contracts had generally been calculated on the same basis 
as for the Ministry of Munitions, the formula being `labour costs + materials costs + 
oncost factor + profit + royalty'. During the war the profit and royalty elements were 
standardised at 10 percent each, with materials and labour being calculated being the 
actual prices. The `oncost factor', devised in the 1890s to cover overheads and 
background expenses, was normally set at 70 percent. The firm, remained content with 
this formula when negotiating settlements with the Ministry, but things went differently 
with the Admiralty. 
Contracts made in 1917 and 1918 had sometimes departed from the usual arrangement, 
being made on the basis of a fixed sum to cover both the `oncost', and `profit and 
royalty' elements. In 1919, when these came under scrutiny for liquidation, Barr & 
Stroud became concerned that compensation payments would not - from the firm's point 
of view - fairly reflect the value of lost business. In August, Jackson pointed out that 
when made `there was an expectation of a long period of continuous work' and that both 
wage and commodity costs had been lower. 49 Rising costs had `rendered quite inadequate 
the sums originally considered fair and reasonable to cover oncost plus profit' so that 
some fixed-price contracts were already showing a loss, and others only a 'bare margin 
of profit' making it `imperative' for the firm to ask for a revision of the prices. 
The money involved was considerable, Jackson estimating in mid-September 1919 that 
the amount already owing on them was `considerably over £50,000'. There were also a 
48 UGD 295/19/6/3, Admiralty file, papers on liquidated and cancelled contracts, provides the source 
material for the following section, unless otherwise indicated. 
49 UGD 295/19/6/3, Jackson to Director of Contracts, 8.8.1919. 
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large number where even the basis for payment was still to be fixed. The company 
requested that all terminated contracts be settled on one basis irrespective of previous 
agreements, amounting to a retrospective increase in prices. To do this took no little 
nerve and showed considerable self-confidence because the fixed-sum contracts had been 
freely entered into, there was no legal ground for renegotiation, and by leaving open the 
matter of final profits the company had put itself in a weak position. As the client no 
longer urgently needed the instruments, Barr & Stroud's position might be considered to 
have been somewhat weak. 
The initial response from the Contracts Department certainly showed no inclination to 
help, peremptorily demanding a full list of the contracts involved and the full disclosure 
of profit and loss accounts from 1913 to 1918 50 In addition, the Director wrote that he 
was prepared to send the matter to the Treasury Contracts Committee which had the 
power to make a final decision against which there could be no appeal, implying that the 
firm might consequently find itself even worse off. Quite unshaken, Jackson sent only 
the list which information, he pointed out, the Director already had, and refused to 
provide accounts or balance sheets, saying `We do not see that they can furnish any 
useful information'. 51 In fact, there were as yet no results for 1917 and 1918; like other 
firms, Barr & Stroud had found the war's chaotic trading conditions meant that accounts 
were not only difficult to prepare but largely meaningless without some means to 
disentangle the involvement of the Ministry of Munitions in day-to-day business and to 
allow for inflation. 52 As for the threat to refer matters to the Treasury, he urged the 
Director of Contracts to do that `with the least possible delay', probably confident that 
the threat was hollow. (Having lit the touch-paper, the firm then had to watch it bum -a 
slow process which continued well beyond the boundaries of this study, lasting for six 
years before the Admiralty eventually settled all the claims virtually in full, paying out 
£356,808. ) 
so UGD 295/19/6/3, Letter Book, Admiralty to Barr & Stroud 12.8.1919. 
s' UGD 295/19/6/3, Letter Book, Jackson to Admiralty, 18.8.1919. 
52 UGD 295/11/1, Balance sheets, profit and loss accounts, Jackson's working papers. 
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These apparently fraught negotiations with the Contracts Department had no immediate 
effect on work in hand although, as will be seen in the following chapter, the whole 
relationship between the Royal Navy and the firm came under scrutiny at the Admiralty 
and the nature of that association began to change. New orders in 1919 totalled scarcely 
£10,000 but there was still a substantial amount of other work from earlier orders in 
progress, submarine periscope and anti-aircraft rangefinder development was proceeding 
steadily and a set of experimental rangefinders for trials nearing completion. 
53 Besides all 
this, the company was examining and reporting on war-time German instruments as they 
came into the Navy's possession, so that both technical staff and production workers 
were being kept busy for the moment. 54 
Although prepared to fight for as much as possible from its cancelled contracts, and 
although certain that a reduced level of Admiralty business would continue, Barr & 
Stroud - like all the other demobilised optical munitions contractors - was faced with a 
pressing need to secure additional work to avoid further contraction. Some of this might 
come from foreign navies which had been starved of up-to-date instruments during the 
war, but in early 1919 this was uncertain and hedged about with political considerations 
as the recent combatants considered their post-war positions. Diversification into civilian 
markets was one way for Barr & Stroud to hold its plant and workforce together. 
Michael Moss and lain Russell have given a useful `broad-brush' picture of the firm's 
efforts at extending its product base immediately after the Armistice, and William Reid 
has described its attempts to manufacture and market binoculars. 5s These accounts point 
out the company's lack of experience in selling to non-government customers, indicate a 
lack of adept direction, and imply failure by suggesting that the resulting financial 
benefits were at best minimal and sometimes non-existent. However, scrutiny of the 
firm's records indicates that these attempts were never expected greatly to support the 
business, and that the concept of failure in commercial marketing is actually 
ss Extracted from UGD 295/19/2/6 and /7, Customer Order files 1919. 
S4 UGD 295/4/132, Letter Book, J. W. French to Archibald Barr, 3.5.1919. 
ss Moss & Russell (1988) Chapter 4, and William Reid, We're certainly not afraid of Zeiss: Barr & Stroud 
Binoculars and the Royal Navy (Edinburgh: National Museums of Scotland, 2001) Chapter 1. 
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inappropriate. The evidence strongly suggests that Barr & Stroud never saw any 
substantial future for itself outside optical munitions manufacture and that the apparent 
attempts at diversification were really efforts at internally-generating subsidies to support 
core activities in the lean times anticipated following the war's end. 
William Reid considered that the decision in 1919 to start production of binoculars was 
not propitiously chosen. He maintained that this was `the worst period in history to 
launch such a venture', as large quantities of war-surplus glasses came onto the market as 
soldiers returned home with improperly retained Army-issued instruments and War 
Office surplus stocks started to be sold off. 56 However, an official decision on the large- 
scale disposal of stores was not even made until 23' September 1919, when the intention 
put before the Cabinet was that 
All Government Stores in the UK, and in every theatre of war and all ports 
whatsoever to be declared surplus forthwith and sold as soon as possible, 
excepting only sufficient to provide for the peacetime requirements of the 
Fighting Services and such duly authorised reserves as prudence may require 
in the interests of safety... 57 
The Government's desire was clearly to be rid of as much as possible in the shortest 
possible time, without regard to prices fetched: 
The intention is to release storage and circulate stores and materials without 
delay and for this reason sales should be effected even at reduced prices, 
rather than hold out for better results which would entail the retention of 
storage accommodation which the commerce of this country so badly needs, 
and which is hindering trade. 58 
Although there was the possibility of binoculars being put onto the market at very low 
prices in late 1919, this could hardly have been known by the company earlier in the 
56 William Reid (2001) p. 22. 
S' PRO WO 32/4947, minute, Secretary, War Cabinet to Secretary, War Office, 23.9.1919. 
53 PRO WO 32/4947, minute, Secretary, War Cabinet to Secretary, War Office, 23.9.1919. 
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year. And, given the continual shortages of such instruments being complained about in 
the Ministry's own war-time weekly reports, the high war-time attrition rates, and the 
large quantities retained by the Admiralty, the notion of an avalanche of very cheap 
59 binoculars swamping the domestic market after 1919 cannot readily be sustained. 
Reid went on to account for the firm's decision partly through the expectation that the 
substantial pre-war German export trade in optical goods would not be resumed, and 
partly through `restless ambition marinated in optimism' 60 Neither of these suggestions 
stands close examination. In early 1919 there had been no indications from the victorious 
Allies that any peace settlement would restrict pre-war German trading activities and so 
embargo the manufacture or export of optical goods 
61 What was certain, though, was 
that the disruption of pre-war distribution and marketing structures suffered by the more 
important German firms in Britain meant at least a temporary lack of optical imports. 
Antje Hagen has described the extent of their pre-war activities and how the problems 
they faced subsequent to the Armistice in recovering lost assets and rebuilding their 
operations delayed the return of German-made instruments to the British market. 62 Far 
from being `the worst period in history' to begin manufacturing binoculars, from Barr & 
Stroud's position the timing was not only good but even imperative. The decision to start 
in early 1919 had nothing to do with ambition or optimism but was rather the result of 
the firm's realistic assessment of its immediate needs and opportunities, combined with a 
piece of sharp commercial opportunism. 
One of Barr & Stroud's biggest problems was the retention of its optical workers. 
Building a self-sufficient optical department had been difficult because precision optical 
working in Glasgow was unknown before the company set up its own glass-working 
shop. Unlike the London-based optical companies, which were concentrated 
geographically and effectively provided themselves with a pool of skilled labour, Barr & 
Stroud had never been able to recruit experienced workers locally. Before the war the 
s' PRO MUN 4/165, MUN 4/166 and MUN 4/167, Weekly and Monthly Reports. 
60 William Reid (2001) p. 22. 
61 see Jaffe (1985) Chapter 4. 
62 Antje Hagen, `Export versus Direct investment in the German Optical Industry' Business History, 
Number 4 October 1996. 
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business either had to entice workers from far afield or train new ones from scratch. In 
1919, for the first time Barr & Stroud had a full complement of optical workers carrying 
out all the processes needed to make even the most complex rangefinders. Loosing them 
would put the business back to the unsatisfactory pre-war state when it depended on 
outside contractors who were frequently unable to work to the required standards. The 
only commercial optical product with sophisticated lens and prism systems similar to 
those of the rangefinder - and which had any prospect of being sold in substantial 
numbers - was the prismatic binocular. 
63 It alone offered the chance of keeping the 
experienced optical workforce employed in the face of uncertain prospects for 
Government orders. 
During the war, Barr & Stroud had contracted to make 120,000 prisms for the Army's 
`Binocular No. 3.64 This was the first time they had been mass produced in Britain, and 
the firn had acquired considerable expertise in making the most expensive optical 
component of the binocular. When the war ended, the contract was incomplete, and a 
large number of prisms were still at Glasgow in various stages of completion. The rough- 
moulded glass blocks for them had been supplied, at the Ministry's expense, by Chance 
Brothers Ltd. When the prism contract was `closed down', Barr & Stroud not only 
claimed compensation but also offered to buy the blocks still at Glasgow at well below 
cost, as well as tendering to buy a large number of binocular `optical sets' (spherical 
lenses) from the Liquidator of Munitions Contracts 65 With all the optical components to 
hand, the firm then needed only to provide the mechanical body parts and assemble 
everything. Binocular manufacture would thus initially be done mainly using 
components bought far cheaper than normal costs. 
The decision to start production was not to satisfy any `restless ambition' or even to 
enhance the firm's profitability, but to safeguard the future of the optical workshop and 
its skilled staff; as one of the firm's directors later wrote, `something had to be done 
63 H T. Seeger, Feldstecher: Fernglaser Im Wandel Der Zeit (Borken, Germany: Bresser-Optik, 1989), and 
F. Watson, Binoculars, Opera Glasses and Field Glasses (Princes Risborough, Bucks: Shire Books, 1995) 
gives background information. 
see Chapter 7 above. 
6s UGD 295/4/635, Letter Book, Jackson to Controller of Optical Munitions Supply, 4.3.1919. 
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immediately for the sake of the optical workers ... one of the objects of the decision was 
to keep at least some of the [optical shop] machines in operation'. 66 The binocular 
project was the product of what was, for Barr & Stroud, a typical combination of altruism 
and pragmatism. The desire to provide employment for the optical shop went beyond a 
philanthropic ideal in wanting to do something simply for the sake of the workers. 
Disbanding a large proportion of the skilled optical hands would have severely weakened 
the ability to handle future munitions contracts and the venture was conceived principally 
as a way of holding together skilled operatives who would subsequently have been 
almost impossible to replace. The directors, through shrewd recognition of the potential 
utility of newly-surplus prisms and lenses, set about creating what amounted to an 
internally generated subsidy to keep the optical shop in existence. 
The company also began making `Kinematograph' machines. 67 These cinema film 
projectors were by no means alien to Barr & Stroud's munitions products. Besides an 
optical system, they used geared driving and other mechanical components which were 
related to the mechanisms in the rangefinders already being made at the factory. The 
firm's machine tools and its workers' skills could readily be applied to their production, 
and it was expected that demand for them would quickly begin to increase 
substantially-68 The Ross Optical Company and A. Kershaw & Sons Ltd., both optical 
munitions makers during the war, also made similar machines, and Kershaw in particular 
had considerable experience with them that dated back to before the war. 69 By April 
1919, Barr & Stroud had a contract for 530 machines, and work began on them during 
June 7° 
The profits to be made were, however, substantially less than those from military and 
naval work. The contract had a gross value of £26,500, but Jackson regarded it as 
unprofitable compared to Government work. Each machine sold at £50, apparently based 
UGD 295 Unlisted material: J. M. Strang manuscript The History of Barr & Stroud. p. 124. 
67 Moss & Russell (1988) p. 103. 
68 Moss & Russell (1988) p. 104. 
69 Leeds Industrial Museum Library, Kershaw material (unclassified), `A Kershaw & Sons, Leeds: A brief 
history based on notes by Mr. Cecil Kershaw'. 
70 UGD 295/19/217, Customer Order File 1919-1920,11.6.1919. 
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on the actual costs of labour and materials and influenced by other makers' prices, 
whereas using the established formula for optical munitions work the figure would have 
been at least double. Unlike optical munitions, the movie projector market was well 
supplied and competitive, with neither demand nor need for innovation or technical 
superiority, and price the over-riding consideration. Jackson believed that the return was 
inadequate in relation to the margins the firm had always enjoyed on its munitions 
contracting and was only prepared to accept it because he felt it was essential to keep the 
plant employed for the company's immediate welfare. 71 Although there might be some 
future profit, the principal motivation was again to retain as many skilled workers as 
possible. As with the binocular optics, even relatively rudimentary work at a reduced 
profit was better than losing highly experienced fitters whose value was largely in their 
`savoir-faire'. 
The other moves towards diversification taken in 1919 and mentioned by Moss and 
Russell were never likely to generate significant income. 72 Substantial profits were again 
less important than actually doing work. The simple `Impactor' golf practice device, 
made for another company to sell, kept some of the apprentices busy and retained them at 
minimal cost to the business. It was only ever made in small numbers and eventually 
abandoned when its parent company failed. The `Optophone' was a complex electrical 
instrument intended to convert printed words in books into sounds by which the blind 
would be able to `read books by ear', and really was an expression of Archibald Baff 's 
philanthropic character. 73 It never proved successful and was eventually allowed to fade 
away, once again having shown a loss to the business. A plan to manufacture motor cycle 
engines (which employed some of the mechanical techniques used in making 
rangefinders) was also taken up in 1919, but it developed slowly and the decision to start 
production was not taken until the end of 1920. Eventually, after both technical and 
marketing difficulties, it too was terminated without any financial benefit to the firm. 
71 UGD 295/4/315, Letter Book, Jackson to Barr, 9.9.1919. 
72 Moss and Russell (1988) pp. 104-106. 
73 Moss & Russell (1988) bring out some aspects of this side of Barr's character in Chapters 1 to 4. 
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None of these `great efforts'74 to move into commercial lines generated much in the way 
of profits, and emphasise the extent to which the company's expertise and success was 
connected with optical munitions. Diversification for Barr & Stroud was not intended to 
move into new territory, but was a means of holding together as much of the workforce 
as possible until munitions work established a new equilibrium. The months following 
the war's end were characterised by uncertainty about the future for the whole of the 
optical industry, but Barr & Stroud alone of the optical munitions makers made the 
decision to remain wedded to that now unpredictable speciality. Where all the other firms 
saw their futures in the civil market, Barr & Stroud banked on its core activity returning 
to a level great enough to sustain the business, recognising that it lacked the expertise or 
infrastructure to move quickly and successfully into large-scale new activities which 
might substantially replace optical munitions work. Although accepting the need for 
short-term amendments to its product range, there was no doubt that rangefinders would 
continue as the mainstay of the business. 
7.5 Conclusion 
1919 was a significant year for optical munitions manufacturing in Great Britain. It saw 
the large and specialised war-time industry vanish completely within a few months as 
the need for its existence disappeared. In one way, this was in accord with what the 
Ministry of Munitions had planned for. When Frederick Cheshire was its Joint Head, he 
had worked to cultivate a climate in which the whole of optical instrument making in 
Britain would be brought up to a level where sophisticated apparatus could be designed 
and made economically on a scale large enough to let the industry compete profitably 
with foreign makers in peace-time, and to meet all the country's needs in the event of 
war. The notion of a separate optical munitions industry had no place in Cheshire's 
philosophy, and much of his efforts had gone into creating what he saw as the essential 
underpinnings of scientific training which would benefit technical optics generally. That 
his ideas for reform were incomplete when the war ended was unfortunate, and the 
sudden, premature casting loose of the industry from government work was bound to 
have serious implications for the future of the optical trade. The vicissitudes suffered by 
74 Moss and Russell (1988) p. 108. 
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the makers of civil optics after 1919 are really separate to this account, and have yet to be 
examined and analysed. What is relevant here is that for practical purposes the optical 
munitions industry actually reverted to its pre-war state leaving only one substantial 
maker which had to struggle to keep its capabilities intact. The problems encountered by 
Barr & Stroud were analogous to those suffered by specialist armaments makers, and 
heighten the case for considering optical munitions production as a distinctly separate 
activity to instrument making in general. The weakness of Cheshire's ideas lay in failing 
to recognise this and put in place in any mechanism by which the capacity could be 
maintained. The result was that the nation's capability for optical munitions production, 
after four years of trial and effort was left in no better state than it had been in August 
1914, with only one company retaining either the inclination or ability to stay in the 
game. Over the next four years, Barr & Stroud was to become, to all intents and 
purposes, the British optical munitions industry, as the following chapter relates. 
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Chapter 8 
Adaptation and survival, 1919 to 1923 
8.1 Introduction 
The period from 1919 to 1923 was extremely difficult for the optical munitions industry. 
The peace brought new political attitudes to armaments, and the resulting shift to arms 
limitation and reduction contrasted sharply to the pre-war years which had been 
characterised by the willingness of governments to spend heavily on military 
technologies. Budgets shrank, and the War Office found itself with surplus optical 
munitions which would not need replacing for a considerable time. This practically 
eliminated demand for land service instruments and for most pre-war producers, military 
optics ceased to be viable business. Matters were different with sophisticated naval 
instruments such as large rangefinders and submarine periscopes, where demand did not 
vanish because progress in related weapons technologies sustained the need for 
improvements, even though the quantities required were relatively small. Diminished 
requirements meant that by 1923 only one British company was still substantially 
involved in complex optical munitions, and of the other makers mentioned earlier, only 
three continued occasionally to manufacture less complex optics for the forces. Frederick 
Cheshire's gloomy assessment of optical munitions manufacture in 1915 perhaps came 
closer to the truth in 1923 than when he originally made it; fewer firms were involved 
and the capacity for mass production even less than before the war. This chapter 
examines the policies and strategies devised by the major participants and examines the 
extent to which they were successful, providing another reminder of how the optical 
industry was faced with further difficulties interacting with a range of external factors 
which crossed social, economic and political dimensions and added to the internal 
problems relating to the technical aspects of instrument design and production. The 
ability of Barr & Stroud to attain a significant degree of success in resisting the tendency 
of external factors to force it onto a new path suggests that they had, in Thomas Hughes' 
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words, become `systems builders', successfully evolving strategies to enable them to 
cope successfully with maintaining their products in the `enduring whole'. ' 
8.2 The problems facing the makers 
Optical munitions producers have previously been seen as part of general instruments 
manufacturing rather than the armaments industry, and it has been assumed their 
problems were those of the makers of civil optical goods. Mari Williams illustrated a 
number of difficulties faced by British precision instruments producers, and Anita 
McConnell described the problems facing Thomas Cooke's of York. 2 Williams identified 
problems of inadequate research and development, difficulties of providing appropriate 
education and training, and the threat from foreign competition which benefited 
significantly from exchange rate advantages. McConnell dealt generally with the 
commercial problems facing Cooke's trying to regain its pre-war commercial trade, but 
gave little attention to its munitions activities after 1919. The instruments trade certainly 
had its share of difficulties, but they were by no means the same as those facing the 
manufacturers of military or naval optics. The weaknesses identified by Williams were 
not always found in the munitions makers, and even where they were, their correction 
would not necessarily have benefited individual companies. 
The principal difficulty for makers of complex service optics was not any of those 
touched on by Williams and McConnell. Scientific training was not lacking at Barr & 
Stroud, for example, nor were research and development departments absent there or at 
Cooke's. The increasing complexity of the most important optical munitions made them 
the province of a very small number of manufacturers who certainly did not lack the 
necessary expertise to design and manufacture them, and because of the insistence of 
domestic supply by the armed forces, questions of foreign competition were irrelevant. 
Rather, the difficulty was that the massive reduction in post-war arms budgets made 
1 J. Law, `Technology and Heterogenous Engineering: The Case of Portuguese Expansion' in Bijker et al 
(1989) p. 112. 
2 Roy and Kay MacLeod, `Government and the Optical Industry in Britain, 1914-18' in J. M. Winter, ed. 
War and Economic Development (Cambridge: University Press, 1975), Man E. W. Williams, The 
Precision Makers: a History of the Instruments Industry in Britain and France, 1870-1939 (London: 
Routledge, 1994), Chapters 5 and 6, and Anita McConnell, Instrument Makers to the World: a History of 
Cooke, Troughton & Simms (York, England: William Sessions Ltd, 1997) pp 76-80. 
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successful involvement difficult because of the paucity of orders. Adding to the problem 
was the peculiar nature of naval rangefinders and submarine periscopes compared to civil 
instruments like microscopes and spectrometers, which almost wholly precluded the 
possibility of spin-off that could have aided other commercial production. These key 
munitions instruments needed technologies and manufacturing facilities unlike those 
normally employed in civil instrument making. Although precision devices requiring 
tolerances similar to laboratory instruments, naval rangefinders and periscopes were 
massive objects requiring welding torches and 30-foot lathes in their manufacture, as 
well as heavy lifting gear to move around workshops. Their lenses and prisms, although 
often weighing less than an ounce, were buried in massively complex frameworks that 
frequently weighed nearly a ton and whose construction required specialised tooling and 
abilities that were unknown in the precision instruments industry. To move between one 
field and the other was not a straightforward exercise. 
Because of falling demand and the trade's idiosyncratic nature, few firms showed the 
inclination and ability to remain substantially in optical munitions production. Sir 
Howard Grubb & Company never resumed munitions activities after the Armistice and 
ceased entirely to be involved, whilst Thomas Cooke & Sons Ltd, whose activities had 
always been broadly based, struggled for several years to remain active in military optics. 
Barr & Stroud, whose specialised business had no previous commercial lines, found it 
easier to remain in optical munitions than to diversify into civil products. Their differing 
degrees of success illustrate how difficult it was to make headway with optical 
munitions in the early 1920s. Of the other pre-1919 optical munitions makers, all 
returned to their civil activities and continued substantially as before, with a handful 
occasionally making sighting telescopes or prism binoculars when the War Office placed 
small orders for them. Only A. Kershaw & Sons Ltd of Leeds and two London 
companies - W. Ottway & Co. Ltd, and the Ross Optical Company Ltd - received any 
War Office business up to the end of 1923.3 They all regarded military contracting as 
3 National Archives, Kew, London (subsequently PRO) WO 395/4, Annual Reports of the Director of 
Army Contracts, 1920-1921 to 1923-1924. 
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only a very small part of their business, picking up and developing pre-war activities as 
best they could. 
8.3 Sir Howard Grubb & Company 
The one important company that failed to make the transition back to its pre-war status 
was the original maker of submarine periscopes, Sir Howard Grubb & Company. The 
firm had made them right from the introduction of submarines in the Royal Navy in 
19014 and had been the sole British maker until the Great War, when Kelvin Bottomley 
& Baird of Glasgow started productions The company shared some of the monopoly 
characteristics of Barr & Stroud, but with important differences that had an important 
bearing on its ultimate fate. In 1917, Sir Howard, the firm's sole proprietor, had been 
forced by the Admiralty to shift periscope production from Rathmines near Dublin to St 
Albans in Hertfordshire, partly to reduce the risks from U-boats when shipping 
completed instruments across the Irish Sea, and partly through security fears over 
political unrest in Ireland. 6 The choice of site was the Admiralty's, relocation was slow 
and still far from complete when the war ended, leaving the business in a difficult 
situation from which it never really recovered. 
Grubb's post-war problems were probably worse than for any other long-established fine 
recently engaged in optical munitions. The disruption of the move had interfered with 
both periscope production and contracts for less complex instruments, which the 
Ministry of Munitions had largely been able to terminate without paying substantial 
compensation. 7 The narrow interpretation of performance clauses to the Ministry's 
benefit, despite the situation having been forced on the company, denied the business the 
useful injections of cash that helped many others to ride out the difficulties of translating 
their manufacturing back to pre-war commercial activities! As late as March 1919, 
although work on small instruments was still being carried out in Dublin, the St Albans 
` See Chapter 4 above. 
s University of Glasgow Archives, Records of Kelvin & Hughes Ltd, UGD 33/4/2, Inventories and 
valuations, 1919. 
6 I. S. Glass, Victorian Telescope Makers, The Lives and Letters of Thomas and Howard Grubb (Bristol: 
Institute of Physics Publishing) p. 213. 
7 Williams (1994) p. 106, and PRO MUN 4/5306 Contract cancellations and liquidation advances. 
a see Chapter 8 above. 
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factory remained incomplete and yet to start production-9 This was not really the result of 
any failure on the company's part, and it is hard not to feel some sympathy for Sir 
Howard's subsequent plight. 
He had not volunteered to make the move, which had been forced on him through the 
powers of the Admiralty under the Munitions of War Act. If possible he would have 
preferred to abandon it once the war ended, but `the arrangements ... had gone so far 
when the Armistice occurred that it was impossible to go back', 10 and in any case neither 
the Admiralty nor the Ministry of Munitions were eager to relinquish war-time controls. 
The Dublin works were under military guard to protect government stores from expected 
civil unrest, and he believed his business would not be free `for some time yet'. This, 
along with the Rathmines works' partially dismantled condition and the unfinished state 
of the St Albans site meant that he could neither take up unfinished pre-war contracts for 
astronomical telescopes nor complete whatever government work there was on hand. " 
Adding to these woes was widespread industrial unrest in Ireland which prevented the 
shipping of `three hundred tons of machinery' still missing from the new works and 
ii}terfered with operations at the already disrupted Irish factory. The choice of the new 
factory had been entirely the Admiralty's, and there seems to have been little enthusiasm 
for the whole project within the company. With some prescience, Sir Howard noted in 
1919 that `I am afraid we are in for a bad time'. 12 
He was quite right. By August 1921, even with the transfer to St Albans finally complete, 
things were going badly. The recession had set in, and Grubb was in low spirits; he wrote 
to an overseas client who was still awaiting a large astronomical telescope ordered before 
the war that `It is very difficult for an outsider to understand the state of things in this 
countryjust now ... factories closing or closed all around, everyone trying to realize, no 
one buying ... '. 
13 His business was by then in straitened circumstances. Periscope 
manufacture, the mainstay of Grubb's optical munitions work, had stopped once the 
9 Glass (1998) p. 214. 
1° Glass (1998) p. 214, Grubb to Inns, 27.3.1919. 
" see PRO MUN 4/5306, Contract Cancellations and Liquidation Advances. 'Z Glass (1998) p. 215. 
13 Glass (1998) p. 215,19.8.1921, Grubb to Ines. 
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move from Dublin began and never restarted. Almost no new civil astro-telescope work 
had come in, and existing orders were very much behind schedule. The business was 
barely surviving. 
The loss of the periscope business was critical and contributed substantially to the firm's 
dire condition in the early 1920s. Grubb was by inclination a telescope maker who had 
been drawn into optical munitions around the time of the Boer War through an 
association with the armaments firm of Vickers, and the production of submarine 
periscopes had almost certainly helped the business financially before 1914.14 
Astronomical telescopes were never renowned for producing high profits, and payment 
for them frequently protracted. ls Both McConnell and Glass illustrated the uncertain 
economics of that business, and Grubb had benefited from the regular substantial 
payments that periscope manufacture and servicing brought in. 16 Although he had 
enjoyed a monopoly of supply, its nature was significantly different to Barr & Stroud's 
position with rangefinders. Unlike Barr & Stroud, Grubb had never dealt directly with 
the Admiralty, either individually or as a business, and consequently failed to establish 
the same rapport that Barr & Stroud enjoyed. His relationship with Vickers, established 
when they first became involved with submarines, evolved into that of sub-contractor, 
and his periscopes were supplied direct to Vickers (for many years the monopoly builder 
of submarines) who delivered the boats fitted with them. The Navy's technical 
requirements for periscopes went to Vickers, who then passed them to Grubb. In 
consequence of this separation, Sir Howard was unable to build up the connections that 
Barr & Stroud enjoyed with the Navy, and this ultimately contributed to his loss of 
periscope manufacture. 
In 1915, the Admiralty had approached Barr & Stroud to see if a rangefinder could be 
incorporated into its existing periscopes. That proved impossible, but the company 
" Glass (1998) p. 206. 
's H. C. King, The History of the Telescope (London: Charles Griffin & Co. Ltd, 1955), Chapters XV and 
XVII provide background material. 
16 Cambridge University Library, Vickers Collection (subsequently CUL/VC): Document 739, Periscopes 
- correspondence with Sir Howard Grubb 1908-1908: Document 1003, Electric Boat Company 
correspondence 1901-1907. 
247 
offered to make an entirely new type incorporating a specially designed rangefinder that 
would readily replace the instruments in boats already in service. " The proposal was 
accepted and a contract placed in 1917 not only for it, but also trial models of 
conventional types. 18 This involvement of Barr & Stroud in periscope design and 
manufacture came at a most inopportune moment for Grubb. At the same time that the 
Admiralty was insisting periscope manufacture be shifted to England unavoidably 
interrupting deliveries, setting up an additional supplier would have made sense, but that 
was not the principal motive for the Navy's involving Barr & Stroud. Neither was there 
any complaint about Grubb's periscopes. They were generally satisfactory by 
contemporary standards, and were also being made by Kelvin Bottomley & Baird at 
Glasgow, presumably to ensure sufficient output during the war. 19 But, the Royal Navy 
was minded to have a combined rangefinder-periscope and Grubb had no background in 
rangefinder design which was even more complex and problematical than the 
periscope's. It made more sense to approach Barr & Stroud for the novel instrument 
because, unlike Grubb, that firm not only had wide rangefinder experience, but also a 
large design department, a secure factory, and - most importantly - had come to 
command the confidence of the Navy. The anticipated interruption of Grubb's output in 
the planned move to England added to the Navy's inclination to draw Barr & Stroud into 
periscope manufacture. Grubb's vulnerability was unfortunate, and in large measure 
neither his own creation nor the result of ineptitude. Nevertheless, this combination of 
circumstances completely removed Grubb's primacy in periscope making and transferred 
that role to Barr & Stroud which not only replaced Grubb as the Navy's preferred 
supplier but eventually attained a monopoly. 
Grubb's company struggled unsuccessfully after 1918, and the St Albans works never 
became fully operational. In 1920 Sir Howard tried to `re-organise [the] business on a 
very much enlarged basis' for astro-telescope work, but this was never carried through. 2° 
17 Michael Moss & lain Russell, Range & Vision: The First Hundred Years of Barr & Stroud (Edinburgh: 
Mainstream Publishing, 1988) pp. 83 and 84. 
1E UGD 295/19/2/5, Customer Order records 1917. 19 Norman Friedman, U. S. Submarines through 1945 (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1995), 
Appendix B provides background material. 
20 Glass (1998) p. 215, Grubb to Ines, 26.5.1921. 
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By October 1922, the company was `weak financially and probably in the hands of their 
bankers 21 and in 1923 there were still `confused heaps of material ... lying on the new 
workshop floors' including parts for submarine periscopes whose contracts had been 
terminated in 1919.22 The relocation of the business had a catastrophic effect on its 
ability and efficiency-, it ceased entirely to produce optical munitions, continued to 
decline as a builder of large astro-telescopes and eventually, in January 1925, went into 
liquidation. 23 
Grubb's failure as an optical munitions maker resulted principally from being compelled 
to relocate to England. A second, but inseparable, cause was the coincidental decision of 
the Admiralty to bring Barr & Stroud into periscope manufacture, which opened an 
opportunity for that firm to assume Grubb's previous role. The massive disruption that 
followed the move was entirely predictable, but although Grubb was opposed to moving 
he lacked the ability to dissuade either the Admiralty or the Ministry of Munitions from 
the idea. The inability to resolve the chaos once the war ended and the income from 
munitions contracts ceased, reflected Grubb's financial weakness and compromised his 
ability to take up his pre-war commercial work; it also crippled his prospects of 
continuing to be competitive with his conventional periscopes which were not 
immediately superseded and continued satisfactorily in service for many years 
afterwards. 4 For Sir Howard Grubb, the war had brought no lasting benefits. His 
business, more than any other in optical munitions, suffered through serving the State. 
The firm's subsequent failure as an instrument maker stemmed from the harmful effects 
of Admiralty enforced policies during the war rather than the shortcomings identified by 
Mari Williams in the civil precision instruments industries. 
21 Glass (1998) p. 216, Innes to Secretary of State, Pretoria, 19.5.1923. 
u Glass (1998) p. 215, Frank Robbins report. 
23 Glass (1998) p. 225. 
u Cumbria Archives, Barrow-in-Furness: Vickers Material BDB 16/500, handbooks, and specifications, 
various dates, 1918 to 1927. 
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8.4 Thomas Cooke & Sons Ltd (Cooke, Troughton & Simms Ltd from 1922)25 
The fate of Cooke, Troughton & Simms in 1923 had many similarities with Sir Howard 
Grubb's business, but its route there was very different. Cooke's had a broader base in 
optical work - including service optics - than Grubb, although its earlier importance to 
the British service was far less. The company had ceased to be independent when 
Vickers acquired 70 percent of its shares in 1915,26 a circumstance that bore heavily on 
its post-war course. The wider involvement in ordnance products and the support of the 
massive armaments company should have placed the business in a stronger position to 
compete in optical munitions work, but Cooke's struggled to make headway after the 
war, losing money until eventually its parent withdrew support and, like Grubb, it went 
into liquidation. As with Grubb, the company lacked any close rapport with the Royal 
Navy, and despite the connections its parent company already had with the Department 
of Naval Ordnance, it never built up the kind of relationship that had always worked in 
Barr & Stroud's favour. 
The relationship between Vickers and Cooke's is not easy to understand, and even the 
reason for buying such a large stake in the firm is unclear. J. D. Scott considered it was 
`to bring a particular product more directly under control', meaning the mechanical fire 
control instruments that Cooke's were already supplying. 7 This may be correct, but 
Vickers was probably more interested in the connections Cooke's had with the Argo Co. 
Ltd., which was the marketing agency for the Pollen system of naval gunnery control that 
had been rejected by the Admiralty in 191428 Not only did Cooke's make all its 
mechanical elements, the firm had also introduced a sophisticated long-base rangefinder 
for it that was radically different from the Barr & Stroud pattern and promised to be 
superior. 29 Cooke's had a majority interest in Argo, so that by acquiring the one, Vickers 
acquired the other as well. Cooke's was the only other British company to have 
constructed a large naval rangefinder before the war, it was highly competent in optical 
u The term 'Cooke's' is used to describe both. 
26 J. D. Scott, Vickers, A History (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1962) p. 132. 
27 Scott (1962), p. 132. 
28 J. T. Sumida In Defence of Naval Supremacy; Finance, Technology, and British Naval Policy 1889-1914 
(London: Routledge, 1993), Chapter 6 provides a full account of these events. 
21 McConnell (1992) p. 74. 
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design, and offered Vickers an opportunity to integrate optical munitions capability into 
its other armaments operations. Cooke's importance to Vickers lay partly in its optical 
expertise and partly in its ability to tackle the specialised optical and mechanical 
engineering needed for complex optical munitions. What Vickers did not do, though, was 
to take over the day to day running of the firn, nor even to establish a strong presence on 
its board. 3° Instead, the business was left-very much to its own devices, with its 
munitions department coming under Cooke's general management and accounting 
structure. 
Although there was much to commend the idea of integrating Cooke's into Vickers 
armaments operation as a base for optical munitions manufacture, the exercise ultimately 
proved costly and problematical. Cooke's had not been asked to make sophisticated 
optics for either the War Office or Admiralty during the war, all its production being for 
relatively simple sighting telescopes, none of which were the company's monopoly. Nor 
had it actually sold any rangefinders to either British or foreign governments because all 
the deals that were in progress before the war were frozen by the hostilities. 1 As a result, 
Vickers owned an optical instruments company with no proven record in complex 
armaments optics, which had no programme to develop new products - civil or military - 
and which was also in a weak financial condition. Unlike Barr & Stroud, Cooke's had no 
experience in selling to foreign armed forces, and its name lacked sufficient cachet to 
command the attention of prospective buyers. All the potential for optical munitions sales 
actually lay in the firm's ability to design and manufacture instruments nominated by 
Vickers as a result of its own armaments experience. The failure by Vickers' 
management to separate civil and military optical products meant that the parent 
company found itself propping up a business that struggled to overcome the problems of 
post-war re-adjustment, whilst the munitions products that were developed under 
Vickers' aegis failed to find markets either at home or abroad. 
30 No mention of any such steps occurs in CUUVC Document 1366, Directors' Minute Book, entries 1920 
to 1924, and University of York, Borthwick Institute, Vickers Instruments Archive (subsequently VIA) 
AJB 030/1.1.1, Cooke Directors' Minute Book, entries 1915 onwards. 
31 McConnell (1992) p. 74. 
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Cooke's had never been a particularly profitable business and although its accounting 
records have not survived, by late 1922 the company was clearly struggling despite its 
recent acquisition of one of its instrument-making rivals, Troughton & Simms Ltd. of 
London. 32 This had actually been done with Vickers' encouragement and money, but it is 
unclear how Vickers might have benefited from it. 33 Troughton & Simms was a smaller 
firm which had little expertise in optical munitions, its war-time activities had been on a 
smaller scale than Cooke's, and its design capabilities virtually non-existent. Anita 
McConnell suggested that Vickers were persuaded into the acquisition because 
Troughton & Simms' management was better than Cooke's, producing `competitive 
goods at lower prices'. 34 This is doubtful: the London firm was also financially weak and 
Elinor Mennim showed that after 1920 there was a crucial lack of effective direction and 
management, with strong disagreement between the two principal family shareholders 
whose chief desire was to be rid of the responsibility of running the business in 
increasingly difficult conditions. S Whatever the underlying reasons for the purchase, the 
result was a further weakening of Cooke's overall condition and the merged company 
continued to decline. 
Cooke, Troughton & Simms was not actually selling any optical munitions, although it 
had prepared designs and built prototypes of instruments that Vickers hoped 
subsequently to market. Vickers' aviation interests led to a `Prismatic Bomb sight' being 
manufactured in 1919, as well as an `Aeroplane Periscope' that allowed a pilot to see the 
ground directly under his aircraft. 36 The following year, Vickers' naval interests led to 
new designs of large naval rangefinders for Admiralty trials to decide on future standard 
types, and in 1920 and 1921 a number of rangefmders and range-and-heightfmders were 
constructed for both surface and anti-aircraft use. 37 This must have been an additional 
drain on Cooke's resources. The Admiralty was accustomed to having trial instruments 
32 McConnell (1992) p. 77. 
33 CUUVC Document 1366, Directors' Minute Book, entry 30.9.1920. 
34 McConnell (1992) p. 77. 
35 VIA AJB 050/1.2.3, Troughton & Simms Balance Sheets 1914-1919, Income Tax Papers and Stock 
Figures provide financial details, and E. Mennim, Reid 's Heirs: a Biography of James Simnxs Wilson 
(Braunton, Devon: Merlin Books, 1990) p. 127 describes family relationships. 36 NqAkM 070/13, Index to Optical Munitions Drawings, references 3524 and 3677. 
37 VIA AJB 070/13, Index to Optical Munitions Drawings, references 3434 to 3492, and 3860. 
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supplied gratis, and the costs of developing them were expected to be borne by the 
submitting company, which may explain both why the Vickers' Board was starting to 
register concerns over Cooke's finances and why it was prepared to keep underwriting 
the losses. 8 
The Vickers finance committee had forecast in September 1920 that Cooke's bank 
overdraft would exceed £58,000 by the following June. Cooke's bankers (who were not 
Vickers') were obviously uneasy, having recently refused to raise the existing overdraft 
ceiling of £45,000, and in consequence Vickers had to lend Cooke's £15,000 to meet 
immediate needs. In addition, another £75,000 was needed to cover liabilities for Excess 
Profits Duty. By February 1921 Vickers' loans stood at £39,000, and Cooke's bankers 
were asking for the overdraft to be guaranteed, a further indication of their doubts over 
the firm's finances. The deterioration continued with a trading loss of £10,000 for the 
financial year ended 30th September 1922. The now-guaranteed overdraft's ceiling was 
increased, with Vickers' support, first to £60,000 and then to £80,000 in the following 
January. The trading loss for 1922-1923 worsened to £16,183 with unpaid Excess Profits 
Duty of over £22,000 still to find besides, and by then it was clear that Cooke's was no 
longer a viable business. 9 Vickers finally `grew tired of pumping cash into an ailing 
company' late in 1923 and liquidated the firm in the following Spring. 40 
The only optical munitions designs recorded at York from 1921, when Cooke's position 
was seriously worsening, until the close of 1923 were some observation periscopes for 
naval gun turrets and a prismatic sight for the Vickers-Berthier light machine gun which 
Vickers hoped to sell to the War Office and the Indian Army. 41 Like the earlier 
rangefinders and aeroplane instruments, these came to nothing. The observation 
periscopes, for some unexplained reason, were actually made by Barr & Stroud, 42 and the 
machine gun sight languished because neither prospective client made its mind up about 
32 see Barr & Stroud's previous experiences described in earlier chapters above. 
39 CUINC Document 1366, Directors' Minute Book, entries 30.9.1920,24.2.1921,19.7.1922,28.9.1922, 
23.1.1923,28.3.1924 and 2.5.1924. 
40 McConnell (1992) p. 79. 
" VIA AJB 070/1.3, Index to Optical Munitions Drawings, references 3905 and 3906. 
42 UGD 295/4/336, Letter Book, Harold Jackson to Vickers, 12.7.1922. 
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the Vickers-Berthier gun. The rangefinders produced for the Admiralty trials in 1921 
failed to convince the Royal Navy of their superiority (although Barr & Stroud saw them 
as a serious threat and worried about prospects until May 1922), 43 and the aeroplane 
instruments apparently never went into production. Not a single Cooke-Vickers optical 
project successfully generated orders between 1919 and the end of 1923. 
The difficulty in understanding Vickers' relationship with Cooke's is illustrated by the 
acquisition of marketing rights for Barr & Stroud products in Spain in 1921 and the 
willingness to have Cooke observation-periscope designs made by Barr & Stroud. 44The 
marketing rights included both naval and land-service rangefinders, both types which 
Cooke's was already able to make. One possible answer for the agency acquisition is that 
Vickers was then working hard to sell the Spanish government an entire coast-defence 
gunnery system, and it may be that the client had shown a preference for the proven and 
familiar Barr & Stroud instruments, rather than because Vickers doubted Cooke's ability 
eventually to manufacture a competitive product 45 It would have made no sense for 
Vickers to prejudice a very large project through a refusal to supply something the 
customer preferred or demanded. Whatever the reasoning, Spain bought sixteen Barr & 
Stroud field-artillery rangefinders worth £2,000 through Vickers in 1922 and £9,837 of 
larger models the following year, and afterwards no more attempts to promote Cooke- 
Vickers rangefinders were made. 6A satisfactory explanation for out-sourcing the 
periscopes is harder to find, but whatever the reason, Vickers chose to go outside its own 
organisation for a product which it could have made itself. This was scarcely an 
expression of confidence in Cooke, Troughton & Simms, and possibly by the time Barr 
& Stroud were given the order the Vickers Board had already written-off the idea of 
using Cooke's for optical munitions production. 
Vickers' attempts to capitalise on the integration of optical capacity into its armaments 
business did not fail because of the difficulties Cooke's had in marketing its civil 
43 UGD 295/4/334, Letter Book, Harold Jackson to F. Morrison, 2.5.1922. 
" Vickers CUL/VC 1367, Directors' Minute Book 9,27.10.1921. 
45 CUIJVC 1367, Directors' Minute Book 9,27.10.1921. 
"UGD 295/19/2/11, Customer Order files 1923. 
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products. The lack of success was firstly because the amount of new munitions business 
available at home and abroad was small and secondly because all the advantages lay with 
the established and demonstrably successful competition. Even if Cooke's had been a 
profitable instruments company, Vickers' efforts at developing a range of optical 
munitions would still not have succeeded up to 1923. That failure was almost inevitable, 
given the scarcity of government business and Cooke's previous lack of success in 
selling ordnance products in competition with rivals. Faced with a dominant and proven 
domestic competitor, and in the absence of either demonstrable functional failure in the 
Navy's rangefinding instruments or being able to demonstrate any presumptive anomaly, 
Vickers had little chance of displacing Barr & Stroud as the Admiralty's preferred 
supplier. Cooke's failure as an instrument maker and Vickers' failure as an optical 
munitions supplier were quite separate issues. 
Left alone, Cooke's would probably not have continued with optical munitions after the 
war. Its earlier efforts had brought no financial rewards, and the firm probably felt it had 
suffered through its association with the vexatious Arthur Pollen's dealings with the 
Admiralty. 47 War-time munitions profits had been small as a result of State taxation 
policies, and like almost every other maker Cooke's finished in a weaker state than when 
it began as a munitions conscript. That the firm was a reluctant player in 1919 does not 
necessarily mean it would have survived solely as an instrument maker - the vicissitudes 
of the British instruments industry described by Mari Williams were felt as keenly by 
Cooke's as by anyone else. The company's potential utility to Vickers justified continued 
support only until it eventually became clear that no substantial optical munitions work 
was likely in the foreseeable future, and that matters relating to Cooke's civil 
manufacturing should not be allowed to drift further. Any hope of profits from civil 
instruments in 1920 were long gone by 1923 and it then made sense for Vickers to let the 
ailing company go to the liquidator, apparently relinquishing all involvement with optical 
munitions. However, Cooke's story did not end there; Vickers eventually bought the 
company's assets and re-floated it under their own direct control, so that they kept some 
47 Anthony Pollen, The Great Gunnery Scandal (London: William Collins & Co. Ltd, 1980) Chapters Ito 
V provide background material on Pollen and his association with Cooke's. 
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capacity for fine mechanical and optical engineering as well as running the instruments 
business on a more or less profitable footing until the re-armament programmes of the 
late 1930s pulled Cooke's once again into optical munitions contracting. 48 For Cooke 
Troughton & Simms Ltd, 1923 marked not so much the end of optical munitions 
manufacture, but the start of a period of hibernation. 
8.5 Barr & Stroud 
Unlike Grubb and Cooke's, Barr & Stroud not only stayed in business but remained 
almost entirely dedicated to optical munitions. It had the benefits of a continuing 
domestic monopoly, an effective and tightly controlled management structure, and both 
the determination and ability to continue exploiting its previous success. However, 
success is a relative term, and Barr & Stroud sometimes found that it amounted to little 
more than simply remaining in business. Despite its corporate assets, the problems of 
maintaining the firm's existence were often considerable and frequently outside the 
Directors' control. One critically important - though intangible - asset that Barr & 
Stroud possessed, uniquely amongst British optical munitions makers, was a relationship 
with the Admiralty that had continued unbroken since 1892. This association, which both 
brought benefits and obligations to each party, was a very significant factor in Barr & 
Stroud's survival in the difficult times of the early 1920s, despite some fundamental 
alterations in its nature. 
The relationship was, nevertheless, not something that could be taken for granted by the 
company. The war had imposed strains on it, and in particular on the firm's earlier ability 
to set prices for Admiralty work as it alone thought fit. That had been overturned by the 
provisions of the Munitions of War Act which had imposed a series of controls intended 
to bring war-work firmly under the State's governance. 9 Almost immediately after the 
Armistice, Barr & Stroud sought to be rid of those controls, causing the Admiralty to 
look closely at how it saw the nature of post-war dealings. The fum wanted to be able to 
`E McConnell (1992) pp. 86-88. 
49 Great Britain, Ministry of Munitions, Official History of the Ministry of Munitions (London: HMSO, 
1922) Vol. 1 Part N, Sections 1 to 5 describes these controls. 
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negotiate freely over prices, to pursue whatever markets seemed opportune, and be rid of 
the war-time controls that, like Sir Howard Grubb, it felt to be restrictive and irksome 50 
This request to be released had an effect on the Admiralty which Barr & Stroud may not 
have anticipated and which apparently remained unknown to the company. 51 Before 
replying, the Admiralty set out to consider the merits of control from the Navy's 
viewpoint, and opinions were sought within the service as to the future. The responses 
illustrate that there was by no means unanimity about how the firm was regarded within 
the Navy. 52 
The Naval Contracts Department favoured keeping Barr & Stroud permanently under 
Admiralty control by extending the war-time arrangements. There would be `great 
advantage' in keeping the firm's skills and technical facilities available on demand, 
although difficulties were seen in arranging what amounted to a takeover. State business 
would not be sufficient to keep the firm going, and Government ownership would 
preclude not only foreign work but also commercial production because `the Private 
Trade would not appreciate Government competition'. A subsidy would therefore be 
needed, which the Director saw as being problematical to arrange. Nevertheless, the 
Contracts Department favoured bringing the company into the Navy's hierarchical 
structure, so that prices might be controlled and contractual arguments avoided. 
Those arguments were not welcomed by the Director of Naval Ordnance (DNO) who 
saw Barr & Stroud in a different light. His response illustrates the service's internal 
tensions about taking over the company. 53 The DNO said that because the firm was the 
only British maker of naval rangefinders it was `imperative' to keep it going both for 
peace-time needs and future requirements in time of war. That would better be done by 
maintaining the status quo. The idea of outright control disturbed the Ordnance 
Department because it threatened the nature of the relationship that had grown up with 
50 UGD 295/4/146, Letter Book, Jackson to Secretary of the Admiralty, 6.12.1918. 
st Nothing in the contemporary letter books examined shows any knowledge of it. 
52 Ministry of Defence, Naval Library. Monthly Record of Principal questions Dealt with by the Director of 
Naval Ordnance (subsequently PQ), July to December 1918. Minute No. 192,17.12.1918. other minutes 
provide the source material for the rest of this section, unless otherwise indicated. 
PQ, July to December 1918, Director of Naval Ordnance to Director of Navy Contracts, 21.12.1918. 
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the company, and the Department was perfectly happy to have an independent Barr & 
Stroud acting virtually as its consultant. The tendency of service hierarchies to resist 
change, as described by William McBride, 54 is not necessarily confined to their internal 
structures. As with ordnance, where the commercial development of weapons had long 
been accepted as working to the Navy's advantage, so the design and supply of optical 
munitions was established as an external but inseparable adjunct. The firms supplying 
both had become so closely identified with the Navy's own interest that they were seen 
as inseparable from its functional framework. With Barr & Stroud, the Gunnery Branch 
strongly resisted any change in the relationship, seeking to maintain the familiar and 
satisfactory arrangement that had evolved in the preceding twenty five years . 
Even worse than unwelcome structural change was the chance that the firm might fail 
completely. For the Gunnery Branch, the solution was to let the firm again sustain itself 
with foreign business. The hierarchical structure again resisted change, not through 
conservatism or prejudice but through a justifiable fear of a future functional failure in 
design and supply. The DNO insisted State control was neither `advisable nor necessary' 
and urged that `no other restrictions' should be imposed beyond those already in place, 
stressing that it would take until `well into 1920' to complete current orders. In his 
judgement there was `no other firm in the country who can be compared with Barr & 
Stroud in respect of their experience and facilities ... '. and urged an immediate meeting 
to settle what work should be regarded as `specially confidential'. That would clear the 
way for Barr & Stroud to seek new foreign business and make up any shortfall in 
Admiralty orders to ensure its survival. 
The idea of perpetuating control was abandoned by the end of February 1919, probably 
without the firm ever having any inkling of it. SS The advantages in preserving the status 
quo, where the Navy obtained rangefinder research virtually free of charge, were 
massively in the Admiralty's favour, and the Contracts Department was disregarded. 
54 William McBride, Technological Change and the U. S. Navy1865-1945 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2000) pp. 4 and 5. 
55 UGD 295/4/146, Letter Book, Jackson to Secretary of the Admiralty, re. conference with Barr & Stroud, 
26.2.1919. 
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However, the war-time controls were not immediately rescinded, a situation that Barr & 
Stroud was temporarily, if unwillingly, obliged to accept. 
The question of fording new business was pressing. Contracts were disappearing and 
work to replace them was urgently needed. Orders were most likely from foreign navies 
which had been starved of rangefinder deliveries since 1914, but some of the war-time 
controls - particularly those relating to secrecy - stood firmly in the way. In a typically 
studied approach to the Admiralty, Harold Jackson first assured their Lordships that 
`nothing can give us greater satisfaction' than continuing to work for the Royal Navy, 
and that the firm would continue all the security precautions `maintained during the war', 
including not soliciting foreign sales without specific consent. Then, almost certainly 
with clients already waiting, he blandly asked whether, without further special 
applications, he could supply France, Italy, Japan and the U. S. A. with `any instruments 
actually in use by H. M. Fleet' at the date of the Armistice. Jackson presumably got his 
way, because there were no further letters of protest from him, but the problem of foreign 
sales for the new instruments being developed for the Royal Navy was less easily solved. 
He agreed to defer the matter until questions of limiting the spread of armaments 
`attaching to the proposed League of Nations have been formulated and agreed by the 
Powers'. There were now constraints on business that were unknown in 1914.56 
They went far beyond those imposed by the Admiralty and were likely to be an even 
greater problem. Jackson touched on the nature of future difficulties when he mentioned 
the limiting of armaments and the embryonic League of Nations, implying that 
opportunities were likely to be governed by factors outside the firm's control. Much of 
its pre-war prosperity had come from supplying Europe's large conscript armies, none of 
whom were now in the market for instruments as they shrank rapidly leaving enormous 
surpluses of optical munitions. The neutral states which had been denied deliveries after 
late 1914 generally maintained only small armies, and even if they offered some 
opportunity for business the value of their likely trade was small. 
'" UGD 295/4/146, Letter Book, Jackson to Secretary of the Admiralty, 3.3.1919, is the source for this 
paragraph. 
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If the prospects of foreign land-service business were discouraging in early 1919, there 
was greater optimism over naval orders. Even the Allied navies had been starved of 
rangefinders since 1914, and war experience emphasising the need for effective gunnery 
control systems, suggested there was a reasonable expectation of foreign business when 
navies sought to modernise. Jackson must have had orders pending when he wrote to the 
Admiralty in March that year, and there were actually still some rangefinders for foreign 
governments held in store from 1914 when deliveries had been embargoed. 57 As an 
antidote for excess optimism though, there was virtually no new foreign warship 
construction outside Japan and the United States. New ships had always been the prime 
movers for high-value orders, because with rangefinders went their associated mountings 
and data transmission systems. The U. S. Navy had a large programme of capital-ship 
building, but Barr & Stroud had never captured its business as it had done with France or 
Japan before 1914, and after 1915 the British government had prevented the firm 
pursuing American sales. By 1919, the U. S. optical company of Bausch & Lomb had 
advanced so far that it was unlikely that Barr & Stroud could win major orders, but Japan 
still lacked any sophisticated optical industry and its navy had so many earlier ties with 
the company that Barr & Stroud must have seen the Imperial Navy as the main chance of 
foreign sales. 
However, to Michael Moss and lain Russell, `Barr & Stroud's immediate future looked 
bleak' in 1919, with the directors `resigned to the fact that there was no prospect of a 
revival in [munitions] orders ... in the near 
future'. 58 This was by no means the case, and 
their opinion paints a gloomier picture than the evidence warrants. The company was still 
busy; turnover for the year was a substantial ££369,279,1,200 of the workforce still 
employed in the autumn working a 47-hour week, and - most importantly - the order 
book was by no means empty. 59 The value of those uncompleted orders is not easy to 
assess as the firm's financial records are not always easy to interpret, but the sums 
" UGD 295/4/315 Letter Book, Jackson to Satiolas, 10.9.1919. 
$' Moss and Russell (1988) pp. 101,102,103. 
59 UGD 295 unclassified, Strang Material, financial papers, UGD 295/4/315, Letter Book, Jackson to the 
Federation of British Industries, 11.10.1919, and UGD 295/4/131, Letter Book, Jackson to Conrad Beck, 
23.1.1919. 
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involved were certainly very considerable, probably exceeding half a million pounds, 
even if the future of some of the contracts was uncertain. 60 Ordnance work was certainly 
not about to evaporate and the Board was definitely not in despair. In fact, by November 
1919, the directors had agreed unanimously that they could not `consider any 
abandonment of our armament business' and that it must be maintained if at all 
possible. 61 As for them being `resigned' to the prospect of no new munitions orders, in 
October Jackson asked the Admiralty to confmn there was no objection to quoting the 
Imperial Japanese Navy for new rangefinders, and began negotiations with the Coventry 
Ordnance Company for a `complete fire control system' 62 In November the Admiralty 
asked for a design for a new rangefinder for large submarines, as well as additional fire 
control instruments for the torpedo directing rangefinders on large surface ships. 3 And in 
December negotiations began with the Dutch Army for 600 infantry and artillery 
rangefinders, to make up for the dearth of deliveries since 1914.64 Although these 
negotiations were all in the early stages, prospects were by no means lacking and 
confidence certainly not absent. 
Even if prospects were far from barren, there was still the problem of managing the 
present. Inflation and reduced margins had greatly eroded the fine's profitability. 65 
Turnover was actually lower than the last year before the war after allowing for inflation 
- only £166,000 against £188,000 in adjusted figures. 
66 Manufacturing profit was down 
from 55 percent to 26 percent, which with higher operating costs resulted in a recorded 
pre-tax loss of £530. Bank overdrafts were £62,402, the highest recorded since the 
limited company's creation. Against this, the year's new orders received were only just 
61 1 am grateful to Paul Hodgson ... 61 UGD 295/4/316, Letter Book, Jackson to Francis Morrison, London office, summarising recent board 
meeting. 
62 UGD 295/4/148, Letter Book, Jackson to Admiralty, 27.10.1919, and UGD 295/4/316, Letter Book, 
Jackson to Coventry Ordnance Co. Ltd., 30.10.1919. 
63 UGD 295/4/148, Letter Book, Jackson to Admiralty, 13.11.1919, and UGD 295/4/148, Letter Book, 
Jackson to Director of Admiralty Contracts, 25.11.1919. 
"UGD 295/4/316, Letter Book, Jackson to W. H. Martin (Dutch Agent), 2.12.1919. 
6s Robert Twigger, Inflation: the Value of the Pound] 750-1998 (London: House of Commons Library 
Research Paper 99/20, Economic Policy and Statistics Section, 1999) provides the data for this and other 
inflation references. 
'6 UGD 295/11/1 Balance sheets, profit and loss accounts. Audited accounts for 1919 and later supply the 
data for this section. 
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over £39,000 which meant that the value of work on the books was declining. Overall, 
the situation was far from ideal, although a long way from crisis. 
However, 1920 saw a marked deterioration in the firm's position. Recorded turnover 
declined to £310,822, manufacturing profits fell to only 12 percent, and the year-end 
showed a very large pre-tax loss of £80,497. Although orders had increased to £91,114, 
this was insufficient to sustain the business, and after allowing for inflation, new work 
was only one eighth of that received in 1913. Borrowings had increased to £129,497 by 
the end of December, and it appeared that without some radical change of circumstances 
the business would be heading towards insolvency. The firm sought to achieve this 
through reforming its relationship with the Admiralty. 
In the autumn of 1920, Barr & Stroud requested an annual subsidy. This marked a major 
change in the way the firm saw its relationship with the Admiralty and prompted the 
latter to reconsider its own role in the association. The company asked for £50,000 yearly 
`for the purpose of continuing their Experimental and Research work and also for 
maintaining in a state of efficiency their own plant as well as the plant and factory put up 
by the Admiralty [during the war]'. 67 In essence, the company wanted the State to 
guarantee the costs of running the business, a circumstance inconceivable in 1914. 
There can be no doubt that Barr & Stroud's position was far from satisfactory. This 
stemmed partly from diminishing business and partly from the twin burdens of 
maintaining an expensive research and development section whilst carrying a substantial 
amount of Admiralty debt. The research facility, which worked almost entirely on 
Admiralty projects, was the firm's largest standing charge and its salary costs had risen 
from 5.23 percent of turnover in 1913 to 18.05 percent in 1919.68 Manufacturing wages 
fluctuated with output, but the cost of scientific staff had continued to grow irrespective 
of current production, and sustaining research and design was Barr & Stroud's heaviest 
single expense. A guarantee of £50,000 would cover it and many of the company's other 
67 PRO ADM 212/46, Barr & Stroud correspondence. 
68 UGD 295/11/1 Balance sheets, profit and loss accounts. Extracted from annual accounts 1913 to 1923, 
trading account section. 
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standing costs as well. However, such a subsidy would not help with the question of 
outstanding bills. 
There were substantial Admiralty debts for war-time contracts where Barr & Stroud had 
financed the work's progress. Their total is now difficult to assess, and it appears to have 
been a problem even at the time. In October 1919 Jackson reckoned that the sum owing 
for finished and invoiced jobs alone was `not less than' £58,663.69 To complicate 
matters, invoices had not been submitted for many completed contracts because the basis 
for charging was still not agreed. 70 There were 73 of these still to be settled in August 
1919, whose value is not recorded in the surviving records. 71 And there were frequently 
long delays in payments for pre-priced contracts which forced the firm to press hard for 
settlement on several occasions, more than once even telegraphing requests for money. 72 
Because materials and labour costs were paid by Barr & Stroud as contracts progressed, 
the burden of financing Admiralty orders continued to grow, even as the total value of 
work on hand was falling. 
At the beginning of 1920, these pressures were showing. Jackson was in discussions 
with the Department of Naval Ordnance about a large project involving the development 
of a new 30-foot rangefinder intended to become standard for capital ships, and on 22°a 
January he wrote that unless relations with the Contracts Department improved `we shall 
ask for our name to be removed from the Admiralty list [of approved contractors] - if 
indeed it is not automatically removed by proceedings in the Bankruptcy Court ! [sic] '73 
This illustrates Jackson's willingness to play one section of the Admiralty against 
another. The frustration with the Contracts Department is clear, but it was the Ordnance 
Department that stood to suffer most from the possible loss of Barr & Stroud and it was 
to them that he made both threat and complaint. The threat was delivered with a light 
69 UGD 295/4/147, Letter Book, Jackson to Admiralty, Advisor of Costs of Production, 20.10.1919. 
70 see Chapter 8 above. 
71 UGD 295/4/147, Letter Book, Jackson to Director of Naval Contracts, 18.8.1919. 
72 UGD 295/4/145, Letter Book, Jackson to Director of Naval Contracts, 29.10.1918, and UGD 295/4/148, 
Letter Book, Jackson to Accountant General, 11.11.1919. 
73 UGD 295/4/148: Jackson to Commander Ardill, DNO, 22.1.1920. 
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touch (and a delayed action fuze), but the complaint about the Contracts Department's 
shortcomings was justified as many of the firm's immediate difficulties could be laid at 
its door. What the business needed was not only orders, but also prompt payment for 
them. In early 1920, Barr & Stroud's greatest difficulty was to match income to 
outgoings, and having to borrow large sums at interest to finance the Admiralty was 
expensive and clearly fivstrating. 74 Jackson's complaint was part of his continuing efforts 
to extract the money due from the Admiralty. 
By the Autumn of 1920, those efforts had seemingly had little effect. Faced with the 
subsidy request implying that the company was in difficulties, the Admiralty once again 
looked at the relationship. It passed the question to the Director of Scientific Research 
(DSR) for an opinion on the cost of maintaining a research department to handle 
rangefinder design and construction, as well as optical glass research. 75 The question was 
not whether the sum requested was reasonable, but whether the research could be done 
cheaper by the service itself. The DSR made a general examination of rangefinder 
procurement and his report illustrated the position the Admiralty thought the Navy to be 
in vis-ä-vis the company, strongly suggesting that Barr & Stroud had succeeded in 
colouring the Admiralty's perceptions very much to the firm's benefit. 
He accepted that Barr & Stroud was `in financial difficulties' and that the consequences 
of its failure would be serious. There were no substantial new British orders likely `for 
some time' to come and the firm's foreign business would only last for about two years. 
Without assistance, Barr & Stroud would have to convert to commercial instrument 
making, and subsequently `... close the rangefinder business down completely' in order 
to handle the new work. That would put the fighting services `in a most dangerous 
position' as there was no other firm to step in. `We must have rangefinders' he said, 
neatly summing up the Admiralty's predicament. 76 
74 UGD 295 unclassified material, Russell research notes, Barr & Stroud Board Meeting 19.2.1919. 
's PRO ADM 212/46, Correspondence between Admiralty and Director of Scientific Research, December 
1920, supplies the material for the rest of this section. 
76 PRO ADM 212/46, undated memorandum. 
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If Barr & Stroud discontinued rangefinder operations, the creation of an Admiralty 
research and experimental department would be essential, as no other firm `would be in 
the position to make [rangefinders] without assistance'. The DSR estimated its annual 
costs as between £17,500 and £22,500 for research into the mechanical aspects of 
rangefinder design, and suggested either setting up a government factory to produce 
entire instruments, or a state-owned assembly shop to assemble parts made by other 
instrument firms. His preferred plan however, was for the Admiralty to take over the 
large new premises it had built at Glasgow during the war, then progressively transfer 
both plant and personnel from Barr & Stroud as the company dropped out of rangefinder 
manufacture. This would avoid any `dangerous hiatus during which the supply of 
rangefinders would be completely stopped'. Almost as an afterthought, he suggested that 
the State might buy a controlling interest in Barr & Stroud `and then run the firm in the 
way they wanted'. 
The Director of Scientific Research was perhaps unclear about what should actually be 
done, but an opinion dated 1e December 1920 from the Admiralty Research Laboratory 
at Teddington was much more decisive. This acknowledged that the question of subsidy 
was problematical, but in the present circumstances there was simply `no choice': there 
was no State rangefinder factory and it would take `some years' to create an effective 
one, so `some Agreement with [Barr & Stroud] must, in the public interest, be arrived 
at... ' This was very much to the point and in line with the Admiralty's eventual 
conclusion. 77 
The decision was that a subsidy would be the most effective and simplest way to assure 
the supply of rangefinders and the Admiralty then approached the War Office for its co- 
operation in securing funds from the Treasury. The War Office, doubtless remembering 
its unsuccessful pre-war attempts to buy rangefinders elsewhere, agreed to the overtures, 
and the Director of Army Contracts subsequently recorded that `... in view of the 
probable smallness of orders in the near future, the Admiralty and War Office have 
conjointly made application for Treasury sanction to subsidise Barr & Stroud to enable 
" PRO ADM 212/46, Memorandum from Director of Scientific Research to Admiralty, December 1920. 
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that firm to keep in being its existing facilities for manufacturing'. 78 The paucity of 
current War Office orders could hardly be disputed, just £75 having been spent with the 
firm in year April 1 1920 to March 31't 1921, out of a total outlay on optics of only 
£2,347.79 
The application was vetoed by the Treasury, which refused to provide funds because in 
its judgement the current warship building programme would provide enough work to 
keep the firm going. 80 Exactly how this conclusion was arrived at is hard to see, given 
the absence of major warships then being built in Britain, but the decision stood, leaving 
the Services facing the prospect of Barr & Stroud withdrawing from rangefinder 
building. However, the course of subsequent events turned out to be very much different 
from what might have been expected. 
When the Director of Army Contracts wrote his annual report in March 1921, he noted 
the Treasury's refusal but observed that it had not been possible to take any further action 
on Barr & Stroud's behalf, as the firm had made no further appeal for assistance. 81 Given 
that scarcely six months earlier the company had been predicting great difficulty in 
staying in optical munitions, the lack of subsequent calls for succour raises questions as 
to what had happened in the meantime. 1920 had continued to be difficult. In mid- 
September, Barr & Stroud reminded the Naval Staffs Director of Gunnery that although 
the Navy was calling for lots of new designs, there was still `no real work' coming in. 82 
Admiralty orders for new instruments and servicing contracts for the year came to just 
over £17,888, or just 19.6 percent of the year's new equipment business. 83 Without 
Japanese orders totalling £71,953, the year would have been catastrophic. 
The new year marked a sudden upturn in the company's attitude and its fortunes. 
January's orders came to £37,900, which apart from 1915, was the largest ever for that 
'S PRO WO 395/4, Report of the Director of Army Contracts 1920-1921; 31.3.1921, p. 14. 
" PRO WO 395/4, Report of the Director of Army Contracts 1920-1921, p. 91. 
80 PRO WO 395/4, Report of the Director of Army Contracts 1920-1921; 31.3.1921, p. 14. 11 PRO WO 395/4, Report of the Director of Army Contracts 1920-1921; 31.3.1921, p. 14. 62 UGD 295/4/149, Letter Book, J. W. French to Capt. F. C. Dreyer, 15.9.1920. 
83 UGD 295/19/217 and /7, Customer Order files 1920 and 1921. 
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month. 84 In late February the bank overdraft was down from almost £100,000 at the end 
of December to only £54,000, `without any Excess Profits duty repayment' and `two or 
three large accounts still to be paid', 85 and Jackson observed that Japan's recent decision 
not to accept any reduction of armaments `may be sad from the humanitarian point of 
view, but it is not likely to cause much sorrow with Barr & Stroud Ltd'. 86 The Admiralty 
had pronounced the new 30-foot FX rangefinder model `excellent', and was asking about 
an even larger one. 87 Armaments business was now encouraging, unlike the civil 
ventures started soon after the war's end and mentioned in the preceding chapter, none of 
which seemed likely to be profitable. The Optophone device was uncertain of making 
even a `small return' on its investment, the cinema projector programme was mired 
because the single client could not pay for the machines already delivered, and the motor 
cycle engine project was demanding such large sums that the Directors had been obliged 
to talk `solemnly about costs'. 88 Despite all these difficulties, Jackson was able to tell a 
correspondent `Don't think I'm not cheerful ... '89 a sentiment which probably summed 
up the firm's overall attitude in early 1921. 
There were indeed some changes for the better that year. Despite the prediction in late 
1920 that the Royal Navy would have little business for Barr & Stroud in the near future, 
the Admiralty ordered almost £60,000-worth of equipment, making it the largest client in 
1921.90 The Imperial Japanese Navy was the next largest, with orders of nearly £53,000. 
The total value of new business that year was £125,610, an increase of 38 percent on 
1920's figure of £91,114. Although this was an encouraging trend, the state of new 
business was not so much getting better as becoming less bad. 
94 UGD 295/ MI I Jackson to Barr 16.2.21. 
as UGD 295/ M 11 Jackson to Barr 16.2.21. 
86 UGD 295/4/325, Letter Book, Jackson to Barr, 16.2.1921. 
a' UGD 295/4/325, Letter Book, Jackson to Barr, 25.2.1921. 
as UGD 295/4/325, Letter Book, Jackson to C. P. McCarthy, 16.2.1921, UGD 295/4/325, Letter Book, 
25.2.21 J to Tongue & Co., and 25.2.1921. UGD 295/4/325, Letter Book, 25.2.21 Jackson to Barr, 
25.2.1921. 
a' UGD 295/4/325, Letter Book, 16.2.21 Jackson to C. P. McCarthy, 16.2.1921. 
90 UGD 295/19/2/8 and /9, Customer Order files 1919 to 1922 provide data for the rest of this paragraph. 
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Nevertheless, the underlying condition of the business was improving. Manufacturing 
profit increased to £98,629, up from 12 percent to 36 percent of output, and there was a 
small pre-tax profit of £4,406 compared to the previous loss of £80,497. Even more 
importantly, the accounts in December 1921 showed the borrowings at the end of 1920 
had been discharged, and even after paying £26,000 of dividends there was still £10,765 
cash in the bank, plus another £2,335 in French National Bonds. A fall in turnover, from 
£310,822 to £259,226 represented the working-through of older contracts before 
payments for newer ones began, and continued the expected trend in sales 91 There had 
clearly been a major turnaround, but it was not accounted for by either an increase in 
sales or a massive reduction in operating costs. The transformation probably resulted 
from refunds for earlier overpayments of Excess Profits Duty. These large war-time 
payments (on top of income tax) totalling at least £225,000 according to Jackson's 
working papers, must have harmed liquidity, and their progressive repayment, which 
according to Moss and Russell began in 1918, must have been instrumental in restoring 
the balance sheet to a satisfactory condition. 
This welcome trend continued as prospects for munitions business began to improve 
during 1921, enhanced by the Government's belated, and reluctant, decision in December 
1920 to restart capital-ship building which had finally come to a halt with the completion 
of the battlecruiser Hood in May 1920.92 None other had been planned after 1916, partly 
because the fleet action at Jutland that year had raised questions about what types of 
ships and armament were actually needed. 93 The post-war elimination of the German 
High Seas Fleet as a threat had been countered by the apparent willingness of the United 
States to complete its very large war-time construction programme that would have 
challenged the superiority of the Royal Navy, and which was the subject of much 
political and naval debate. 94 In January 1920, the Admiralty had urged that four new 
ships be started in the financial year 1921-1922, with four more the year after. In 
91 UGD 295/11/1, Balance sheets, profit and loss accounts 1912-1928: audited accounts and working 
papers. 
Z Alan Raven & John Roberts, British Battleships of World War Two (London: Arms & Armour Press, 
1976) p. 75. 
93 Raven & Roberts (1976) Chapters 1 to 5. 
94 Phillips Payson O'Brien, British and American Naval Power: Politics and Policy 1900-1936 (Westport, 
Connecticut:. Praeger, 1998) chapters 6 and 7 provide background material. 
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December 1920, the Committee for Imperial Defence agreed that whilst diplomatic 
efforts would be made to check the USA's naval programme, the Admiralty could begin 
planning the ships it had advocated. In fact, design studies had been progressing since 
95 1919, and thirteen different designs had been examined by early 1921, so that plans for 
the first four ships were approved as early as August 1921, invitations to tender issued on 
3'd September, and orders placed on 26th October. 
To Barr & Stroud, this must have been welcome news. In March 1921 the Admiralty had 
approached the firm about a rangefinder of over 40-foot base, 96 and by June discussions 
were taking place with shipbuilders Armstrong Whitworth over the necessary turret 
installation. 97 The new ships were to reflect all the lessons of the war as well as more 
recent progress in design, which meant rangefinders that were larger, more sophisticated 
in design and more complex in construction to give more accurate readings. Barr & 
Stroud's `duplex' design incorporating two instruments in a common housing, provided 
an increase in the rate at which readings could be fed into the newest range and bearing 
computers and was accompanied by a new height-fording rangefinder was intended for 
both anti-aircraft and surface use, providing information for gun direction and fuse-delay 
settings 98 These were all vastly more expensive than those in battleships during the 
Great War, and were also to be provided on a much larger scale. The four battlecruisers 
were to carry at least three 41-foot instruments each for the main armament as well as 
sets of 15-foot duplex instruments for the other guns and torpedo armament, all requiring 
associated sighting telescopes, periscopes and fire-control equipment, and representing a 
substantial amount of business. 
Any optimism felt by Barr & Stroud at the ordering of these ships was to be of short 
duration. There had been considerable political reluctance to embark on a costly capital 
ship programme in Britain, and a similar desire in the USA to disengage from its own 
programme. In July 1921, the USA had called a conference of major naval powers to 
95 Raven & Roberts (1976) p. 98 provides the source for order dates. 
% UGD 295/4/315. Letter Book, Letter Book, Jackson to Barr, 2.3.1921. 
" UGD 295/4/150, Letter Book, J. W. French to Secretary of the Admiralty, 25.6.1921. 
98 UGD 295/4/150, Letter Book, J. W. French to Secretary of the Admiralty, 29.6.1921. 
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discuss the whole question of naval armaments, and this met in Washington during the 
November. The resulting Washington Treaty limited new building and fixed relative 
strengths between the navies of the signatories. Welcome as this may have been to the 
politicians, it had serious implications for Barr & Stroud because one of the key clauses 
was `a ten-year capital ship building holiday'99 which ended British plans to build the 
eight new warships for which the firm had been going to supply all the optical fire 
control apparatus, as well as curtailing the Japanese programme that would also have 
brought it considerable new business-100 The only immediate consolation was that the 
Royal Navy was to be allowed to construct two new battleships requiring similar outfits 
of optical instruments, so that there was still to be some business for Barr & Stroud. 
None of the rangefinders for the subsequently cancelled ships had been ordered by the 
end of 1921, but design work was progressing and the firm's research and development 
department was fully employed, even if manufacturing work was still insufficient for the 
entire work force. In September, Jackson told a naval officer enquiring about joining the 
firm that although Barr & Stroud was `having a pretty thin time at present' and had laid 
off shop-floor workers, there was no intention of letting any of the design staff go. 
'01 
When the Admiralty Research Laboratory approached Jackson in December, asking if he 
could help them find a skilled optical designer, he replied that he made every effort to 
keep them and had not let even a single one go. 102 This emphasised the company's policy 
of maintaining its strategy of adherence to optical munitions production, despite the high 
costs of research and design - nearly all the salaries of £29,347 in 1921 went to it - and 
the difficulty of finding new business to keep it going. 103 
Orders for 1921 came to £125,610, and even with the ship cancellations resulting from 
the Washington Treaty, new contracts in the next twelve months increased by 41 percent 
to £177,399. However, Admiralty orders fell to £23,000 and War Office orders for anti- 
"O'Brien (1998) p. 166. 
10° Raven & Roberts (1976) p. 108. 
101 UGD 295/4/151, Letter Book, Jackson to Commander F. Bennett, RN, 18.9.1921. 
102 UGD 295/4/151, Letter Book, Jackson to T. Y. Baker, 13.12.1921. 
103 The data for this and the following section has been extracted from UGD 295/11/1 Balance sheets, 
profit and loss accounts and working papers 1912-1928, and UGD 295/19/2/8, /9 and /10, Customer Order 
files 1920 to 1922. 
270 
aircraft rangefinders were just £25,835 so that had the company been forced to rely on 
British trade alone, the consequences would certainly have been dire: even with 
commercial orders for rangefinders from shipping companies the total of home orders 
was less than £55,000 and insufficient to maintain the business. The trading account for 
1921 showed an actual expenditure of £85,800 on operating costs, excluding 
manufacturing wages, and for 1922 the figure was £71,350. The average gross 
(manufacturing) profit margin between 1902 and 1922 was 51 percent, with 1921 at 38 
percent and 1922 at 52 percent; using this as an approximate guide to the level of 
business needed to sustain the company, relying on British orders alone in 1921 and 1922 
would have resulted in massive and crippling losses. As it was, foreign government 
contracts enabled the firm to remain solvent and hold a substantial proportion of its 
skilled workforce together. 
Improvement continued in 1923. Turnover increased by 7.33 percent to El 94,901. Orders 
rose more substantially, by 22.94 percent to £218,091, of which civil products amounted 
to only 3.9 percent. Barr & Stroud was still almost entirely an optical munitions business, 
with the vast majority of that work - 82 percent - coming from rangefinders. This was a 
remarkable state of affairs. No other manufacturer demonstrated such an ability to sustain 
itself on sales of military or naval optics in the early 1920s. In Britain, by 1923 every 
other optical company had ceased to be involved. The German makers were forbidden to 
engage in optical munitions production because of the provisions of the Versailles 
Treaty, and although Zeiss had set up a Dutch company to circumvent this proscription it 
was still not operational. 104 In the USA, Bausch & Lomb ran its ordnance products 
within the framework of a large business with substantial involvement in ophthalmic and 
scientific instruments manufacturing, and made little progress in foreign munitions 
sales. 105 Notable as this achievement was, Barr & Stroud was still in a far from ideal 
position. 
'04 Reid, W. "Military Binoculars from Venlo. " In A Farewell to Arms: Liber Amicorum in Honour of Jan 
Piet Puype, Former Senior Curator of the Army Museum Defi, edited by G. Groenendijk. (Delft: 
Legersmuseum, 2004) pp. 82 and 83. 
'os Bausch & Lomb Archives, Rochester New York, Unclassified material (subsequently B&LA), G. S. 
Saegmuller, letters to Bausch & Lomb from Jena, Germany, various dates during 1920 supplies the source 
material for this paragraph. 
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British service orders for 1923 totalled £114,994, which on their own would not have 
sustained the business. It was only foreign sales that made it viable. But, some 87 percent 
of that business came from the Imperial Japanese Navy, leaving Barr & Stroud largely 
dependent on one foreign client. Japan had always been the firm's largest overseas buyer 
of naval instruments, and in 1922 and 1923 had ordered rangefinders and commissioned 
a prototype mechanical analogue fire-control computer. 106 Japan still lacked an optical 
industry that could make rangefinders as well as the precision mechanical engineering 
capability necessary for the analogue computer, but this was not something Barr & 
Stroud expected to continue indefinitely. For several years the Japanese Navy had had 
resident inspectors at the Glasgow works, and by mid-1922 the company knew that two 
of them who had already returned home were designing rangefinders and submarine 
periscopes intended to be built in Japan. 107 The firm was also well aware that Zeiss had 
set up a Dutch subsidiary to build optical munitions, and may have known that Zeiss had 
already established connections both with Bausch & Lomb in the USA and the Tokyo 
firm Nippon Kogaku. 108 The anticipated growth in Japan's optical self-sufficiency may 
account for Barr & Stroud's subsequent willingness to keep the Admiralty informed 
about the Japanese fire-control contract, although in July 1923 the firm hoped for at least 
one substantial order following the successful demonstration of the prototype. 109 A major 
problem for the evolving Japanese industry came with the earthquake of September 1923 
when the Nippon Kogaku works were destroyed, causing delays on its route to self- 
sufficiency and prolonging the connection with Barr & Stroud. ' 10 
The Admiralty's orders for 1923 included only part of the rangefinder outfits for the two 
battleships built as a result of the Washington Treaty. Only the smaller instruments for 
the secondary armament were ordered during 1923, at a cost of £24,820, with the bulk of 
Naval orders that year coming through £72,000 worth of contracts for similar 
106 UGD 295/4/637, Letter Book, J. W. French to Col. Alison, Royal Artillery College, Woolwich, 
4.7.1923. 
107 Moss & Russell (1988) pp. 110,111, and UGD 295/4/334, Letter Book, Jackson to French, 31.5.1922 
'°'B&LA, Saegmuller letters, and J. Alexander, `Nikon and the Sponsorship of Japan's Optical Industry by 
the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1917-1945', Department of History, University of British Columbia. 
109 UGD 295/4/154, Letter Book, J. W. French to Commander Bruce Fraser, RN, 16.7.1923. 
110 Moss & Russell (1988) p. 111- more orders were received in 1924. 
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rangefinders intended for cruisers. The very large main-armament outfits, worth £40,813, 
were in fact officially ordered early the next year, although work on them had begun 
during 1923.111 These were significant because they were the last orders for such 
enormous and complex rangefinders until the late 1930s, and marked the suspension of 
this activity for almost fifteen years until the resumption of capital-ship building. 
The close of 1923 saw Barr and Stroud in far better shape than three years previously. 
1920 must be considered as the low point for Barr & Stroud. Even though Moss and 
Russell considered 1924 to have been the firm's `lowest ebb, ' 112 the earlier date marked a 
more critical situation. Manufacturing profit as a percentage of output reached its lowest 
at only 12 percent and the pre-tax trading loss of £80,497 was the greatest ever recorded 
by the company. In addition, although in earlier years the company had borrowed money 
from its own members to save bank charges and interest, ' 13 during 1920 it paid interest at 
2 percent over bank base rate to them and was prepared to take up £75,000 in loans, 
suggesting that its bankers were unwilling or unable to extend as much credit as the 
business anticipated needing. This principally reflected a problem of liquidity rather than 
anything else, and it was solved in 1921 through massive tax refunds which wiped out 
the heavy deficit. After 1920, things were never so bad again, and by 1923 the point had 
been reached where the percentage of profit on manufacturing output had returned to pre- 
war levels and orders were again at a level that would let the business survive. 
8.6 Into suspense 
By 1923, the British optical munitions industry was quantitatively, if not qualitatively, 
inferior to its condition in 1914, with only one business actively engaged in producing 
instruments on a significant scale. This was not the result of inadequacies in 
technological ability, nor any lack of business acumen, but came about because the 
demand for military and naval equipment had fallen internationally to a level where 
armaments products of all kinds were hard pressed to find adequately remunerative 
11' UGD 295/19/2/10, Customer Order file 1922-1923. 
112 Moss & Russell (1988) p. 114 
"' UGD, unclassified material, lain Russell research notes, Barr & Stroud Directors' Minute Book, Board 
minute 19.2.1920. 
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markets. Optical munitions makers fared little different to those making weapons after 
the war and were generally forced to diversify in order to survive, Barr & Stroud alone 
successfully maintaining its status as a speciality producer, albeit on a smaller scale than 
before the war. Capacity had adjusted to current demand, and the industry was at the start 
of what can be described as a period of hibernation during which the ability to produce 
all kinds of optical munitions would be sustained, even though output remained at a low 
level for the remainder of the 1920s. The disposition to limit armaments constricted the 
British optical munitions industry but failed to bring its elimination, leaving enough of a 
nucleus to build on when the shift to re-armament eventually arrived. 
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Conclusion 
The story of optical munitions manufacture in Britain between 1888 and 1923 involves a 
successful technological manufacturing community that is not always easy to categorise 
and which runs counter to perceptions of general relative decline in British scientific and 
technological industries during this period. Its small size and comparative obscurity 
when set beside other sectors engaged in manufacturing either weapons or scientific 
instruments has led to its being almost wholly overlooked, and to misidentification and 
misunderstanding by the few historians who have previously stumbled upon it. It was a 
peculiar industry whose progress was as much governed by the State's defence policies 
as commercial ability, and which despite its comparatively small size came to assume an 
importance of strategic significance. 
The introduction to this thesis made the point that the industry's story was diverse and 
complicated, suggesting that its interpretation and understanding could be aided by 
reference to one or more of the models which seek to explain the nature of change over 
time in the study of history. The necessarily brief summary of their chief characteristics 
indicated that although all of them might be appropriately applied to different phases in 
the industry's evolution, the one best suited to be a general model here was Thomas 
Hughes' `systems approach', with its emphasis on considering together both the 
technological and social factors that bore on the evolution of events. This model of 
explanation has indeed fitted well with the story of the progress of optical munitions 
production in Great Britain in the review period, even though at times it has become 
apparent that certain events outside this specialised field had a deterministic effect that 
eventually carried through to the industry itself. At the start of the story, for example, 
recent advances in the technology of gun propellants can be understood to have caused 
directly a rapid and unprecedented progress in the design of weapons, enabling their 
ranges to became so greatly extended as to trigger a demand for some means to measure 
distances on the battlefield. The process that led to the emergence of the new propellants 
may well itself have been driven by a series of complex and interacting social and 
technical forces, but the result of that process - `nitro powder' was the catalyst, the 
275 
determining factor in the next stage in weapons technology. To this extent, `hard 
determinism' does have its place in the study, but the subsequent evolution of optical 
munitions manufacture can only be explained through a highly involved process that 
places the technical, the scientific, the social, the political, and the economic in a shifting 
but ever present juxtaposition. By the end of the account, there is again a condition that 
can be seen as deterministic, where the cost of armaments (in political, economic and 
social terms) was seen as so prohibitive that there was an over-riding political imperative 
to curtail both their development and proliferation. Again, a complex and socially driven 
process led to a deterministic outcome which then caused those managing the industry to 
react in a similarly complex way to evolve strategies for survival. 
This study of a highly specialised and relatively small scale industry tends to support the 
use of the approach taken by Hughes, if only because his model has a broader compass 
than the others considered at the outset. If the others are less satisfactory, it is because 
they do not encompass all the elements of this story and their relevance is, to a greater or 
lesser extent, only partial. They may be reconciled with each other and with this story to 
some extent; certainly none (not even hard determinism) can be dismissed as irrelevant 
or flawed but their capacity to make sense of the subject is less than the systems 
approach. Whether or not the optical munitions industry fits perfectly with Hughes' 
model, that is the one which best facilitates its understanding. The purpose of the 
exercise was, after all, to document and explain the industry, rather than to provide a 
detailed critical assessment of a range of theories and models in the history of 
technology or the evolution of businesses. 
Those historians who have touched on this idiosyncratic industry assumed without 
question that optical munitions production was a component of the scientific instruments 
industry. Optical instruments for warfare were taken to be little more than variations of 
those for civil applications; it was taken for granted that the makers of, say, microscopes 
or survey instruments could - and did - adapt both their products and manufacturing 
techniques to supply whatever the British Army and Royal Navy required in optical 
instrumentation. As the preceding account has indicated, such an understanding is far 
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from correct, firstly because most of the instruments used as optical munitions came to 
be far-removed from civil patterns and secondly because the nature of the market for 
them was quite unlike any commercial one. The evolution of the optical munitions 
industry can only be understood by locating it within the framework of the larger 
armaments industry, although in a tantalising paradox its constituent businesses were 
never actually part of the arms manufacturing community. The British optical munitions 
makers functioned in a demand-led market which was based on evolving weapons 
technologies and heavily influenced by both domestic and foreign political 
considerations, whilst depending on the civil instrument producing community for many 
of its optical techniques, raw materials, and skilled workers. 
At a time when much of British technological industry can be shown as fitting well with 
notions of relative decline, this one showed a pattern of financial and technological 
growth right up to the start of the Great War, flourishing in a climate of lavish spending 
on armaments and increasingly dominated by one company, Barr & Stroud, that by 
deliberately choosing to specialise in what became a particularly important type of 
optical munitions - the rangefinder - created for itself a dominant place in the world 
market for them. It would be misleading to say that Barr & Stroud competed successfully 
against a German optical industry that was acknowledged by contemporary 
commentators as being the world's largest and which represented the very highest levels 
of optical design and manufacturing skills, because the reality is that the German 
companies were forced to compete (almost always unsuccessfully) against Barr & Stroud 
for markets other than their domestic one. 
Archibald Barr & William Stroud became `first-movers' in rangefmder manufacture and 
established an early lead, not because they recognised a marketing opportunity and 
exploited it - as William Armstrong did with his breech loading artillery weapon after 
1854 - but because they were serendipitously drawn as academics to a military problem 
that awaited a solution, and because of their willingness to persevere in finding an 
answer, even though the commercial rewards were not immediately quantifiable. Had 
they not been discouraged by the slow progress of their earlier joint academic research 
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project in 1888, they would never have taken up rangefinder design, and had they been 
entrepreneurs by profession they would almost certainly have been so deterred by the 
difficulties they met in their rangefinder experiments that they would have abandoned the 
idea after their failure in the 1889 trials. The question of chance in theories and models of 
explanation in history may be resistant to scientific employment but sometimes, as in this 
case, it cannot be ignored. Unlike Armstrong, who first identified a market and then, 
stimulated by motives that were as much patriotic as business-like, invented a novel 
product through the application of engineering techniques that were familiar to him, the 
Professors Barr and Stroud stumbled accidentally across rangefinders and taught 
themselves as they went along. Their rapid progress up the learning curve came from the 
application of scientific methodology which enabled them to become `first-movers' in 
the field and build up a lead that competitors found extremely difficult to overcome 
before the outbreak of war in 1914. 
Barr & Stroud's performance as a business can be interpreted in two ways. One is that it 
was a success, running counter to notions of a general under-performance in British 
technological industries before 1914, and exploiting the benefits that first-mover status 
conveyed to secure both market share and profitability. The other is that weaknesses in 
management caused a failure to employ adequately the strategies of vertical integration 
that were needed to ensure it obtained all the facilities it required along its chain of 
production, which inhibited its development and limited its capacity for diversification 
out of a highly specialised and narrow market. Both of these interpretations contain 
elements of truth. The company was indeed profitable, and it undeniably had a 
hegemonical market position in 1914, but at the same time it did fail to integrate fully 
into lens and prism manufacture, a condition whose causes and implications must be 
understood before a judgement can be reached. 
Alfred Chandler proposed a number of reasons why firms might carry out vertical 
integration, suggesting that the most common was `to ensure a steady supply of 
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materials' for production processes. ' That certainly applied to Barr & Stroud, and its 
problems obtaining adequate quantities of high quality optical components were manifest 
right from its formation, tending to worsen as the level of business grew more rapidly 
after 1912, and reaching a peak in the first two years of war when the inability to procure 
optical materials and parts at times threatened to halt production altogether. That failure, 
which might also be described as limited success, came from two causes. Firstly, as 
Chandler suggested, the `personal ties and relationships' typified by those with Adam 
Hilger & Co., `helped to assure' the fulfilment of contracts and diverted attention 
towards improving the relationship rather than replacing it with another, more 
satisfactory, arrangement. But where Chandler said that such arrangements tended to 
divert businesses away from investing in production facilities and that most makers 
`preferred other routes to growth' Barr & Stroud were actually prepared to make the 
investment but were restrained from developing a substantial optical manufacturing 
capacity by factors that were largely beyond their control and that reflected the condition 
of British optical manufacturing in general, and in particular the lack of structures for 
scientific education and technical training that had already been identified by the 
instruments industry itself. It was not that Barr & Stroud did not want, or could not 
afford, to make such a move, but that there was no means to obtain the necessary skilled 
labour except from other optical businesses, all of whom were geographically remote. 
Once that impasse was ended by changes created during the Great War, then the firm 
moved quickly into large-scale optical production and integrated even further into optical 
glass design and manufacture. 
The apparent success of Barr & Stroud combined with its uniquely extensive surviving 
archive tends to skew attention towards it and emphasises an unfortunate - though 
unavoidable - reduction of attention on the other pre-war optical munitions makers, most 
of whom have left little in the way of records. This is regrettable, particularly in the case 
of Sir Howard Grubb & Co. who had a British monopoly of submarine periscope 
manufacture until well after the start of the Great War and may well have exported them 
A. D. Chandler, Jnr. Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism (Cambridge Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press, 1994) p. 38. 
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successfully in competition with the German Goerz company. For most of these lesser 
players, all that can be said is that they met the requirements of the British armed forces 
adequately and provided a source of supply that, contrary to previous suggestions, did 
make Britain independent of foreign supplies after the Boer War. The importance of 
these relatively small-scale manufacturers was that they provided a base on which to 
build much of the massively expanded war-time industry, a stage for which much more is 
known about them thanks to the surviving records of the Ministry of Munitions. 
That archive material allows the opportunity to judge how well the optical munitions 
industry responded to the challenges of the Great War, and provides a large body of data 
about what happened from mid-1915 to late 1918. Unfortunately, the printed History 
reflects only what the Ministry chose to record of what it saw as its main achievements, 
and the remaining manuscript material was heavily `weeded-out' in an apparently 
arbitrary manner during the closing down of the Ministry in the early 1920s. 
Nevertheless, much unpublished confidential material remains to show the `coupled 
agendas' that ran within the Ministry's Optical Section and which represented largely 
unofficial efforts to inject State aid, not into optical munitions manufacture, but into the 
peace-time framework of the civil instruments industry in an effort to bring it to a level 
of parity with its German counterpart. What emerges is a picture showing the diversion 
of the short-term energies needed to complete industrial mobilisation and accelerate war 
output into a longer-term effort to create a strong, science and technology oriented 
instruments industry that could quickly and effectively adapt to large-scale munitions 
production in the event of a future war. That philosophy reflected governmental pre-war 
attitudes to the structure of armaments production which had envisaged private 
manufacturers supplementing the State arsenals to achieve adequate output, but in the 
case of the optical industry the notion ignored the essential difference that there was no 
State-owned capacity for manufacture. Cheshire's plan to secure future optical munitions 
supplies through a rejuvenated civil industry also contained the flaw of making no 
provision for keeping that sector of activity alive in peace-time when demand might be 
minimal. 
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One inference from that, and one which is very hard to resist, is that despite what he had 
already seen since the late spring of 1915, Cheshire was still failing to grasp the 
fundamental differences between almost all optical munitions and civil instruments in 
mid-1916 when his efforts to create a new infrastructure for advanced education in optics 
were well under way. Most of his plans were rooted in the entrenched pre-war attitudes 
and desires of the instrument making community that had become virtually an 
intellectual paradigm and built up enough momentum to keep attention fumly focused on 
the need to create an optical industry closely modelled on the German one that had long 
been regarded as intrinsically superior. Neither Cheshire nor his colleagues recognised 
that, so far as optical munitions were concerned, there was no critical inferiority in the 
British model. None of that means that his emphasis on technical training was misplaced; 
far from it, it was the lack of it before the war that had prevented Barr & Stroud from 
successfully integrating into lens and prism manufacture and its provision was long 
overdue. His misjudgement was in not understanding how very different not just the 
instruments were, but also the circumstances surrounding their marketing and sale. 
It was ironic that Cheshire's success in pushing for university-level training in optical 
design should lead to him leaving the Ministry in 1917, before the rest of his ideas had 
matured to a point where results were likely. His departure caused much of the 
momentum he had built up to dissipate, and little was done to set up the network of 
technical-school teaching that he had envisaged. The end of the war, which seems to 
have come much sooner than anyone in the Optical Section expected, brought all those 
developments to a halt and created chaos throughout the war-time optical munitions 
makers. 
Peace found the industry fully adapted to war work after a lengthy process of industrial 
mobilisation, and both unprepared and ill-equipped to abandon munitions work and 
resume making civil products. All Alfred Esslemont's war-time energies had been used 
to create capacity for war products, and the end of new orders together with the almost 
immediate and total cancellation of government contracts meant that the war-time 
conscript industry quickly found itself redundant and disbanded, having to resurrect civil 
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product lines and seek out old clients. Of the pre-war optical munitions makers, only 
Barr and Stroud had been a total specialist, and it was the specialisation that had brought 
its earlier prosperity that now threatened it with collapse; Barr & Stroud never had 
commercial products and almost all its old clients were either fully stocked or closed- 
down by the war. The return to peace was a bigger trial than the war itself. 
The problems Barr & Stroud faced in 1919 would almost certainly have occurred to some 
lesser extent even there had been no conflict. By 1914, most of the benefits it had 
enjoyed as a first-mover were ending, not because it had fallen behind in the technology 
of what it produced nor because of its inadequate integration in optical production, but 
because most of its foreign clients were approaching self-sufficiency in optical 
manufacture. The firm's profits since 1905 had increasingly come from overseas armed 
forces in countries which either lacked the ability to produce complex optics or which 
were prevented from making particular types, such as the rangefinder, through 
international patent protection. In 1912, for example, neither Austro-Hungary nor Russia 
had advanced optical industries and Barr & Stroud had been able to start negotiations to 
supply both countries with rangefinders, parts of whose designs were still covered by 
patents. Two years later, as war began, technology transfer via foreign firms who had 
established factories there meant that both countries could consider the production of 
sophisticated instruments, and the patents' lives were running out. Once the earlier 
contracts were complete, Barr & Stroud's chances of finding fresh orders would be 
diminished, although not necessarily eliminated. The same applied in France and Italy, as 
well as the USA, and the only other country likely to be a large buyer of military 
rangefinders was Japan, whose optical industry was still relatively backward. The 
momentum of Barr & Stroud's success was starting to dissipate, not because of superior 
competition but through a combination of growing foreign self-sufficiency, market 
saturation and the absence of any demonstrably superior rangefinder to replace expensive 
instruments whose service lives were likely last a goodly number of years. In 1914 the 
firm was reaching a condition that, but for the war, would soon have demanded attention 
to the question of alternative products. 
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For Barr & Stroud, then, the problem after 1918 was how to convert to peace in order to 
survive. The development stimulated by the war meant that, unlike in 1914, the firm was 
now largely self sufficient in everything except large quantities of the simpler optical 
glasses, and could undertake to manufacture every item of optical munitions required 
either by the Anny or the Royal Navy. It was the antithesis of Cheshire's prescription for 
an optical munitions industry -a business that made only optical devices for warfare and 
lacked the ability to manufacture a range of civil products in order to sustain itself in 
peace-time, demonstrating its characteristics as an armaments manufacturer. Faced with 
the evaporation of such business, the firm's management turned to a two-pronged 
strategy for survival which embraced diversification and state subsidy. 
The problems of war industries in adapting to peace through diversification were 
examined by Alfred Chandler, who observed that armaments firms frequently lacked the 
relevant managerial and technical skills needed to move into unfamiliar markets? That 
this condition applied to Barr & Stroud seems demonstrated by the lack of success in 
attempts to diversify into motor cycle engines and cinema projectors, but in fact the 
firm's philosophy in these efforts was quite different to other, much larger, arms 
businesses who sought to replace one activity with another. To Barr & Stroud, the issue 
was of what could be made using existing capacity, which might be sold commercially to 
provide a bridge until enough government business came in to keep the firm employed in 
optical munitions manufacture. As early as 1919, the Board was convinced that the future 
lay in doing what the business had always done, despite the problems confronting them. 
The correctness of that judgement, based on instinct rather than a detailed study of 
options, was shown by the subsequent success in getting the Admiralty to believe that the 
symbiotic relationship that had evolved between them over the previous thirty years was 
balanced in favour of the Royal Navy, and that the company had to be kept alive for the 
benefit of the service rather than the firm. Survival was not always a matter of making a 
demonstrably superior product. Although the Admiralty, or rather the Treasury, balked at 
an outright subsidy, the willingness of the Admiralty to guarantee a substantial level of 
profit on a reduced volume of business enabled Barr & Stroud to retain enough of their 
2 Chandler (1994) p. 342. 
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skilled workforce to keep going in the munitions business, and to be able to abandon its 
relatively un-remunerative civil ventures. By 1923, irrespective of the reduced levels of 
business, Barr & Stroud was tacitly recognised as `an essential arm' of the Admiralty's 
establishment. 3 It also remained, as in 1914, the world's only manufacturer devoted 
wholly to the production of optical munitions. 
For the British optical munitions industry in the early 1920s, success had become 
synonymous with survival. In 1888 there had been no industry, it had emerged after then 
in the wake of evolving armaments technologies and its products only became taken 
seriously by the British Army and the Royal Navy in the first years of the 20a' century. 
By 1914, still led by the evolution of military science, optical munitions were an integral 
part of strategic weapons systems and the importance of their makers to the state starting 
to become apparent. The Great War provided a totally unprecedented scale of demand 
and created a vastly expanded and vital industry that suffered an inevitable implosion 
with the Armistice of 1918, threatening to leave the State without any means of 
producing the now-essential instrumentation of warfare. Such a simple summary implies 
a deterministic nature to the shaping of the industry, but as the preceding narrative has 
shown, much of that shaping was done under social and cultural influences that were no 
less important than the technology that framed them. Under those influences the optical 
munitions industry equipped not only Britain's armed forces but also most of the world's 
navies before 1914, provided profits for its members, adapted to the needs of the greatest 
war yet experienced, and emerged from it in a drastically truncated but still capable form. 
That it was effectively reduced to only one company was not so much evidence of failure 
but an unavoidable adaptation to vastly changed circumstances. Faced with a major shift 
of international political attitudes towards armaments that looked likely to eliminate any 
large future demand for optical munitions, Barr & Stroud not only survived the transition 
from war to peace, but through adhering to a policy of austere specialisation continued 
until the re-armament programmes of the 1930s simultaneously resurrected optical 
munitions and stimulated the development of the electronic range and targeting systems 
Chandler (1994) p. 345. 
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that would eventually make them obsolete. 1923 marked not the end of the British optical 
munitions industry, but the start of a period of hibernation. 
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